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Roman Gaul

**The Three Gauls,
58 BC-260 AD**

J.F. Drinkwater



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Roman Gaul

Roman Gaul, first published in 1983, makes use of a wealth of archaeological discoveries and modern methods of interpretation to give an account of the Roman presence in Gaul, from the time of Caesar's conquests until the Crisis of the third century. Professor Drinkwater emphasises the changes caused in the Three Gauls and Germany by the impact of Romanisation – urbanisation, agriculture, trade and education – and points out the often curious ways in which Roman influences survive in these areas to the present day.

Particular attention is paid to the evolution of the landowning class, as well as its relationship with the artisans and traders found in townships and cities. An assessment of the strength of Romano-Gallic society and its economy in the tumultuous third century AD concludes this lively and provocative coverage of an intriguing subject. *Roman Gaul* will be of interest to all students of the Roman legacy.

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J.F. Drinkwater



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ABBREVIATIONS OF MODERN WORKS USED IN THE NOTES

- ANRW* *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*, Berlin, 1972-
BAR *British Archaeological Reports*, Oxford
BRGK *Bericht der Römisch-germanischen Kommission*
CIL *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum*, Berlin, 1893-
ILS *Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae*, Berlin, 1882-1916
ILTG *Inscriptions latines des Trois Gaules*, ed. P. Wuilleumier,
 Paris, 1963
KP *Der kleine Pauly*, Munich, 1964-1975
RE *Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der classischen*
Altertumswissenschaft, Stuttgart, 1894-
RIC *Roman Imperial Coinage*, London, 1923-

For the authors cited in the Notes, see Bibliography.

For my parents,
ELSIE and EDWARD DRINKWATER

PREFACE

This book is intended for those who are interested in the history of the western Roman Empire. I particularly hope that it will be found useful by students of Roman Britain who, while appreciating the great importance of the comparative material available across the Channel, may have felt themselves excluded from it by the absence of a modern English survey. However, I would also like to think that it will result in a growth in interest in Roman Gaul as a subject in its own right, and further, that it will be of value in the general study of the early history of western Europe.

I would like to express my thanks to the University of Sheffield Research Fund, and to the Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst for financial help in the preparation of this work. In this respect I also acknowledge a special debt to the British Academy and the Fonds National Suisse de la Recherche Scientifique for supporting a most fruitful visit to the Fondation Hardt pour L'Etude de l'Antiquité Classique, Geneva, in the autumn of 1981, during which time I made many new friends and began the first draft of this book. I am very grateful to Professors H. Heinen, J. Rougé, D. van Berchem; Drs T.S. Burns and J. Krier; and Herr G. Biegel for discussing various matters with me and for sending copies of material which would otherwise have been very difficult for me to consult. Mr R. Stoneman of Croom Helm Ltd gave me sympathy and encouragement in times of crisis. I was very fortunate to be able to call upon the expertise of Mrs Julie Kennedy, aided by Shelagh Gregory and Carolyn Hannam, in the preparation of the figures and maps. My colleagues in the Department of Ancient History and Classical Archaeology at the University of Sheffield shouldered considerable additional teaching and administrative duties to permit me a term of study-leave, for which I thank them. I am deeply obliged to Keith Bradley for long-standing encouragement and support, often in difficult times. My particular indebtedness to Edith Wightman will be obvious throughout the book, whether or not directly acknowledged, and whether or not we agree on specific issues. Special mention must be made of my colleague and friend, Richard Winton, who has attempted to persuade me to remove the grossest errors and inaccuracies, both in substance and in style, from my text. I greatly appreciate his help in this; the faults which remain are, of

course, entirely my responsibility. The need to visit foreign museums and libraries took me several times away from home for extended periods; I must thank my wife Gillian for the manner in which she bore this so patiently. Finally, I must express my deep gratitude to my parents, whose early sacrifices on my behalf I have only recently come to realise. To them this book is dedicated.

J.F.D.

University of Sheffield

INTRODUCTION

Gallia, 'Gaul' was the name the Romans gave to continental Europe's Celtic heartland. At the beginning of the first century BC this extended from the northern flank of the Apennines across the western and central Alps to the Atlantic, the Channel and the Rhine. Rome at first distinguished only between *Gallia Cisalpina*, 'Gaul this side of the Alps', and *Gallia Transalpina*, 'Gaul over the Alps'. As far as we know, it was Julius Caesar himself who, around 58 BC, first described the latter in terms of four quite distinct regions: Roman territory in the south-east, long since organised as a province of the Empire, and three still-independent areas which lay to the west and north of this which he called 'Aquitania', 'Celtica' and 'Belgica'. These 'Three Gauls' soon fell to his victorious armies. *Gallia Cisalpina*, which had by then long been held and settled by Rome, had already lost most of its Celtic character and was soon to become effectively part of Roman Italy. Thus, in accordance with established academic convention, 'Roman Gaul' should usually be understood to mean the 'Four Gauls' of *Gallia Transalpina*.

From the first century BC to the fifth century AD Gaul was the giant of the Roman west. Its borders now accommodate all of modern France, Belgium and Luxembourg, and considerable parts of the Netherlands, the German Federal Republic and Switzerland. It was a wealthy and important part of the Empire, and figures prominently in the historical record. In particular, its close relationship with the strategically and politically sensitive frontier-zone along the Rhine ensured that it was often caught up in events of Empire-wide significance, and therefore that it frequently finds mention in the works of the great historians of imperial Rome, Tacitus, Cassius Dio and Ammianus Marcellinus. The distinctive non-Mediterranean culture of the land attracted the interest of other Greek and Roman writers, such as Diodorus Siculus, Strabo and Pliny the Elder, who describe in some detail interesting and important aspects of Gallic geography, history and society. Part of the material wealth generated in Gaul by the Pax Romana was spent in following the Roman custom of commemorating significant events in private and community life by inscribing an account of these, sometimes in great detail, on altars, statue-bases, buildings, funeral monuments and the like. These inscriptions, whether entire or, more commonly, as fragments filled out through the art of epigraphy, survive in their

2 Introduction

thousands and are an invaluable supplement to the literary sources. Finally, of course, our knowledge of Romano-Gallic life is hugely increased by the work of the archaeologist.

In such circumstances it is unsurprising that, as in the case of Roman Britain, Roman Gaul continues to provoke enthusiastic study and debate. As Duval's 'Chronique gallo-romaine' in the *Revue des études anciennes* faithfully records, not a year goes by without its crop of learned articles and monographs on every aspect of the subject. Since the late-nineteenth century French scholarship in particular has regularly produced excellent general summaries of the state of research. However, there have been oddly few attempts to present a synthesis of the history of Gaul in English. Indeed, it is fair to say that the only comprehensive study has been Brogan's *Roman Gaul*, which appeared as long ago as 1953. MacKendrick's *Roman France* (1971) is a guide to Roman archaeological sites in France rather than a history of Roman Gaul; it whets the appetite, but investigates nothing in any great depth. C.E. ('Tom Brown') Stevens' short but brilliant chapter in Wallace-Hadrill and McManners, *France: government and society* (1957) gives only a frustrating hint of what might have been had he been able to set down in full his immense knowledge and understanding of Gaul and things Gallic. The most detailed and stimulating study of the last few years has without doubt been Wightman's *Roman Trier and the Treveri* (1970), but here the focus on a single Gallic community necessarily prevented any attempt at generalisation. Therefore the publication of a new survey of Roman Gaul, written in English, would seem to be worthwhile.

The scope of *Roman Gaul: the Three Provinces* calls for some explanation. I intend this to be the first of three studies, the second and third of which will deal with the Gallic Empire of the third century and later Roman Gaul respectively. The decision to restrict the present volume to the history of Gaul beyond the original Roman province during the period from Caesar's Conquest to the establishment of the Gallic Empire was made for two reasons. First, the exclusion of the south — a Mediterranean land with its own distinct history and character, which in the context of the High Empire is best considered in company with Italy and Spain — avoids the introduction of a mass of material which does not always help, and indeed frequently hinders, the understanding of the condition of the more northern Gallic communities. Secondly, the three centuries between 58 BC and AD 260 constitute a clearly defined and important phase in northern Gallic development which saw the emergence of a homogeneous but complex society, different from that of both the pre-Roman period and the later Empire.

Adoption of these limits allows detailed consideration of some central episodes and elements in the history of that society, such as the Caesarian and Augustan settlements, the revolts of Florus and Sacrovir, Vindex, and Civilis, the formulation of a German policy and the working of the administrative system. It also permits discussion of new ideas, arising principally out of the study of the archaeological evidence and concerning for example land-tenure, urbanisation and trade, which have been suggested by scholars such as Hopkins, Percival, Rivet, Stevens and Wightman. It is historically fitting, and conveniently keeps the present work within manageable limits of length and expense, to begin the story with Caesar and to end it with the appearance of the Gallic emperors.

I hope that this book will both inform and provoke discussion and debate. To my mind there are many important areas of study in the field of Roman Gaul where long-cherished notions are in need of revision, and where an adequate consensus has yet to be established. In my discussions of these I have tried to give a fair statement of the nature of the controversy, and of the relevant evidence, while feeling free to argue for the view that seems to me most plausible. In more general terms I have tried to break away from the straightforward categorisation of the various aspects of Gallic life, involving separate sections on political and military history, administration, urbanisation, town-planning, architecture, agriculture, industry, commerce, art, religion, and so on to be found in Brogan. In this case the result is a book full of fascinating information and perceptive insights — in fact a classic work of synthesis, magisterial in the way it overcomes the many difficult problems involved in such an enterprise. However, I feel that a serious disadvantage of such an approach is that given the limited space available it tends to the descriptive rather than the analytical, and is unable to pursue any single topic to a satisfying conclusion. I have preferred instead to build my account around three fundamental themes: the nature of the relationship between Gauls and Romans; the effect of this relationship on the working of Gallic society; and, above all, the condition of this society as it had developed by the end of the High Empire. The consideration of such themes necessarily involves specific investigation of political and military history, the evolution of the administrative structure, and changes which affected the towns and the countryside, in which all are present. I have, on the other hand, found it more fruitful to introduce discussion of art, architecture, handicrafts, religion and the like only when these topics have something to add to the general development of my arguments.

4 *Introduction*

Place-names are always a problem when one has a choice between the ancient and the modern versions. Rigid consistency is impossible, since some circumstances lend themselves to the use of the old name and some to that of the new. I have followed Brogan's example in that I have tended to use the latter rather than the former in referring to archaeological sites. I hope that the maps and the accompanying keys will resolve any uncertainties. In the event, however, it is often just personal taste which has been the deciding factor: on the whole I find 'Lugdunum' more natural than 'Lyon', but prefer 'Trier' to 'Augusta Treverorum'.

All the dates are AD, unless otherwise stated. The term 'High' Empire is employed to describe the period between the accession of Vespasian and the emergence of the Gallic Empire, in order to distinguish it from the immediately preceding 'Early' Empire of the Julio-Claudian emperors. This usage, borrowed from the French, may be somewhat unfamiliar to English readers. However, I have adopted it to emphasise my argument that the earlier period was essentially one of a working-through of the effects of the Caesarian conquest, and that it was only when this process was complete, by the time of the Flavian dynasty, that the society and the economy of the Three Gauls assumed the shape and character which they then maintained down to the onset of the third-century Crisis.

In the course of a single day, probably late in June, in the year 58 BC the independent history of western continental Celtic Europe was brought to an effective end. Julius Caesar's successful intervention to turn back the main host of the migrating Helvetii led, within just seven years, to Rome's domination of all territory between the Mediterranean and the Channel and between the Atlantic and the Rhine.¹ Henceforward, the particular interests of the hitherto turbulent and volatile Celtic nations (*civitates*) which inhabited the greater part of these lands were to be fully subordinated to those of the Roman Empire.² The conquered peoples were robbed of all political and military initiative; local wars and folk-movements were proscribed. However, in return Rome offered her subjects peace and order, and so eventually prosperity. For their part, the Gallic Celts (henceforward referred to as 'the Gauls'), never a people to fear novelty or change, took up the opportunities which were offered them, and in doing so laid the foundations of the medieval Frankish kingdom, and modern western Europe.

When Caesar crossed the middle Rhône to engage the Helvetii he passed from an area which he knew as Transalpine Gaul, or 'The Province' (*Provincia*), into one which most of his fellow countrymen would have referred to, somewhat disparagingly, as *Gallia Comata*, 'Long-haired Gaul' (Map 1). By 58 BC The Province had been under Roman rule for over three-quarters of a century. Rome's involvement in the affairs of this region had come about as a result of her friendship with the independent Greek city-state of Massalia (Marseilles). Founded about 600 BC by colonists from the Ionian city of Phocaea, Massalia had prospered and had done much to encourage the introduction of a Mediterranean-type lifestyle and economy along the neighbouring coast and (possibly through the mechanism of the British tin-trade) even deep into the hinterland.³ However, her political and military strength remained relatively weak, and she had little real say in the battle for the control of the western Mediterranean which was played out in the third century BC between Rome and Carthage; fortunately for her, she remained consistently faithful to the winning side. Additionally, and more to the point, she apparently found it increasingly difficult to control the Celto-Ligurian peoples who were her immediate neighbours.⁴ In 154 BC and again in 125 BC she was forced to call on Roman aid to meet this threat.

6 *Conquest and pacification*

However, whereas on the first occasion Roman forces came and went, on the second they came and stayed. Following the defeat of the most dangerous of Massalia's enemies, the nation of the Salluvii, and the destruction of their main centre at Entremont, the Romans established a permanent military base (*castellum*) at Aquae Sextiae (Aix-en-Provence) and then pressed forward to root out all further likely troublemakers in the area. In 122 BC Domitius Ahenobarbus defeated the forces of the Allobroges, who had been giving aid to the Salluvii; and in the following year Q. Fabius Maximus destroyed an army led by the Arvernian king Bituitus who had come to the aid of the Allobroges. Massalia was allowed to keep her existing lands, and indeed Rome even added to these from those of the newly conquered peoples; but the most important outcome of this series of campaigns was the direct annexation by Rome of a huge area extending from the Pyrenees to the lower Rhône, and up the Rhône valley to Lake Geneva. The western base of this new possession was secured by the founding of the colony at Narbo Martius (Narbonne) in 118 BC; and a road, the Via Domitia, was built which linked it to Italy and to Roman possessions in Spain. Massalia was now simply an enclave in Roman territory and from now on it is permissible to speak of the whole of southern Gaul as effectively Roman. The only major challenge to this state of affairs arose in 109 BC when the Germanic Cimbri and their allies arrived from the north and showed themselves capable of defeating Roman armies in the field. In Gaul this provoked further danger by encouraging fierce rebellion among peoples nominally subject to Roman rule: the Volcae Tectosages around Tolosa (Toulouse) were especially troublesome. However, as so often before, the Romans were rescued by a combination of good luck and good sense; the native revolts were savagely suppressed, and, thanks to the generalship of C. Marius, the invaders were eventually thrashed. By 100 BC the danger was past.⁵ Roman mastery of the region was not challenged again until the early fifth century AD, with the arrival of the Visigoths.

Mention has been made of the way in which Massalia had already opened up southern Gaul to the economic, cultural and social influences of Mediterranean civilisation. Traditionally, much is made of Justinus' high estimation of the progress of the neighbouring peoples under Greek tutelage, to the extent that 'it seemed as though Gaul had become part of Greece, rather than that Greece had colonised Gaul'. More recently archaeology has made us aware of Hellenising influences at work in settlements such as Entremont and Glanon (St-Rémy).⁶ It is therefore easy to think that, in a sense, Rome's job had already been half-done for her and that, once conquered, 'The Province' was destined

automatically to become the *nec plus ultra* of the success of Romanisation: that all-important process by which Rome assimilated those whom she had conquered to her own ways and culture and so transformed them into loyal subjects. Indeed, it is true that as southern Gaul 'had become part of Greece' it could later just as easily be seen as part of Italy: by the first century AD the elder Pliny could talk about *Italia verius quam provincia* ('Italy more than a province').⁷ However, such a view must be qualified by the observation that as late as Caesar's day this destiny was decidedly less than manifest. What actually prompted Rome's direct annexation of land in southern Gaul, once the Massaliot cry for aid had caused her interference, is difficult to say, and has been much debated.⁸ However, once established, possession of The Province clearly afforded, and also protected, an important land-route between Italy and older Roman possessions in Spain.⁹ Additionally, it formed a useful base from which to combat trouble in Spain, which was taking a long time to subdue, and it had clearly shown its value in acting as Italy's shield against incursions from the north. Finally, it was a handy place for ambitious late-Republican politicians caught up in the ruthless and expensive political game of the day, to build up fortunes and retinues of dependants.¹⁰

Beyond this, Rome showed little serious interest in developing the area either for her own good or that of its original inhabitants. It was not a happy land; the state of affairs reflected in Cicero's speech, delivered in 70 BC in defence of the corrupt governor Fonteius, was not good. Quite apart from the shady operations conducted by Fonteius himself, the reader must be struck by the way in which Cicero works on the virulently anti-Gallic prejudices of his audience; amongst a wide variety of charges that he brings against Fonteius' accusers is one that as rude barbarians they do not even appreciate the significance of giving evidence under oath.¹¹ This attitude, it has plausibly been suggested, can be traced back to that traumatic shock, the *terror Gallicus*, which the Romans experienced as a result of their defeat by Brennus and his Celtic hordes around 390 BC.¹² It was destined to recur as a fundamental theme in the dealings between Rome and Gaul.¹³ Against such a background it is surely significant that scholars still debate the date at which The Province actually became a province – that is, when its judicial status was changed from war-zone to properly constituted permanent possession of the Empire, with rights and obligations on the part of both conquered and conqueror. Some would argue that this process began only after the Cimbric war, and reached its completion very much later.¹⁴ Thus despite the external security which came with the

defeat of the Germanic invaders the internal affairs of The Province over almost the next fifty years were punctuated by unrest and revolt, the last and most serious being a great rebellion among the Allobroges, caused entirely by Roman mismanagement.¹⁵ (The last straw must surely have been that the Allobrogian ambassadors sent to Rome to seek redress for the grievances of their people served the City well by providing Cicero with his first real evidence of Catiline's conspiracy, but then received no reward for their pains.¹⁶) The rebellion was put down, with great difficulty, in 62-61 BC, only three years before the opening of the campaign against the Helvetii. In fact, the fate of The Province, as the fate of Gallia Comata, was to be decided by Caesar. The citizen colonies which he established after his rise to power as Dictator of the Roman Republic (together with his grants of privileges and status to existing indigenous communities) would transform the south.¹⁷ In the meantime it must be regarded as a tribute to his luck, or his personality, that The Province remained loyal while he embarked on his hazardous adventure to the north.

There, beyond the boundary of The Province, lay a world which before Caesar was at best only half-known to Rome. It requires some conscious act of the imagination to envisage this land as the Romans saw it. Even by modern standards it covered a large area: Beloch estimated a surface of 535,000 square km.¹⁸ Given the difficulties involved in ancient transportation, to Caesar's contemporaries it must have seemed colossal. To Mediterranean man it was certainly a wild place, full of rushing rivers which, as they neared the sea, the vagaries of wind and tide made even more treacherous, and divided not so much by waterways or mountains but by thick forests and impenetrable marshlands, which separated Gallic nation from nation. These natural barriers, it has been observed, were so strong that they persisted into Roman and medieval times to carry the echo of this ancient political geography well into the modern era.¹⁹ The inclemency of the weather, windy and cold, was also frequently commented upon.²⁰ But it could be seen that it was also a rich land, rich in agriculture (although the products differed from those of the south — cereals and livestock as opposed to olives and grapes), in timber, in minerals and in people.²¹ According to the most recent thinking on the subject, man had been exploiting the resources of the area which was later to become Gallia Comata since about 500,000 BC.²² We can only speculate from the scatter of archaeological evidence left to us, but it is reasonable to assume that by the time of Caesar innumerable peoples and cultures had mixed and merged to form a highly complex society which, in its economy, culture, languages

and dialects would have shown great variation from place to place. However, a unity of sorts was imposed on the whole by the dominance of the last great culture to prevail before the irruption of the classical, namely the Celtic. Indeed, it may be argued that this unity was increased rather than diminished just before the end by the need to face the Germans from the north and the Romans from the south.²³

The early Celts are a subject in their own right, one which is properly the preserve of the prehistorian, and which is fraught with great problems of interpretation and explanation. However, for our purposes it will be sufficient to say that while Celtic culture had been developing on, and spreading out from, the upper Danube since as early as the Bronze Age (around 1200 BC) in the guise of the 'Urnfield' culture, its progress was apparently particularly stimulated by the introduction of iron-working techniques which seem to have precipitated an actual movement of peoples into neighbouring lands.²⁴ This movement is discernible in our written sources in such episodes as Brennus' attack on Rome (already mentioned) and in the Celtic sack of Delphi in 279 BC.²⁵ However, it certainly began much earlier than these dates might suggest. Archaeologically, the type of developing Celtic Iron Age culture conventionally classified as 'Hallstatt' appears in Gaul, Spain and Britain from about 750 BC; it is probably best known in the Gallic context from the great Vix (Côte-d'Or) burial, which is dated to the sixth century.²⁶ In its more advanced 'La Tène' form it makes itself felt from about 500 BC.²⁷ Thus the *Gallia Comata* which Caesar saw and described in the framework of the tripartite division with which he opens his account of his Gallic campaign ('*Gallia est omnis divisa in partibus*') was, in our terms, essentially a 'La Tène' country. This certainly applied to the larger part of it which lay between the Garonne and the line of the Seine and the Marne (although modern scholarship would prefer to treat separately the less developed area of *Aremorica*, extending inland from the Brittany peninsula). According to Caesar here lived 'the Gauls' proper. In the north-east, between the Seine/Marne line and the Rhine lay the more turbulent region of the *Belgae*, who were the latest of the La Tène arrivals, and who had yet to settle down completely. An exception was provided by the Aquitanian peoples of the south-west, who lived between the Pyrenees and the Garonne: they were apparently an outcrop of Iberian peoples who had managed for the most part to hold their own against the incoming Celts and their ways, although undoubtedly influenced by them. (It should be noted, of course, that these Celtic influences also extended into *The Province*: the *Allobroges* clearly very much resembled the *Helvetii*, *Sequani* and

Aedui who were their La Tène neighbours; nearer to the coast, and in particular around Massalia, incoming Hallstatt culture had fused with settled Urnfield traditions to form a 'Celts-Ligurian' amalgam which was able to preserve its individuality against both the La Tène and the Greek tides.²⁸)

Our best witness as to the state of Gallic society in his day, although his credibility has at times been questioned, is Caesar himself, supplemented where possible by the archaeology. There can be no doubt that in his description of Gaul and Gallic ways Caesar was influenced by a Greek tradition which, through prejudice and ignorance, was predisposed to view the Gauls as trousered and moustachioed barbarians.²⁹ Thus in his narrative they appear superficially as an uncultured people, enjoying few, if any, of the amenities of Greco-Roman civilisation – a deficiency which had as compensation the maintenance of their martial zeal, but which also involved a sad lack of order and discipline in their political and military dealings; everyone in Gaul belonged to rival factions.³⁰ Individuals strove for power in their own *civitates* and used whatever political weapons lay to hand without thought for the wider consequences of their actions. Appeals for aid against internal rivals could be made to allies within other Gallic nations, or even to the Germans or to Rome. This inveterate and pervasive discord was of untold value to the Roman conqueror, who never in fact faced united Gallic opposition. On the other hand, Caesar was certainly no servile copier, and from his own observations, and from the material remains of the people whom he was describing, we can piece together a picture of a society which in many other respects was not all that far behind his own.³¹ The Gallic economy may have been different, but it was far from being primitive. The rich grave-goods of the Hallstatt and La Tène burials demonstrate that a surplus was being produced which was being used to develop a sophisticated specialisation of skills and roles – farmer, miner, artisan, trader, priest – and so a social hierarchy at the top of which stood great aristocrats with the means and the inclination to acquire expensive weapons, jewellery, foodstuffs and the like, whether of Gallic origin or imported from outside.³² Such a hierarchy finds expression in Caesar's narrative in his distinction between the Gallic military elite, the *Equites* ('Knights'), the religious elite, the Druids, and the common people.³³ It is also indicated by his willingness to employ Roman terms to describe the powers exercised by these elites, and their relationship with the lower orders: he has no more problems in identifying magistrates, patrons, and clients in Gallic society than he has in seeing them in his own.³⁴ For all their instability,

the Gallic nations were not in a state of primitive anarchy. Indeed, in his famous description of druidic activities, Caesar touches on the religious powers and the sanctions which allowed these men to settle disputes between quarrelling states.³⁵ There was probably a great difference between theory and practice in this respect, and, as Fustel de Coulanges observed, for men so powerful the druids are oddly absent from the Gallic political scene.³⁶ On the other hand, the existence of the principle of supra-national jurisdiction suggests that in some halting way at least progress was being made towards one sort of pan-Gallic unity.

The wealth which supported the lifestyle of the upper classes was almost certainly derived from their effective private control of extensive property in land.³⁷ The land was worked from scattered farmsteads (*aedificia*) which, together with unfortified artisanal and commercial centres (*vici*) and defended strongholds (*oppida*), comprised an integrated system of production, processing, and distribution. It is the *oppida*, which stood at the top of the hierarchy, which have of late attracted possibly the most attention in the assessment of pre-Conquest Gallic social and economic development, as they have come to be regarded less and less as crude refuges and more and more as emerging 'proto-towns' (although always, of course, retaining an important military role). Here, living off the produce which the *aedificia* and *vici* rendered as rent and taxation, were based the aristocratic rulers and warriors and those who attended to their needs as servants, craftsmen or traders.³⁸ Archaeology has revealed the presence of simple but substantial dwellings of wood and stone, and workshops for the production of metal goods and pottery. Just before the Conquest such places were attracting Mediterranean wares in large quantities; it has even been suggested that at least part of this commercial activity was stimulated, encouraged and even made possible by the introduction of a smaller-denomination coinage by the more advanced *civitates* of the centre and the east from about the end of the second century BC, thus establishing some form of market economy. All the evidence seems to point to the latter part of the second century BC as being also the time when the urbanisation of Gallia Comata got fully under way.³⁹ The absence of obvious town-planning and monumental public buildings would have been enough for most Mediterranean observers, used to the strict criteria of Greco-Roman civilisation (the long-standing urban roots of which had produced a rigid set of ideas as to what should be expected of any agglomeration which claimed the title of 'city'⁴⁰), to have dismissed these places out of hand as yet another facet of the barbarous life of the Gauls. However,

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it is clear that direct experience taught Caesar to be highly impressed by what he saw.⁴¹ Gallic urbanisation, born of different circumstances, was different from the urbanisation of Greece and Rome, but it was thereby no less valid.

In addition to all the above, we have evidence that the Gauls were able to formulate complex constitutional rules (even though they did not always keep them), had introduced written records into their administrative practices (using the Greek alphabet), and had shown themselves well capable of appreciating and exploiting the benefits of good communication-routes by both road and river, for both taxation and trade.⁴² Comatan Gaul was far from backward: there was a strong and developing social and economic infrastructure. Sadly for its inhabitants, however, the very level of sophistication of their culture was best revealed by the relative ease with which they, once conquered, were to be held. As Groenman-van Wateringe has observed, the Roman Empire simply could not have absorbed the Gauls if Gallic society had not yet reached the level where it could accommodate and support a conqueror.⁴³

As we have already seen, long before Caesar Rome had been forced to take an interest in the affairs of peoples beyond The Province, the more so because the very form and limit of the latter remained for so long vague and undefined. In the very beginning conflict with the Saluvii had brought trouble with the Allobroges, and through them with the Arverni, all of whom were defeated by Roman arms. Thus it was clearly a conscious weighing of the political and military implications involved which led to the first two peoples being directly subordinated to Roman power while the last remained for the moment independent. However, the Arverni had to be watched, lest they should cause trouble once again, and indeed to balance their power Rome entered into a formal alliance with their traditional enemies, the nation of the Aedui, who had in fact called for Roman intervention as early as 122 BC. They were consequently honoured with the title of 'Brothers' and 'Friends' of the Roman People. In addition, Roman generals did not hesitate to take their armies, or even to recruit supplementary troops (Gallic cavalrymen were much in demand) beyond The Province if circumstances so demanded.⁴⁴ Thus there was a long-standing precedent for Roman interference in the affairs of the north, and by the 60s of the first century BC direct Roman involvement was once more highly probable.

The trouble appears again to have been caused by pressure from the Germans. The study of these people has long been bedevilled by prevail-

ing nationalistic and ideological prejudices. Nevertheless, it now seems that we can talk, if only with much qualification, of early 'German' peoples in northern Europe from around the middle of the fifth century BC.⁴⁵ Expansion, leading to contact with the Mediterranean world, took place from the third century BC, including, of course, the movement of the Cimbri into Gaul at the end of the following century. It is likely that full German settlement across the lower Rhine (involving Caesar's Eburones, Condrusi, Caerosi, and so on) and a fusion of Germanic and Celtic peoples around the Eifel (to form, above all, the future *civitas* of the Celtic-speaking Treveri) also belong to this period.⁴⁶ There is no doubt that the Gallic nations were seriously disturbed by this activity, particularly the Cimbric invasions, but they seem to have learned to live with the new circumstances.⁴⁷ However, towards the middle of the first century BC there was renewed and increased pressure in Gaul as a result of the arrival of Germanic latecomers, who plunged Gallia Comata into further unrest. The stress manifested itself in two distinct but related forms, both potentially dangerous to Roman interests. In the first place German penetration into the upper Rhineland threatened to displace the nation of the Helvetii. A Celtic people who had originally lived beyond the Rhine, they had been increasingly forced into the area of modern Switzerland from about the third century BC onwards. They lost their last foothold across the river probably around 100 BC, and from about the late 70s BC began to feel embattled in their new habitat. They started to plan a retreat through central Gaul, which would have disrupted the peoples already settled there, including their neighbours, the Allobroges, who were the direct responsibility of Rome, and the Aedui, who could claim a 'special relationship' with the City.⁴⁸

In the meantime, the very unrest which these and similar events were provoking among the Gallic *civitates* was also promoting the German cause. In the course of the long-running rivalry between the Arverni and the Aedui, the Sequani, allies of the former, were tempted to invite in a German princeling and his followers, Ariovistus and the Suebi, as mercenary troops, to be paid in land. Militarily, this policy proved a great success; the 'Friends' of the Roman People were severely mauled, which must have reflected very poorly on the credibility of Roman power and influence. Further de-stabilisation of the Gallic situation was then threatened by the Germans' turning on the Sequani and seizing most of their land (which, in its turn would have had the effect of further alarming the Helvetii by threatening them from over the Jura).⁴⁹ Overall, therefore, Roman interference in some fashion or other must

have been unavoidable, particularly since her friends in Gaul were now appealing for aid.⁵⁰ In fact a senatorial decree confirming Roman support for the Aedui was passed in 61 BC; and in March of the following year we find Cicero writing to his friend Atticus forecasting a Gallic war.⁵¹ The war which eventually occurred, however – Caesar's war – turned out to be something more important than imperial police-work.

To appreciate what happened it is now necessary to sketch in something of the development of the Roman state and Roman politics down to this period.⁵² The Roman Empire of the mid-first century BC had no 'emperor'; it had been created and was run by the Roman Republic, which effectively meant by the mature males of a relatively small number of aristocratic families, who, as present or past officers of state (magistrates), met together and took collective decisions as the Senate of Rome. Any notion of one-man rule was despised and abhorred as monarchical and tyrannical. However, monarchy was not very far away. Victory over Carthage in the Second Punic War, 'Hannibal's War' (218–201 BC), had made Rome the undisputed mistress of the western Mediterranean, and had opened the way for interference in, and ultimately conquest of, the Greek and Greek-ruled states of the east. Imperial expansion had made the Roman upper classes staggeringly powerful and wealthy; the price they paid was the decline and collapse of their social and political system. In particular that finely-tuned *aemulatio*, 'studied competition', between leading families, which had been the driving force behind the old Republic, quickly degenerated into the crude rivalry of ambitious individuals. This was the age of the 'warlords' who, far from being controlled by the Republican constitution and its magistracies, constantly sought to manipulate these as a means of furthering their own interests. By 60 BC the struggle had resolved itself into a three-sided contest between Pompey, Crassus, and Julius Caesar.

These three co-operated to run the state through an unconstitutional, but effective, concordat which historians have come to call the 'First Triumvirate'. However, theirs was clearly an unstable alliance. Three was a crowd; one partner would eventually have to be got rid of, leaving the other two to battle between themselves for sole control of the Roman world. Caesar, lacking both the military reputation of Pompey and the wealth of Crassus, was patently in the weakest position. This explains his eagerness to be given one of the two consulships for 59 BC – not for itself, because the present political situation made a nonsense of the old Republican offices, but for the rank it bestowed which would justify his pressing for a military command to follow. In the recent past many Roman politicians had shamelessly exploited the proconsulship in

order to win glory and riches on campaign in the provinces. Caesar was to be no exception; after angrily rejecting the suggestion that he should take as his responsibility the supervision of woodlands and by-roads within Italy, he at length obtained the governorship of *Gallia*, 'Gaul'. This included not just The Province, and those lands on its borders which might legitimately be considered to fall within the Roman sphere of influence, but also the former Celtic region on the Italian side of the Alps, north of the Po, called *Gallia Cisalpina*, 'Cisalpine Gaul' (as opposed to *Gallia Transalpina*, 'Transalpine Gaul', at this period the official designation of The Province), and its eastern adjunct, the troubled frontier-region of Illyricum (roughly speaking, the area of Yugoslavia). In this last, as much as anywhere else, an able general might win a name for himself and acquire sufficient riches to support his political ambitions in the capital.⁵³ By the beginning of 58 BC the Transalpine war-scare had died down. Indeed, as early as May, 60 BC, Cicero had told Atticus of peace in Gaul, and in the following year Caesar himself, in his capacity as consul, had promoted the acceptance of Ariovistus as 'Friend of the Roman People'.⁵⁴ The allotment of The Province to Caesar was no indication of any feeling that there was a particular job to be done beyond the Alps; on the contrary, the incumbent governor had unexpectedly died late in 59 BC and his command had been added to *Gallia Cisalpina* and Illyricum at the last minute.⁵⁵ Troops were concentrated in northern Italy; clearly Caesar's first thought was for a campaign in the direction of the Danube.⁵⁶

News that the Helvetii were still determined to migrate westwards through Gaul away from the Germans therefore came as a surprise; but Caesar was quick to see the chance which was being offered to him, and to seize it with both hands. His conquest of *Gallia Comata*, when it came, was founded on 'not a plan, but a succession of brilliant improvisations'.⁵⁷

I do not propose to give a detailed narrative account of the Gallic War here. It is well enough accessible in all general histories of the period and above all, of course, from the masterful description provided by Caesar himself in his *Commentaries*.⁵⁸ In brief, the news that the Helvetii were pressing ahead with their plans brought him quickly into The Province in March 58 BC. The failure of diplomacy led to an armed confrontation, and the utter defeat of the migrants as they attempted to cross the territory of the Aedui. They were sent back to their old lands. Having demonstrated his military prowess Caesar was then invited by friendly Gallic nations to help them against Ariovistus, who was once again proving troublesome. Caesar was willing to intervene; a

breakdown in negotiations led to war, and the Germans were defeated and expelled. In the following year, news that the Belgic nations were now inimical to Rome, out of fear of potential Roman domination of the rest of Gaul, again drew Caesar beyond the Alps to defeat them, and also the Veneti and their neighbours who were causing trouble on the Atlantic coast. In 56 BC renewed rebellion brought further successful campaigns by Caesar and his generals against the Veneti, in Aquitania, and along the Channel coast; and in the following year his first visit to Britain was preceded by a bloody campaign on the Rhine. 54 BC saw the second campaign in Britain, but also clear signs of still-smouldering unrest in Gaul, which came to a head in the following year, with savage action against certain Belgic nations, and a further expedition over the Rhine. However, all this was but the overture to the great Gallic revolt which, under the leadership of the Arvernian, Vercingetorix, flared up in 52 BC, and which culminated in the latter's surrender following the fall of the *oppidum* of Alesia to the Roman besiegers. The next two years were spent in stamping out the last sparks of disobedience, and in attempting to win those who survived among the Gallic communities to some sort of loyalty to Rome, or rather, to Caesar himself as civil war loomed.

The above summary is based, as closely as space permits, on the substance and, above all, the studied blandness of Caesar's own account. His style is in fact all-important. So well written, so clear, and seemingly so objective is his narrative that, as was intended, the unwary reader is seduced, without ever really being aware of it, into a ready acceptance of the rectitude of Caesar's imperialism.⁵⁹ Only reflection, and close reconsideration of the text, allow proper appreciation of the intense ambition, ruthlessness, hypocrisy, skill, courage and foolhardiness which Caesar deployed to attain his overriding aims of military power and personal wealth, without which he would have been no match for his rivals: the conquest of Gaul was Caesar's only means of political success, or even survival. So, for example, it may with justification be argued that the picking of those vital first quarrels with the Helvetii and Ariovistus was in fact blatantly engineered by Caesar, since the former showed themselves entirely willing to respect Roman interests on their march, and the latter could offer ample justification for his actions.⁶⁰ Caesar's case was weak; he was plainly just itching for a fight. In both instances, however, he was able to use his *Commentaries* to gain support for his actions, for example by playing on Roman fears of another German invasion through clever asides concerning the exploits of his famous ancestor, C. Marius.⁶¹ But, once he had provoked crisis, he could

proceed to exploit the situation. The Belgae were right to be afraid; by 57 BC Caesar had already decided on the domination of Gaul. It is interesting to note that nowhere in his introduction to the events of that year does he bother to refute their accusations. Protective interventionism had soon given way to outright annexation.⁶² Moreover, given the *terror Gallicus*, he was on to a winner so far as the Roman people were concerned: whatever the views of his political enemies, no-one was likely to object to his thrashing the hateful Gauls.⁶³ There was now no stopping his ambition; he took great risks, but the gamble paid off handsomely.⁶⁴

Crassus, as a result of his own vain attempt to gain renown as a general, was killed fighting the Parthians in 53 BC; the final struggle lay between Pompey and Caesar. As the 50s drew to their close so the relationship between the two warlords was ever strained, and the slide to open conflict began. Having been forced by increasing political pressure (arising out of moves to deprive him of his Gallic command) to leave Gaul the previous winter, Caesar precipitated the war by taking his army across the Rubicon into Italy in 49 BC. Following a series of bloody campaigns fought throughout the Mediterranean, culminating in the battle of Munda, in Spain, in 45 BC, he finally emerged as sole ruler of the Roman world.

The second part of this chapter will be devoted to the consideration of how Rome, having acquired Gallia Comata, set about managing it. Emphasis will fall mainly, although not exclusively, on military and political matters, since details of the administrative machinery, and matters to do with the economic and social ramifications of the Conquest, will be discussed in more length at a later stage.

Caesar had conquered Comatan Gaul as governor of all Cisalpine Gaul and The Province, and it was to prove a very long time before these three elements were to be formally separated within the structure of Roman provincial government.⁶⁵ However, it is fair to say that one important legacy of Caesar's dictatorship was his planting of formally-constituted townships of demobilised troops -- *coloniae*, 'colonies' -- in the south, which effectively won The Province for the Roman world.⁶⁶ As we have already seen, Gallia Transalpina had been in a far from settled state when Caesar used it as a base from which to conquer the whole of northern Gaul. However, it had won his praise for its constancy between the years 58 and 50 BC and, except for the isolated and ill-conceived resistance of Massalia, which finally lost her what little independence she retained from her previous greatness, the area had maintained a consistent loyalty to Caesar throughout the conflict which

had resulted in his autocracy. Perhaps general weakness, following the Allobrogian revolt, coupled with Caesar's quickly-won reputation as a great general, undermined any further thoughts of resistance to Rome; and probably the peoples of the south were themselves genuinely alarmed by the threat of renewed trouble from the Germans, against which the power of Rome was their only effective bulwark. Certainly, the opportunity for The Province's fierier spirits to take service in Caesar's auxiliary forces would have helped to ease the situation.⁶⁷ Be this as it may, the area was clearly readier now than it ever had been to be pushed firmly along the road to Romanisation; added to which, Caesar, like every other warlord of the late Republic, was desperately anxious to find land on which to settle the many legions now faced with demobilisation. The single solution was the establishment of at least four full (in the sense that all their inhabitants were Roman citizens) colonies at Narbo (Narbonne), Arelate (Arles), Forum Iulii (Fréjus) and Baeterrae (Béziers), and the integration of many native centres within the Roman municipal hierarchy as lesser 'Latin' colonies (an archaic and anachronistic term, which meant in effect that the ruling aristocrats of these places became Roman citizens).⁶⁸

Of course the settlement of Roman ex-soldiers would have led to the dispossession of many native land-owners, but the quasi-military nature of the full colonies would serve to counter any unrest which this might have occasioned in their areas; and indeed it is now realised that possibly such disruption was not as total as was previously imagined, and that a fair proportion of the local populace would in fact have become full citizens of the new cities.⁶⁹ Once founded, and quickly developed, the colonies would act as pacemakers to the newly-promoted native communities; solid advertisements of the splendour and comfort of Greco-Roman civilisation, to which all should, and could, aspire.⁷⁰ The accelerated, and indeed over-hasty, advancement by Caesar of southern Gauls into the Roman Senate provides dramatic proof of how quickly and positively the leading natives responded to these new opportunities.⁷¹ From this time on the paths of The Province and of Gallia Comata begin to diverge dramatically, and we can concentrate more and more on the development of the latter, without constant reference to happenings in the former.

The Caesarian settlement of Comatan Gaul was quite different; direct Romanisation was far less imposed or, apparently, even encouraged, and as a result the next few centuries would see the growth of a culture that we can recognise as being more Gallo-Roman than simply Roman. Gallia Comata had been hard hit by the Conquest; the details and

consequences of this will be discussed more closely at a later stage in this work, but at least the anti-Roman elements had been wiped out.⁷² Caesar's inclination seems to have been to allow the surviving and tractable Gauls to come slowly to grips with their new situation. Only three colonies were founded in the newly conquered territories, at Noviodunum (Nyon), Raurica (Augst) and Lugdunum (Lyon), (the last two after Caesar's death but, it is generally accepted, in accordance with his plans.)⁷³ All were on the periphery of Gallia Comata, and all were clearly sited to cover a likely invasion route from the Rhine into The Province and Italy — that is, they were founded with more of an eye to the Germans than the Gauls.⁷⁴ The main Gallic heartland remained untouched by this sort of activity. Rome sought to exploit rather than subvert the existing social and political structure (or such as had survived the wars). As Sherwin-White observes, general stability was achieved by 'attaching to Rome the self-interest of the two or three most influential *civitates*'. The Arverni and the Aedui were exempted from the punishment which was their due for having supported Vercingetorix; and indeed the *civitas*-alliances which they led remained intact.⁷⁵ At a more local level, and affecting all communities, Caesar buttressed the power of the local aristocratic leaders, to whom valuable gifts and concessions (but not at this stage, I think, Roman citizenship) were given to promote their continuing loyalty to him.⁷⁶ *Oppida* remained in occupation, and communities continued to produce their own coinages.⁷⁷ Taxation, though set at a less favourable rate than has usually been thought, was none the less far from extortionate.⁷⁸

On the other hand, as we shall see later, the demands of the civil wars, a lingering vague unrest in northern Gaul, and the unsolved German problem, led to continuing military occupation and possibly even to a form of martial law which would have taken precedence over *civitas*-government.⁷⁹ Caesar's policy of *laissez-faire* was politically correct but it was very untidy: it simply shelved problems without settling them. After the civil wars had ended the future lay not with dispirited *civitas*-elders, but with the young Gallic cavalry-leaders who, like their cousins from The Province, had accepted service with Rome as a means of giving vent to their native military enthusiasms, and of winning fame and fortune in battle under the command of a great warrior-general in accordance with their own traditions.⁸⁰ If they backed the winning side, and survived, these would return home wealthy, travelled, partially Romanised and with a positive inclination to change their own way of life and that of their communities, in which they would exercise considerable influence. They would also return as Roman citizens, bearing

in accordance with Roman custom the family-name of the men who had enfranchised them, as Julius Togirix or Julius Gedomo, proud clients of both Caesar and his successor, Octavian; for, of course, the future also lay with the latter.

Caesar's assassination in March, 44 BC, provoked a further round of civil war in the course of which the dictator's grand-nephew and self-styled political heir emerged victorious. His naval victory over the combined forces of Antony and Cleopatra at the battle of Actium in 31 BC, and their subsequent suicide in Egypt in the following year, gave him full control of the Roman Empire. In 27 BC the first of many stages of his reformation of the Roman constitution, with the aim of accommodating the sham of a still functioning Republic to the reality of a monarchical Empire, saw him change his name to Augustus — 'Revered One' — and adopt the title of *Princeps* — 'First among equals' — as the previously typical late-Republican political gangster and warlord now strove to be seen as the legitimate head of state. The following two-and-a-half centuries of the 'Principate' (in fact until the onset of the third-century Crisis with which this work closes) would see both the rulers and the ruled of the Roman Empire struggling to adapt themselves, not so much to the growth of absolute power, but rather to the realisation that, from this moment on, such power formed the indispensable foundation of imperial government.⁸¹

Octavian's Gallia Comata was basically Caesar's, as already described. However, as Caesar's successor, and as a supreme strategist and politician who saw that Antony's East needed to be balanced by his own West, he seems to have given great attention to Gaul as a whole after the land fell to him from the former in 40 BC. As I will argue below, his first visit in 39/38 BC led to a change in military policy which was to have a very significant effect on the future development of Gallia Comata;⁸² and Gaul was the first of Rome's possessions which he saw as Augustus in 27 BC.⁸³ The Julian connection was steadfastly maintained by further personal visits in 16-13 BC and 10 BC, and by the extensive use of other important members of the imperial family in Gallic affairs.⁸⁴

It was his second visit, in 27 BC, however, which heralded the beginning of the end of Caesarian Gaul. In The Province further establishment of veteran colonies and the granting of more privileges to the indigenous communities renewed the process of Romanisation begun by Caesar.⁸⁵ The south now was patently different from the north, and in recognition of this fact in 27 BC it was given the status of a separate province — *Narbonensis* (Map 2).⁸⁶ At the same time, undoubtedly for ease of administration, the north was formally divided into the provinces

of Aquitania, Lugdunensis and Belgica – divisions reflecting, but in fact only extremely loosely corresponding to, Caesar's 'three parts' of Gaul. However, from this date onwards the *Tres Galliae* – the 'Three Gauls' – which are the subject of this work may be said to be in existence.⁸⁷ (It may be noted, for the sake of completeness, that in 22 BC the difference between Narbonensis and the rest was even more underlined when, in accordance with the contrived constitutionalism that lay at the base of Augustus' confirmation of his own tyrannical power through the agency of a supposedly restored Republic, the former province was, at least nominally, returned to the control of the Senate.⁸⁸)

Concurrent with these changes, and obviously related to them, Augustus introduced further measures to define and strengthen his control of the Three Gauls, and so move away from Caesarian neglect. Probably from the earliest days of his possession of the west he had put in hand the creation of a scientifically-surveyed and constructed system of military highways;⁸⁹ the information collected during the prosecution of this project, and the roads themselves, could now form the basis for the holding of the first census in the new provinces.⁹⁰ Such a novelty, involving as it did not only the investigation of personal wealth but also probably at this time the re-drawing of some *civitas*-boundaries in order to reduce the extent of the larger nations, threatened to provoke trouble.⁹¹ We must also bear in mind that, twenty years on from the traumas of the Conquest, and with the civil wars ended, the *Tres Galliae* may well have been required to furnish rather fewer fighting men and rather more ready cash in taxation.⁹² It is no wonder that Augustus decided to be on hand.

His sensitivity to Gallic susceptibilities, which was, if anything, even more acute than Caesar's, also restrained him from founding further colonies in the Three Gauls; rather, one of the existing ones, at Lugdunum, which had already become the nodal point of the road-system, was encouraged to develop an outstanding grandeur as an advertisement for Roman wealth and power.⁹³ Thus began its swift rise to become, provincial boundaries notwithstanding, the virtual capital of the Three Gauls under the High Empire.⁹⁴

Within the newly-created provinces there occurred further developments, the details of which will be examined more closely in later chapters. By way of example, however, there was the establishment of at least the foundations of a regular imperial administration along the lines being laid down for the rest of the Empire, comprising the establishment of the responsibilities of senatorial *legati Augusti*, equestrian *procuratores* and the like.⁹⁵ And, side by side with the redrafting of

provincial boundaries and administration, at this time must also have come the invention of that felicitous judicial conceit which permitted the Roman authorities henceforth to treat the sprawling Gallic *civitates* as compact Mediterranean-style city-states in respect of their local government.⁹⁶ This in its turn resulted in the establishment of single administrative centres, whose architecture consciously followed the classical model, the so-called '*civitas*-capitals', many of which were honoured with a title reflecting the favour and patronage of the imperial house: Augustodunum Aeduarum (Autun), Augusta Treverorum (Trier), Juliomagus Andecavorum (Angers), and so on. The growth of Greco-Roman civilisation – or, again, Romanisation – in the Three Gauls went hand in hand with a further reminder of the special connection between these provinces and the ruling family.⁹⁷ The founding of a sort of 'School of Liberal Studies' for the benefit of the sons of the Gallic nobility at Autun probably also fell within this period; as time proved, it went on to become one of the Latin west's leading centres of learning.⁹⁸

In the meantime, the external and internal security of Roman government in the Three Gauls was being secured by successful campaigns of conquest against the inconveniently still-independent peoples of northern Spain and the Alps (in 28-13 BC and 25-27 BC respectively) and also against the restless small tribes of Aquitania.⁹⁹ However, Augustus' most important undertaking in this respect resulted from his obvious realisation that similar short-term, limited-objective expeditions to combat the constant Germanic threat in the north-east were gaining the Empire nothing; he therefore resolved upon the conquest of *Germania Magna* (which probably sounds best in English as 'Greater Germany') from the Rhine to the Elbe.¹⁰⁰

The history of Germany, and of the 'German problem', is inseparable from the history of the Three Gauls. Indeed, as we have already seen, the *terror Germanicus* played as great a part in bringing about the conquest of the Three Gauls as did the *terror Gallicus*: Caesar was able to exploit Roman fears of a second Cimbric invasion to justify his continued and widening military activity beyond The Province even after the luckless Helvetii had been effectively neutralised.¹⁰¹ And (as in the case of Britain) his subsequent blazing of a trail across the Rhine created a precedent which his immediate successors were unable to forget – an open invitation to follow in the great man's footsteps, and even outdo his feats of arms by conquering Germany as he had conquered Gaul.¹⁰² The circumstances which brought Augustus to embark on such a venture are considered elsewhere; these occasioned his long third visit to

Gaul from 16 BC.¹⁰³ So far as the actual war is concerned, suffice it to say that to begin with all went well. The massive forces which had been gathering on the Rhine (and on the Danube) from 16 BC were unleashed in 12 BC under the overall command of Augustus' adopted son, Drusus.¹⁰⁴ By 9 BC the Roman army found itself on the Elbe; the process of conquest seemed well under way. The accidental death of Drusus as he returned from this campaign took the cheer from the news, but adequate replacements were found, in particular in the person of Drusus' brother, the future emperor Tiberius; Germany was, apparently, still in the process of being absorbed by the Roman Empire.¹⁰⁵ Indeed, so successful were Roman arms that about the turn of the century a great cult altar dedicated to the worship of 'Rome and Augustus', the mate of the Gallic Altar (*Ara*) established at Lugdunum at the opening of the war, was erected at the administrative centre of the Rhenish *civitas* of the Ubii, which was thereby clearly designated as the capital of Germania Magna under the name of *Ara Ubiorum* (Köln).¹⁰⁶ Germany and the Three Gauls were to proceed in step as dutiful provinces of the Roman Empire and its ruler.

However, the situation was far less stable than it seemed. Above all, unlike the Gauls, the Germans had not yet reached the level of economic and social development which would allow them to be conquered and ruled by Rome.¹⁰⁷ This is reflected most vividly in Rome's inability to winter an army in the heart of Germany: no matter how far the legions might advance, their winter-quarters remained on the Rhine.¹⁰⁸ Beyond the river there was simply not the social and economic infrastructure to support so many unproductive mouths for so long a time. Only unremitting care and attention to detail, both political and military, would keep Rome on the Elbe. In AD 9 carelessness brought disaster. The villain of the piece is usually taken to be P. Quinctilius Varus, governor of Germany, whose insensitive insistence on an ambitious policy of Romanisation led to revolt.¹⁰⁹ However, it may with some justification be claimed that Varus was himself the victim of much earlier and much more serious mistakes made by the imperial government with regard to the new province. Above all, personal differences between Tiberius and Augustus (leading to the effective exile of the former) had led to the abandonment of any hope of a complementary Roman advance from the Danube to the Elbe. By the time the two were reconciled it was too late: the new Germanic province now presented an awkward salient jutting into unsubdued barbarian territory. Furthermore, as the land thereby lost a good deal of its overall strategic importance it suffered a reduction in its garrison.¹¹⁰ Varus faced

rebellion not just because of his own errors, but also because the leaders of the anti-Roman faction within the new province saw that anyway this was a good time to strike. The revolt was led by Arminius, a second-generation Germano-Roman cavalry officer of the type whose continued loyalty was, on the other side of the Rhine, binding the three Gauls to Rome.¹¹¹ His forces cut Varus' army to pieces as it marched against them through the primeval forest of the Teutoburger Wald. Three legions and nine auxiliary regiments were lost.¹¹² The Romans fell back to the Rhine frontier which, thanks to the energy of Tiberius, stood firm; they were to remain there, more or less, until the collapse of the western Empire early in the fifth century.

These events were of enormous importance for the development of the Three Gauls. The German venture had led to the withdrawal of most of the occupying garrison; the period of conquest could be said to be definitely at an end, and the period of settlement to be beginning. However, instead of being totally abandoned by the military, as part of the peaceful inner core of the Empire, the inhabitants of the Three Gauls eventually found themselves occupying, if not border provinces, then at least those the fortunes of which were extremely closely tied to those of the frontier, and of the army which guarded it. They were not returned, however nominally, to senatorial control; emperors needed to keep those lands in which armies were stationed, and troops were likely to operate, directly under their own thumbs.¹¹³ This would lead to its own problems, particularly while the German question remained a live issue, and in times of civil war, but as we shall see this situation had its compensations, for example, in the stimulation of the Gallic economy.¹¹⁴ Also, and in its own way ironically, the war against Germany may even be said to have led to the creation of 'Gaul'. As part of his preparations for the campaign Drusus held a second census in Gaul. Since this exercise was connected with an impending war there can be little doubt that its purpose was to increase still further tax revenue from the Gallic nations; at any rate, we know that it caused serious unrest.¹¹⁵ It is therefore likely that it was in an effort to dampen this disquiet, and to emphasise the unity of Gauls and Romans in the common, anti-German, cause, that at the same time as the census Drusus instituted the great Altar to Rome and Augustus at Condate, just across the Saône from Lugdunum, upon which were inscribed the names of all the Gallic *civitates* (about sixty in all) (see Figure 5.1).¹¹⁶ The religious (or better, sentimentally patriotic) business at this Altar was conducted in the name of the *Three Gauls*, so that complete unity was never officially conceded, but the fact remains that by this move Rome achieved the

ambition in which Vercingetorix had failed, namely the creation of the notion of a single Gallia Comata.

The Augustan settlement, while crucial to the pacification of Gaul, was not definitive. Here, as elsewhere in the Empire, the changes which had transformed Republic into Principate needed time to work themselves out. The administrative system, for example, though generally roughed-out, still had to be refined in practice. In particular it suffered from the absence of a reservoir of talent, experience and tradition which only time could supply. As far as the Three Gauls were concerned, the system was clearly as yet only imperfectly understood, even by the leaders of the *civitates* who, rich and proud though they may have been, were still relatively unsophisticated. Thus tensions could arise, as in the case of Licinus, a former imperial slave who had been made an imperial financial official (*procurator*) in Gaul.¹¹⁷ He is supposed to have manipulated the Roman calendar to convince the Gauls that taxes were payable on a fourteen-month year in order to line his own pockets.¹¹⁸ Only the personal intervention of Augustus himself, making his third visit to Gaul mainly for military reasons, was able to end this deceit. (It is interesting to note that Licinus, though brought to heel, was not punished; he was able to defend his actions by pleading the *terror Gallicus*.) At *civitas*-level it may well have been that variations in the constitutional relationship between the Gallic communities and Rome, which were a relic from the days of Caesarian generosity, and which enabled certain nations to claim substantial tax-exemptions, were already proving an embarrassment to an imperial administration anxious to establish a degree of uniformity in this respect.¹¹⁹ Generally, although no longer themselves the battle-ground, the Three Gauls cannot but have been disturbed by continuing problems with Germany, and by the related succession of visits from high imperial princes. Indeed, the latter, however gratifyingly they confirmed the favoured status of the Gauls, must have been expensive to bear and disruptive of the day-to-day running of the provinces. It is perhaps significant that there is less evidence for monumental building under Augustus than there is for the period immediately following (although there are problems in making such a comparison).¹²⁰ It is against such a background that the importance of the reign of Augustus' successor, Tiberius (14-37), is best appreciated, beginning with the way in which this emperor handled the awkward legacy of the German question.

We have already seen how Varus' disaster brought the Roman imperial frontier effectively back to the Rhine, never again really to move significantly far from it, until the end of the western Empire. However,

this was to anticipate events, for the resolution of the German problem was to remain a live issue for a long time to come, and the realisation that outright conquest was not practicable took many years to sink in. It is easy to take the view that, following the loss of Varus and his army, Augustus decided that the Empire was best served by a policy of dogged defensiveness; after all, was not this the policy which he included in his final testament, in a form of codicil, 'the advice that the Roman Empire should be kept within its existing boundaries'?¹²¹ However, it should be noted that in 11 Tiberius, the imperial heir designate, still keeping a watch on the Rhine, was joined by his nephew and adopted son, Germanicus, son of Drusus; together they launched a punitive expedition across the river.¹²² Two years later, when Tiberius had to leave the northern front to attend to the looming problem of Augustus' death and his own succession, Germanicus took sole command of the Roman armies on the Rhine, and undertook renewed activity against Germany. In 14 he turned this into a full-scale offensive, justifying his actions by claiming that he needed to work off the tensions generated among his troops that year by the death of Augustus, the accession of Tiberius, and his own refusal to go along with the demands of his men that he should make his own challenge for the imperial purple.¹²³ One may perhaps speculate that shortly before his death, and despite the evidence apparently afforded by his testament, Augustus himself had resolved to renew the bid for the establishment of a Greater Germany. (Indeed, as has long been observed, the reconquest of Germany up to the Elbe need not have been regarded as an extension of the Empire.¹²⁴) Germanicus was therefore both the herald and the intended instrument of this decision — a decision of which, as events were to show, Tiberius himself heartily disapproved. But in the first instance the latter dared not go against Augustus and then, following Germanicus' apparent military success, popular opinion prevented him, even as emperor, from putting an end to this policy; and, after all, Varus had to be avenged. Whatever one may think, the fact remains that between 14 and 16 Germanicus continued to campaign extensively in Germany.

His achievements were spectacular, but very costly; once again a Roman general's inability to winter his troops beyond the Rhine took its toll.¹²⁵ The Three Gauls had rallied to the cause in the best Caesarian spirit and without demur; great levies were raised to support the imperial 'chief'.¹²⁶ But there can be no doubt that this enterprise was harmful to the western provinces, draining them of men and materials: we must presume that demands based on the revised census of 14, which Germanicus had been hard at work upon just before Augustus'

death, would have taken into consideration the costs of this war.¹²⁷ Added to this, the very glory which Germanicus won would have threatened to undermine Tiberius' own popularity with the German army, and in Gaul itself, which remained one of the great supports of the Julio-Claudian house. In 16, therefore, Tiberius finally determined to grasp the nettle. Germanicus was recalled for a huge triumph in Rome, and then packed off to the east, where he died shortly afterwards in somewhat strange circumstances.¹²⁸ Meanwhile, Germany was once more effectively abandoned, except for a bridgehead at the Rhine/Main confluence opposite Moguntiacum (Mainz), and a somewhat loose claim to sovereignty over the length of the right bank of the Rhine.¹²⁹ Its left bank became a sort of military zone, under the control of the commanders of the armies of 'Upper' (*Superior*) and 'Lower' (*Inferior*) Germany. Tiberius was, no doubt, criticised for this policy, but for Gaul it brought relief.¹³⁰ The haemorrhage of resources was stopped, as was the upset caused by the constant presence of scions of the imperial house. In brief, the Three Gauls could now settle down to allow the Augustan settlement to pursue its course. It is probably no coincidence that from the reign of Tiberius appears the first solidly dateable evidence for the material and institutional Romanisation of ordinary Gallic life.¹³¹

This hopeful beginning was, however, marred by one unfortunate blemish, namely the unrest inspired by the rebellious Gallic noblemen, Florus and Sacrovir, in 21.¹³² We must take care not to allow Tacitus' brilliant narrative to persuade us to see in this episode comprehensive Gallic rejection of Rome: the rebellion in fact consisted of local disturbances quickly quelled by Roman troops with the assistance of Gallic auxiliaries. No *civitas* seems to have officially declared against the imperial government.¹³³ However, the Roman historian's concern to describe these events so well within the relatively narrow space offered by the style of narrative which he employed in his *Annals* is a measure of their absolute importance, and the episode may also be of significance in helping us to understand Roman attitudes to the Gauls almost a century later, when Tacitus was writing – attitudes which had been formed by these occurrences and those which followed. Therefore the revolt of 21 requires some close attention.

The fine details are obscure, and much disputed, but it would seem that much of the responsibility lay with Tiberius.¹³⁴ His was a gloomy and introspective nature which, unlike those of Drusus and Germanicus, did not generate much popular support. He was an unwilling emperor, who ran the continual, and inevitable, gauntlet of unfavourable com-

parison with his great predecessor. The rumours which flowed from the death of Germanicus did not help, especially in Gaul where, as we have seen, Germanicus had enjoyed great popularity; troops and civilians alike had taken his young family particularly to heart.¹³⁵ However, Tiberius possessed a firm sense of duty, and was clearly determined not to flinch from any decision imposed by his imperial responsibilities, however unpopular it might be. Thus he ran the risk of being seen as cold and inflexible.

One pressing problem around 21 seems simply to have been a general shortage of money. As far as the imperial government is concerned, some would see this as the emergence of a deep-rooted weakness, arising out of the exhaustion of the Augustan reserves, which occasioned a general tightening-up of financial policy.¹³⁶ However this may be, there seem to have been particular local difficulties in the Three Gauls, which may well eventually have been required to make good most of the expenses incurred during the German wars, on top of that which they had already supplied. It is possible that extra revenue was raised by the 'temporary' revocation of the tax-exemption of the more important *civitates*.¹³⁷ In principle this would have been far from unreasonable since it could be argued that the Gauls benefited from the breaking of German strength and (possibly less truthfully) that the measures involved were not intended to be permanent. What seems to have gone wrong was the practice: as the fiscal screw began to turn Tiberius stayed away from the provinces. With Germany quiet, and effectively abandoned, the Three Gauls no longer figured in the forefront of imperial strategic and political thinking; therefore they had no right to special imperial attention. For the first time since their annexation they faced the full force of Roman officialdom without an imperial patron on hand to whom they could turn in trouble.

Such neglect was doubly dangerous because it also seems that certain leading figures among the Gallic nations were already under severe financial pressure. Ironically, the very settling-down of Gaul, and the opportunities for greater Romanisation, may have tempted some *civitas*-aristocrats to spend beyond their means. Whether for comfort, prestige, war or simply to pay the tax-collector, many ran deeply into debt with foreign usurers.¹³⁸ By 21 important Gauls were complaining bitterly about 'endless taxation, crushing rates of interest and the brutality and arrogance of governors'; oppressed on all sides, a few of them, in desperation, attempted revolt.¹³⁹

The leaders, Julius Florus and Julius Sacrovir, came from the Treveri and the Aedui respectively — peoples whose purses and honour were

likely to have been affected by Tiberius' measures. They were both aristocrats, both Roman citizens, both officers of auxiliary regiments within the Roman army, and both of families which could boast a long association with Rome. Once again all that is necessary here is the briefest of outlines of the main events of the uprising, which began with apparently unplanned incidents in the Loire valley, which were easily suppressed. However, these stimulated Florus and Sacrovir to attempt to seize power in their own communities. Florus bungled the job, and was soon forced to suicide; Sacrovir was more successful, took Augustodunum (Autun), and even managed to field some sort of army to face the advancing Upper German legions. But his forces were routed, and he too killed himself.

There can be no doubt that during these events, and in their immediate aftermath, the Three Gauls could not have been a comfortable place in which to live. Tacitus tells us that there was hardly a *civitas* that was unaffected by them. Loss of life and damage to property caused directly by the fighting must have been followed by equally cruel and unsettling Roman retribution against those who had participated in the rebellion: we later find C. Silius, the victor of the battle of Augustodunum, being charged with extortion arising out of his activities during the campaign.¹⁴⁰ Moreover, at least according to Tacitus' interpretation, the uprising revived the *terror Gallicus* – the fear that all Gauls were untrustworthy, and that trouble in Gaul might lead to the collapse of the whole of the Empire in the west; old prejudices were thus revived, and these events left a nasty taste in the Roman mouth.¹⁴¹ On the other hand not one entire community had come out against Rome, and indeed the Treveri in particular had been quick to reject, and to destroy, Florus: there is certainly no reason to envisage a policy of comprehensive punitive vengeance being subsequently carried out by the Romans.¹⁴² Tiberius clearly realised the limited danger involved in the rebellion: he maintained a steadfast calmness during these troubles, which he continued to display once they were over.¹⁴³ This was not the attitude of a man liable to act unthinkingly against the best interests of the Empire; and, once the excitement had died down, he visited the region, no doubt to chide and punish those who had been directly involved in the disturbances, but otherwise generally to act fairly and without malice.¹⁴⁴ (Indeed, there is more than a hint that Tiberius suspected that the Gallic troublemakers may have been manipulated by outside forces, inimical to his own regime.¹⁴⁵) There is no sign at all that the events of 21 in any way adversely affected the developing Romanisation and material prosperity of the Three Gauls.¹⁴⁶ The

economy of the Empire was still strong; the financial problems of these years had more to do with cash-flow problems than with basic economic flaws. Less than thirty years later another Roman emperor could afford to treat the revolt of Florus and Sacrovir as if it had never occurred.¹⁴⁷

Notes

1. For the date see Holmes, 53; for the events see below 15f.
2. *Civitas*: the common translation of this word as 'tribe' or 'community' is certainly too weak. de Coulanges, 8f, and Rivet (3), 499, both suggest 'state'. My own feeling, however, is that this expression suggests a degree of centralised organisation probably still wanting among the pre-Conquest Gauls. I prefer 'nation' in the American Indian sense (made up of a number of tribes – Caesar's *pagi*: cf 103-9 below).
3. Piggott, Daniel and McBurney, 158f.
4. Celto-Ligurian: see below 10.
5. Todd, 22f. Staehlin, 55f., points out that the 'Tentones', who are usually associated directly with the Germanic Cimbri, are in fact better seen as Celtic (specifically, Helvetian) 'Toutones', picked up *en route* as allies.
6. Justinus, 43.4.1; Février (1), 11f.
7. Pliny, *NH* 3.4.31.
8. See, e.g., Benedict.
9. Cicero, *De prov. cons.* 3.
10. Cf. below 14.
11. *Pro Fonteio* 27f.
12. Peyre; cf. Hirschfeld, 475, and his use of the word *Keltenfurcht* (although I disagree with his particular argument here).
13. See, e.g., below 25.
14. See Badian, 901f, arguing for a later date; Barraclough, 167-84, claims that the province came into being in 118/17 BC, but accepts that it took about a century for it to be fully organised.
15. Previous troubles: Livy, *Epit.* 73; Sallust, *Hist.* 2.98.9; Cicero, *Pro Fonteio* 6; the Allobrogian revolt: Dio 37.47-9.
16. Sallust, *Catil.* 40-1; 44-5.
17. See below 18.
18. Beloch (1), 449.
19. Strabo 4.1.2f; cf. Diodorus Siculus 5.25.3-5. Caesar, of course, was surprised by the Channel tides. Lucan, *Bell. civ.* 3.399-425, has a splendid description of a Gallic primeval forest. Generally, see Pinchemel, 4f. (There has been some argument as to the actual extent of the Romano-Gallic forests: see Grenier (1), i.110f, 179f, with Harmand, J., 22f. Cf., however, the remarks of Agache (4), 161.)
20. Cf. Diodorus Siculus, 5.25.2.
21. Strabo, 4.1.2f; Diodorus Siculus, 5.25.1: generally, Lerat, 19f.
22. Piggott, Daniel and McBurney, 29.
23. Piggott, Daniel and McBurney, 188.
24. Piggott, Daniel and McBurney, 149, 191 (for the dates).
25. Livy, 5.48; Justinus, 24.6.4.
26. Piggott, Daniel and McBurney, 154f, 180f.
27. Piggott, Daniel and McBurney, 183f.
28. Piggott, Daniel and McBurney, 178 (cautiously).

29. See Lerat, 22, for the origins of this tradition. Its most powerful purveyor was undoubtedly Posidonius: see Nash (1) for a very useful discussion of both Posidonius and his imitators, and of the value of Caesar as an independent witness.

30. *BG* 6.11.2.

31. Apart from the economic and social aspects which immediately follow, even the political turmoil in the Three Gauls at this time may be said to have closely resembled that in Rome itself: cf. below 14.

32. For Hallstatt see above 9; for La Tène, the rich 'Marnian' chariot-burial of 'La Gorge-Meillat' – Piggott, Daniel and McBurney, 185.

33. *BG* 6.13.1f; see Wightman (3), 588-91.

34. E.g., see Holmes, 514f.

35. *BG* 6.13.4-14.6.

36. de Coulanges, 3f (cf. *contra* Nash (1), 124).

37. For the great debate over this issue see Holmes, 509f; Grenier (3), 407; Wightman (3), 592f; cf. Rivet (2), 182f.

38. Grenier (1), ii.783f; cf. Leday (2), 155. See especially Nash (2), 104f. Cf. Caesar, *BG* 6.30.3.

39. See Collis, 10-19. (The best-known example of such a settlement in Gaul is, of course, Bibracte: see, most recently, Fevrier (2), 206f.) See also Nash (2), 114-29.

40. See below 143 n 11.

41. E.g. *BG* 7.13.3: his appreciation of Avaricum (Bourges) as 'the best fortified *oppidum* in the territory of the Bituriges and one lying in an extremely fertile part of the country' (trans. A. and P. Wiseman). Hellenistic influences in the designing and building of Celtic *oppida* should not be forgotten – see Dehn, 149.

42. See de Coulanges, 14-17; Nash (2), 106. Cf. below 124.

43. Groenman-van Wateringe, *passim*. Cf. below 23 for the opposite being the case as far as free Germany was concerned.

44. Florus, *Epit.* 1.37; Cicero, *ad Att.* 1.19.2; Caesar, *BG* 1.35.4. The Cimbric war saw operations in Aquitania; and the numerous Pompeii of the Dordogne are usually taken as a sign of local recruitment of auxiliary troops by Pompey during the Sertorian war.

45. For this, and the following, see Todd, 19-23.

46. This is, however, still a very difficult subject – see Wightman, (1), 16f.

47. Staehlin, 58. The crisis was marked by a revival in the use of *oppida*, the recovery by the development of the *oppida* beyond mere refuges: cf. Collis, 5f, and Nash (2), 107.

48. For the Helvetii, see Tacitus, *Germania* 28; Staehlin, 60, 67. Some Celtic peoples remained across the upper Rhine, despite these changes, and were, presumably, later absorbed in the *Agri Decumates* – Baatz (3), 93; below 60.

49. Staehlin, 68.

50. Caesar, *BG* 1.31.3f.

51. Caesar, *BG* 1.35.4; Cicero, *ad Att.* 1.19.2.

52. A brief and readable account of the following may be found in Adcock.

53. Sherwin-White (1), 36.

54. Cicero, *ad Att.* 1.20.5; Caesar, *BG* 1.35.2.

55. For a discussion of the chronological problems involved see Jullian, iii.166.

56. Caesar, *BG* 1.10.3.

57. Lerat, 13; cf. de Coulanges, 45. (For a rather different interpretation of events see Stevens (2), 168f – the Helvetii were not migrating but were marching to the aid of the Aedui.)

58. The classic work remains Holmes. Very useful translations are now available, for example in the 'Penguin Classics' series and, most recently, that of A. and P. Wiseman.

32 Conquest and pacification

59. Much ink has been spilled in the debate over Caesar's imperialism and its effect on the truthfulness of his *Commentaries*; for a summary see Timpe.

60. Helvetii: *BG* 1.7.3; 1.12.4-7; Ariovistus: 1.33.1f; 1.40.5; 1.44.1f.

61. *BG* 1.7.4; 1.40.5.

62. As was soon recognised, and praised, by Cicero: *De prov. cons.* 32 (56 BC).

63. See above 8, cf. Suetonius, *Caesar* 24.

64. Caesar was always reporting that Gaul was pacified, only to find himself facing further rebellion – *BG* 2.35.1; 3.7.1; 7.1.1; 8.46.1. Clearly, at times he sailed very close to the wind.

65. See below 92.

66. I.e. it was from the time of Caesar, and no earlier, that the strong Greco-Celtic culture of the south began to take on a more Roman form, cf. Février (1), 13f.

67. E.g. the careers of Roucillus and Egus, Caesar, *BC* 3.59.

68. Narbo and Arelate were certainly Caesarian foundations (Suetonius, *Tiberius* 4.1); Forum Iulii and Baeterrae are generally considered to be so by virtue of their official names; the issue as a whole, however, is muddled by the subsequent colonisation of Augustus: see Février (1), 19f; Sherwin-White (3), 367f.

69. Grenier (1), iii.93f (with special reference to *CIL* xii 4333 = *ILS* 112); cf. van Berchem (1), 33; Syme (4), 36; Février (1), 21.

70. Cf. Tacitus, *Annales* 12.32.5 (on the Roman colony at Colchester): *subsidiū adversus rebellis et imbuendis sociis ad officia legum*.

71. Suetonius, *Caesar* 76.3; 80.2.

72. See below 119; DeWitt, 6.

73. Staehlin, 91-6; *CIL* x 6087 = *ILS* 886; Dio, 46.50.3-6.

74. Drinkwater (2), 139. (The somewhat odd positioning of Augst suggests a desire to keep an eye on the Belfort Gap, as well as on access to the Rhône valley by way of the central Swiss plateau.)

75. Caesar, *BG* 7.89.5; Sherwin-White (1), 45. Cf. below 94.

76. Drinkwater (3), 824f.

77. Wightman (6), 117f.

78. The notion that the tribute of 40,000,000 sesterii which Caesar levied on Gallia Comata was deliberately set at a low figure to win the support of the Gauls is deeply embedded in the standard literature, and goes back at least as far as de Coulanges, 66; but cf. below 65.

79. See below 131.

80. Drinkwater (3), 827f.

81. Cf. below 59.

82. Appian, 5.75; see below 121.

83. Dio, 53.22.5.

84. Dio, 54.19.2; 54.25.1; 54.36.3.

85. This is a difficult point since, principally from Dio, 54.23.7, it is generally considered that the main programme of colonisation fell in 16-13 BC. The earlier date seems to me, however, to be more consistent with the military exigencies of the day, and makes more sense of the changes of 22 BC (below). Possibly, as Hatt (2), 92 implies, a beginning was made now, which was exploited at a later date.

86. The usual interpretation of Dio, 53.22.5; the name was already in use in the late Republic – see Cicero, *ad Fam.* 10.26.1.

87. The contemporary reorganisation of Gallia Comata is disputed; see below 95 for my reasons for choosing this date, in preference to 16-13 BC.

88. Dio, 54.4.1; cf. below 94.

89. See below 125.

90. Dio, 53.22.5. To my mind this reference does not necessarily imply the taking of a census in Narbonensis. Pliny, *NH* 4.17.105 tells us that Agrippa

measured the length and breadth of Gaul, and the extent of its coastline, which surely must have been connected with his road-building activity. For the census as an institution see below 99f.

91. Cf. above 19, and below 93f.

92. Drinkwater (3), 831.

93. See below 124.

94. See below 103 and Drinkwater (2). (It should be noted that the chronology just expounded, which places Agrippa's work before that of Augustus, reverses and replaces that of my 1975 article.)

95. See below 94-101.

96. See below 103-5.

97. See below 142f.

98. First mentioned in Tacitus, *Annales* 3.43.1, but perhaps presaged by Caesar's handing over of his Gallic hostages to Aeduan safekeeping: *BG* 7.63.3. Generally, and for subsequent developments, see Haahrhof.

99. Hatt (2), 87f; and see below 121f.

100. See below 122.

101. See above 16.

102. See below 36.

103. See above 20 and below 122.

104. For the main narrative see Dio, 54.32.1 - 54.33.5; 54.36.3; 55.1-2.

105. Cf. Velleius Paterculus, 2.97.4; 2.105.1f.

106. See Fishwick (2), 1204f (who suggests dates of either 8-7 BC or AD 5 for the erection of the Köln altar). For more on the Gallic and German altars see below 111-14, 130.

107. Groenman-van Wateringe, *passim*.

108. von Petrikovits, 31.

109. See Dio, 56.18.3f; Velleius Paterculus, 2.117f.

110. Harmand L. (2), 80-7; cf. Hatt (2), 106f.

111. See above 19f.

112. Velleius Paterculus, 2.117f.

113. Cf. below 26f, 94.

114. See below 42f, 128.

115. Livy, *Epit.* 139; cf. Dio, 54.32.1. *CIL* xiii 1668 (= *ILS* 212) ii, 35-38.

116. Below 111f.

117. Dio, 54.21.2f; below 97-101.

118. Bénabou, *passim*.

119. See below 28, 106.

120. See below 189f.

121. Tacitus, *Annales* 1.11.7.

122. Dio, 56.25.2; cf. Tacitus, *Annales* 1.3.6.

123. Velleius Paterculus, 2.123; Tacitus, *Annales* 1.31.1f; 1.49.5f; 1.55.1f etc.

124. E.g. Hatt (2), 110 (from Augustus, *Res Gestae* 26).

125. Tacitus, *Annales* 2.5.3.

126. Tacitus, *Annales* 1.56.1; cf. Alföldy (1), 77f.

127. Tacitus, *Annales* 1.31.2; 1.71.3, 2.5.3.

128. Tacitus, *Annales* 2.26.3f; 2.41f; 2.69f.

129. Schönberger, 152f (cf. below 55).

130. Cf. Tacitus, *Annales* 2.26.6, 2.41.3f: allowance must be made for Tacitus' own prejudices, but there can be no doubt that Germanicus was a popular figure, whose recall could all too easily be ascribed to the emperor's jealousy.

131. Below 189, 198. Generally, see Grenier (3), 513. It is perhaps worth noting that von Petrikovits, 15, dates the period of occupation of the Rhineland from Caesar to AD 16.

132. Tacitus, *Annales* 3.40-47.

133. So de Coulanges, 72.

134. See Harmand L. (2), 58f.

135. Tacitus, *Annales* 1.41; cf. 3.40.5.

136. This, and much of the following interpretation of events, is based on, although not bound to, the views of Grenier – (2) *passim* and (3) 500, 510.

137. Cf. above 25 and below 106, with Grenier (3), 500, 516.

138. The implication here, of course, is that I suppose a sharp rise in Gallic indebtedness after 17 – cf. above 27. However, as Grenier (2), 376, points out, there was some development under Augustus; and, I would like to suggest, it is not impossible that the Gauls contracted some debts to finance their military support of Germanicus. Thus the events of 21 should be seen as the culmination of a variety of pressures. It is interesting to note that the father of the future emperor Vespasian would have been pursuing his money-lending activities among the Helvetii at this time – below 73.

139. The place of druidism here is discussed below, 38f.

140. Tacitus, *Annales* 4.18f.

141. Tacitus, *Annales* 3.44.1; cf. 3.46.2 (the ready anti-Gallic emotions which Silius was able to inspire in his troops).

142. de Coulanges, 72; Heinen, 40. Generally here I argue against Dyson, 158.

143. Tacitus, *Annales* 3.44.4; 3.47.1f. (Indeed, he ran the risk of playing down the situation too far: according to Tacitus, *Annales* 3.41.4, he refused to act on early accusations against Sacrovir.)

144. Tacitus, *Annales* 3.47.3; cf. Suetonius, *Tiberius* 49.2 (where I would see the emperor's acting against certain rich men in Gaul in the context of events following, rather than preceding, the revolt).

145. See Tacitus, *Annales* 3.44.2f, for the feelings expressed in Rome, and cf. the suspicions at 4.28.2f.

146. Cf. below 37, 169-92.

147. Claudius: *CIL* xiii 1668 (= *ILS* 212) ii, 34f, where the emperor talks of a century of unbroken peace since the Conquest (cf. Tacitus' *continua inde ac fida pax* – *Annales* 11.24.10); cf. below 37.

2 ROMANISATION AND REBELLION

Under Tiberius circumstance and conscious decision had, for good or ill, combined to weaken the close relationship between the Three Gauls and the imperial house, which had been established by Caesar and maintained by Augustus. However, although damped-down, this relationship was far from extinguished; indeed it was soon to flare into life again. One major theme of this chapter will be the alternating warmth and coolness which the two parties continued to feel for each other during the remaining years of the Julio-Claudian dynasty. We shall see, as a particularly fine example of historical irony, how the indispensable part played by the Three Gauls in the promotion of the line of Caesar to imperial power came to be almost exactly balanced by their provocation of its fall and its extinction.

In 37 Tiberius died at the age of 78, to be succeeded by his 25 year-old great-nephew, Gaius, the son of Germanicus. This emperor is notoriously difficult to assess, and widely differing explanations have been advanced for the acts of 'badness' or 'madness' attributed to him by our sources, particularly Suetonius.¹ There can be no doubt that, as far as the Three Gauls are concerned, he directly harmed many individual inhabitants of these provinces; however, there can be equally little doubt that, for better or worse, he restored the close acquaintanceship between the reigning emperor and Gallia Comata. It is worth pointing out that he had spent part of his earliest childhood in northern Gaul while his father was engaged upon his military responsibilities along the Rhine, either in the border area itself (where his miniature version of the legionary's uniform gained him the nickname *Caligula*, 'Bootikins') or in its hinterland.² The whole family enjoyed great popularity, and it is clear that at the beginning of his reign he still felt able to draw this Gallic support to himself.³ It is surely significant that when, in 39, his welcome in Rome showed signs of cooling he moved to the west, eventually entering his third consulship at Lugdunum on 1 January, 40. He returned to Rome in the course of this year.

His extravagant western exploits have been much discussed by scholars: do they disclose plain insanity, or embody some serious intention which our sources either failed to understand or wilfully misrepresented?⁴ His purpose in leaving Italy in 39 was ostensibly to launch an expedition against Germany, which however quickly dissolved into

farce and play-acting.⁵ Yet it might also be argued that since all the leading males of the Julio-Claudian line - Caesar, Augustus, Drusus, Tiberius, and Germanicus - had waged war across the Rhine, Gaius was compelled to follow suit simply to confirm his claim to the purple, the more so since as yet he had no military career to boast of. After long years of Tiberian inactivity the imperial army commanders may themselves indeed have felt a similar need to prove their worth.⁶ Additionally, or perhaps alternatively, it could be that the campaign was never really intended to be a full-scale invasion, but had a more modest aim, that of providing a show of strength to overawe certain trans-Rhenish tribes (especially the Chatti) who were beginning to make nuisances of themselves.⁷ In this respect archaeological evidence has suggested a positive extension of the Tiberian bridgehead opposite Moguntiacum into Chatti territory, with the building of the fort at Hofheim, in the Taunus (Map 4).⁸ Gaius' projected invasion of Britain in 40 may be similarly interpreted - that is, as representing both the bobbing of a curtsy to Caesar's memory, and as a positive demonstration of support to Roman clients over the Channel, now pressured by growing Catuvellaunian power.⁹ (It is also tempting to see some sort of Celtic religious significance in his apparently lunatic manoeuvring of his troops on the beach at Boulogne: in a rather strange aside Aristotle wrote that the Celts were accustomed to make continual war on the sea; but this is probably to push speculation a little too far.¹⁰) Again, a direct material benefit from this activity was the building of a lighthouse at Boulogne. Finally, the games which he is reported to have instituted at Lugdunum included a rhetorical competition which seems to have been designed specifically to humiliate many of those who took part; but they were not blood-thirsty, and they fostered that love of public speaking which we know to have been part of the Gallic tradition while adding to the prestige and importance of the city as the effective capital of the Three Gauls.¹¹ Less excusable is the proscription of wealthy Gauls after a contrived 'auction' of imperial bric-à-brac to unwilling bidders had only temporarily eased his chronic shortage of ready cash.¹² Individuals certainly suffered by this, but from a more general viewpoint it may be argued that both the proscription, and the sale, are evidence for the growing wealth of Gaul (while the technique employed in carrying out the former reflects the extent of the imperial government's knowledge of Gallic affairs: the census was doing its job).¹³ After the remoteness of Tiberius, however, his successor must at times have seemed embarrassingly and uncomfortably close. His departure will have been welcomed.

The assassination of Gaius in 41 led to the accession of his uncle,

Claudius, of whom it may with justification be said that he not only restored the special relationship between his family and the Three Gauls, but also took it to its furthest extent. He was in fact born at Lugdunum — on 1 August, 10 BC, the second anniversary of the dedication of the great Altar by his father, Drusus.¹⁴ Fortunately, his interest had not the unpredictable perversity of Gaius', and so the Three Gauls benefited probably more than most provinces from a reign which, despite its eccentricities, is now generally regarded as being beneficial to the Empire as a whole. Indeed, perhaps as a result of his interest in Roman history, he possessed an unusually positive and highly developed sense of Rome's imperial destiny.

This is best seen in his promotion, against the bitter conservative opposition of the Roman and Italian aristocracy (shades, once more, of the *terror Gallicus*!) of the so-called *ius honorum*, the legal details of which have in the past been disputed, but which was clearly intended in some way or other to allow certain of the leading men of the Three Gauls quickly to become members of the Roman Senate (and so, through such participation in the elaborate charade of Augustus' 'Restored Republic', to take a major role in the administration of the Empire).¹⁵ This was in 48, just under a generation since the revolt of Florus and Sacrovir, and reveals the emperor's perceptive realisation of the extent to which the Gallic upper classes were both wealthy and Romanised, despite the political ups and downs of the previous century.¹⁶ Significantly, the concession was apparently stimulated by an enquiry from the Aedui, those early 'Brothers' of the Roman People, and it was first granted specifically to members of this nation.¹⁷ However, as Audin has remarked, the fact that the famous discovery of a copy, on bronze, of part of the emperor's speech in the Roman Senate in support of this proposal, was made at Condate suggests that the formal request came from representatives of all the *civitates* of the Three Gauls, meeting as the 'Gallic Council' to worship at the Altar of Rome and Augustus.¹⁸ Thus, though the Aedui were the first to boast Roman senators in the ranks of their aristocracy, the way would be open for others quickly to follow suit.¹⁹

On a slightly less exalted plane, there is evidence that under Claudius it became somewhat easier for the inhabitants of the Three Gauls to obtain Roman citizenship. The many 'Julii' of Gallia Comata under the High Empire almost certainly owed their enfranchisement to military service under Caesar and Octavian; after 27 BC the latter was less generous, and this more restrictive policy seems to have continued under Tiberius and Gaius.²⁰ From the middle of the first century, however,

we notice the appearance of several 'Claudii', and also of Roman citizens, who although they did not bear the imperial name itself, were labelled, anachronistically, as belonging to the long-defunct Republican electoral division of *Quirina*, of which Claudius was a member and to which anyone enfranchised by him would automatically be allotted.²¹ Again such liberality provoked reaction: in Seneca's blistering attack on the emperor, published of course after Claudius' death in 54, great emphasis was laid on his reckless generosity to the provincials in the way of grants of Roman citizenship – a general, and very likely exaggerated, taunt but one which almost certainly was stimulated by events in the Three Gauls.²² In addition to this increase in privilege the Three Gauls also benefited materially from Claudius' rule. This aspect of Gallic life will be examined more closely later in this work, but the main points may usefully be sketched in here. Above all, it seems that under Claudius the Gallic road-network, begun by Agrippa, was brought more or less to completion; specific help and encouragement were given to certain towns – for example Lugdunum received at least one aqueduct; and there seems to have been extensive personal spending on urban amenities by rich Gauls now obviously prospering from the *Pax romana*.²³ Claudius' active, though not overly aggressive, frontier policy could have been only to the benefit of Gaul.²⁴ The economy, and the general Romanisation, of the north-east would also have received particular encouragement from the promotion of the chief towns of both the Ubii and the Treveri to full colonial status (the former changing its name to become Colonia Claudia Ara Agrippinensium).²⁵ The emperor's conquest of Britain was no doubt undertaken for direct, selfish, political ends (like Gaius, Claudius needed some sort of military victory to set the seal on his accession), but there were some very positive results: a disturbing influence on Gallic life was removed; the Three Gauls could now feel themselves to be at the centre of the western Empire instead of being perched on its periphery; and the invasion brought material benefits in its wake, for example more and better roads, and greater opportunities for trade and commerce.²⁶

There is, however, one possible blemish in this story of general Gallic advancement under Claudius, namely the fact that he moved to eradicate surviving druidic activity.²⁷ Augustus had banned Roman citizens from participation in druidic rites and, according to the elder Pliny, Tiberius had also acted against the priesthood.²⁸ As a number of scholars have observed, this latter action might suggest that religious forces played some part in the rebellion of 21, the more so since they were to reappear in 70.²⁹ For all his high regard for the Three Gauls,

therefore, do we here see Claudius realising that there were still dark political forces to be combatted which, given the opportunity, would ruin the Romanisation of the west? The question is difficult. My own inclination, however, is against the exaggeration of the importance of these moves. Advanced druidism of the late La Tène period required intensive training of both memory and intellect, and therefore great resources of time and money; it is not surprising that it came to depend on, and be dominated by, the Gallic aristocracy.³⁰ The subjugation, and then the Romanisation, of this aristocracy would have sounded the death-knell of the priesthood from a very early date. Augustus' interdiction was probably the most lethal blow suffered by the order. I would prefer to see subsequent Tiberian and Claudian legislation as being not so much connected with the political side of Gallic life as with straightforward revulsion against the persistence of the bizarre activities of the debased remnant of druidism in the back woods of the Three Provinces (especially the rite of human sacrifice).³¹ As for Tacitus' druidical prophecies concerning the likely fall of Rome as a result of the troubles of 68-70, which we shall come to shortly, I would prefer to place little historical weight upon them, and even to suggest that they derived from Italian rumours going ultimately back to the old *terror Gallicus*.³²

According to ancient tradition, Claudius was murdered by his niece, and second wife, Agrippina the younger (the daughter of Germanicus and Agrippina the elder, and the sister of Gaius) in order to promote the succession of her son by a previous marriage, Nero (54-68). There seems to be no reason to doubt this. Nero's exalted views of his own importance are well enough known. These attitudes caused him to neglect the Three Gauls, and to weaken the Julio-Claudian connection beyond repair; and this was to be the cause of his downfall. Above all, for the first time since the dynasty came to power, a Julio-Claudian emperor showed himself to be much more interested in the Greek east than in the Latin west.³³

At the beginning of his reign he had even toyed with the notion of abandoning Britain, and in 58 his inertia on the Rhine frontier tempted the Frisii to insult the might of Rome, to their cost.³⁴ Apart from this, the only noteworthy pieces of specific information which we have from the greater part of his period as emperor are reports of a new census of the Three Gauls in 61, and of a great fire which destroyed Lugdunum in 65 – ironically enough probably only just after its inhabitants had sent a contribution to help towards the cost of rebuilding Rome after the famous Neronian conflagration in the capital the year before.

The money, amounting to some 4,000,000 sesterii, was returned.³⁵ There is no record of the emperor's having visited any of the Three Provinces. To a certain extent such neglect was benign. If nothing positive was done, neither was there any effort made to reverse the Claudian advances. In particular, it is reasonable to suppose that as a result of the reform of 48 more and more Gallic aristocrats used their wealth not only to enter the Roman Senate but also, as senators, to undertake important Roman magistracies. The speed of Gallic Romanisation, at least as far as the upper levels of Gallic society were concerned, was gaining pace. Yet, curiously enough, perhaps this was to be Nero's undoing for, as time went by and his excesses increased in number, the dissatisfactions, doubts, worries and ambitions which arose in the minds of such people concerning the state of the Empire of which they found themselves part, and which, in earlier days, might have caused them to long for 'liberty' and 'freedom', now more easily found expression and release in disgust for a Roman ruler whose extravagancies disgraced the good name of a Roman family and the reputation of Rome.³⁶ This criticism would certainly have been sharpened by such happenings as the spasmodic abuse of his power by an imperial favourite travelling through Gaul on his way to Britain, and by the emperor's efforts, as his reign drew to a close, to recoup some of the costs of his madcap schemes from the taxpayer — especially, it would seem, from British and Gallic taxpayers (in the latter case perhaps because the new census would have made the operation so much easier).³⁷ In March, 68, rebellion broke out in Gaul.³⁸

The revolt was led by a Gallic nobleman, Julius Vindex, who claimed descent from Aquitanian kings.³⁹ However, as I have already suggested, this was no nationalistic uprising, but one led by a Roman senatorial magistrate in the name of Rome: Vindex was governor of a Gallic province, usually assumed to be Lugdunensis. He came of a second-generation senatorial family: his father had probably entered the Senate under Claudius.⁴⁰ We may presume that to attain his Gallic governorship Vindex had had to work his way up through a fairly standard range of posts in the army and in the civil administration like any other aspiring young man of senatorial rank of his day. Indeed, we are told that he possessed much military experience.⁴¹ As he served his apprenticeship he would have come into close contact with people of the same rank and social status, but of quite different ethnic backgrounds, whose thoughts and ambitions, like his, ran far beyond their native towns and provinces to centre on Rome itself. That powerful conservative senatorial tradition which throughout the life of the Empire consistently

showed itself capable of taking leading provincials and making them see themselves as the heirs of Cato and Cicero would, through those whom it had already converted, have won over Vindex in his turn.⁴² He should be regarded as being more Roman than Gallic in his mentality. In fact, so 'imperial' was his viewpoint that he exposed his plans to betrayal by communicating his thoughts to fellow governors well before he actually began his revolt.⁴³ The senatorial tradition was realistic; Vindex's aim was not to re-establish a truly 'restored' Republic, which the overwhelming majority of the political nation realised was an impossibility, but rather to depose an emperor plainly no longer worthy of his position and to install a 'better' man (that is, one who would show more respect to the Senate) in his place.⁴⁴ In the end, just after his open declaration against Nero, Vindex issued the appropriate invitation to Servius Sulpicius Galba, governor of the Spanish province of Tarraconensis, a man already in his seventies.⁴⁵ *Faute de mieux* though it may have been (since Galba is likely to have been the only one of his intended accomplices not to betray him), this turned out to be an acceptable move. Galba was of ancient senatorial stock, with a fine reputation in his own right, and already known to the Gauls through an earlier governorship in Aquitania and service on the Rhine.⁴⁶ Nervously at first, he accepted the offer and, careful to act in the proper fashion himself, set Spain against Nero not as a usurper but in the name of the Senate and People of Rome.⁴⁷ Generally, the studied constitutionalism (dangerous though it is to apply so categorical an expression in the context of the peculiar farrago of precedents, privileges and powers which made up Augustus' 'Restored Republic') of Vindex's enterprise is quite remarkable, and in marked contrast to the desperately anti-imperial ferocity of the Jewish revolt which had broken out some two years earlier, and which still raged furiously.

In Gaul, however, events did not run smoothly. Vindex's failure to bring over the Roman imperial administration to his side meant that his revolt very quickly began to run ragged. He seems to have been unable to secure a complete province. In particular, if he was the governor of Lugdunensis then his rejection by the provincial capital of Lugdunum would have come as an especially severe setback.⁴⁸ The support of individual *civitates* gave the venture something of a unified appearance: he was joined by the Aedui of Lugdunensis, the Arverni of Aquitania, the Sequani of the upper German military zone (at this time probably still nominally in Belgica) and the city of Vienna (which may well have brought with it a sizeable number of the nation of the Allobroges) in Narbonensis.⁴⁹ However, many communities held back; and such a

cobbling-together of overtly Gallic support carried its own dangers.

There can be little doubt that, given his military and political experience, Vindex would not have acted as he did if he had not had good reason to expect the support, or at least the acquiescence, of the commanders of the Rhine armies.⁵⁰ The key figure here was Verginius Rufus, in charge of the upper German legions, whose actions and motives at this time have long attracted the interest of scholars. Although he was a Neronian protégé it is now generally seen that Nero was very quick to suspect Verginius' loyalty, fearing, with good reason, some sort of *rapprochement* between the general and the rebels.⁵¹ It is likely that Vindex too thought he had won his man; therefore, once the revolt had begun, why did Rufus proceed with the mobilisation of his forces, apparently against the rebel? I would suggest that both he and his men were prisoners of the *terror Gallicus*. As is reflected in our written sources, the Greco-Roman mind found itself unable to grasp the fact that a revolt in Gaul could be entirely in the best interests of the Empire.⁵² Vindex helped to confirm this prejudice by ignoring provincial boundaries to unite at his side the three great nations of the old Independence-era.⁵³ In the event Verginius could not countenance (nor would his legionaries have countenanced) open alliance with someone who, however faintly, already had the look of a nationalistic rebel. He began to make arrangements to move into Gaul to take direct control of the situation (although, I feel, not necessarily, at this stage, to crush the whole movement against Nero, especially once the involvement of Galba gave it respectability). At this juncture, I would further suggest, Vindex made his most serious mistake. Verginius, characteristically, had not yet declared himself. Therefore Vindex, without regular military backing (and lacking even the support of the unit of Rome's security-police -- the 'urban cohort' -- which was stationed at Lugdunum to guard the mint there, and which must have followed, or dictated, the colony's lead in declaring for Nero⁵⁴), may well have felt that his enterprise was in danger of losing its credibility. He therefore did the only thing which was left to him: he turned to the *civitates* once again and raised the native levies. It is quite possible that in acting in this manner he was able to exploit old Gallic precedents which enabled a military overlord to summon a *levée en masse*. On the other hand, in view of what has already been said about him as a Roman senator, it is open to question whether this was the view he took of the matter. He could quite simply have seen himself as a Roman magistrate calling on the regularly organised *civitas*-militias to help out in an emergency, as had happened before and would happen again.⁵⁵ In the event, in the eyes of

the Rhenish legions it was the former impression which prevailed. For here was the Roman governor certainly turned into the 'Gallic dynast' — no longer the political heir of Cato and Cicero but rather of Sacrovir, Vercingetorix, and indeed of Brennus; and it has justly been remarked that, whatever Vindex's own ideas were, the impression in the minds of his less politically sensitive Gallic lieutenants, and indeed in those of the politically illiterate multitude, may have been quite different: somewhere down the chain of command there might well have been foolish talk of Gallic liberty.⁵⁶ The upper German army could not stand aside; and even if Verginius Rufus had not possessed his own doubts about Vindex it would have cost him his life if he had attempted to thwart his men.⁵⁷

Within weeks of the original uprising (very likely in April, 68) he faced Vindex at Vesontio (Besançon), the key to the Belfort Gap.⁵⁸ Last-minute secret negotiations, which should have reconciled the two leaders, served only to frustrate the Roman troops; they forced battle, with the predictable result. Vindex's forces were no match for three full legions and their auxiliaries; the Gauls were wiped out. Plutarch gives a figure of 20,000 dead, which is no doubt inexact, but suggests extensive loss of life.⁵⁹ Vindex perished by his own hand; Verginius assumed a position of uneasy neutrality. For Nero, however, it was already too late. A cooler personality might still have been able to control the situation, but he had by now given way to panic. By the wildness of his actions he provoked those who opposed him in Rome itself to action, which led eventually to his death. Thus the way was open for the Senate legitimately to offer, and for Galba legitimately to accept, the imperial purple: the constitutional game was played to the last.

This was, however, only the raising of the curtain; the drama proper now began, for the events of 68 had undammed political currents which took time to run their course. The Rhine army in particular was restless because it felt out of favour with an emperor whose accession it had nearly negated by its suppression of Vindex and its subsequent inactivity. This was a far cry from the glory and booty which the troops had expected to win from victory over mere Gallic rebels. Verginius Rufus was later to claim that he had done what he did to suppress a dangerous nationalistic uprising. This attitude was plainly already that of his men who, having seen their commander removed under a cloud, and official honours paid to the defeated Gaul, were now aghast at the favours showered on those individuals and nations who had followed Vindex (grants of Roman citizenship, generous remission of direct and indirect taxes, gifts of land).⁶⁰ Further discord was sown by the Treveri, Lingones

and other northern *civitates* which, no doubt, prudently following the example of the neighbouring legions, had also been hostile to Vindex; their representatives now moved amongst the troops complaining about harsh punishments, including loss of land (presumably to communities which had backed the rebel) imposed upon them by Galba.⁶¹ Here was a situation to be manipulated by ambitious men. On 1 January, 69, the legions in upper Germany threw off their allegiance to the new emperor; the insurrection quickly spread to the lower German army and led, as was probably planned, to the elevation of the lower German commander, Aulus Vitellius, to the purple. His forces soon began to advance on Italy; the Empire was plunged once again into civil war.

These events, naturally enough, had important repercussions in Rome itself. Galba's government was weakening, the result, we are told, of his harshness and meanness which lost him the support of his troops, and of his inability to control his favourites (probably the result of his age) which undermined his political position. As the bad news from Germany came in Galba attempted to bolster his regime by choosing an heir, Piso Licinianus. The effort was in vain. Marcus Otho, Piso's disappointed rival, and his backers immediately suborned the Imperial Guard; Otho was proclaimed emperor, and Galba and Piso were killed. The usurper's triumph was, however, only short-lived. Despite his spirited strategy, in April 69 his forces suffered defeat in northern Italy as they attempted to repulse the invading German army under the command of Vitellius' generals. Otho promptly, and rather melodramatically, committed suicide. Vitellius was thus able to enter Italy as undisputed emperor. But still the agony had a long way to run, for the new emperor was almost immediately challenged by the commander of the battle-hardened forces in the east, Vespasian, already the hero of the Jewish war. The year 69 had become 'the year of the four emperors'; and for the first time for over a century the entire Greco-Roman world found itself at war.

The Three Gauls continued to pay a heavy price for their involvement in these events. The slaughter of the supporters of Vindex, and Galba's heavy-handed policy of rewards and punishments, were in their turn followed by the excesses of Vitellius and his cronies. Gallic communities in the path of those forces which his lieutenants were marching into Italy were generally terrorised into providing supplies, particularly if they had not been early supporters of the usurper.⁶² The unfortunate Helvetii, who had the temerity to refuse to recognise Vitellius, were especially badly treated.⁶³ Vitellius himself, who already possessed something of a reputation as a libertine, followed his advance-

columns at a more leisurely pace, and in fact took up prolonged residence at Lugdunum, while proving to be just as much a burden on the provinces thanks to his increasingly expensive tastes.⁶⁴ There can be no doubt that during this period Galba's policy concerning the Three Gauls was summarily reversed. The unsettled state of the country at the time is well reflected in the activity of a certain Mariccus, a Boian of humble stock who, declaring himself to be a divine 'Liberator of the provinces of Gaul', managed to collect a following of some 8,000 persons before being put down by the Aeduan militia, with a stiffening of auxiliary forces supplied by Vitellius from Lugdunum. Mariccus was captured and later killed, probably in the amphitheatre at Condate.⁶⁵ As in the case of the Empire as a whole, however, the full horrors of the civil war had yet to play themselves through to the finish. Once emperor, Vitellius would naturally have considered the main threat to lie with Vespasian in the east. However, in an attempt to open a war on two fronts Vespasian's agents incited the commander of an auxiliary infantry regiment, the Batavian Julius Civilis, to stage a mock Germanic rebellion against Vitellius, and so tie down the latter's strength.⁶⁶ This worked, but rather too well. The Batavians were a Germanic people who had been allowed into the Empire to settle on the lower reaches of the Rhine; renowned warriors, they paid no tribute, but instead supplied valuable fighting men to the Roman army, usually in the form of ethnic units under native officers.⁶⁷ They were a powerful but unpredictable weapon to deploy in the Vespasianic cause, the more so because of late they had begun to resent the demands of imperial recruiting officers operating in the name of Vitellius.⁶⁸ Civilis himself was no ordinary soldier, but a prince among his people, who had his own reasons to resent Roman rule.⁶⁹ While at first he pretended simply to be playing his agreed part, in reality he skilfully exploited his position, and the prevailing weakness of the Empire, to develop what increasingly amounted to a genuinely nationalistic rebellion against Rome, aided by the free Germans from over the Rhine.⁷⁰

Within a short time his success revealed the true nature of his revolt. According to Tacitus, Civilis had hoped from the beginning that the Three Gauls would be sympathetic to his cause, and to this end had treated his Gallic prisoners (particularly auxiliary officers) well and played down the defeat of Vindex.⁷¹ He had clearly begun to entertain ambitions of an independent state in the west, with himself as ruler.⁷² However, it is noteworthy that in the early stages of Civilis' rebellion, despite the growing magnitude of its success, the Gallic communities remained for the most part loyal to Rome. Gallic reinforcements

streamed in to support the imperial cause; and even other Germanic or semi-Germanic peoples settled on the left bank of the Rhine continued to support the Empire, often to their cost.⁷³ For the moment, and in sharp contrast to the legionary troops, whose political allegiance so often conflicted with that of their officers as to damage both discipline and fighting capacity, even the larger conflict being waged over the Alps seems to have left unshaken the general commitment of the Three Gauls to stay with and protect the Empire of which they had now for so long formed part. Civilis' rebellion seemed about to localise itself on the lower Rhine in an undignified struggle for the legionary base at Vetera (Xanten).⁷⁴ It was the increasing intensity of the Roman civil war, as Vespasian's victorious commanders moved in on Vitellius, which finally began to change Gallic attitudes, and to set certain Gallic leaders behind Civilis on the same road towards independence from Rome. Tacitus, characteristically, stresses the bitter street-fighting which broke out in Rome late in December 69 and, above all, the subsequent burning of the Capitol, as the main stimulus for the druidic claims that Rome's days were numbered and that the future lay with the Gauls.⁷⁵ I have already expressed my doubts on this score, and, however this may be, a more practical consideration was certainly the contemporary total collapse of Roman military power on the Rhine, resulting from the complete demoralisation of the legions stationed there.⁷⁶ To those who gave the matter any serious thought it must have seemed that Civilis held the fate of the west in his hands.

The men who became the leaders of the Gallic revolt against Rome were from much the same mould as Florus and Sacrovir, and Vindex, before them.⁷⁷ The Treverans, Julius Classicus and Julius Tutor, and the Lingonian, Julius Sabinus, were clearly all of aristocratic families which could trace their ancestries back to the pre-Conquest era, but which had received Roman citizenship at a very early date from the hands of Caesar or Octavian, probably as a reward for military service.⁷⁸ Classicus and Tutor were indeed serving officers in the Roman army of their day, the former as an auxiliary commander and the latter holding the somewhat enigmatic position of 'officer commanding the Rhine bank' (*ripae Rheni... praefectus*). However, they were not senators and therefore had not been subjected to the influence of the senatorial tradition. Claudius' concession had clearly not been taken up by all the leading families in the Gallic *civitates*. The defection of these men, with the influence they could control, spelled the end for the legions of the Rhine; there was wholesale surrender and those troops whose lives were spared were compelled to swear allegiance to an *Imperium Galliarum*.⁷⁹

The revolt began to spread. However, early success was followed by a sudden reversal in fortune. As in pre-Roman days, there was disagreement among the Gallic nations, and even in the vicinity of the Rhineland there remained *civitates* unwilling to join the enterprise. One such state was that of the Sequani who, when Julius Sabinus attempted to force them into submission with his Lingonian militia, defeated him soundly and forced him into a bizarre nine-year-long secret exile.⁸⁰ This setback, together with the news of the approach of a large Roman army, despatched by Vespasian to exact retribution now his hold on the Empire was secure, inspired other Comatan communities to organise a great conference (one is immediately reminded of similar gatherings recorded in Caesar's *Commentaries*) at Reims to establish a joint policy on future action.⁸¹ Suspicion of the Treveri and Lingones, and a shrewdly practical appreciation of the political and administrative difficulties involved in the creation of a Gallic state, led to the inevitable decision, issued in the name of the Gallic provinces (*nomine Galliarum*), not to join the rebels.⁸² From this moment onwards the ambitions of Classicus and Tutor were doomed to frustration. The idiosyncratic, but capable, Flavian general Petillius Cerealis arrived to break the *Imperium Galliarum* at the battle of Trier, in 70.⁸³ Classicus and Tutor, and other leading rebels, escaped with Civilis to regather their strength, but henceforth the war degenerated into an essentially local wrangle between Rome and a troublesome Batavian renegade on the lower Rhine; full rebellion was at an end. Civilis was hunted down remorselessly to his surrender;⁸⁴ his subsequent fate is unknown, but we may presume that he was executed.

In many ways the historian of the Three Gauls must take care not to exaggerate the consequences of the events of 68-70. As we have already seen, it is highly unlikely that Vindex ever saw himself as the champion of Gallic nationalism against imperialistic Rome; and although the supporters of the *Imperium Galliarum* were prepared to be more forthright in their claims they were unable to win more than a small part of the Gallic population to their cause. (They seem, indeed, to have been restricted to Belgica and the German military zone -- in fact to those communities which had earlier tended to support Vitellius against Galba. Once Civilis had shown his true colours these *civitates* would have had no inclination to back an imperial government now led by Vitellius' arch-enemy and destroyer, Vespasian.) In general, most Gallic individuals and communities had stood by the Empire in a period of convulsion and confusion. Although certain examples were no doubt made, there was no need for widespread retribution in the form of confiscations or

executions.⁸⁵ Archaeologically, there is no evidence to suggest that Gallic progress towards the acquisition of the material comforts of Roman civilisation was in any way hindered or impaired.⁸⁶

There is, however, another side to this story, less accessible but just as important.⁸⁷ I have deliberately drawn attention to the *terror Gallicus*, that deep-seated Roman fear of Gauls which was always lurking under the surface ready to bedevil Gallo-Roman relations.⁸⁸ We have already seen such feelings renewed by the revolt of Florus and Sacrovir in 21; further, although strictly speaking not part of the history of the Three Gauls, it is interesting to note that the eminent Narbonensian, the Allobrogian Valerius Asiaticus, could fall in 47 to a charge of being a rich 'Gallic dynast'.⁸⁹ It is hardly surprising that in the following year Claudius had to battle against conservative senatorial opposition to win acceptance for his *ius honorum*. I have argued above that it was his apparent transformation from Roman magistrate to Gallic 'baron' that condemned Vindex in the eyes of the Rhine legions.⁹⁰ The foolishly overt nationalism of the *Imperium Galliarum* must have served only to deepen these feelings, a circumstance which seems profoundly to have affected the relationship between Gauls and Romans.

The picture is clouded by problems of evidence. For most of our detailed knowledge of events in Gaul under the early Principate we are dependent upon Tacitus. Unfortunately, his narrative is lost to us from the opening of Civilis' speech of surrender to Cerealis, and in its absence it is perilously easy to run into the dangers of argumentation *ex silentio*. However, other forms of information (particularly epigraphical) do seem to suggest, as many have noticed, a sort of squeezing-out of Gauls from the high positions of Empire: after Vindex senators and equestrians originating from the Three Provinces are very difficult to find.⁹¹ Inscriptions would also indicate an ending of the policy of raising Gallic auxiliary units from a single *civitas* under native officers, and allowing them to serve in Gaul - a practice which had figured prominently in the events of 69-70 and which had certainly led to trouble.⁹²

In addition, without being too perverse, it may indeed be possible to argue that there is still something to be won from Tacitus in this respect. Though the surviving books of the *Annals* and the *Historiae* describe events that took place during the first three-quarters of the first century, these works were, of course, the product of the early years of the following century. The troubles of 68-70 in particular, which fall within Tacitus' own early manhood, could therefore be assessed in the light of subsequent experience, and could be set in the overall context of the first hundred years or so of the Principate. It is a very difficult, and

indeed dangerous, undertaking for the modern historian suddenly to round upon a first-rate ancient source which he has cited so far almost without question to claim bias and even distortion. However, it is clear that the bulk of Tacitus' narrative is perfectly acceptable; generally he is a very credible reporter. I would argue that it is really only in his omissions and asides, and particularly in his set speeches, that we can detect something of that uneasy attitude to Comatan Gauls which the lessons of history had made part of the furniture of the educated Roman mind of the *second* century.

Thus, while Tacitus provides sufficient information to support the idea of Vindex as a senatorial opponent of Nero, he never overtly advances this conclusion himself, and indeed seems perfectly content consistently to allow the impression of the Gaul as a Gallic rebel, who, with chiefs as his henchmen (*duces Galliarum*) waged outright war (the *bellum Vindicis*) on Rome in the manner of a latter-day Sacrovir.⁹³ One cannot but feel that in Tacitus' mind the stinging retort which he makes the garrison of Vetera address to Civilis was equally applicable to Vindex: 'it was not for a turncoat to sit in judgement on matters Roman' (*proinde perfuga arbitrium rerum Romanarum ne ageret*).⁹⁴ Justified though Vindex's complaints against Nero may have been, it was not a Gaul's place to rebel against Rome, still less to decide on who should rule her and her Empire. Concerning Gauls as a whole, Tacitus seems generally content to illustrate those stock Gallic vices which recur time and again in the ancient historiographical tradition, from Caesar to Ammianus Marcellinus: the Gauls appear as hot-tempered, insolent, politically feckless and untrustworthy people, whose loyalty to Rome is only lukewarm.⁹⁵ Summarising the condition of the Empire some two years after the defeat of Florus and Sacrovir, and plainly speaking for himself, Tacitus could bluntly state that the German garrison was ready to cope indifferently with the German or the Gaul; and as Cerealis prepared to face the main force of the rebels for the first time he dismissed his Gallic reinforcements, telling them to tell their peoples that the legions could cope with the defence of the Empire (*sufficere imperio legiones*).⁹⁶ Memories of Brennus and his misdeeds are recalled by both direct and indirect references.⁹⁷ The speech which the loyal Julius Aepex delivered at Reims is only very briefly summarised, for we are told that the Gauls decided to follow his advice (to abandon the rebels) out of expediency, not positive appreciation of Rome.⁹⁸

The overriding impression of the Gauls suggested by Tacitus is therefore, far from flattering. However, the situation is not entirely straightforward; side by side with his criticism Tacitus seems to have had a

genuine interest in, and sympathy for, the inhabitants of the Three Gauls. Like those of naughty children their failings are described more in terms of sorrow than of anger.⁹⁹ This theme is best expressed in one of the most famous set-speeches of the work, that delivered by Cerealis to the Treveri and the Lingones just before the battle of Trier.¹⁰⁰ His basic message is quite simple: the Roman presence in Gaul protects the Gauls from the Germans; only Gallic stupidity could lead to the supposition that the rule of Civilis would be lighter than that of Rome. However, Cerealis goes beyond this to stress the positions already held by Gauls in the actual running of the Empire: Gauls have become legionary commanders, even provincial governors: 'there is no question of segregation or exclusion' (*nihil separatim clausumve*).¹⁰¹ Assuming the exercise of that wide degree of licence which was allowed to an ancient historian in the reconstruction of such orations, I would guess that here we have no authentic report of Cerealis' own words, but Tacitus himself pushing forward to describe what he believed to have been the case some thirty-odd years before, but which no longer obtained in his own day, possibly with a view to inviting the leading Gauls of the age to return to the Roman fold.¹⁰² However, as his own narrative reveals, despite these good intentions anti-Gallic feeling within the Roman ruling class was still too strong. The Gauls sensed this, and while a few edged a little more into the warmth, most continued to stay out in the cold (which could only have confirmed Roman doubts).¹⁰³ The demise of the Julio-Claudian relationship seems to have been an important turning-point in Gallo-Roman affairs.

Notes

1. E.g. Massaro and Montgomery, *passim*.
2. Tacitus, *Annales* 1.40f. One presumes that the city of Trier in particular would have quickly become a normal resort of senior officers of the lower German army for the purposes of relaxation and recuperation.
3. Cf. above 28.
4. See the general discussion, with references in Massaro and Montgomery, 901f. The problem is really incapable of solution, and the following remarks are intended simply to suggest lines of thought, not to propose any definite answer.
5. Dio, 59.21.1-3, 59.22.2f; Suetonius, *Gaius* 43-5, 47.
6. Stein, 27. (I.e. I do not believe that the expedition was initially spurred by the revolt of Gaeticulus.)
7. So Hatt (2), 126; cf. Suetonius, *Galba* 6.3, where, when relieved of the need to criticise Gaius, Suetonius does reveal that there was real trouble in Germany at this time.
8. Schönberger, 152.
9. Dio, 59.21.3; Suetonius, *Gaius* 46 (cf. 44.2).
10. *Eudemian Ethics* 3.1 (26).

11. Suetonius, *Gaius* 20; cf. Diodorus Siculus, 5.28.5, 5.31.1.
12. Dio, 59.21.5f; 59.22.3f.
13. Cf. below 99f.
14. See above 24; Suetonius, *Claudius* 2.1 (confusing the date of his subject's birthday with that of the dedication of the Altar).
15. Tacitus, *Annales* 11.23-24; cf. *CIL* xiii 1668 (= *ILS* 212). It is now generally recognised that the process involved was simply one of adlection to the Senate – Sherwin-White (3), 237f.
16. Cf. above 29, it is to be observed how much emphasis both Claudius, and his senatorial critics, put on Gallic wealth in this debate.
17. Cf. above 12f, Tacitus, *Annales* 11.25.1.
18. Audin A., 10f, 122f; cf. above 111, below 114.
19. See Dio, 63.22.1² (Loeb), and below 40 (concerning the father of Julius Vindex).
20. Sherwin-White (3), 237.
21. Drinkwater (3), 832f; Jullian, iv.174, 240.
22. Seneca, *Apocolocyntosis* 3.3. (It is interesting that in the same work, at 6.1, Seneca also associates Claudius with the *terror Gallicus*: he was born in Gaul, therefore like a Gaul he had to take Rome: *itaque quod Gallum facere oportebat, Romam cepit*).
23. See below 124f, 189-92.
24. See below 55f.
25. Tacitus, *Annales* 12.27.1; Wightman (1), 39f; cf. below 56. (Köln's new name honoured the emperor's second wife, Agrippina, daughter of Germanicus and sister of Gaius, born at Ara Ubiorum in 15.)
26. On this, and generally, see de Laet, *passim*.
27. Suetonius, *Claudius* 25.5.
28. Suetonius, *Claudius*, 25.5; Pliny, *NH* 30.4.13.
29. Tacitus, *Historiae* 4.54.3; see Dyson, 157f.
30. See above 10f.
31. So de Coulanges, 111f; Last, *passim*.
32. For very much the opposite view see Syme (2), 32: 'the testimony of a Roman consular ought not to be ignored or discarded'. Cf. further below, 48f.
33. See Bradley, 253, for the idea that the west positively resented the emperor's eastern jaunts.
34. Suetonius, *Nero* 18.1; Tacitus, *Annales* 13.54 *passim*. (For a discussion of the dating and context of the former, see Bradley, 110f.)
35. Tacitus, *Annales* 14.46.2; Seneca, *ad Luc.* 91.1f, Tacitus, *Annales* 16.13.3. See Jullian, iv.172, 177, for a discussion of the evidence and of the difficult chronology.
36. See Suetonius, *Nero* 41.1f, for Vindex's taunts against the emperor.
37. Tacitus, *Annales* 14.39.2; 15.45.1; Dio, 63.22.1a (Loeb). Cf. Brunt (1), 553f.
38. For the rebellion of Vindex see, in the first place Brunt (1), *passim*; for a recent review of the literature, and a meticulous exposition of the chronology, see Bradley, 254f.
39. Dio, 63.22.1² f. (Loeb).
40. Cf. above 37.
41. Dio, 63.22.1² (Loeb).
42. Cf. below 97.
43. Plutarch, *Galba* 4.2.
44. Brunt (1), 531f.
45. Suetonius, *Galba* 4.3.
46. Suetonius, *Galba* 2f, 6.1f, 8.1f etc; Plutarch, *Galba* 3.1f.

47. Suetonius, *Galba* 10; Plutarch, *Galba* 5.2.
48. Here I disagree with Bradley, 245, that Aquitania followed Vindex.
49. Bradley, 244.
50. Cf. above 27.
51. Brunt (1), 537f; Bradley, 256.
52. E.g. Plutarch, *Galba* 10.1f, 29.2.
53. Cf. below 94.
54. Cf. below 96.
55. Cf. below 96.
56. Brunt (1), 549. Vindex would certainly have to have had local helpers – presumably the *duces* who came under suspicion at a later date: Tacitus, *Historiae* 2.94 (cf. below 49) – and the extraordinary taxation and the poor standard of provincial government which marked the end of Nero's reign (Brunt (1), 553f) would have affected the less well-to-do much more than men of Vindex's class, and would have given them cause for resentment. For 'dynast' see Syme (3), i.461.
57. The anti-Gallic attitudes of the Rhine armies have already been noted – see above 29.
58. Bradley, 257; Dio, 63.24.
59. Plutarch, *Galba* 6.3.
60. Pliny, *Epistulae* 6.10.4, 9.19.1f; Plutarch, *Galba* 10.3, 22.2f; Tacitus, *Historiae* 1.8, 1.51; Plutarch, *Galba* 18.1. (Despite Brunt's clever reasoning, (1) 541, I believe that Verginius, to his death still had his doubts about Vindex, and that his epitaph was deliberately ambiguous in this respect.)
61. Tacitus, *Historiae* 1.8, 1.53f; Suetonius, *Galba* 12.1.
62. Tacitus, *Historiae* 1.63f.
63. Tacitus, *Historiae* 1.67f.
64. Tacitus, *Historiae* 2.59f; cf. Suetonius, *Vitellius* 10.2.
65. Tacitus, *Historiae* 2.61; cf. above 24 and below 113.
66. Tacitus, *Historiae* 4.13.
67. Tacitus, *Historiae* 4.12; cf. Braat, 44, however, for the view that the Batavi may have been of Celtic stock.
68. Tacitus, *Historiae* 4.14.
69. Tacitus, *Historiae* 4.13.
70. Tacitus, *Historiae* 4.12.1-18.1.
71. Tacitus, *Historiae* 4.14; 4.17.
72. Tacitus, *Historiae* 4.18.1.
73. Tacitus, *Historiae* 4.25, 4.28.
74. Tacitus, *Historiae* 4.28-36; cf. below 57.
75. Tacitus, *Historiae* 4.54.
76. Tacitus, *Historiae* 4.36, cf. 4.55; see also above 39.
77. Tacitus, *Historiae* 4.55.
78. Drinkwater (3), 824-31.
79. Tacitus, *Historiae* 4.57f. (The situation had undoubtedly been destabilised by extensive recruitment of native Gauls into the depleted Vitellian legions in earlier months – see Tacitus, *Historiae* 2.57, cf. 4.57.)
80. Tacitus, *Historiae* 4.67, cf. Dio, 65.16.11; the Mediomatrici also remained loyal – 4.70.
81. Tacitus, *Historiae* 4.68; cf. below 111f.
82. Tacitus, *Historiae* 4.69.
83. Tacitus, *Historiae* 4.75-78.
84. Tacitus, *Historiae* 5.14-26.
85. Life in the Rhineland would certainly have suffered disruption, and further into the interior the Treveri would have been hurt by the mass flight of their lead-

ing men – Tacitus, *Historiae* 5.19, cf. Heinen, 46. On the other hand, as Wightman (3), 633 notes (from Frontinus), the Lingones escaped direct retribution.

86. Cf. below 189–92.

87. On the following cf. Syme (2), *passim*, and (3), i.451–64. I differ from him on a number of points, but my debt to his thinking is obvious. As he remarks, (2) 27: 'There was a Gallic problem in the early Principate, and Tacitus was aware of it'; and, (3) 458: 'The Gallic danger now becomes clearer. A rebellious noble had allies among his own class and kin – but he could also summon a large following of clients and serfs from the rural areas'.

88. See above 7.

89. Tacitus, *Annales* 11.1.2.

90. For 'baron' see Syme (2), 34; cf. Tacitus, *Historiae* 1.51.

91. Barbieri, 453, 457f, 473; *RE* xxiii 1264f. (Though cf. below 202).

92. Drinkwater (4), 97f.

93. Tacitus, *Historiae* 1.51 (Vindex's supporters as *Galbiani* – 'Galba's men'), 1.70, 2.94, 4.57; cf. above 42 n 51.

94. Tacitus, *Historiae* 4.21.

95. Cf. Sherwin-White (2), 9, 21; a complete set of references would be out of place here, but, for Gallic unreliability see Tacitus, *Historiae* 4.18, 4.26, 4.37, 4.55.

96. Tacitus, *Annales* 4.5.2; *Historiae* 4.71.

97. Tacitus, *Historiae* 3.72, 4.54; 4.58.

98. Tacitus, *Historiae* 4.68f.

99. Cf. Syme (2), 35f.

100. Tacitus, *Historiae* 4.73f.

101. Tacitus, *Historiae* 4.74.

102. Included among those first-century Gallic senators and equestrians whom Tacitus had in mind would certainly have been Vindex, and possibly Julius Clascianus, equestrian procurator of Britain under Nero – cf. Syme (2), 30.

103. Drinkwater (5), 242; cf. Drinkwater (4), 98f, for the possibility of a slight relaxation on the military side early in the second century; cf. also Sherwin-White (2), 60, and below 195.

3 THE CREATION OF THE GERMANIES

Following the events of 68-70, and their aftermath, the Three Gauls moved out of the mainstream of Roman history. As we shall see in later chapters, they settled down to enjoy the benefits of further Romanisation, but on their own terms. However, during the late-first and early-second centuries a matter was settled which was crucial to all the Gallic provinces, namely the nature of the border with free Germany. The issue was resolved by the creation and development of a fixed, continuous, visible and permanently-guarded frontier-zone, based originally on the holding of a military road: the *'limes-system'* of linear defence. It was closely associated with a relative decline in importance of the Rhenish frontier compared with those of the Danube and the east; but it led, through the establishment of settled military bases and hence of permanent centres for the injection of large amounts of coined money into the local economy, to a high degree of material Romanisation in the frontier areas.¹

From the ending of Germanicus' campaigns in 16 to the invasion of Britain in 43 eight legions came to be stationed along the left bank of the Rhine in earth and timber fortresses. For the sake of strategic convenience and probably, no doubt, to avoid concentrating too much power in the hands of generals who were not members of the imperial family, the German forces had long been divided into two army-groups, along the lower and upper parts of the river respectively.² During the early part of the first century the German legions were apportioned equally between the two; four were stationed in 'Lower Germany', at Vetera (Xanten: two legions — V Alauda, XV Primigenia), Novaesium (Neuss: one — XX Valeria), and Bonna (Bonn: one — I Germania); the other four were to be found in 'Upper Germany', at Moguntiacum (Mainz: two — XIV Gemina, XVI), Argentorate (Strasbourg: one — II Augusta), and Vindonissa (Windisch: one — XIII Gemina) (Map 3).³ Between the fortresses we may already assume the existence of a frontier road, secondary communications-routes, auxiliary forts, fortlets, police-posts, watchtowers and supply-bases.⁴ However, it is clear that the whole of this apparatus was not as yet envisaged as marking a fixed imperial boundary. It was one long military assembly-area, extended to follow the line of the Rhine, but not yet accepting the river as the effective limit of Roman power. There was, for example, Tiberius'

bridgehead on the Main; and in fact the Empire steadfastly laid claim to territory along the whole of the right bank of the Rhine.⁵ Indeed the system betrays a certain tension; there may not have been very much activity immediately after the campaigns of Germanicus, but equally there seems to have been little inclination to recognise that further expansion east of the Rhine was permanently out of the question. Even the activities of Gaius suggest that dreams of a restoration of Augustus' 'Greater Germany' were still not impossible.

Strictly speaking, the land which the troops occupied should have come under the overall jurisdiction of the governor of Gallia Belgica, in whose province it was situated.⁶ However, there can be no doubt that from a very early date (and very likely from the time of the general relocation of troops on the Rhine in preparation for the great offensive of 12 BC) this region would have been subject to the direct authority of the higher-ranking commanders-in-chief of the Upper and Lower armies or, on occasions, of the various imperial viceroys who were sent to serve on this frontier.⁷ Thus in some cases sections of, and in others whole *civitates* would have been sheared away from one of the Three Gauls to become part of the separate administrative units of the 'Two Germanies'.⁸ It is in fact virtually certain that Lower Germany, with its leading city of Ara Ubiorum, belonged for a while to the formally constituted province of Germania Magna.⁹ However, the provincial administration collapsed with Varus, and it was some time before either of the Germanies was established, or re-established, as a fully independent entity in its own right.

As events turned out, the first major acquisition of territory since Augustus involved not Germany, but Britain. However, the conquest of the southern part of the island caused alterations in the Rhine forces, which were reflected in changes in the disposition both of individual legions (the replacing of XX Valeria by XVI at Novaesium; of XIV Gemina and XVI by IV Macedonica and XXII Primigenia at Moguntiacum; and of XIII Gemina by XXI Rapax at Vindonissa) and of the garrison as a whole (Argentorate lost its legion, reducing the army in Upper Germany to a total of three legions). Such dislocation, coming as it did immediately after the antics of Gaius, may have been at least in part responsible for unrest in Lower Germany (including sea-borne raids along the coast, and possibly up estuaries) around 47. The seriousness of these troubles is possibly reflected in the presence of a destruction layer at the fort of Valkenburg. However, the situation was soon remedied by Corbulo, who subjugated the Chauci and the Frisii.¹⁰ The diminution of the legionary strength of Upper Germany may have been offset by a

strengthening of auxiliary forces on the upper Rhine. The forts at Wiesbaden, Kastell, Höchst and Hofheim were also maintained, thus keeping open the option of further penetration into the Taunus hills and the valley of the Main (the Wetterau) should the need arise; as we shall see, this was to be of great significance in the near future (Map 4).¹¹ Generally speaking, the tension between the limits imposed by finite Roman capacity to absorb new subject-peoples and the unwillingness openly to concede that, on the Rhine at least, the Roman Empire had more or less ceased to grow was not lessened during the middle years of the first century. However, the undeniable economic and social consequences which arose out of the reality of having had a more or less fixed and permanent frontier army along the Rhine for at least one generation and possibly two (from the time of Drusus) were well reflected in Claudius' reign in the granting of the status of full colony to the chief cities of the Ubii and the Treveri – Colonia Claudia Ara Agrippinensium (Köln) and Colonia Augusta Treverorum (Trier) respectively.¹² Only in the case of the former was there any settlement of Roman veterans, and this involved fusion with, rather than dispossession of, the indigenous population.¹³ Such a gift could only have been given as a reward for a high degree of commitment to Rome and her Empire on the part of these communities, a commitment which would not only have been expressed in attitudes of loyalty and obedience but also in terms of a very visible and concrete adoption of Roman customs and a Roman lifestyle: in short, they had Romanised. Thanks to the presence of the troops, the money they brought and the economic activity which they stimulated, the Rhineland was, by 50, already a long way from being just a temporary military support area and was well advanced on the road to becoming the power-house of Romanisation in the north-western provinces. Köln and Trier were to become two of the greatest cities of the Latin west – in their heyday, in the mid-third and fourth centuries, virtual sub-capitals of the Empire.¹⁴

Typically, the German question seems to have been neglected by Nero, along with everything else to do with the western provinces (although a more charitable view might well be that, given the difficulties of holding Britain, the Rhine was forced into the background, as reflected in the appointment of less senior army commanders¹⁵). The garrison here was badly weakened by the withdrawal of troops by Vitellius to help him fight his civil war. With the revolt of Civilis and his allies, however, there was more or less a complete military breakdown in the area.¹⁶ The literary record is full of tales concerning the defection, annihilation or surrender of Roman army units, both legionary

and auxiliary; this picture is amply corroborated by the archaeological evidence, which reveals a consistent story of damage to and destruction of military and civil sites along the whole length of the Rhine, and particularly of course in Lower Germany where, for example, the double legionary base at Vetera was completely destroyed. It is clear that those at Novaesium and Bonna were also affected.¹⁷ At this point, of course, we rejoin the historical narrative of the previous chapter. This is very convenient, it so happens, because the period following the civil wars was one not only of reconstruction, but also of reappraisal and rethinking of the northern frontier.

Vespasian, an experienced general, made the rebuilding of the Rhine frontier one of his first priorities. The legions were brought up to their old strength (that is, to an overall total of eight); those which had sworn allegiance to the *Imperium Galliarum* were disbanded. Thus in Lower Germany we now find single legions at Noviomagus (Nijmegen -- a new base, on the edge of the country of the Batavi: X Gemina), Vetera (XXII Primigenia), Novaesium (VI Victrix), and Bonna (XXI Rapax). In Upper Germany the disposition is two legions at Moguntiacum (I Adiutrix, XIV Gemina) and single legions at Argentorate (VIII Augusta) and Vindonissa (XI Claudia). Auxiliary regiments must likewise have been brought in to replace destroyed or disaffected units, and to balance the new legionary strength. In this respect it is very noticeable, as we have already seen, that the experiences of 69/70 had taught Rome to avoid giving too much power to local leaders: the new auxiliary forces were made up of men serving well away from their own places of birth, and were put under solidly Roman officers.¹⁸ All this, however, still comes under the heading of repair work, and may be regarded simply as a restoration of the *status quo*. Much more important was a further activity which I see as marking the beginning of the conscious acceptance that the frontier would henceforth stay on or about the Rhine, and of the working through of the implications of such an acceptance, which would eventually lead to the fully-formed *limes*-system, as touched upon at the start of this chapter.

Paradoxically, this development was marked first of all by an advance. The Wetterau bridgehead, like much else, had gone down in the recent troubles. Vespasian ordered its reoccupation and the strengthening of its communications and defences.¹⁹ At about the same time Roman troops were moved across the upper Rhine, with apparently the immediate aim (although the details are far from clear) of securing control of the territory between the Rhine and the river Neckar.²⁰ This development must be connected with the driving of a route through the

Black Forest from Argentorate to the upper reaches of the Danube, in the province of Raetia, around 74; the road would have run for the most part to the west and south of the Neckar, crossing it at its uppermost reaches in an area apparently well guarded by early Flavian forts (Offenburg, Waldmössingen, Rottweil).²¹ What we seem to have here is the first sign of positive defensive imperialism. The Rhine was being crossed not to destroy a great foreign enemy, or with a view to some grand subjugation of Germany, but rather simply to obtain a better line of communication between it and the Danube and so, presumably, to enable Vespasian to manage the better defence of his northern borders.²² This was adjustment, not conquest: the proper husbandry of a frontier which increasingly had to be accepted as fixed.

Vespasian died in 79, to be succeeded by his son Titus, who died young in 81, and then by Titus' younger brother, Domitian, who reigned until his assassination in 96. There is a lively dispute among scholars as to the extent to which Domitian formulated a completely new policy for Germany and the defence of the Rhine. My own inclination is to follow Schönberger in seeing his work as a development of trends that were plainly already perceptible under his father, possibly in spite of what Domitian himself to begin with had in mind. However, it is my belief that it is Domitian who has a strong claim to be recognised as the 'father' of Roman Germany. To his contemporary Tacitus, and to many of the latter's social class and generation, Domitian was the imperial tyrant *par excellence*, whose reign was fifteen years of terror and misery. Modern thinking is prepared to be kinder to the memory of this ruler, both in attempting to understand his character, and in appreciating the importance of his actions. He had become an imperial prince amid stirring circumstances (having been directly involved in the battle for Rome) at the age of eighteen; he had great ambitions, which needed to be directed into useful channels. Yet, because he was never expected to rule as emperor, he was largely ignored by his father and brother, in that he was given no real authority and therefore no chance of gaining useful experience or to prove himself — above all in military matters, where he must have been very sensitive to the great reputations already won by Vespasian and Titus. Instead of satisfaction he can have experienced only gross frustration; thus it is hardly surprising that on coming to power he immediately cast about for the means to cover himself in glory. His choice fell upon the waging of a war in Germany, possibly even with the idea of the revival of the notion of *Germania Magna*.²³ The basic instability of the Roman attitude to the Rhine frontier was once again revealed; Vespasian's policies

seemed to be in complete abeyance.

Between 83 and 85 Domitian, with his headquarters at Moguntiacum, waged all-out war against the intelligent and ever-troublesome Chatti of the Taunus hills. Massive forces were committed to this campaign: all the four Upper German legions, together with XXI Rapax from Bonna, detachments from the British legions, and a commensurate number of auxiliary units – a total of thirty to thirty-six thousand men.²⁴ The effective result of this activity was a massive enlargement of Roman control over the lower Main valley and the High Taunus. A campaign-road, guarded by watchtowers and forts, was built along the crest of these hills; the Upper German *limes* proper was beginning to take shape.²⁵ However, despite his adoption of the title of 'Conqueror of the Germans' (*Germanicus*), and the precocious triumph which he celebrated in 83, it is clear that such a result was not the great imperial victory which Domitian had intended. Indeed, as has often been remarked, the bulk of the newly acquired territory belonged not to the Chatti, but to the Mattiaci and other peoples who, through long contact with Rome, were anyway well-disposed to the Empire.²⁶ The cause of this was probably quite simply that the emperor was interrupted in his work: in 85 he had to turn away from Germany to deal with a real threat that had suddenly manifested itself on the Danube – for the next century and more to be the most endangered of the northern frontiers.²⁷ Yet for the moment, despite the removal of some units to the new theatre of war, the German expeditionary force was left a good deal of its strength, with very strong concentrations of troops at the Rhine/Main confluence and in the Wetterau: Domitian was at first probably unaware of the severity of the Danubian threat, and was planning a resumption of his campaign in the west.²⁸ This was almost his undoing; he was detained longer than he had anticipated, and in the meantime his popularity among the Empire's ruling classes declined sharply as they reacted adversely to what later ages, more accustomed to monarchy, might have called legitimate absolutism but which to them was crude tyranny.

In the winter of 88/89 L. Antonius Saturninus, commander of the Upper German army, staged a revolt; at the same time the recalcitrant Chatti saw their chance to fish in troubled waters, and overran Roman military installations on the Taunus.²⁹ But Domitian, unlike Nero in very similar circumstances, kept his head, and was rewarded by the steady loyalty of the Lower German army which was able to put down the usurper even before the emperor's prompt arrival on the scene. Domitian had had a very close shave; and the Saturninus-affair was to

have important repercussions on politics in Rome, where Domitian's increased insistence on his imperial powers caused the gap between himself and the senatorial aristocracy who helped him run his Empire to widen beyond the point of recovery.³⁰ As far as the Rhine is concerned, however, the attempted coup seems to have brought him firmly to his senses, and resulted in a fundamental and crucial change in his German policy. The Empire was now seriously entangled in a difficult war across the lower Danube, in Dacia; there was no longer the opportunity to pursue conquests in Germany. Domitian therefore reverted to his father's policy of simply securing the Rhine frontier, and of assuring good communications across the re-entrant created by the headwaters of the Rhine and the Danube, the latter now made all the more important by the dangerous situation in Dacia, and the need to transfer troops along the whole length of the northern border, particularly from west to east. Around 90, therefore, the German garrison was substantially reduced; the practice of laagering legions together (which had added impetus to Saturninus' cause) was discontinued, and the troops thus released were moved to the Danube. This left legions at Noviomagus (X Gemina), Novaesium (VI Victrix), Bonna (I Minervia), Moguntiacum (XXII Primigenia), Argentorate (VIII Augusta) and Vindonissa (XI Claudia). At about the same time the military zones of Belgica were abolished, to be replaced by the two new *provinces* of Germania Superior (Upper Germany) and Germania Inferior (Lower Germany), with their capitals at Moguntiacum and Colonia Agrippina (Köln) respectively (Map 3).³¹

Between 90 and 96 the eastern frontier in Upper Germany (which, as we have already seen, had been tentatively extended beyond the Rhine by Vespasian) was advanced firmly to the line formed by the construction of a string of auxiliary forts across the Odenwald and up the Neckar, thus joining existing defences in the Wetterau with those already pushed north of the upper Danube to the upper Neckar – the 'Alb-limes' (Map 4).³² These forts and their associated watchtowers defended a military road, such as the one which had appeared at an early date in Domitian's reign in the Taunus: the *limes* had now extended southwards. The land to the west of this line was effectively annexed, and in fact was then, in rather mysterious circumstances, thrown open to settlers from Gaul.³³ Its name, *Agri Decumates*, used to be taken to indicate a system of share-cropping, whereby the newcomers paid one-tenth of their agricultural produce in rent to the government as landlord; it is now generally thought to mean simply 'the Ten Cantons'.³⁴ With these changes Roman Germany proper was born;

she would remain more or less the same shape until the arrival of the Crisis of the third century.

It remained for Domitian's successors to develop and elaborate the Flavian design. Under the emperor Trajan (98-117) additional forts were probably added to the line of the Upper German *limes*, although there is some argument as to the number of these additions.³⁵ The same ruler encouraged civilian life in the new provinces by stimulating urbanisation: for example, in Lower Germany the long-standing civil settlement in the neighbourhood of the legionary base at Vetera was completely rebuilt, and given colonial status and the name Colonia Ulpia Traiana, while at Nijmegen, following the withdrawal of the legionary garrison, a similar community was encouraged to remain, as Ulpia Noviomagus (the Celtic element of the name suggesting the granting of a formal permission to hold regular markets).³⁶ In Upper Germany the Gallic settlers (and, presumably, the native inhabitants) were encouraged to adopt local self-government, and town life, by the creation of artificial *civitates* on the model of those to be found in the Three Gauls. Thus there was a *civitas Ulpia Sueborum Nicretum* on the lower Neckar, with its capital at Lopodunum (Ladenburg), and possibly a *civitas Taunensium* administered from Nida (Hedderheim).³⁷ What had failed disastrously in Germania Magna seemed to work well enough in the Agri Decumates, the result, no doubt, of the much smaller area involved, the long-standing leavening of Celtic ways (now renewed by Gallic settlement in the Agri Decumates) and possibly also a higher degree of initial Romanisation among the Germanic population: it is possible that the Upper Rhine Suebi had provided a sort of militia in the pre-Flavian period.³⁸

A firmly held frontier and a peaceful hinterland, together with the demands of Trajan's eastern wars, resulted in a further run-down of the Rhineland's military strength. Lower Germany was effectively reduced to two legions, at Vetera (VI Victrix) and at Bonna (I Minervia);³⁹ Upper Germany likewise had a legion removed, and was left with XXII Primigenia at Moguntiacum and VIII Augusta at Argentorate. Superfluous auxiliary forts in the rear of the frontier, for example Rottweil, were abandoned at about this time.⁴⁰ The German policy of Trajan's successor, the emperor Hadrian (117-138) is particularly significant for the manner in which he went out of his way to stress the now frozen nature of the frontier there. It should be borne in mind that the Flavian border was still very close in form to the original concept of a *limes* in that it consisted of an interconnected system of military outposts of varying sizes keeping watch over a border-road and border-rivers, both of which, through their very nature, also acted as lines of communication.

The border was, in these circumstances, not a continuous barrier, but rather an extended militarised zone, straddling road and rivers; in a word, it was open. What Hadrian did was to leave the river frontiers (principally the lower Rhine and the middle Neckar) alone: here the waterways offered sufficient demarcation of the limits of the Empire; bridges and ferries could be controlled, while naval superiority would allow careful monitoring of the opposite banks, and sufficient support for any Roman army units operating there. However, in those parts of Upper Germany and adjoining Raetia where there was only a land frontier he ordered the construction of a wooden palisade which ran along the eastern side of the *limes*-road. This was manned by auxiliary units brought up from the rear. The frontier was now closed, and legitimate movement across it was channelled through particular guard-posts where it could be controlled and taxed. Illegitimate movement, which would have involved physical violation of the *limes*, could be easily detected and acted against; outposts beyond the palisade made sure that no trouble developed there.⁴¹ It is scarcely necessary to mention that probably the same period, around 121/22, when Hadrian travelled extensively in the west, saw the beginning of the British Wall: the borders of the High Roman Empire were receiving their finishing touches.

There can be no doubt that one important consideration in Hadrian's promotion of this policy was the growing need for military manpower on the Danube and in the east. The Empire's resources in this respect were limited (though probably more due to considerations of expense than population).⁴² The only place which could supply these troops was the west. Thus the paraphernalia of the continuous frontier may be seen as a substitute for soldiers on the ground. Once more all this is reflected in the stationing of the legions: the Upper German garrison was left alone, but the Lower German was now formally reduced to just two legions, XXX Ulpia Victrix at Vetera, and I Minervia at Bonna. These four were to remain on the Rhine until the end of our period, and well beyond.

In 138 Hadrian was succeeded by Antoninus Pius, and it was probably this emperor who completed the work of his predecessors. Once again, the Lower German frontier remained as it stood, as did the existing Upper German *limes* in the Taunus hills and along the Main. However, where the old *limes* had left the Main at Obernburg to cross overland (the 'Odenwald *limes*') to the Neckar, and to run down the Neckar to K6ngen, a new one (which, since it left the Neckar behind, had to be entirely on the Hadrianic, palisaded, model) was now built about 30 km

to the east, possibly on a line of previous Hadrianic outposts, running some 100 km from Miltenberg-Ost to Welzheim (Map 4). The reason for this imperial expansion is obscure; the same thing, of course, happened in Britain with the building of the Antonine Wall beyond Hadrian's Wall. The last major alteration to the Upper German *limes* was the building of the 'Pfahlgraben' — a rampart and ditch backing on to the palisade and obviously intended to make it a much more difficult obstacle to cross (like the eight-foot high stone wall which at the same time seems actually to have replaced the palisade in Raetia). The Pfahlgraben has traditionally been attributed to a much later period, the reign of the emperor Caracalla (211-17), but Schönberger has pointed out the weaknesses in the evidence for such a dating, and, although not pressing the point, seems inclined to assign this structure to the middle years of the second century, on analogy with the Antonine Wall.⁴³ It seems that in Germany, as elsewhere in the Empire, the *limes*-system was in its essentials a work of the late-first and early-second centuries.

The *limes*-system as a whole, even when rendered for a good part in stone and brick, as opposed to timber and turf (a change which began to take place in the Germanies from the middle of the first century, and which took about a century to complete)⁴⁴ should not be considered as transforming the Roman Empire into some sort of 'citadel'. It was much more a garden-fence, and as such was really incapable of keeping out sizeable groups of enemies who were really determined to break in, as the horrors of the third-century Crisis, which saw the loss of the *Agri Decumates* and the second, and final, Roman retreat to the Rhine, would indeed show. For this reason it has been much criticised by scholars as representing too static a concept of imperial defence. However, as a recent and extremely stimulating study has pointed out, such harsh criticism is really unjustified.⁴⁵ The various *limites* (the plural of *limes*) of the Empire were not designed to transform it into a fortress. Roman strategy was still based on aggressive mobility, not passive inertia: any serious threat to the frontiers was to be met and dealt with by troops operating well beyond the boundary line. In fact, as Luttwak has perceptively suggested, the *limes*-system made the Empire not a fortress but a marching-camp, like the legionary marching-camps of the old Republican army. Behind its not inconsiderable, but far from impregnable, defences those who manned it might enjoy certain valuable psychological benefits, such as relative safety from surprise attack, which allowed them to rest and plan future moves while making the most economical use of their manpower. In times of peace there were scouts to be posted and small patrols to be sent out to deal with minor

troublemakers; but in time of war the whole garrison could be raised to proceed to march out against a really threatening foe. Given the relatively peaceful circumstances of the time of their conception and construction, the *limites* were in fact primarily designed to facilitate the former sort of activity;⁴⁶ in other words they were built to combat the 'low intensity' threat posed by 'transborder infiltrations and peripheral incursions'.⁴⁷ However, they could, and did, manage to deal with much greater, 'high intensity' pressures, as is shown, I feel, by the way in which Marcus Aurelius (161-180) was able to cope with trouble on the Danubian frontier in the latter part of his reign. The Marcomannic Wars of 166/7-175 and 177-180 are often regarded by scholars as having shown up all the weaknesses of the *limes*-system, and as marking the beginning of the Crisis to come.⁴⁸ However, viewed dispassionately it may be argued that the *limites* did their job: their penetration alerted the Empire to danger; a large army was collected which threw back the invaders beyond the border and proceeded to crush them in their own country; political circumstances (the accession of Commodus) may possibly have led to a premature ending of the hostilities, but there was no further trouble for almost two generations. The strategists of the time are to be praised for devising and continuing a system which apparently worked; they were not to know of complex social changes and folk-movements which in the middle years of the third century would completely change the situation and make all previous thinking obsolete.⁴⁹

The *limites* taken together were, therefore, effective, and the German *limes* in particular served Gaul well. It assured the Three Provinces' external security and, in ways which will be discussed partially below and more fully in a later chapter, it did so cheaply and in a manner beneficial to their economic development.⁵⁰ There can be no doubt that the inhabitants of Gaul fully realised the importance of the two German provinces; the threat posed by the possible collapse of the Rhine frontier must be seen as one of the major factors contributing to the establishment of a breakaway state in the west in the worst years of the third century, the 'Gallic Empire'.⁵¹ The sort of Gaul which grew up in the lee of the German *limes* will be the main subject of the following chapters. Generally speaking, it may be said that the German provinces shared in this Gallic development, and henceforth may for the most part be considered, as they were in Caesar's day, as part and parcel of the Three Gauls. However, before leaving them it might be useful to attempt to convey something of their character, which in certain respects was different from that of their hinterland.

Primarily, of course, the Germanies differed from the rest because

they were a military area. As we have already seen, in the final state of the frontier the four great legionary bases on the Rhine were either linked (as in Lower Germany) or fronted (as in Upper Germany) by a string of auxiliary forts; between fortresses and forts was strung a close network of roads furnished with police-posts and customs stations. Nor should one forget the presence of the Rhine fleet, with its major base at Köln-Alteburg, which must have considerably added to the figure of 44,000 men calculated as being the likely combined strength of the legions and the auxiliaries.⁵² The military would have been everywhere. In fact overall the Rhineland probably absorbed about 15 per cent of the entire manpower of the Roman army, reckoned to total about 300,000 men.⁵³ Recent work has suggested that the army cost the Empire about 400,000,000 sesterii annually, around half its gross tax revenue. On this basis, although the sum is naturally very rough, and cannot take into account a host of factors which would serve either to increase or decrease the final figure, about 60,000,000 sesterii per year would have gone to Germany. This amount (which is virtually impossible to quantify in modern terms but which, by way of example, in terms of its value in gold would have been reckoned by Victorian writers at about £540,000 sterling⁵⁴) probably came very close to the annual sum raised by the direct taxation of the Three Provinces.⁵⁵ As will be explained in a later chapter, the necessity of having to pay such taxation should have acted as a stimulus to the Gallic economy in that the producers of wealth, in particular the landowners, would have had to gear themselves up to generate a regular surplus to sell to obtain money to meet their fiscal obligations.⁵⁶ The army would have provided the readiest market; the chain was complete, and the ancient observation, that the Rhine army depended upon the riches of Gaul, becomes understandable.⁵⁷ However, it must be stressed that such a flow of goods and money, once established, led to wider economic developments. As has often been remarked, the High Roman Empire was governed and defended on the cheap; the overall level of taxation was low – probably less than 10 per cent of the gross product.⁵⁸ Therefore the tax burden was far from crippling, especially for the well-to-do who were not subject to progressive taxation on their wealth, and who could anyway find ways and means, licit and illicit, of evading many of the obligations which fell on them. This must have been so in the Gauls which, at least as far as regular taxation went, were clearly not overburdened – although this must now be seen as more a function of the working of the system than of any particular fiscal advantage bestowed by the Julio-Claudians upon the Three Provinces.⁵⁹

The sums demanded as tax, and spent on administration and the army, although not inconsiderable in themselves, and certainly on occasions causing worry and distress for taxpayer and emperor alike, did not, therefore, amount to a crushing burden on individual enterprise. On the contrary, they may be regarded as having primed the economic pump of Gaul. Money paid to the frontier troops was spent in the neighbourhood of their bases, which attracted traders and stimulated the growth of civilian settlements.⁶⁰ Such settlements in their turn offered markets to producers of the interior who, thanks to the demands imposed by taxation, were in a position to increase output and seize the new opportunities, thereby making a profit; the ramifications of this development will be explored in a later chapter.⁶¹ However, as far as the Germanies themselves are concerned such a phenomenon also encouraged and allowed the civilian settlements to progress beyond mere shanty-towns set in an uncompromisingly military area. On the contrary, one of the most remarkable features of this region is its rapid urbanisation, crystallising around practically every military and quasi-military installation, from massive legionary bases, which spawned the modern cities of Bonn, Mainz and Strasbourg, to the little customs-post at Belgica vicus (Billig).⁶² In between, of course, and probably the most characteristic, are the *vici* – ‘townships’ – which blossomed around the ubiquitous auxiliary forts. As Schönberger has remarked, the ‘largest known *vicus* attached to an auxiliary fort anywhere in the Roman Empire’ occurs at Zugmantel, on the Taunus line of the Upper German *limes*.⁶³ Earlier activity on the Lower Rhine had, as we have already seen, led to the development of two cities which soon lost any direct tactical role, but which still benefited from the swirling military activity around them, namely Köln and Trier; these now blossomed as major administrative and commercial centres.⁶⁴

The character of the German countryside would have reflected this military emphasis. It has reasonably been argued that immediately in the vicinity of the legionary fortresses and auxiliary forts we should expect to find either formal or informal *territoria* – stretches of land owned by the state (in the person of the emperor) the produce of which went directly to augment (but not entirely to supply) each unit’s provisions.⁶⁵ Such estates would have been worked by tenant-farmers.⁶⁶ Indeed, the well-attested tendency of retired Roman troops to stay close to their place of service should mean that the Rhineland saw fairly intensive settlement by veteran-farmers, possibly on the *territoria* but equally possibly on other imperially-owned land further afield. There are anyway strong indications of the presence of imperial estates in the

area, especially in those regions rich in mineral resources, which would, of course, have been of great use to the army.⁶⁷ In addition, it is surely likely that the opening of the Agri Decumates to settlement was carried-out under military supervision. Finally, given the failings of human nature, and the recognition of such transgressions in the military law reforms of the early-third century, it is not unlikely that by the end of the High Empire even serving soldiers and their families were working small farms in the vicinity of their postings.⁶⁸ Against this background one would expect, and archaeology seems to confirm, the existence of a fairly neat and regimented landscape. As in the Three Gauls, as we shall see, the land and its resources, both agricultural and mineral, were worked from the Romanised farmstead, or *villa*, but, compared to their counterparts in the hinterland these German villas are generally plainer, more simply equipped, have a tendency to occur at regular intervals, and are often found associated with roof-tiles produced in army workshops.⁶⁹ Here alone, I feel, we should expect evidence for true centuriation (as opposed to the simple tidying-up for the purposes of cadastration which I envisage in Gaul): it is perhaps both a pity, yet also an indication of how difficult it is to detect such a layout in the north-western Empire (and hence how careful we must be in the way we treat claims from elsewhere), that as yet this has not come to light.⁷⁰

The military side of the Germanies, and everything which went with it, should not, however, be taken as its sole feature. Far from the actual frontier there were undoubtedly areas which differed very little in life-style and appearance from their immediate neighbours in the Three Gauls proper. This must have been especially true in large parts of Upper Germany where, probably under Domitian, and presumably for strategic reasons (the securing of the major road junction at Andemantunnum (Langres), of the Belfort Gap, and of the central Swiss Plateau) the newly established provincial border was extended to loop sharply west and south before returning to rejoin the Rhine at Lake Constance (Maps 3, 5, 8). This arrangement meant that certain important *civitates* — the Helvetii, Sequani and Lingones — were removed from the province of Gallia Belgica.⁷¹ However, apart from the repercussions of important campaigns, such as the stationing of a major expeditionary force under Velius Rufus at Mirebeau-sur-Bèze outside Dibio (Dijon) during Domitian's German war, there is no evidence to suggest that life in these communities was radically different from that in adjoining Gallia Lugdunensis.⁷² It comes as no surprise that, despite their German status, certainly the Sequani, and probably all three nations, continued to send representatives to the Council of the Three Gauls at Condate.⁷³

One of the richest western villas is at Seeb, near Zurich, in the land of the Helvetii.⁷⁴ Further north, in the smaller, but still considerable, hinterland of Germania Inferior we find the growth of Aquae Granni (Aachen) around the healing waters of Apollo Grannus, a non-military development for which it is easy to find parallels elsewhere in Gaul.⁷⁵ Even within the *limes* heartland itself we should be wary of overstressing the military presence. There, the fact that *civitas*-government continued, and was even encouraged, must suggest the absence of comprehensive martial law, and the allowance of as much local autonomy as possible. This must have produced some strange bedfellows, as originally in the case of Vetera, where throughout the first century legionary bases and what could only have been the *civitas*-capital of the Cugerni nestled cosily up to each other (the civilian settlement presumably lying on a neck of *civitas* land projecting into the legion's *territorium*).⁷⁶

Overall, indeed, it must once again be emphasised that both military and civil elements combined to make the Germanies one of the most highly developed regions of the Roman west. The Rhineland must not be envisaged as a sterile or totally parasitic military enclave. With its booming centre at Köln it became the power-house of western Romanisation; the Rhenish school of funerary sculpture, for example, was to have a great impact on that of central Gaul.⁷⁷ Nor should the troops who manned the *limes*-installations be regarded as the uneasy representatives of an alien power, holding down a troublesome frontier in a distant and unloved corner of empire. Certainly, as far as the legionaries are concerned, something of an occupation mentality persisted through most of the first century, to be strengthened, as we have seen, by the events of 68-70.⁷⁸ The subsequent replacement of Gallic by non-Gallic auxiliary regiments on the Rhine sprang from, and would have served to confirm, such an attitude.⁷⁹ However, this feeling, important as it undoubtedly was in the short term, served only to conceal an overriding contemporary trend throughout the Empire towards local recruitment into both legions and auxiliary units which, as the second century progressed, came to affect even the German armies.⁸⁰ The acceptance into the legions of men who were in many cases not yet Roman citizens was, strictly speaking, questionably legal. However, it was necessary and, together with the growing practice of taking Roman citizens into the auxiliary regiments, it meant that the social and cultural differences between legionaries and auxiliaries, between Romans and provincials, gradually diminished. In fact, a new form of irregular force, the *numerus*, had to be devised to fill the gap left by the now-Romanised auxiliaries.⁸¹

A related development was the inclination of all soldiers to contract forms of marriage with local women, and to bring up families, while still on active service. For Roman citizens such marriages were in fact illegal, but the custom was tolerated throughout the first and second centuries and the privilege was conceded in full by the emperor Septimius Severus late in the second century. The male children of such liaisons frequently entered the army in their turn.⁸² Thus everywhere the army became part of the land. By the end of the second century the Rhine army, recruiting almost exclusively from the Germanies and the Gallic hinterland, was no longer the Roman army *in* Germany but the Roman army *of* Germany – an accepted, essential and integrated part of the life of the whole of the Three Gauls.

Notes

1. See below 128f.
2. See below 55.
3. For the technical details here, and in what follows, see Schönberger, 151f.
4. von Petrikovits, 54; Schönberger, 145f.
5. Cf. above 27.
6. For details of the provinces and of the office of governor see below 95-7.
7. Stein, 3, 11; Harmand L. (2), 118; cf. below 95. See Tacitus, *Annales* 13.53.3, for a clear case of German commanders involving themselves in the civil development of their territories: the governor of Belgica objected, but only when troops seemed likely to trespass outside the Rhenish military zone.
8. Cf. Wightman (1), 124 (and cf. 35f).
9. Cf. above 23; Stein, 2f.
10. Tacitus, *Annales* 11.18-20; Schönberger, 152.
11. Schönberger, 153.
12. Cf. above 38, below 130.
13. Tacitus, *Annales* 12.27.1; *Historiae* 4.65. Wightman (1), 40f.
14. Cf. below 88f, 221, 223.
15. Stein, 27f.
16. Cf. above 46.
17. von Petrikovits, 54; Hatt (3), 220, also suggest that there is similar evidence for destruction in Upper Germany, especially at Argentorate.
18. Cf. above 48.
19. Schönberger, 155.
20. Schönberger, 156.
21. *CIL* xiii 9082 = *ILS* 5832; cf. Schönberger, 156 (and note especially the existence of Arae Flaviae (Rottweil)).
22. Cf. Luttwak, 87.
23. Cf. Schönberger, 158.
24. Schönberger, 158.
25. Schönberger, 159, from Frontinus, *Strategemata* 1.3.10; *contra*, Syme (1), 162f.
26. E.g. Syme (1), 165.
27. So Schönberger, 158 (from Braunert), but the chronology is difficult here; cf. Syme (1), 168.

28. Schönberger, 159.

29. For the narrative see Syme (1), 172f (from Ritterling); cf. Suetonius, *Domitian* 6.

30. For the role of the Senate see below 97f.

31. The dating is again difficult here. Baatz (3), 97, chooses the year 85. The year I suggest is the latest possible date (cf. *ILS* 1998, 1015), and it does pose some problems – see Schönberger, 159. Despite the difficulties I have adopted it because I feel it best fits the historical circumstances. For the capitals see Stein, 31f.

32. Schönberger, 161f (somewhat different from Syme (1), 166f).

33. Tacitus, *Germania* 29.4.

34. Jullian, iv.462; Grenier (3), 535; Syme (1), 181; Staehlin, 237; Baatz (3), 95f.

35. Schönberger, 164.

36. Raepsaet-Charlier, 130; cf. Eutropius, 8.2; and below.

37. Stein, 15f; Schönberger, 165; cf. Jullian, iv.469; Baatz (3), 97f.

38. Schönberger, 153f.

39. Noviomagus (Nijmegen) was occupied by legion IX Hispana under Trajan, but only in passing: Schönberger, 165; cf. below 000.

40. Schönberger, 169.

41. Schönberger, 165f.

42. Cf. below 169f for the suggestion of a large imperial population.

43. Schönberger, 174.

44. The finer details of this development are complex, and still far from clear: see von Petrikovits, 55.

45. Luttwak, *passim*, but especially from 55, for this and what follows.

46. For the relative peace see below 222.

47. Luttwak, 66.

48. For a useful summary of events, and the drawing of such conclusions, see Parker, 14f and 37f; also below 87.

49. See below 214f.

50. See below 128f.

51. See below 89, 225f.

52. von Petrikovits, 122f; Biegel, 7; cf., however, Doppelfeld, 55.

53. For this, and what follows, I draw principally on Hopkins (2).

54. I.e. reckoning the gold aureus (= 100 sesterii) at 18/- (from Smith's *Latin Dictionary*).

55. As Hopkins points out, the specific level of Gallic taxation is impossible to calculate. The figure of 60,000,000 sesterii, however, corresponds well with Caesar's original levy of 40,000,000 (Suetonius, *Caesar* 25), which was probably increased under Augustus – Grenier (3), 498f; cf. below 98-100.

56. Below 129.

57. Tacitus, *Annales* 1.47.2: (sc. the German army) *Galliarum opibus subnixus*.

58. Hopkins (2), 120.

59. Cf. above 19; Duncan-Jones (2), 217, reckons 40,000,000 sesterii as a significant contribution to the Roman exchequer.

60. Cf. above 61.

61. See below 130f.

62. For the growing prosperity, and self-identity, of the civilian inhabitants of the shanty-town (*canabae*) around Mainz see *CIL* xiii 11806 = *ILS* 9235, with Baatz (1), *passim*; for Billig see below 132, and von Petrikovits, 108.

63. Schönberger, 71.

64. See above 38, 56; below 130.

65. von Petrikovits, 61, 63f, 67.

66. von Petrikovits, 63f.
67. von Petrikovits, 113, 116 (concerning the North Eifel); cf. Staehlin, 176f.
68. Baatz (3), 97f, considers that imperial estates were used as a means of developing an administrative organisation in the Agri Decumates prior to the area's being handed over to its own *civitates*. MacMullen (2), 1f, 11; cf. below 83.
69. von Petrikovits, 109f, 115f; Percival (2), 83f.
70. See below 125; cf. the remarks of Ternes (1), 193.
71. Staehlin, 124, 139, 237.
72. For Mirebeau see *CIL* xiii 12539, 1-6 (= *ILS* 2285; cf. 9200); Syme (1), 163. It should be stressed that irregular military activity could affect the Three Gauls proper – below 73 – and that, despite the general move to the Rhine there was probably a small-scale, but continuing, presence of regular army units in the interior throughout the High Empire: cf. Wuilleumier (1), 32.
73. Staehlin, 237; Deininger, 101, 105.
74. Drack, *passim*; Percival (2), 86f.
75. von Petrikovits, 108; Raepsaet-Charlier, 146; cf. below 132f, 182.
76. von Petrikovits, 101, 103; Hinz (1), 48; Ternes (1), 99; Raepsaet-Charlier, 134f.
77. Hatt (1), 111; Harmand L. (1), 785; Leday (2), 305; below 130, 188.
78. Cf. above 43; also Tacitus, *Historiae* 1.51.
79. Cheesman, 72; cf. above 48.
80. For the details see Forni, 85f, 99; Cheesman, 77f.
81. Cheesman, 88f; Watson, 16.
82. Watson, 133f; cf. above 66 and below 83.

4 AN AGE WITHOUT HISTORY

From the collapse of the *Imperium Galliarum* of the first century to the creation of the Gallic Empire of the third century the Three Gauls ceased to exercise any particular influence on the course of Roman history; at the same time Rome apparently lost interest in them, except as provinces among other provinces. Gaul is paid little attention in the literary sources and, as a result, the historical picture loses most of its definition, and a continuous narrative becomes impossible. Relatively few facts are known, and even these are usually difficult to accommodate within any sort of pattern. We may, following a French historiographical tradition, speculate as to the likely effects on Gaul of general imperial happenings as related by ancient writers for the period. In this respect corroborative evidence of a sort is sometimes obtainable from epigraphy or from archaeology; but again the total amount of information remains scanty. Moreover, in cases where the literary evidence is far outweighed by information of other kinds or is indeed non-existent, a serious problem arises which cannot be ignored. This is simply that the literary picture tends to be consistently darker than the non-literary. It may be argued that such probably results from the natural tendency of historians to exaggerate 'bad' characters and 'bad' news for the sake of intensifying the drama of their narratives; and such an inclination would be sharpened in our period by the fact that Roman imperial history was for the most part written by and for members of the senatorial order who, influenced by the senatorial tradition, had no particular cause to champion the reputations of emperors who were progressively showing themselves more 'tyrannical'.¹ On the other hand, it must be true to say that the non-literary information, especially the purely archaeological, by removing the fates and fortunes of individuals from the story, and by frequently involving the consideration of periods of time longer than the usual human frames of reference must often present too static a scene (rather like the television cameras used for space exploration, which scan too clumsily to pick up moving objects). In such a situation the modern historian of the Three Provinces can do no more than point to the difficulty and use his own judgement in negotiating it. As we have already seen, military activity is usually a little easier to understand because the Rhine armies were still very much an imperial concern, not only as a line of defence but also as likely supports,

or even breeding-grounds, for a western usurper. However, even here there are periods which, to say the least, are very obscure.

As suggested in previous chapters, while Vespasian's forces were restoring Rome's frontier along the Rhine, following the shambles of the revolt of Civilis, it is unlikely that there was any mass retribution in the interior of Gaul.² However, recent events had engendered a tension in Gallo-Roman relations, which was to take a long time to relax; as we have seen there seems to have been a reluctance on the part of the Gallic well-to-do to participate in imperial careers.³ On the other hand, under the peace which the new dynasty gave to the Roman world the Three Provinces settled down to enjoy the fruits of Romanisation, a state of affairs which Vespasian seems to have been quite prepared to accept.⁴ Certainly, as Jullian remarked, the appointment of a man of the calibre of Tacitus' father-in-law, Gn. Julius Agricola, to the governorship of Aquitania in the years 74-77 may be taken as reflecting great imperial prudence in the overall administration of the Three Gauls.⁵ Moreover, some Gallic communities positively benefited from the change of government, especially the Helvetii, who saw their chief city of Aventicum (Avenches) transformed into a colony, and immediately endowed with walls and some rather fine public buildings. Such generosity was perhaps a reward for Helvetian loyalty in the recent troubles, compensation for the way in which the community had earlier suffered at the hands of the Vitellians, and maybe even an acknowledgement of the emperor's family-connections with the people among whom his father had been involved in a money-lending business, probably founded on banking or tax-gathering activities, and among whom Vespasian himself spent some years of his youth.⁶ The new centre would, of course, be well placed to exploit the increased traffic passing through central Switzerland into Rome's newly acquired possessions on the right bank of the Rhine.⁷ Here, as elsewhere, the material wounds of the civil wars, and their repercussions, in the Three Gauls must have quickly been healed. It is possible that Domitian's decision to encourage cereal production in the Empire by restricting the amount of land given over to the cultivation of the vine had some impact on Gallic farmers, but this policy must have been very difficult to enforce, and was within a very short time abandoned by the emperor himself.⁸ Likewise, military tiles indicating a heavy concentration of troops in the area around Dïbio (Dijon), and even on the borders of Aquitania, during Domitian's Chattian war and the campaign against Saturninus certainly suggest a degree of disruption in those regions during the 80s, and must surely reflect one of the reasons why the upper Saône was

included in *Germania Superior*.⁹ However, there is once more no reason to think that lasting damage was done.¹⁰

Domitian's direct successor, the emperor Nerva (96-98), enjoyed too short a reign to have much of an impact on the Three Gauls. However, the accession of Trajan may have been due to specific Gallic, or rather, German circumstances if we accept the ideas of J.-J. Hatt. Trajan, whose determined and speedy loyalty in bringing up legion VII from Spain in 88 had played an important part in helping Domitian out of a crisis, had already been made governor of Upper Germany by Nerva. Hatt has suggested that a common late-first-century destruction-layer, to be found at a number of military sites on the upper Rhine, and especially at Argentorate (Strasbourg), indicates a serious mutiny against Nerva in 97, which was possibly also associated with trouble from the Germans. He supposes that Trajan successfully suppressed this unrest, thus bringing himself to the attention of the elderly Nerva (at the same time harassed by a Praetorian Guard which had not as yet forgotten its loyalty to Domitian) as a man of resolution and action. This eventually led to the emperor's adoption of the Spanish-born general as his heir.¹¹

Such a theory fits the historical circumstances but the interpretation of the archaeological evidence upon which it is based has yet to find general acceptance.¹² At any rate Trajan did become Nerva's successor, and was still on the Rhine when news of the latter's death reached him in 98, although shortly afterwards he moved to the Danube, before entering Rome as emperor in 99. It was perhaps his personal experience of the affairs of the west that inclined him to make the military and civil dispositions outlined in the preceding chapter.¹³ However, once he had departed, he had very little more to do directly with the Three Gauls or the German frontier, since he spent his energies in great campaigns across the Danube, where the Dacian menace remained to be dealt with, and in Mesopotamia.

Trajan's death in 118 led to the elevation of Hadrian, whose general policy was in marked contrast to that of his predecessor. Indeed, instead of making his aim that of expanding his Empire to (questionably) more secure natural frontiers he made the best of what lay to hand and concentrated instead on awakening the provinces which he already had to the advantages of Roman rule. The Three Gauls benefited directly from this activity. His plan to switch the Roman army from an offensive to a defensive role involved him in touring the various border zones to promote the acceptance of the tight frontier and to establish a training-programme which would prevent the troops stationed there from growing slack. As we have already seen, the years 121/22 took

him to Germany and Britain in pursuit of these ends.¹⁴ However, such a grand imperial progress, which had a team of architects, surveyors and builders in its train, and which was distinguished by great imperial generosity, could not but have a positive effect on the civilian as well as the military development of the lands through which it passed, during both the outward and the return journeys.¹⁵ The imperial presence in Gaul was trumpeted by the coinage; and we know, for example, that the largest of the Lugdunum aqueducts was built under Hadrian.¹⁶ It is likely that at nearby Condate a temple was added to the Altar of the imperial cult, the result of the emperor's decision, for political reasons, to institute the worship of dead as well as living emperors here.¹⁷ In Lower Germany the township of Forum Hadriani (Voorburg, between Rotterdam and Leyden) was probably an imperial creation of this period.¹⁸ Certainly, as we shall see in greater detail in a later chapter, direct encouragement, indirect stimulation, and the greater availability of resources led to a great blossoming of the cities of the Three Gauls from about this time: possibly the most exciting example of this is the remodelling of the forum-complex of the little town of Alesia on the lines of the great Forum of Trajan in Rome, designed by Apollodorus of Damascus, and begun in Trajan's lifetime, but completed by Hadrian.¹⁹

On the other hand, one must be careful always to set such developments in their wider context. It must be emphasised once more that if the Three Gauls prospered during this time it was because this was a period of great prosperity for the whole of the Roman Empire: the west was not deliberately favoured. Indeed, it should be remarked that Hadrian's first visits to Gaul and Britain were his last; he was still primarily concerned with the military situation in these countries, and having assured himself that all was well he moved on to Spain, Africa, and most of all, the eastern part of his Empire where, Hellenophile as he was, his heart truly lay. The special relationship was not restored.

Hadrian may have visited Gaul only to leave it, but Antoninus Pius, despite his 'Gallic' origins (his father's family is supposed to have come from Nemausus (Nîmes) in Narbonensis), did not come at all as emperor. Very likely in deliberate contrast to his predecessor, whose frenetic wanderings had not found complete favour among the senatorial aristocracy, Pius, once emperor, refused to stir out of Italy. His long and peaceful reign is often seen as marking the apogee of the 'Golden Age' of the Roman Empire. As far as the Three Gauls are concerned the projection of the Upper German *limes* is the only known event of major historical significance.²⁰ For the rest, continued road-building activity, on both major and minor routes, indicates the growing development

and wealth of the area.²¹

With the accession of Marcus Aurelius (161-180) we begin to go beyond the point in the chronological narrative which we reached in the preceding chapter. The years following the death of Pius brought renewed unrest on the frontiers, and within a generation the Empire was once more faced with civil war. In particular, after a long period of peace, and even of small-scale expansion, the Rhine frontier was to face further pressure. However, as I have already stressed, it is important to note that under Marcus and his immediate successors, indeed for almost another hundred years, this frontier held firm. Thus, while Marcus fought his wars against the Macromanni and the Quadi, along the Danube front, the tribes along the Rhine grew troublesome, but were kept effectively in check (Map 5).²² At the very beginning of the new reign, apparently, the Chatti managed to breach the Upper German frontier, and may even have penetrated as far as Argentorate, where signs of destruction have been dated to this period, before being defeated by C. Aufidius Victorinus, governor of Germania Superior, in 162.²³ Eight years later the same people had to be dealt with once more, this time by the future emperor Didius Julianus, in his capacity of commander of the legion at Moguntiacum.²⁴ Further to the north the Chauci seem then to have taken to the sea to raid along the coastlines of Lower Germany and Belgica, to be suppressed in their turn by the same Julianus, now governor of the latter province, in the period 170-175.²⁵ It has been suggested that new army bases at Aardenburg and Oudenburg were built in an attempt to counter further threats of this nature, and that they may be seen as the precursors of the much more sophisticated coastal defence-system of the later Empire, founded on the network of the Saxon Shore forts.²⁶ The Rhine frontier, therefore, remained strong. Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable to suppose that Gaul suffered her fair share of the general ills of the Empire occasioned by the struggle on the Danube – a shortage of ready cash, a temporary draining-away of manpower, and the plague brought from the east.²⁷

During the reign of Marcus Aurelius the senator Vettius Sabinianus was in fact sent into the Three Gauls as the emperor's direct representative in order to 'examine the accounts'.²⁸ This could mean anything, from investigating a shortfall in Gallic taxation revenues to overseeing the finances of the Gallic Council which was responsible for the running of the Altar and the Temple at Condate.²⁹ In any event, it is an indication that all was not well with at least certain aspects of Gallic money-matters. These pressures, together with the uncertainties created by the border incursions outlined above, may indeed have resulted in strain

within the Three Gauls, and particularly among those communities who lived close to the frontier regions. We are told that Marcus Aurelius faced trouble among the Sequani, which could mean among the nation of that name, or even, given the late nature of our source, among the Sequani and the Helvetii, who together made up the fourth-century province of *Maxima Sequanorum*.³⁰ However, it would be unwise to exaggerate the extent or the depth of such distress and discontent. Once again, care must be exercised in the employment of the archaeological evidence, but it does not seem to reflect any great damage done to Gallic social and economic development during this period; and we are informed that even the open unrest among the Sequani was quelled by *censura et auctoritate* ('a rebuke, and the emperor's personal influence'), not by any sort of armed intervention. If the great triumphal arch, known as the 'Porta Nigra' at Vesontio (Besançon), capital of the Sequani, dates from this time then it was certainly intended to commemorate victories over Germanic, not Gallic, adversaries.³¹

Indeed, away from the borders, deep within the Three Gauls, the best-recorded and most well-known event of the reign had nothing directly to do with the military situation (although, as we shall see, there may have been an indirect link). A contemporary document, preserved in the first history of the Christian church, which was written by Eusebius, bishop of Caesarea, early in the fourth century, vividly recounts the martyrdom of a number of Christians of Lugdunum and Vienna (Vienne) at the former city around 177.³² Having already been subjected to local persecution, the faithful were brought before the 'governor' (presumably of Gallia Lugdunensis) who put pressure upon them either to deny their faith, or else admit to participation in the sensational practices (specifically, cannibalism and incest) which were supposed to form an essential part of Christian worship.³³ Some, including Pothinus, the elderly bishop of Lugdunum, died during this process of tortures and wretched imprisonment; the survivors were killed in the 'amphitheatre' (which could only have been that belonging to the imperial cult at Condate³⁴) after being made to endure a gruesome mixture of flogging, exposure to wild beasts, and scorching. The most prominent was the slave-girl Blandina who, despite her lowly position, and the dreadful suffering she underwent, refused to break. After public display, the bodies were burnt and the ashes thrown into the Rhône. Once again while acknowledging the great personal courage shown by the martyrs in defence of their faith the significance of this incident must not be over-estimated. Certainly it must not be taken to

indicate the existence of a large and strong Christian community in Gaul at the time concerned.³⁵

In this period Christianity, like all other religions from the eastern part of the Roman world, was very much a faith of the large cities with their cosmopolitan commercial populations.³⁶ Lugdunum provides us with particularly good evidence for this; at much the same time as Christianity was putting down roots in the Gallic capital, the cult of Cybele, 'Mother of the Gods', whose home was in Asia Minor, and whose worship involved the initiate's being baptised in the living blood of a newly sacrificed bull, was also establishing itself there.³⁷ It would take many years yet before Christianity could achieve its overall domination. However, this incident is valuable in giving us an unlooked-for taste of life in the Three Gauls under Marcus Aurelius. Resentment against the Christians could well have been kindled by underlying unease about the state of the Empire: the German war was still simmering, and to tempt the displeasure of the gods of old, to whose support over the preceding centuries Rome so manifestly owed her success, by refusing them their proper respect would have been to court disaster. Such feelings were perhaps concentrated and distilled by the growing excitement as preparations were made for the annual summer gathering of the representatives of the Gallic nations at Condate, which, as we might have expected, seems also to have drawn in great crowds of holiday-makers: Eusebius' source (a letter, probably written by Irenaeus, successor to Pothinus, to Christian communities in the provinces of Asia and Phrygia) in fact specifically dates the martyrdoms to this time of the year, and stresses the crowds who were present.³⁸

In such circumstances, and in the July heat, it is hardly surprising that tempers ran high, and that the small Christian community suddenly (but perhaps not entirely unwillingly³⁹) became the object of persecution — first at the hands of the mob, then of the local authorities, and finally of the governor. Typically, the Roman authorities sought to control the situation by attempting to ride popular feeling, not by diverting it; thus in the eyes of posterity the reign of the 'philosopher-emperor' is besmirched by religious persecution. The use to which the Condate amphitheatre was put is interesting because it demonstrates quite plainly that it was not intended simply for ceremonial pomp or public debate. It is indeed certain that the national representative chosen to be the annual chief priest, the *sacerdos Romae et Augustorum*, had to pay for some kind of celebratory games there.⁴⁰ In this respect, it is to be observed that we know from a near-contemporary source that the holders of this position were finding the expense of providing fully-

trained gladiators ever more onerous, and that the central government had to intervene in an attempt to diminish this burden, which led to the handing over of locally condemned criminals to the cult-authorities for subjection to some kind of fight to the death in the arena (the details are obscure).⁴¹ Some have in fact been tempted to see in the events of the late 170s a direct result of this legislation, as leading Gauls saw their opportunity to exploit the new concession by fomenting trouble, that is, persecution of the Christians, to generate more victims.⁴² This has rightly been disputed: both the arrests, and the punishment which followed, are quite separate issues from that of the expense of gladiatorial contests, and can be understood perfectly well on their own terms and within official imperial policy of discouraging Christianity as circumstances demanded, without going as far as a permanent process of enquiry and retribution. However, the debate does return us to the theme of possible financial difficulties to be found in the Three Gauls at this time, already touched upon above.⁴³

In 180 Marcus Aurelius, still actively campaigning on the Danube, died, to be succeeded by the son whom he had long groomed for office, but whose reign was soon to be reviled by the senatorial aristocracy. Once again, as in the case of Domitian, the charge was to be 'tyranny' while reality was probably rather the continued discovery of the extent of those absolute powers which were inherent in the Augustan system: 'good' emperors recognised these powers and exploited them, but shrouded their activities in the ambiguities of Augustus' restored Republic; 'bad' emperors simply recognised them and exploited them in an openly absolutist fashion. The difference was one of style, not substance. Nevertheless, like other emperors of his type, Commodus, whatever he got up to in Rome, does not seem to have had all that bad an effect on the provinces. He broke off the German war, and the Empire enjoyed external peace for another generation.⁴⁴ Thus the general drain on provincial resources came to an end and, in the first years at least, the care of the Empire was delegated to some very capable administrators, for example the praetorian prefect, Perennis. The Three Gauls in particular found themselves in the hands of a number of effective governors, including the future emperors Didius Julianus (Lower Germany), Septimius Severus (Lugdunensis), and Clodius Albinus (province uncertain).⁴⁵ Again, however, an isolated incident, the specific importance of which must not be over-rated, serves to draw our attention to the fact that the uneventful peace of the early part of the century was long gone, and that there was an odd tension developing in the Three Provinces which, though impossible to relate to the material evidence,

nevertheless will have to be borne in mind when we come to assess the overall picture. This incident was the revolt of Maternus.

According to the historian Herodian, Maternus was an army-deserter who turned to brigandage, and whose success won him an ever-increasing following. So numerous, indeed, did his band become that, turning aside from the farms and villages that had been his earlier prey, from around 185 he began to attack and plunder large towns, releasing prisoners from the jails, who in their turn joined his ranks. In this way Maternus began to appear less of a robber and more like a usurper in the field; in fact, he overran Gaul and Spain before excessive ambition, and consequent betrayal, led to his death in 187.⁴⁶ Such activity probably once again should be related to the strains of the recent campaigns and their aftermath (including, possibly, the impressment of unwilling recruits into army service to fill gaps left by war and disease⁴⁷). On the other hand, the speed with which Maternus' following grew, and the size which it eventually reached, suggest a broad popular support for reasons which need not have been directly related to purely military grievances. This, together with Maternus' specific attempt to win over the prison populations, might well indicate a certain amount of social unrest, particularly among the less prosperous section of the Gallic population. The implications of such observations will be considered further in a later chapter, but certainly the fact that Maternus' exploits ceased to be regarded as requiring only police-work to suppress them, and forced the authorities to declare a formal war, shows how serious the situation became.⁴⁸ It is possible that the legion VIII Augusta, at Argentorate, won the titles *pia fidelis constans Commoda* for the part it played in these events.⁴⁹ Apart from activity related to the suppression of Maternus, there is strong evidence that under Commodus the Upper German *limes* was strengthened by the building, or rebuilding, of auxiliary forts.⁵⁰

The assassination of Commodus on the last day of 192 precipitated a civil war very similar to that which had followed the suicide of Nero. 193, indeed, was another 'Year of the Four Emperors': Commodus' immediate successor, Helvius Pertinax, was within a very short time murdered by a section of the Imperial Guard which still cherished its loyalty to Commodus, and which then set up Didius Julianus in his place; he, however, found himself immediately challenged by Pescennius Niger, governor of Syria, and Septimius Severus, governor of Upper Pannonia, each of whom claimed the throne for himself. It is to be noted that neither the Three Gauls nor the two Germanies were directly involved in the instigation of these events, nor was there any hint of a

revival of the *Imperium Galliarum* of 69/70. By late 195, however, the situation had changed. Instead of being on the fringes of the struggle, the Gauls now found themselves sandwiched uncomfortably between Severus (who had quickly disposed of Julianus and then proceeded to a victory over Niger) and Clodius Albinus, the governor of Britain (who had initially seemed inclined to revolt on his own account in 193, but who was persuaded by Severus to accept the position of 'Caesar', or 'heir-designate', which involved the emperor's legally adopting him as his son). Following the final defeat of Niger in 194, Severus gave the title of Caesar to his true son, Caracalla, thereby virtually declaring him heir in Albinus' place. Albinus saw the way the tide was running and, in 195, declared himself 'Augustus', full emperor, thus directly challenging Severus. Once this had happened it was plain that sooner or later Severus and Albinus would have to resort to arms to settle the issue, with Gaul as the likely battle-ground. Albinus in fact seized the initiative; in 196 he took his army across the Channel.

His reception was mixed. The Severan administration within the Three Provinces seems to have crumbled: the governor of Lugdunensis fled; and the detachment of police stationed at Lugdunum to guard the mint apparently went over to Albinus, who established his headquarters in the city.⁵¹ On the other hand the German armies, while they do not seem to have gone out of their way to destroy Albinus, did not give him any direct support, and may indeed have resisted the approach of his forces close to the Rhine.⁵² Certain Gallic communities must have backed him, if only because they stood directly in his line of march south; but this would have been a matter of expediency, not principle. Throughout this affair an authentically Gallic view-point is noticeable only by its absence: these were imperial politics, in which Gaul was involved by virtue of her being part of the Empire, no more.

Attacked from the rear by a Severan army which penetrated Gaul through the Belfort Gap, Albinus' forces were defeated at the battle of Lugdunum in February, 197. He himself died in flight. The city was sacked and burned; and henceforth its garrison consisted of detachments drawn from the Rhine legions: the cosy relationship which had grown up between the citizens of Lugdunum and Urban Cohort XIII, stationed there since early in the century, was at an end.⁵³ In addition, there was a general persecution of those leading men (*principes civitatis*, *proceres*) of Gaul who had supported the usurper; and we are told that the new emperor arranged the administration of Gaul 'to his satisfaction', which resulted in all the supporters of Albinus, whether they had allied themselves to his cause spontaneously or under compulsion, being

executed and their property confiscated.⁵⁴ Very likely in connection with this last, an extraordinary census was held in respect of Lugdunum and Lugdunensis, which may also have been extended to include other Gallic provinces.⁵⁵ For a short while a much tighter form of emperor-worship may have been imposed at Condate, as a means of bringing the leaders of the Gallic nations firmly to heel.⁵⁶

Some scholars have seen the collapse of that fine red Gallic pottery known as 'samian', or *terra sigillata*, which may be argued from the archaeological records, as a further manifestation of the turmoil of the period.⁵⁷ In addition, Le Gall has suggested that the town of Alesia (Alise-Ste-Reine), in the *civitas* of the Aedui, was forcibly evacuated and systematically destroyed by Severan troops in retribution for its having supported the enemy cause.⁵⁸ Yet again it is essential to view these happenings in an imperial, not a specifically Gallic, context. Albinus founded his political position on the support of a far-flung network of western senatorial families, particularly in Africa and Spain. These lands suffered at least as severely as, and probably more severely, than the Gauls.⁵⁹ There is therefore no reason to assume that the Three Gauls were singled out for particular punishment in order to bring them to their knees. Other cities had endured worse treatment than Lugdunum in the recent conflicts and would recover — for example Byzantium; Lugdunum in fact followed suit. The governor of Lugdunensis, with his mint and its new garrison, returned to pick up the reins of government;⁶⁰ and damaged buildings seem to have been repaired.⁶¹ Many leading Gauls, no doubt, paid a heavy price for their dealings with Albinus, but in this case the class of *proceres* as a whole may well have benefited from their customary reluctance to involve themselves directly in senatorial careers: as comparative nonentities most would have offered far less obvious targets for imperial wrath than their cousins over the Pyrenees or the Mediterranean. The friends of Albinus who suffered as a result of Severus' administrative changes could well have been Roman career-politicians, not Gallic *civitas*-leaders; and indeed Herodian supplies this information just after his discussion of the emperor's new arrangements for the running of Britain, which would have involved men of this sort. As for the collapse of samian production, it may be pointed out that such was the nature of this industry, which was worked by many small craftsmen who relied on no heavy plant or machinery or high-energy sources, that it is most unlikely that it could have been killed-off simply by the temporary dislocations of a civil war;⁶² the causes of its decline must be sought elsewhere (possibly in a change in taste) and, anyway, new ideas

concerning the dating of Gallic samian production would put its cessation almost a generation later than the battle of Lugdunum.⁶³ Finally, the notion of a Nazi-style demolition of Alesia is imaginative, but unconvincing: on commonsense grounds such an arduous, time-consuming, and utterly negative undertaking when concerned with a very minor settlement and without the help of explosives is an anachronism; and a recent reappraisal of the evidence has in fact undermined the idea on archaeological grounds.⁶⁴

Indeed, the overriding impression to be won from the material evidence is that once the turmoil of the civil war had subsided the Three Gauls proceeded to enjoy a period of astonishing peacefulness and prosperity under Severus and his house. In places as far apart as Burdigala (Bordeaux), Augusta Treverorum (Trier) and the land of the Helvetii, archaeological finds seem to point to even greater economic growth.⁶⁵ And, archaeology aside, perhaps one of the most interesting developments of the reign is the concessions which were apparently made at this time to indigenous Gallic culture, which nicely illustrate that Gallo-Roman civilisation was a true hybrid, and not just an artificial transplant. In the first place Severus allowed Celtic to be used in courts of law; secondly, native leagues officially replaced Roman miles as the means of indicating distances along Roman roads in the Three Gauls.⁶⁶ In both cases we are entitled to see the working-through of the administrative pragmatism so typical of the High Empire: if current usage was so strong as to produce a serious legal anomaly it was found much better to change the law than to attempt to suppress the anomaly. The classic example of such an attitude must be Severus' permission to his troops to marry while on active service. We may guess that the unofficial recognition of local languages had from a very early date been a necessary feature in Roman provincial courts; and the Gallic *leuga* (which anyway conveniently measured one and a half Roman miles) is found in use in Aquitania as early as the reigns of Trajan and Hadrian. Finally, it should be observed that along the Upper German frontier there is evidence for Severan activity but certainly not on the grand scale that some have suggested: it does not appear that the Rhenish *limes* suffered the same amount of disruption as, say, the British, as a result of the civil war.⁶⁷ Certainly, too, the notion that the Severan period saw the beginning of the establishment of a semi-disciplined peasant militia as the garrison of Germany seems now to have disappeared from the text-books.⁶⁸ Severus' was a strong empire, as is reflected by the emperor's successful campaigns against Parthia and in Britain.

Nevertheless, if due allowance is to be paid to the literary, epigraphic

and indeed papyrological sources, it would be equally unwise to swing too far in the opposite direction in any assessment of the position of the Three Gauls at the turn of the second and third centuries. I have argued that this was not a ruined land, and that there was a relatively speedy recovery from the damage of the war against Albinus. Yet, even if this view is accepted, it must be conceded that social tension which had first manifested itself under Commodus had not gone away.⁶⁹ Indeed, circumstances probably conspired to make it worse. The recent persecution of individuals would certainly have served to shake the social and economic order. A new type of emperor now ruled in Rome. Unlike Vespasian who, following his victory after a very similar civil war, had striven long and, ultimately, successfully to conceal the autocratic nature of his power behind the rebuilt façade of the Augustan 'Restored Republic', Severus was prepared to eschew such niceties and to rule openly and unambiguously as the absolute monarch, the first of his kind. Land, once confiscated, was not almost immediately sold or given away, as had been the custom in the past, but was held and worked as imperial property; direct evidence for the emergence of such estates in Gaul is available from inscriptions recording the activities of the officials who had them in their charge.⁷⁰ The emperor himself now elbowed his way in among the rich of the Three Provinces as a powerful landlord in his own right. Added to this, as part of his policy of increasing the hold of central government on local affairs (although, it must be conceded, what is involved here is very much an acceleration of trends which had been manifesting themselves in the Empire from at least the end of the first century), Severus also imposed greater financial responsibilities on city-magistrates throughout the Empire, laying stress on their obligations to guarantee the collection of taxation, both ordinary and extraordinary, and to ensure the provision of adequate facilities for their communities.⁷¹

Again, inscriptions seem to reflect the application of these policies in Gaul.⁷² The rich were under pressure and, given the grossly unequal nature of this society, we may be sure that they did their best to pass on as many as possible of their problems to the poor. About ten years after the battle of Lugdunum we find Julius Septimius Castinus, commander of legion I Minervia at Bonna (Bonn), leading an expeditionary force consisting of detachments from this unit and from the other three German legions against *defectores et rebelles*; during roughly the same period troops are to be found among the Bituriges; and, generally, the early-third century is well known both for a rise in banditry and the regular appearance of military policemen (*beneficarii*) guarding junctions

and bridges along the main roads of the Gauls and the Germanies.⁷³ Despite material prosperity, the spirit of Maternus was, apparently, still abroad. An inscription giving the text of a prayer for the safe return of the imperial family erected between 198 and 209 at Mediolanum Santonum (Saintes) can be taken either as indicating a genuine fear for the well-being of a line which was seen as serving Gaul well, or as a hypocritical and meaningless display of conventional loyalty to a man in whose reign life had become harder.⁷⁴ The situation in the Three Gauls at this time must, therefore, be regarded as having been very complex.

After Severus' death the Empire passed effectively into the hands of Caracalla (211-217). During his reign we find the first ominous signs of renewed pressure on the Rhenish frontier, particularly in Upper Germany, where for the first time the Alamanni make their appearance.⁷⁵ The nature and origins of these people, and the forces which compelled them westwards against the Roman frontier, will be discussed more fully in a later chapter. Here it is enough to say that in future years they were to cause increasing trouble, to the extent that in the late 250s they would actually overrun the Agri Decumates and wrest them permanently from direct Roman control; for the moment, however, they were controllable.⁷⁶ The emperor, who happened to revel in the military life, campaigned against them actively during the year 213; it has been noted that the concentration of troops on the German front was the greatest since Domitian.⁷⁷ Through a combination of force, trickery and bribery Caracalla was generally successful; the Alamanni were to remain submissive for almost a generation.⁷⁸ Once again, as in the days of Marcus Aurelius and those of Septimius Severus, the *limes* had held firm and done its job. There is little justification for supposing either widespread damage or subsequent reconstruction in Upper Germany during this period; and, as we have already seen, the building of the Pfahlgraben, commonly attributed to the reign of Caracalla, may have been a much earlier phenomenon.⁷⁹ The war proper was probably waged deep into enemy territory. As far as the interior of Gaul is concerned, there was trouble caused by the emperor's 'cruelty' and 'greed' as he moved from the south to the German front. However, as in the case of his father, there is good reason to suppose that much of this activity in fact derived from his concern for his political position, especially following his clear involvement in the death of his brother (which had allowed him to assume sole power). Again it might be argued that those who suffered most belonged to the imperial administrative aristocracy. Certainly, the brunt of his anger seems to have been borne by Narbonensis rather than by the Three Gauls.⁸⁰ Indeed, his

adoption of the Gallic cape, the *caracallus*, which gave him his nickname (properly, he should be called either Bassianus, or M. Aurelius Antoninus), and which made the garment fashionable throughout the Empire, may well have helped to stimulate the northern Gallic wool and textile industries, particularly in the province of Belgica.⁸¹

His reign is, of course, probably best known for the granting of Roman citizenship to most free inhabitants of the Empire. His motives in doing this were unclear at the time, and have subsequently been much debated. Some accuse him of being interested only in the additional tax revenue which would thereby accrue; others, possibly putting words into his mouth, explain the move rather oddly on mainly religious grounds; and, specific causes aside, the action may be seen as just another of those ways in which the imperial administration yielded gracefully to a *fait accompli*.⁸² In the Three Gauls Gallic communities had for so long aped Roman ways in the running of their affairs that even the technical aspects of the change from foreign to Roman status, where this had not already been conferred, must have been minimal.⁸³ Here too, as in most of the other provinces of the Empire, it is justifiable to assume that the majority of people to whom the possession of Roman citizenship really opened up important doors had either acquired it, or illegally assumed it, by the early third century.⁸⁴ One suspects that the direct impact of the so-called *Constitutio antoniniana* on the everyday lives of most ordinary people was virtually negligible. As far as they were concerned probably even their newly granted rights of access to the machinery of Roman law were but theoretical: the long evolutionary prelude to the actual change would have ensured that irregular practices were now part and parcel of the established system, and that the new order would not have ended poor people's liability to, and indeed their seeking of, the rough but speedy justice dispensed by neighbourhood aristocrats on the basis of tradition and custom.⁸⁵ One group, however, deserves somewhat closer attention. As Wolff has pointed out, we would be unwise to undervalue the status of Roman citizenship as it had developed by the end of the second century by taking into account simply the likely diminution in the material benefits which it brought to its possessors.⁸⁶ The very fact that it had spread so widely among the upper classes of the Empire would have given it great social prestige among those who possessed enough in the way of wealth, awareness and ambition to resent their own deprivation but remained too weak economically and politically to remedy it. At this point, into the mind of the historian of the Three Provinces must spring the figure of the prosperous urban trader-artisan, who was clearly doing well in

this period, and to whom the new circumstances may well have promised a very real and much appreciated rise in status.⁸⁷ Overall, therefore, there seems no reason to suppose that Caracalla would have been particularly unpopular in the Three Gauls (which were, in fact, his birthplace: he was born at Lugdunum while his father was governor there).⁸⁸

Caracalla was murdered on the orders of one of his praetorian prefects, Macrinus, while campaigning in the east. Macrinus temporarily succeeded him (217-218) only to be replaced by two cousins of the dead emperor, first Elagabalus (218-222) and then Severus Alexander (222-235). These events once again involved the Empire in civil war and political strife yet, nevertheless, in the face of such happenings and further trouble from the barbarians the Three Gauls do not appear to have suffered unduly. Without a doubt anxiety must have been caused by further pressure from the Alamanni, culminating in the great attack of 233 which brought Severus Alexander hurrying from an inconclusive campaign in the east to take personal charge of the situation in the west.⁸⁹ His lack of success as a war-leader, his murder at Mainz at the hands of his own troops, and the consequent elevation of the first of the 'soldier-emperors', Maximinus (235-238) to succeed him, indeed mark the beginning of the third-century Crisis, when both the Roman defensive system and the Roman political system collapsed under intolerable pressure, the failure of each accelerating the failure of the other. And yet, as far as the Three Gauls were concerned, although war must have brought its difficulties it seems that for the most part life went on as before.⁹⁰ Despite Alexander's troubles the *limes* had held, and the Alamanni were repulsed vigorously by Maximinus; damage to military installations along the frontier was made good.⁹¹

From the reign of Gordian III (238-244) there is excellent evidence to suggest that during the second quarter of the third century there were still Gauls rich enough and willing enough to act as generous patrons to their *civitates* and to participate actively in the affairs of the Gallic Council at Condate.⁹² It is possible that some form of supplementary defensive works were erected in the territory of the Treveri in the reign of Philip (244-249) but against this must be set the fact that much the same period saw the vigorous, if exotic, flowering of funereal art at Neumagen and elsewhere in the same *civitas*, which was clearly the product of commercial wealth, confidence and, indeed, complacency.⁹³ Inscriptional evidence indicates that civilian local government was still functioning in the Agri Decumates.⁹⁴ Our purely literary sources are, admittedly, very poor and again we must be careful not to

allow the archaeologically-based evidence to present too rosy a picture. There is, in fact, direct mention of unrest in Gaul at about this period: Eutropius' historical digest contains a tantalisingly brief reference to a civil war which was put down by the emperor Decius (249-251).⁹⁵ On past form, however, this is more likely to have been associated with imperial politics than with direct Gallic interests, and would thus again have involved frontier governors and generals, rather than the people of the interior. The overriding impression is that real trouble began only with the joint rule of Valerian and Gallienus (253-260).⁹⁶

By the middle decades of the third century the Crisis was reaching its height. Pressured by a newly revived Persia in the east and by Germanic tribes (in particular the Goths) from over the Danube, the social, economic and political institutions of the Roman Empire came close to collapse as their many weaknesses were made manifest, and amplified. Decius actually died in battle fighting the Goths; he was succeeded by Gallus (251-253) who, however, soon fell to Aemilian (253). Gallus' general, Valerian, had been busy collecting an army together on the Danubian frontier with which to aid the emperor against the usurper. News of his master's death did not cause him to terminate these activities; he now prepared to fight for the throne on his own account. Aemilian was, in fact, soon killed by his own troops, which allowed Valerian to take the purple without opposition. Almost immediately he appointed his son, Gallienus, as his colleague in office, specifically charging him with the duty of defending the west while he, as senior emperor, took the army he had raised eastwards to face invaders from Persia.

The Empire was now paying the price for its internal discord. The northern frontiers had been stripped of troops first to combat Aurelian and then to support Valerian. Neighbouring barbarians were not slow to take advantage of the situation; and most of Gallienus' reign was to be spent in attempting to restore order on these borders. From 254 until 257 he campaigned, apparently with no small success, against the tribes menacing the Danube. In the spring of the latter year, however, he moved his headquarters to Colonia Agrippina (Köln). It is clear that Valerian had taken into his army many men from the garrison of Upper Germany to help promote his ambitions to seize the imperial power, and these he had not returned. Thus the *limes* was weakened, and from around 253 it had once again begun to attract the serious attention of the watchful Alamanni. At the same time, in Lower Germany, the Franks had already probably appeared as yet another new and dangerous threat to the security of Gaul. To begin with the position was far from hopeless: milestones indicate the functioning of *civitas*-govern-

ment in the Agri Decumates, and by implication, the military power and political willingness to protect it.⁹⁷ However, the gravity of the situation was eventually such that Gallienus was forced to leave the defence of the Danube to his elder son, under the care of a guardian, and to proceed in person to the Rhine. The implication must be that the barbarians had broken through.

Arrived in Germany, the emperor acquitted himself with all his usual vigour. The line of the Rhine was secured, but Gallienus undertook a tactical withdrawal from the Upper German *limes*, thereby ending direct Roman control of the Agri Decumates. As part of this move the former legionary base at Vindonissa (Windisch) was reoccupied. His measures seem to have produced sufficient stability to enable him to leave Germany late in the summer of 259 to journey into northern Italy; and although his elder son had died on the Danube he followed the earlier precedent by leaving his younger son, Saloninus, in Köln, in charge of Silvanus, possibly a praetorian prefect. Then disaster struck. In 260 Valerian, aging, sick, afflicted by enemies from the north and east, by earthquake and by the plague, fell prisoner to Shapur I, king of the Persians. The Roman world was stunned by this unprecedented calamity. The internal security, so carefully built up over the preceding seven years, was shattered as barbarians sensed their opportunity and poured into the Empire. The Franks broke through on the lower Rhine and penetrated even as far as Spain and Africa; the Alamanni crossed the upper part of the river and terrorised the Helvetii and the Arverni before invading Italy itself.

In the midst of this confusion came rebellion. Latinus Postumus, governor of the Lower Germany, fell upon and destroyed a barbarian (probably Frankish) raiding party as it was making its way homewards laden with plunder. The booty he distributed among his men. When Silvanus, in the name of Saloninus, attempted to force him to return these goods to their rightful owners he revolted, proclaimed himself emperor, and, after successfully laying siege to Köln, killed both prince and prefect. So far this rebellion had been just like any other in the evolution of the Crisis; and, indeed, in this, its darkest hour, there were many other usurpers like Postumus who had chosen, or been forced, to fish in troubled waters with a view to becoming sole ruler of the Roman world. But here Postumus was to differ from the rest: he remained in the west. Britain, Narbonensis and Spain fell to him, but his rule was clearly centred on Germany and the Three Gauls. An independent 'Gallic Empire' was in existence; after two centuries of passivity Gaul was again making her own history.

Notes

1. Cf. above 20, 48; below 59.
2. Cf. above 47, 57.
3. Cf. above 48.
4. So Grenier (3), 532.
5. Tacitus, *Agricola* 9; Jullian, iv.459.
6. Suetonius, *Vespasian* 1.3; cf. Staehlin, 197. The colonial status of Aventicum, and its purpose, have been much disputed. If it is assumed that the colonial title was merely titular – as Reynolds, 75 – there is no problem: the Helvetii were being honoured by Vespasian as the Treveri had been honoured by Claudius (see above 56). However, if, with most Swiss scholars, we accept that veterans were actually settled in the town then the situation becomes more complex. It could be argued, for example, that far from being a privilege, such an imposition, whereby the newcomers held the *civitas*-capital, from which the administration of the *civitas* still depended, represented virtual military occupation. On the other hand, by stressing the evidence of the inscriptions it is equally possible to say that the settlers were relatively few, that they shared the privileges of the colony with the indigenous population, and that they were quickly absorbed by them. See Staehlin, 222f. I adopt the last hypothesis, while conceding that it is not without its problems. For the building activity see Grenier (1), iii.37.
7. Staehlin, 221; cf. above 60.
8. Suetonius, *Domitian* 7.2, 14.2; cf. below 167.
9. Jullian, iv.458; Grenier (1), 263f; Leday (2), 303; I follow Ritterling's chronology here – see *contra* Jullian, *loc.cit.*
10. It may be noted, however, that Domitian moved to the Rhine in 83, and thence to his campaign against the Chatti, on the pretext of holding a Gallic census (Frontinus, *Strategemata* 1.1.8). The fact that an emperor could justify the collection of an army on this basis is perhaps a further indication of how, in the years following the events of 68-70, Gaul could still be regarded as a land of great potential danger.
11. Hatt (2), 168f; (3), 220.
12. See the remarks of Schönberger, 164.
13. So e.g. Baatz (3), 99; see above 61. Trajan learned of his accession while he was staying at Colonia Agrippina, the capital of Lower Germany (Eutropius, 8.2.1.). This might suggest that as heir-apparent he had already undertaken wider responsibilities for the government of the Rhine frontier than those which were properly his as governor of Upper Germany, which had its capital at Moguntiacum.
14. Above 62; the precise details of the chronology of Hadrian's western journeys are unfortunately disputed: see e.g. Jullian, iv.471, Garzetti, 387. I follow the orthodox thinking.
15. *Epitome* 14.5; *Historia Augusta*, *Hadrian* 10.1.
16. RESTITVTOR GALLIAE; ADVENTVI GALLIAE – *RIC* ii, 325f, 884f; *CIL* xiii 1623 = *ILS* 5749, relating to the Giers aqueduct: Audin, 132f.
17. Fishwick (1), *passim*; (2), 1236f.
18. Jullian, iv.471; Raepsaet-Charlier, 129.
19. Le Gall, 129f, esp. 133; Boëthius and Ward-Perkins, 236f. Cf. below 152.
20. See above 62f.
21. So Hatt (2), 182. Baatz (3), 100, makes the very reasonable suggestion that Pius' extension of the *limes* may well have resulted in a further relaxation of martial law, and the formation of more *civitates*, to the rear.
22. See above 64.
23. Jullian, iv.477; Schönberger, 171; Hatt (2), 185.
24. Schönberger, 171.

25. Jullian, iv.477; Schönberger, 172.
26. Thoen, 246.
27. So Jullian, iv.478; cf. Grenier (3), 563f.
28. *AE*, 1920, 45.
29. Willeumier (1), 42, takes the latter view. As he seems to imply, the appointment of M. Flavius Postumus to some form of extraordinary governorship in Gaul may well belong to this period too – *CIL* viii 7044 = *ILS* 1163: cf. Mommsen (2), *passim*.
30. Historia Augusta, *Marcus Aurelius* 22.10; Jullian, iv.478; Grenier (3), 564.
31. Cf. Hatt (2), 285; Varène, 84f, is however much less specific in his dating.
32. Eusebius, *Historia Ecclesiastica* 5.1.3-63; the date is disputed, see Rougé (4).
33. Jullian, iv.494, offers a neat explanation as to how citizens of Vienna, in Narbonensis, found themselves answerable to the governor of Lugdunensis: they were visiting fellow-Christians in Lugdunum when they were apprehended.
34. Cf. below 78.
35. Jullian, iv.486.
36. Cf. below 196-8.
37. Hatt (2), 183, with reference to *CIL* xiii 1751 = *ILS* 4131.
38. Cf. below 113.
39. See the point made by Jullian, iv.493.
40. Cf. below 111f.
41. The *s.c. de sumptibus ludorum gladiatoriorum minuendis*, *CIL* ii.6278 (= *ILS* 5163): specific references to Gaul and Gallic priests are to be found at 14f, 56. For a comprehensive survey of the very complex debate raised by this inscription, and by related evidence, see Rougé (4), *passim*.
42. Audin, 241 (cf. Matthews, 263).
43. Rougé (2), 91.
44. Schönberger, 42; cf. below 85.
45. Historia Augusta, *Didius Julianus* 2.1 (cf. *CIL* vi 1401 = *ILS* 412); Historia Augusta, *Septimius Severus* 3.8f; Historia Augusta, *Clodius Albinus* 5.4-6, 6.3 – implying a German command of some sort, but this from a source which is here to be little trusted; cf. Whittaker at Herodian 1.10.3, who puts Albinus in Belgica, and Niger in Aquitania.
46. Herodian, 1.10.1-7; Whittaker, at Herodian, 1.10.7.
47. So Whittaker, at Herodian, 1.10.1.
48. See below 213; Herodian, 1.10.2, cf. Historia Augusta, *Commodus* 16.2; *Septimius Severus* 3.9; *Pescennius Niger* 3.3f.
49. Schönberger, 172.
50. Schönberger, 173.
51. Governor and cohort are discussed below, 82, 96.
52. Dio, 76.6.2 (the defeat of Virius Lupus); *CIL* xiii 6800 = *ILS* 419 (the 'siege' of Trier); cf. Schönberger, 173 and Wightman (1), 52.
53. Herodian, 3.7.7; Willeumier (1), 28; Audin, 253f; generally Rougé (3), *passim*.
54. Historia Augusta, *Septimius Severus* 12.1, 12.3; Herodian, 3.8.2.
55. *CIL* ii 4121 = *ILS* 1145; Rougé (3), 228. Aquitania may also have been reassessed at this time – Birley (1), 196.
56. Fishwick (2), 1247; cf. below 114. Against Fishwick I believe that such a move must have been more general in its intention than simply to punish Lugdunum for its support of Albinus: Lugdunum was not Condate.
57. Cf. below 187f.
58. Le Gall, 198f.
59. Cf. Birley (1), 199.
60. Willeumier (1), 18, 28; cf. below 96. It should be noted that there is a

problem with the dating of the Severan governor T. Flavius Secundus Philippianus. The relevant inscription (*CIL* xiii 1673 = *ILS* 1152) bears the abbreviation AVGGG, which strictly speaking could not have occurred before 208/9, which is impossibly late. However, all authorities now agree that there are legitimate grounds for assigning its erection to 198.

61. Audin, 253.
62. Cf. below 188.
63. King, 55f esp. 66.
64. Martin and Varène, 22.
65. Etienne (1), 189f; Wightman (1), 52; Staehlin, 256. Cf. below 219f.
66. Jullian, iv.520f; cf. Walser, *passim*.
67. Schönberger, 173; cf. Hatt (2), 198.
68. Rostovtzeff, 427; cf. MacMullen (2), 13.
69. Cf. above 80.
70. See below 101 (although, from Birley (1), 16, we should note that here, as in much else, Severus was not the inventor of an institution, but rather the one who exploited it to the full).
71. See Hatt (2), 200; Drinkwater (4), 93.
72. Cf. below 109.
73. *ILS* 1153; cf. Wightman (1), 52; Leday (2), 303; Grenier (1), i 183f, 231f.
74. *AE* 1977, 535.
75. Aurelius Victor, 21.2; cf. Schönberger, 173, for the date of 213.
76. See below 89.
77. Schönberger, 173.
78. Dio, 78.13.5, 78.14.3; Herodian, 4.7.3; cf. *ILS* 451 — the title of *Germanicus Maximus*.
79. Schönberger, 173f; cf. above 63.
80. Historia Augusta, *Caracalla* 5.1-3 (cf. 4.9f, immediately preceding).
81. Drinkwater (8), 125.
82. Sherwin-White (3), 279 and, most recently, the excellent study of Wolff (especially, here, his views on the implications of the *Constitutio Antoniniana*, at 109-17).
83. Cf. below 107f.
84. So Lerat, 41.
85. Cf. Percival (1), 468-72.
86. Wolff, 112.
87. See below 130-6, 196-8.
88. Cf. Jullian, iv.533; Grenier (3), 567. (Rather different are the views of Ternes (2), 22, on the 'disastrous' consequences of this policy, due to its introduction of 'centrifugal' forces into Gallic life.)
89. Herodian, 6.7.2f.
90. For possible evidence of the damage done on the frontier at this time see Schönberger, 174f.
91. E.g. Herodian, 7.2.6-8; Schönberger, 175.
92. *CIL* xiii 3162; see Pflaum, *passim*. Cf. below 114.
93. Wightman (1), 173 (from *CIL* xiii 4131 = *ILS* 7056); von Massow, esp. 280f. Cf. below 219.
94. Schönberger, 176; cf. below 219.
95. Eutropius, 9.4.
96. There is as yet no easily referable up-to-date account of the Gallic Empire. The following narrative is taken mostly from Drinkwater (1), which I hope to make available in more accessible form in the near future. See however, especially for the chronology, König, *passim*.
97. Schönberger, 176 (from *CIL* xiii 9103 = *ILS* 532, 9111).

5 THE ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE

Having so far pursued at least a form of historical narrative, from Caesar's Conquest to the onset of the third-century 'Crisis' within the Three Gauls, I intend in the following chapters of this work to explore in more detail certain specific aspects of their development, beginning with the way in which they were run. As we have already seen, under Caesar and then under Octavian the Tres Galliae were managed for the most part simply as an integral part of the Province, and the whole usually under a single governor.¹ Given this, the size of the newly conquered lands, and the civil wars which convulsed the Roman world for most of the period, imperial control cannot have been tight, the local *civitas*-administrations were probably allowed to continue much as before, so long as they caused no trouble. The old hill-forts remained in occupation, and some, indeed, were repaired following the damage of Caesar's war.² (However, it is suggested in the following chapter that a number of Gallic nations may have been under a form of martial law.³) It was after Octavian had become Augustus in 27 BC, and had set about restoring the Republic, that the Gallic situation received closer attention. The groundwork had already been done by the emperor's close friend and companion in his labours, M. Vipsanius Agrippa, particularly in the establishment of the basis of a new military road-system in the Three Gauls, centred on the early colony of Lugdunum.⁴ In the light of the experience and knowledge gained in this exercise, the 'Four Gauls' (the Three Provinces and Narbonensis) could come into being almost immediately, their existence being acknowledged and confirmed by the first formal census.⁵ The three provinces of northern Gaul echoed, as perhaps they were intended to, the three 'parts' of Caesar's description of the land. However, his Aquitania was expanded beyond recognition to include the Celtic peoples between the Garonne and the Loire; and his Celtica, now *Provincia Lugdunensis*, also lost land to a new Belgica (which, in its turn was soon to be forced to give up the military zone along the Rhine to the armies of Lower and Upper Germany (Map 2).⁶

Such divisions carved the land up into three roughly equal areas, and as such must be regarded as being solely for the administrative convenience of the Empire; at this early stage it cannot have mattered much to a Gallic *civitas* which particular province it found itself part of – the more so because great care was taken to prevent the new boundaries

from senselessly cutting through existing communities.⁷ However, as DeWitt observed, it is remarkable that the new arrangements managed to separate the three great central powers of the Arverni, Aedui and Sequani;⁸ and although individual *civitates* were not divided, it also seems highly likely that within the provincial structure efforts were made to rationalise *civitas*-government. Some large communities lost control over hitherto dependent peoples, perhaps in order to check their power: so the Vellavi escaped the control of the Arverni.⁹ On the other hand, the very small *civitas* of the Mandubii seems to have been absorbed by the neighbouring Aedui: it is probable that there the decision was taken on the grounds that the former was not viable as an independent unit.¹⁰ Elsewhere groups of small *civitates*, or *civitates* which had suffered heavily in the war of conquest, were similarly combined for the sake of efficiency: so the Tungri came into being out of the Aduatuci, the Eburones, the Condrusi and others;¹¹ and the 'Nine Peoples' of Aquitania were created from the thirty-odd peoples recorded by Caesar.¹²

In common with many other large and important provinces within the Empire as reorganised by Augustus the Four Gauls each received a governor — no longer the Republican proconsul, who was an officer of state in his own right, rather the emperor's deputy, his *legatus* or 'legate', appointed by him and answerable directly to him.¹³ It was in fact a necessary element of Augustus' settlement that only he, either as 'consul' or 'proconsul' was the 'magistrate' in charge of those provinces where armies operated, or were likely to operate. The return of the unarmed and peaceful province of Narbonensis to rule by proconsular governors (in theory still responsible only to the Senate) in 22 BC, while the Three Provinces continued to be administered by legates, underlines the increasingly developed nature of the former, and the growing separation between it and its northern neighbours, which has already been touched upon above.¹⁴ Until the third century legates appointed to the Gallic provinces were always men who, within the framework of the restored Republic had reached the office of *praetor*, the magistracy immediately below that of the consulship; hence, as 'pro-praetors' they were anyway of a rank formally inferior to that of the emperor, by virtue of his permanent proconsular power. A Gallic governorship was, indeed, usually the last step before the attainment of the consulship. On the other hand, an imperial legate of one of the German military zones (later provinces) always already possessed consular status; therefore his rank in this post had for the period of his office to be artificially restricted to that of praetor too, to prevent his appearing

to enjoy any sort of parity with the emperor. Both sets of governors therefore possessed the same title, *legatus Augusti pro praetore*. The term of office varied — from one or two years to several, as the emperor saw fit.

It will have been noted that here, as earlier, I assume that these changes took place as early as 27 BC.¹⁵ On the other hand it must be pointed out that the evidence is far from clear in this respect, and that a number of scholars have suggested that the full tripartite division of the Three Gauls did not take place until over a decade later.¹⁶ However, I believe that this later dating is the result of confusion arising out of the presence in Gaul, during the early years of Augustus' reign, of important members of the imperial family whose plenipotentiary powers allowed them to override the working of the regular system of provincial administration: such men should be regarded as 'viceroys' rather than as 'governors' of Gaul.¹⁷ It would have been madness for them, since they were usually appointed to take on certain specific, generally military, tasks, to have shouldered the burden of the day-to-day running of the provinces. I feel that on such occasions the *legati* must have continued to carry out their normal duties, under the overall supervision of the resident imperial prince — except, of course, in the main campaigning areas and their support-regions, which would have come under the direct control of him and his generals. The earlier date receives some support from remarks in both Livy and Cassius Dio;¹⁸ it also fits the political exigencies of the period: for Augustus to have left so important a military command undivided might well have tempted an ambitious governor to revolt. Otherwise, as in the case of Dio's description of the defeat of Lollius, where an ordinary Gallic governor is mentioned without specific reference to his province, we should put this down to simple omission, and make an intelligent guess as to which part of Gaul he administered — as we do indeed for Vindex; I would say that Lollius was probably in charge of an unreformed Belgica — that is, before this province was shorn of its military areas, which would explain his command of troops in the field.¹⁹

It is commonly stated that the governors of the Three Gauls had their main residences and centres of administration in the cities of Lugdunum (Lugdunensis), Durocortorum Remorum (Rheims: Belgica) and Burdigala (Bordeaux: Aquitania). As far as the first is concerned, a mass of literary and epigraphical evidence makes this certain; and there are relatively few problems in respect of the second, at least for the early years: some have suggested a subsequent move to Trier.²⁰ However, the evidence for the last is very unsatisfactory indeed, and there is good

reason to believe that, in the early part of our period at least, Aquitania was administered first from Mediolanum Santonum (Saintes) and then from Limonum Pictonum (Poitiers).²¹ Lugdunum had the highest status among the three provincial capitals. As Roman colony, hostess and guardian of the worship of *Roma et Augustus* at Condate, and *de facto* capital of the Three Gauls as a whole, she would have had no rival.²²

Evidence from Gaul and from elsewhere in the Empire reveals that the duties of an imperial governor were very much like those of his Republican predecessor, namely to protect his province from external aggression, to maintain internal peace, and to uphold the law. The first two of these obligations made him the military commander-in-chief in his province, in charge, in the absence of any higher authority (such as a member of the imperial house) of any troops operating there. As events were to prove, most governors of the Three Gauls did not have the opportunity to command large numbers of troops in the field, simply because the creation of the Germanies removed the bulk of the army from the interior of the country. However, this did not mean that military talent was entirely redundant. There was a strong force of security-police permanently stationed at Lugdunum, principally to protect the imperial mint which was located there, but also available for use against particularly troublesome outlaws, or even to oppose or support a usurper.²³ (This posting, involving a detached battalion, about 1,000 strong, from the para-military police force of the city of Rome (*Cohortes urbanae*), witnessed the arrival and departure of a number of units during the first century, thanks to the political disturbances of the age; for most of the second century it was taken by the Cohors XIII Urbana but, following the involvement of this force with Albinus, it was then entrusted to a mixed force made up of men seconded from each of the Rhenish legions.²⁴) Governors could also be loaned troops from Germany; and, in emergency, they were always capable of raising a local militia.²⁵

The third of his duties made a governor the supreme legal authority for all non-Roman citizens (*peregrini*) and eventually, after Caracalla's edict, for everyone in his province (that is, when it became a practical impossibility to allow all Roman citizens to appeal beyond his primary jurisdiction to the emperor himself).²⁶ Consequently much of his time must have been spent travelling around a sort of assize-circuit, holding judicial sessions in the main urban centres of his province, in order to hear cases which the local authorities could not handle, either because they were not allowed to (for instance, cases involving capital punish-

ment, and the severest forms of non-capital penalties), or because it was beyond their competence (for example, disputes between two or more communities, or matters which had an imperial significance, such as the treatment of Christians).²⁷

Because they were part of Augustus' restored Republic, and therefore had to conform with established traditions, imperial governors, like their truly Republican predecessors, had to manage with very small official staffs, especially in the early years of the system. As time progressed more help became available, for example in the shape of the various military messengers, clerks and secretaries whom we increasingly find permanently attached to a governor's *officium* (bureau) – *frumentarii*, *beneficarii*, *commentarienses*, *cornicularii*, and so on.²⁸ To the end of our period, however, in this, as in every other respect, the provinces remained remarkably under-governed by the imperial power.²⁹ This made for cheap administration as it made for cheap defence; and it also forced Rome to co-operate as much as possible with local authorities to persuade these to do her job for her.³⁰

In one very important respect the imperial legates were permitted only restricted direct competence. This was in finance: the collection and disbursement of imperial monies. Here the official in charge was the provincial procurator, or *procurator Augusti provinciae*.³¹ This may be seen as a measure to weaken a governor's power, and hence his capacity to revolt, by dividing it and, in particular, by making it harder for him to buy the support of regular or irregular troops. In addition, it gave the emperor extra agents abroad in his provinces, by whom any mismanagement, or disloyalty on the part of his governors could be observed and reported. Indeed, one of the constitutional anomalies of the 'Restored Republic' was that its operation, through traditional magistrates and pro-magistrates, continued to feed the life of that arch-Republican body, the Senate, which in essence was an assembly of ex-magistrates gathered to give advice to the present officers of state. Men who owed their elevation, wealth and power entirely to their serving an effectively autocratic emperor, and to the series of high offices bestowed on them as the means of and the reward for this service, by this very circumstance found themselves members of a body the traditions of which were so strong that within a generation or so it was able to transform them and their families into fierce protectors of its ancient rights and privileges.³² This was doubly unfortunate, first of all because it meant that senatorial participation in a wide range of new posts necessary to govern the rapidly developing Empire was ruled out as untraditional, and then because it tended to ensure that an emperor who

moved against just a small part of the ruling elite on (possibly legitimate) grounds of disloyalty or incompetence could be regarded as mounting an attack on the senatorial order as a whole, and thus could easily find himself, with no friends among the Empire's highest class, vulnerable to usurpation. In an effort to counter both these problems Roman emperors came increasingly to depend on that level of the land-owning class which, in terms of wealth, lay generally just below that which traditionally supplied senators. This lower, but still very wealthy, order of the aristocracy was, for historical reasons (arising out of the very early obligation of its members to supply horses for the army) known as 'equestrian', and from it was increasingly drawn a wide range of important imperial officials, including the provincial procurators. It can thus be appreciated how the employment of such men allowed the emperor to obtain a non-senatorial view of what was happening in the provinces. In fact the most famous example of this process in action is the reporting by the procurator of Belgica, Pompeius Propinquus, of the revolt of the Upper German legions early in 69, for which he was subsequently killed by the supporters of Vitellius.³³

The procurators, like the legates, worked within the provincial system, although in a slightly more complicated fashion, since there were never more than two such officials to cover the Three Gauls. The details are difficult to establish, but it seems that there were various permutations of the Gallic provinces (including Narbonensis) before the system settled down in its final form, probably around the second half of the first century. Thenceforth, the financial affairs of Lugdunensis and Aquitania were overseen together from Lugdunum, those of Belgica (including the two Germanies) from Augusta Treverorum.³⁴ Politically the most sensitive tax which the procurators were responsible for collecting was the 'tribute', the main direct tax of the Roman Empire, payment of which was the outward and visible sign of a people's subjection to the imperial power.³⁵ Despite Roman protestations that it was levied for the provincials' own good, especially in the matter of their defence from outside attack, it was clearly long resented as a mark of Rome's subjects' buying themselves out of the slavery which, by the right of conquest, was properly their lot.³⁶ The tribute was divided into two categories: the *tributum soli* ('ground-tribute') which was effectively a tax on the yield of agricultural land,³⁷ and the *tributum capitis* ('head-tribute') which, despite its name, was not really a poll-tax but rather a levy on wealth. Land which could be deemed Roman or Italian – colonial land – was not liable to the former. The latter was not paid by Roman citizens wherever they happened to be resident.

It is now generally accepted that under the High Empire no Gallic *civitates* were exempt from these dues by virtue of their relationship with Rome.³⁸ The assessment of the *tributum* depended on figures produced by the census, which made the operation of the census itself, particularly the first one, a difficult business, since it provoked both memories of past humiliations and fears of future demands.³⁹ As we have already seen, for this reason the early years of imperial rule in the Three Gauls saw important members of the ruling house on hand in Gaul at census-time to calm any unrest (for example, 27 BC Augustus, 12 BC Drusus, 14 Germanicus). Later, the job went to senior (consular) *legati censitores*, who were possibly sent to Gaul in teams of three, each man taking one of the Three Provinces (amongst which Belgica, following the model set by the procuratorial area of operations, may have retained its original boundaries, and so included the two Germanies).⁴⁰ It is in fact not entirely clear whether these officials fulfilled a specialised mission, which was quite separate from the day-to-day running of their provinces, or if they were a superior kind of provincial governor and so assumed the responsibilities of the normal incumbents in addition to that of taking the census.⁴¹ Modern thinking seems to favour the former view; my own inclination is to do likewise, since the possibility of a consular governor of Belgica being able to control the armed provinces of the Germanies raises far too many historical difficulties. There is greater unanimity among scholars that the clutch of equestrian *procuratores ad census accipiendos*, and so on, who put in an appearance from the early-second century, were always subordinate functionaries, charged simply with representing the consulars in sub-districts of the census (made up of single large *civitates* or small groups of the lesser nations). These were doing a job which earlier had tended to be the preserve of officers seconded from the army. In other words, they were in no way responsible for directing the operation as a whole.⁴² Given the general increase in the power and competence of equestrian officials at this time – to the point that by the early third century equestrians occur in the place of praetorian governors in the Three Gauls⁴³ – this is rather odd. On the other hand it remains clear that distinguished consular *legati* continue to appear in Gaul until the middle years of the third century. This, taken with the fact, as we have already seen, that senators could anyway be employed as extraordinary inspectors of Gallic finances, gives the impression that the imperial government went to some lengths to separate the aristocratic order which collected the taxes from that which assessed them.⁴⁴ This may well have been intended simply to curb the powers of both, or to avoid

offending native susceptibilities – a very important consideration in the Gallic context. In theory the census should have been taken every fifteen years, but after the first few occasions the routine grew very ragged; in practice the operation seems to have been performed on average about once every twenty-five years.⁴⁵ The information provided by the census was stored, collated and processed in central archives (*tabularia*) at the provincial procurators' headquarters in Lugdunum and Augusta Treverorum.⁴⁶

Besides the tribute, there was also a variety of indirect taxes, most of which went to provide the discharge benefits of soldiers (a small price to pay for the ending of the turmoil which the Republic had witnessed whenever one of its warlords had had to find land for his veterans).⁴⁷ Probably the most famous of these, because it attracted so much imperial attention, was the *Quadragesima Galliarum* or 'Two-and-a-half per cent Gallic tax', which was a customs-duty charged at the land and sea frontiers (and at various inland ports and entrepôts) of the Four Gauls, the Alpine provinces, and Raetia, on all goods entering or leaving these lands. Hence it was no act of protectionism, but simply a means of raising revenue. Other indirect taxes included: the *Centesima venalis*, or 'One per cent sales tax'; the *Vicesima libertatis*, or 'Five per cent tax on the freeing of slaves'; and the *Vicesima hereditatum*, or 'Five per cent estate duty' (applicable only to Roman citizens, and then only in certain circumstances). These were originally collected by means of private companies of tax-farmers, the very much reduced descendants of the notoriously powerful firms of the late Republic.

However, as time went on such enterprises were gradually phased out, to be replaced by imperial equestrian officials also, somewhat confusingly, called 'procurators'. The extent to which these last were subordinate to the provincial procurators is uncertain. Some may have been, but on the other hand there is clear evidence that the collection of the *Quadragesima Galliarum* was managed by a single organisation which covered the whole of Gaul and was headed by its own procurator responsible only to a head-office in Rome; and the organisation of the *Vicesima hereditatum* was modelled on, but quite independent of, that of the provincial procurator.⁴⁸ This last point indeed serves to remind us that there were other powerful equestrian-run organisations in the Three Gauls besides those of the provincial procurators. For example, the imperial mint at Lugdunum was headed by a procurator, as was the office which oversaw all iron-mining (a state monopoly) throughout Gaul.⁴⁹ Septimius Severus' decentralisation of the imperial posting system, the *Cursus Publicus*, led to two new procuratorships in Gaul,

that dealing with Lugdunensis, Aquitania and Narbonensis, and that dealing with Belgica and the Germanies.⁵⁰ The same emperor's policy of building up imperial estates, especially in the west, likewise required the establishment of a provincial procuratorial organisation, which again resembled, but was in no way responsible to, that of the provincial procurators.⁵¹ Many other aspects of civil administration were similarly organised; and the whole position is further complicated by the fact that many lesser officials within each organisation bore, in some version or another, the title of *procurator*.

However, the most significant equestrian administrators in the Three Provinces remained the provincial procurators. Disputes over money are perhaps always the most difficult to deal with, and to help them on their way it is highly probable that the imperial procurators were, from the very beginning, given the means of enforcing their own decisions speedily and effectively – both through their own courts, and through being able to command their own police force.⁵² We know, for example, from British evidence that the procurator Decianus was able to dispose of at least 200 men in the middle of the first century; and later (probably in the middle years of the third century) C. Julius Maximinus, *beneficiarius* (soldier on secondment, from legion VIII Augusta) *procuratoris* seems to have retired to Orolaunum (Arlon), having served his time in Trier.⁵³ As a result there early arose a blurring of the distinction between the fields of competence and authority of governors and procurators.⁵⁴ This, together with the political tide which was increasingly running in their favour, made the latter ever more powerful men; it was the trail they blazed which, in the third century, led to the increasing promotion of equestrians to the rank of provincial governors in their own right. Senators were not at this stage excluded, but the old title of *legatus Augusti*, with its (deliberately) strong Republican connotations died away, to be replaced by *praeses* – 'man in charge'; equestrians could then be slipped in as *vice-praesids*, 'acting governor'. Among these we find Badius Comnianus, who was in charge of Lugdunensis in 223, and C. Furius Sabinus Aquila Timestheus, future father-in-law of the emperor Gordian III, who administered Lower Germany about a decade later.⁵⁵

It is indeed important to bear in mind that, together with the changing relationship between senators and equestrians, the system as a whole was subject to general growth and modification over the two hundred and fifty years of the High Empire. The picture I have presented is very much a composite, drawing on evidence from differing periods and places: as far as the Three Provinces are concerned it would

be foolish to assume that it was exactly like this at any one period. As we have already seen, the Augustan settlement took a while to settle down and sort itself out. The equestrian career-structure, in particular, was not fully defined until the reign of Hadrian; and so in the early days we find an ex-slave like Licinus exercising a very odd but decidedly powerful provincial procuratorship in the Three Gauls.⁵⁶

Similarly, the development of the Germanies caused changes, especially with the emergence of the two provinces each under its own full governor;⁵⁷ and provincial boundary alterations did not stop there. For example, at least by 226, and perhaps by 150, we find the Lingones transferred from Germania Superior to Gallia Lugdunensis.⁵⁸ Most baffling of all, however, is the apparent re-emergence of Caesar's Aquitania (possibly under the name *Lactora*), looking very much like the well-attested late-imperial province of Novempopulania a century or more ahead of its time.⁵⁹ The idea of the later fragmentation of Augustan Aquitania may perhaps, at least partially, be corroborated by the view that Burdigala (Bordeaux) may not have been the capital of this province.⁶⁰ This city lies to the west of the Garonne; and the hardest evidence for its employment as a seat of provincial administration in High Roman Aquitania refers to a period subsequent to the likely date for the 'separation of the Nine Peoples from the Gauls'.⁶¹ Hence it could be argued that whereas earlier the port had to concede precedence to Poitiers or even to Saintes, the formation of a proto-Novempopulania and the need to provide it with a capital led to Burdigala's promotion as chief city of the new province.⁶² On the other hand, we know that the same city was deliberately and rather clumsily included in the late-imperial province of Aquitania Secunda, the main bulk of which lay well to the north of the Garonne, as its capital.⁶³ Clearly, by the beginning of the fourth century Bordeaux had eclipsed Poitiers in importance, which must suggest that at an even earlier date, and possibly before the *Novem Populi* sought permission to secede, the former city had grown in size and importance to become the capital of Aquitania within its Augustan limits. Thus Eutropius' very strong implication that Bordeaux was the capital of Aquitania would have to be accepted on its own terms, and would be of no use in helping to resolve the issue of the 'Nine Peoples'. The question remains difficult. My own inclination is to continue to believe in the *Three Gauls*; it has, indeed, been suggested that the *Novem populi* were interested in matters other than administration when they made their request.⁶⁴ Less controversial is the appearance of new procuratorial offices, some of which we have already mentioned, and to which might now be added, for example, that con-

cerned with the recruitment of gladiators, which is to be found in Gaul from the late-second and early-third centuries (reflecting once more increasing employment of equestrian bureaucrats, not to mention changes in imperial taste).⁶⁵ In addition, as always seems to be the case, administrative structures, once established, grew in size and complexity, like the one involved with the collection of the *Quadragesima Galliarum*, with its inspectors, *praepositi stationum*, scattered across the country, and its headquarters staff at Lugdunum.⁶⁶

This brings us to two further points. First, discussion so far, except for a brief aside in respect of the help enjoyed by governors and procurators, has been more or less limited to the most important officials in each department of Roman administration; it must always be borne in mind, however, that each procurator of every sort was attended directly by his own clerical staff, and would, as appropriate to his duties, have had agents further afield.⁶⁷ Secondly, we must not overlook the great importance of the city of Lugdunum in the Roman imperial organisation. It was the seat of the governor of Lugdunensis who, as we have already seen, was probably the senior of the governors of the Three Gauls.⁶⁸ Unlike the capitals of the other two provinces it also housed the *tabularium* of a provincial procurator, and very likely the *tabularia* of all those other organisations whose structure followed a similar pattern.⁶⁹ In addition, the pan-Gallic activities of not only those who collected the *Quadragesima Galliarum* but also those who supervised iron-mining and the operation of the mint were directed from here.⁷⁰ Not surprisingly in such circumstances, there was probably also a branch of the Imperial Treasury based there.⁷¹ It was the birthplace of emperors.⁷² To the provincial visitor this, together with the bustle and wealth which derived from the city's position at the nodal point of Agrippa's road-system, would have made Lugdunum seem indeed like a miniature Rome.⁷³ The *civitas*-leaders, gathered nearby to worship Rome and the emperors at the Altar at Condate, must have been duly impressed.⁷⁴

This in its turn takes us from the rulers to the ruled, and first to that basic unit of Gallo-Roman local administration, the *civitas*, a term which has been touched upon, and often used, in this work so far, but which now requires closer examination.⁷⁵ As we have already seen, the *civitas* was really no more than the independent Gallic nation in Roman constitutional garb. As such, it well reflects Rome's inclination to leave well alone, the more so with regard to a society in which she was already able to recognise certain similarities with her own customs and conventions.⁷⁶ However, such tolerance depended on the willingness of

its beneficiaries to abandon those practices which actually offended Roman tastes and outwardly to conform to accepted standards of classical civilisation: to Romanise. Rome could not swallow an excess of the alien, as is shown by her treatment of druidism.⁷⁷ Acceptance of the *civitas* may be traced back to Caesar, and even earlier (for example, in the Romans' earliest dealings with the Aedui.⁷⁸) However, as in many other matters, it was Augustus who both set the seal of approval on this acceptance and introduced the necessary theoretical and substantive changes which made it a practical proposition within the established framework of imperial administration. Again, I would argue that these took place as a result of the work which was undertaken in preparation for, and during, the census of 27 BC, and which, as we have already seen, resulted in the redefinition, as necessary, of *civitas*-boundaries, and the formation of groups of *civitates* into the new provinces. Within the *civitates* there were further modifications to the running of government and administration.

The first problem to be solved involved finding a way of changing the appearance of the traditional Gallic nation to make it more acceptable to Roman tastes. The land occupied by each Gallic community was usually large in area, well-peopled, and with several urban centres.⁷⁹ As has often been remarked by scholars, this multi-cellular structure must have surely jarred on a Roman mind which was much more used to dealing with the smaller city-states of the Mediterranean world, in which political and social life was centred on a single township, to which all surrounding territory was subordinate.⁸⁰ The absence of direct Greek and Roman colonial influence also meant that there was no hope of the *civitates* of the Three Gauls following the same path as those of Narbonensis where, thanks to these external influences, there were already signs of a movement from national to single-city identity.⁸¹ Therefore, in typically Augustan fashion, laying emphasis on legal niceties rather than upon the facts of the situation (indeed, exactly like the way in which he had restored the Republic), Augustus skilfully shifted the emphasis of the word *civitas*, which was anyway far from exact, from Caesar's usage, which as we have seen was a rather loose expression for 'nation', to another more specific shade of meaning which was 'city-state'. This imposed on the Gallic communities an appearance of similarity with the Greco-Roman model, whatever form they actually took on the ground. The Arverni, for example, spread throughout the heights of the Massif Central, were now regarded as if they were the citizens not of a nation, but of a city, the *civitas Arvernorum*. This was achieved by ignoring all existing urban centres in their lands, and by

defining the national territory *as a whole* as a city; 'the tribe is treated as a kind of imaginary city, as though the town wall enclosed the whole area of the tribe' (Map 6).⁸² It must be said that this was a forced and decidedly odd arrangement, which fundamentally did not conform to the standard pattern of the classical city-state. It was all 'city' and no 'state' since there could be no surrounding dependent territory: Athens without Attica. However, the idea allowed Rome to continue to work within the framework of the Gallic nation. It also produced the oddly inferior status of the 'real' city from which every *civitas* came to be administered; there could not be a sovereign city within a city.⁸³ Strictly speaking the former (in modern jargon the '*civitas-capital*') was just the built-up part of the city in which the administrative buildings happened to be found; *Augustonemetum Arvernorum*, 'Augustonemetum of the Arverni', showed that the former was subordinate to the latter, not *vice versa*.

All this was, of course, a legal conceit which did not always tally with reality. For example, the massive input of resources into a *civitas-capital* to enable it to function as such led quickly and inevitably to its developing a special importance and personality of its own. We soon begin to find the word *civitas* being applied just to the central city;⁸⁴ and, indeed, the same settlement could officially be honoured with the title of colony (with or without an accompanying settlement of veteran troops).⁸⁵ Moreover, a circumstance which has often been adduced to prove the continuing, and indeed increasing, inferiority of *civitas-capital* to *civitas* in Gaul, namely the displacement of the place-name by the community name (for example, *Lutetia Parisiorum* to *Parisii* – Paris), may be employed equally well to argue exactly the opposite, since such a state of affairs might show that the city had come to personify the *civitas* in people's thinking – *Lutetia* in a sense became the *civitas Parisiorum*.⁸⁶ One might think that such centripetal tendencies were beginning to produce the true city-state; on the other hand there is no evidence to suggest that in our period the chief city in any way went on to control the surrounding *civitas*. This continued to be run by men who had residences, and interests, well outside the capital, and who used it only as a place of resort; the chief magistracies continued to be *civitas-magistracies*, and, as we shall see, the direct administration of the capital was left to underlings.⁸⁷ In the Three Gauls, as elsewhere, the Augustan solution was a contrived and clumsy compromise, which nevertheless fitted the demands of the moment, and as far as we can tell, worked.

Civitates were not all of equal status. To begin with, they would all

have been inferior to the few full Roman colonies which Rome planted in the Three Gauls — Lugdunum, Noviodunum, and Raurica — while the later promotion of places such as Ara Ubiorum and Augusta Treverorum would have, as was undoubtedly intended, spurred those communities not similarly honoured to review the progress of their own Romanisation with a view to promotion. However, even between unpromoted *civitates* there were differences of status won normally during their first few years of contact with the conquering power, which defined their exact relationship to Rome. These would have been formulated in the legislation which created the Gallic provinces. There were three grades, the most privileged being the *civitates foederatae* ('allied states'), below them the *civitates liberae* ('free states'), and finally the *civitates stipendiariae* ('tributary states'). As their names suggest, the first were nominally sovereign communities, freely allied to Rome, the second were subject to Rome, but enjoyed certain prescribed privileges, and the third were subject to Rome with no privileges. Ancient writers were as careful to record the categories into which Romano-Gallic communities fell as individual *civitates* outside the last group were to draw attention to their superior status; thus such differences apparently mattered.⁸⁸ However, it is now regarded as unwise to presume that these titles brought any material benefit to those upon whom they were bestowed — for example, freedom from the control of the provincial governor, or from direct taxation.⁸⁹ 'Federate' and 'free' had increasingly meant less and less in these terms long before Caesar moved against the Helvetii.⁹⁰ It is not impossible, indeed it is very likely, that the conqueror of the Tres Galliae, always his own man, swam against the tide in this respect and, making a special case of Gaul, restored to these titles something of their old substance when he distributed them as rewards (or bribes?) to the most reliable (or powerful?) of the Gallic nations prior to his departure for Italy.⁹¹ However, such a glaring anomaly could not, and did not, persist: as we have already seen, these Gallic privileges were probably terminated by Tiberius.⁹² The titles remained, but simply as badges of status.

The internal government of the *civitates* also betrays a certain emptiness. As will be stressed in the following chapter, it must never be forgotten that the Three Gauls were conquered by a foreign power and were henceforth directed by men who were entirely willing to subordinate their interests to those of the Empire. The Gallic *civitates* thus lacked the ambitions and the powers of the old pre-Conquest states. Above all, they could not go to war with each other: the swirling political life of Caesar's warrior-society came to an end. On the other hand,

so long as they accepted their new, entirely domestic responsibilities, the local aristocrats were allowed a great deal of freedom in the running of their communities; once more, Rome's economical habits in the administration of her Empire meant that she was pleased, indeed she was compelled, to allow others to do the job for her.⁹³

The government of the full colonies in the Three Gauls, as everywhere else, was based firmly on the constitution of Republican Rome, as can be seen from surviving municipal charters. A *colonia* thereby consisted of a citizen body (*populus*) which elected colleges of magistrates whose powers were strictly defined by law. These consisted of *duoviri iure dicundo*, who supervised the rest, and had their own special responsibilities for judicial matters; *aediles*, who dealt with the general running of the settlement; and (although less commonly found than the rest) *quaestores*, who oversaw financial affairs. Magistrates and ex-magistrates formed together an 'order' (*ordo*) of local senators (*decuriones*, *curiales*) meeting to discuss community affairs in the *curia*, or senate house. Most of the information concerning this type of local government comes from outside Gaul, but there is enough evidence from the Narbonese and Comatan colonies to suppose that it obtained there too.⁹⁴

By contrast, the government of the *civitates*, which to begin with were made up of non-Roman citizens, must at first have been quite different — probably no more than a straightforward continuation of pre-Conquest practices, possibly modified to suit the new conditions.⁹⁵ Thus we have clear evidence for the presence of a *vergobret*, a purely Gallic magistrature, among the Santones. In Caesar's narrative this office appears autocratic in nature; in its later form it seems to have been divided, thus creating a Roman-style *collegium* — a 'college' or committee of magistrates, each with equal competence. However, the strong aristocratic inclination to Romanise (reflected, amongst other things, in innovations, name-forms and architecture⁹⁶) must from a very early stage have led to imitation of Roman municipal forms; and *civitates* in their turn would then have started to produce decurions, quaestors, aediles, duumvirs and the like. This practice was, strictly speaking, illegal in the absence of the formal grant of colonial status to a community by Rome; indeed, there is a school of thought which holds that the presence of such magistrates is proof of the promotion of a Gallic *civitas* to that status. My own inclination is to view this as being rather too strict and legalistic an interpretation: such poaching would have done no real harm. Indeed, in a very real way it would have demonstrated genuine goodwill towards the acceptance of Roman ways, and

in a number of cases would have paved the way for promotion to honorary colonial status to follow. I see no reason why Rome should have wished to hinder such a development. In the end, therefore, there was probably a fair degree of uniformity in the way in which all Gallic communities were run — colonial, honorary colonial, or peregrine. For this reason I suggest that the painstaking efforts of scholars to assess the precise impact of the promotion of the capital of, say, the Treveri, or the Helvetii, to colonial rank, whether 'titular' or 'full', on the constitution of the *civitas* concerned, and its administration, are, in the long term, misdirected.⁹⁷

Whatever their outward form *civitas*-capitals remained *civitas*-capitals: the honouring of the urban centre did not thereby demote the rest of the nation to dependent status.⁹⁸ In brief, the system carried on much as before; indeed, it has been observed that as time went on the very term *colonia*, because of its having been so lavishly applied, and perhaps because of its having been equally recklessly borrowed, itself came to mean no more than 'city'.⁹⁹ As in the cases of the 'allied', 'free' and 'tributary' states discussed above, there was probably eventually much less of a substantive difference between communities than scholars are prepared to admit. On the other hand, it would be just as wrong to assume absolute uniformity, in the sense of expecting to find standard magisterial *cursus honorum* ('career-structures') involving *duumviri*, *aediles*, *quaestores*, and so on, everywhere one looks. The evidence for the existence of such offices among the *civitates* (as opposed to the full colonies) of the Three Gauls is in fact very scanty, and such career-patterns as we have are very ragged and unsatisfying. In fact, the standard *cursus* is very rare. Clearly, we do not have the full story, and thus conclusions have to be drawn with care, yet the available information is so untidy that one must assume that even if more were available it would reveal wide local variations. Some of these are perhaps already visible in, for example, the odd localisation of the title of decurion in the full colonies and in the north-east, or the general rarity of aediles in the Three Provinces, or the association of the office of *vergobret* with that of quaestor. Probably from an early date changes were made in the colonial model to accommodate Gallic circumstances. The most interesting of these, in my view, was the emphasis which seems to have been placed on the post of *magister pagi*, 'superintendent' of the tribal subdivision of a *civitas*.¹⁰⁰ Such positions may reflect a continuing strength of local identity within the larger communities, which demanded more accessible government. It also suggests a willingness, or perhaps even a feeling of obligation, on the part of the *civitas*-aristocrats to maintain

local connections even while they busied themselves in affairs which affected the whole nation, and beyond.¹⁰¹ The existence and development of *vici* (townships) away from the national capitals would have provided convenient places from which such *magistri* might operate, although this must remain a guess: the exact relationship between *pagus* and *vicus* is unknown.¹⁰² (The emergence of *vici* as bodies politic, and of *vicus*-magistrates, in their own right is unsurprising given the prosperity of the larger townships; the latter would, I suggest, have had only restricted responsibilities, and would generally have been subordinate to the *magister pagi*.¹⁰³) The provision by *civitas*-aristocrats of urban-style meeting-places (*conciliabula*) deep in the countryside is perhaps also to be connected with *pagus*-administration and *pagus*-ties.¹⁰⁴ In any event, the very size of a Gallic *civitas* would have required some decentralisation of administrative powers to allow certain important (judicial?) decisions to be taken away from the capital.¹⁰⁵

In addition to the idea of the adaptation of Roman forms to Gallic conditions we must also bear in mind the alterations that the new hybrid would have undergone as time progressed, as the result of changing circumstances. We are fortunate in that the two most detailed Gallic local career-inscriptions which we possess (*CIL* xiii 1684, 2949) come from different periods in the history of the same *civitas* (the Senones). Neither of them resembles the standard pattern; the differences seem to result from the growth in the size and complexity of the *civitas*-capital, which in fact demanded a separate, though junior, magistrate to oversee its administration (the equivalent, I would guess, of a *magister pagi*), and from the growing importance of financial and fiscal matters, in both imperial and local government affairs, under the High Empire, which produced new and important posts, such as *duumvir ab aerario* and *praefectus annonae*.¹⁰⁶ This latter development, indeed, also led to the appointment of outsiders to supervise the monetary affairs of local communities — the *curatores civitatum* — although in the Three Gauls these tended to be Gauls themselves.

Mention of financial problems brings us to the nature of the responsibilities of the *civitas*-magistrates. Their specific duties were, we presume, reflected in their titles. However, we should not lose sight of those overriding responsibilities which they owed to their *civitas* and, above all, to the Empire. These were, quite simply to keep the peace, and to help Rome collect the taxes which were owed to her. Peace obviously involved the maintenance of law and order, from the apprehension of ordinary criminals, through the prevention and control of brigandage, to the quelling of rebellion against Roman rule. For this magistrates


apparently had the use of a local militia, recruited from the male youth of each *civitas* organised into a *collegium*.¹⁰⁷ Less directly, order also depended on the general contentment of the populace, which was fostered by the provision of places of resort, entertainment and relaxation, both in the *civitas*-capital and further afield. This necessarily involved great expenditure, some of which could be recouped from local revenues, in the form of endowment-income, local taxation, fines and charges for local services, and so on, but most of which had to be paid for from the pockets of those who undertook the work. Anyone who involved himself in local government in Gaul had to be very rich indeed.¹⁰⁸ The curators were appointed in the first instance to regulate reckless spending, which could lead to bankruptcy, and so the weakening of the personal wealth upon which the continuance of *civitas*-government, and hence the peace of the Empire, depended. Indeed, there was even more to it than this, which returns us to the subject of imperial taxation. The provincial procurator and his staff supervised the collection of all direct taxes, but took charge of the receipts only in the final stages of the operation. *Civitates* were told, on the basis of the most recent census, how much they were each liable for, and it was up to them, through the agency of a specially chosen pair of chief-magistrates (*duoviri quinquennales* — as the name suggests, elected every five years) to decide who should pay what, and to collect what was owing.¹⁰⁹ They were personally responsible for making up any shortfall.¹¹⁰ Without the proper functioning of this operation the Empire would die: it is therefore no wonder that emperors were at pains to prevent their amateur tax-collectors from ruining themselves by profligacy — hence the curators. A final important point, which will be taken up in a later chapter, must, however, be made here. This is quite simply that the underlying gloomy tone, which is bound to creep in when discussing such matters, comes from events beyond Gaul where officials brought in to check over-zealous public munificence in the end found themselves in the job of chivvying the increasingly reluctant rich to undertake their traditional responsibilities. In the Three Provinces, on the other hand, although the evidence is admittedly rather poor, it seems that as late as the middle years of the third century there were still rich Gallic magistrates able and willing to act as generous benefactors to their own communities, and beyond.¹¹¹

'Beyond' in this case invariably meant at the provincial and even inter-provincial level. It is often said that Rome regarded her Empire as being a network of city-states; indeed, this is implicit in the interpretation of the Gallic *civitas* given above. However, as far as Gaul is

concerned, it is clear that the provincial unit, despite its purely administrative origins, also had an important role to play. In fact, having divided Gaul, Rome then set about deliberately to recreate some notion of Gallic unity.¹¹² As we have seen, to begin with only three full colonies were planted outside Narbonensis, and these discreetly and only out of the need to protect Italy.¹¹³ Augustus did not add to them: it made obviously good political sense not to disturb the large northern *civitates*. Yet such self-denial plainly weakened Rome's military presence in the Three Gauls, for veteran colonies were useful for holding down newly conquered regions and protecting strategic routes in the absence of regular forces. They also acted as shop-windows in which to display the material benefits of the adoption of Roman ways. To fill this gap it would appear that from a very early date the most central, though still far from ideally located, of the existing colonies was transformed, magnified as it were into a sort of super-colony, to influence the whole of the Three Gauls.¹¹⁴ The first move in this direction was probably made by Agrippa when, from around 39 BC, he restructured the Gallic road-system to centre it on Lugdunum; building on these essentially military foundations Augustus and his successors then proceeded to make the city the virtual capital of the Three Gauls, with an importance beyond that of just the simple provincial capital of Lugdunensis.¹¹⁵ As such, Lugdunum was ideally suited to house a further, historically even more exciting, pan-Gallic institution, the Gallic Council.

As we have already seen, between 16 BC and 13 BC plans were laid for a massive Roman strike over the Rhine and over the Danube.¹¹⁶ One consequence was the movement of troops from the centre of Gaul to the northern frontier. The commitment of these men to a potentially protracted campaign in Germany would leave the hinterland relatively unsupervised; hence it was essential to bind both Gaul and the Gauls tightly to the Roman cause to forestall possible trouble in the rear, especially since the second census (which, no doubt, produced new taxation demands which took into account the expense of the looming war) was already causing unrest.¹¹⁷ Rome therefore exploited a feature of the Gallic character which Caesar had earlier noted and exploited, namely a strong taste for gatherings and conferences (no doubt stimulated by, and itself stimulating, the famous Gallic love of rhetoric).¹¹⁸ On 1 August 12 BC Drusus instituted the worship of Rome and Augustus (as reigning emperor) at the great Altar built just outside Lugdunum, between the rivers Arar (Saône) and Rhodanus (Rhône) and overlooking their confluence (whence, in fact, the Celtic name, *Condate*) (Figure 5.1). The ceremonial was under the direction of an Aeduan chief priest

Figure 5.1: Lugdunum (Lyon): Colony, Altar-site and Commercial Area



Source: A. Audin, *Essai sur la topographie de Lugdunum* (Lyon, 1956), Figure 1.

(*sacerdos*), and represented an open avowal of loyalty to the imperial power.¹¹⁹ Indeed, the choice of date was not arbitrary, since it was the anniversary of Augustus' final victory over Antony and Cleopatra which had given him control of the whole Empire.¹²⁰ Henceforth, similar gatherings took place at the same time every year. As far as the organisation of the event is concerned, although we know little in detail of its early years we do have a fair idea of the final form of its development.¹²¹ It is likely that all the original *civitates* of Caesar's Three Gauls which had survived into the New Order, even those which eventually found themselves in the two Germanies, sent representatives, chosen

from among those decurions who had undertaken the full range of *civitas*-magistracies, and who had then held the local *civitas*-priesthood of Rome and Augustus (*flamen Romae et Augusti*) – that is, men of considerable wealth and standing. There is no direct evidence, but it is arguable that the number of representatives allowed to each *civitas* varied with its size. Together they made up the *Concilium Galliarum*, the 'Council of the Gauls', which was probably responsible for choosing the year's *sacerdos* from among its own ranks. The financial burdens of this particular office have already been discussed.¹²² It is likely that the days immediately before and after 1 August were ones of general excitement and merry-making, attracting great crowds. This has already been mentioned in respect of the Christian martyrdoms under Marcus Aurelius.¹²³

Within a generation or so of its foundation, the sacred precinct at Condate was fast becoming a magnificent showplace of Mediterranean-style art and architecture: there was not only the huge Altar, marble-faced and adorned with the names of the Gallic states in gilt letters, and with statues of Victories bearing crowns, but also a large amphitheatre, used for the main assembly itself, and for associated games, and later a temple, which was the result of Hadrian's decision to extend worship beyond the reigning emperor to include previous deified emperors: as gods these earlier Augusti required a home, which was the temple. We may reasonably assume the presence of surrounding gardens, baths and lodgings.¹²⁴

It must not be imagined that, apart from the fact that they were the first to participate in this form of worship, the Three Gauls were in any way unique in their reverencing of Rome and Augustus. On the contrary, there were other western Altars established on the same model for the similar promotion of the imperial cult.¹²⁵ On the other hand, it is true that the Gallic version did have a number of unusual characteristics, and especially worthy of mention is the fact that it seems that the Gallic *sacerdos*, alone among his peers, enjoyed the services of a set of subordinate officials – the *iudex arcae Galliarum*, the *allectus arcae Galliarum*, the *inquisitor Galliarum*, and, possibly, the *iudex arcae ferriarum* – who themselves disposed of staffs of slaves. The actual responsibilities of these men are disputed, but most of them seem to be connected with the management of funds which belonged to the Council. Indeed, it is to be noted that, rather oddly, as far as we can tell, none of the holders of these lower offices ever proceeded to the full high-priesthood, and most had more experience in business, administrative and military life than the normal run of *sacerdotes*, whose

interests seem to have been much more involved with their *civitas*. I have myself suggested the possibility that the officials were employed as professional administrators, to run the financial, especially the endowment, side of the *Concilium Galliarum*, so freeing the *sacerdotes* to perform the more glamorous duties of religious observance, and the chairing of debates.

This last point leads us to consider the actual business of the Council.¹²⁶ Ostensibly, of course, it was restricted to the worship of *Roma et Augustus* (later changed, as we have seen, under Hadrian to that of *Roma et Augusti*, and, for a short spell under Septimius Severus, to that of *Roma et Augusti* together with the *Caesares nostri* – the direct worship of the emperor and his line).¹²⁷ However, it is clear that the gathering of so many powerful Gauls together for a common purpose quickly led to the Council's assuming other, less religious, activities, such as the sending of complimentary or consolatory messages to the emperor, and the honouring of Roman governors. The amount of debate involved in the latter instance, however small and formal it may have been to begin with, could pave the way to a more serious discussion of the activity of a senior Roman official, resulting directly or indirectly in criticism which might reach the ears of the emperor himself. Again, the Gallic Council is not unique in this respect, but its activity here has provided us with our best piece of evidence for such a process, namely the famous inscription known as the 'Thorigny Marble', by which we can see a Viducassian *sacerdos*, T. Sennius Sollemnis, managing to steer trouble away from a Roman governor of Lugdunensis early in the third century.¹²⁸ The annual Council could therefore become a real sounding-board for Gallic feeling: it has been reasonably suggested (because a copy of Claudius' speech was set up at Condate) that it was through its agency that the Gauls appealed to the emperor for adlection into the Senate in 48. As always, however, privilege had to be balanced by obligation: it could well have been that eventually the Gallic Council accepted some sort of responsibility for the prompt delivery of the taxation due from the whole of the Three Gauls, over and above that already borne by local *civitas*-magistrates.¹²⁹ Yet this too would have served to promote the concept of a single Gallia Comata.

Notes

1. Above 19, 20f. The appropriate evidence is conveniently collected and clearly presented in Wightman (2), 474f (although in my opinion, as will be seen below, she dates the Augustan reorganisation rather too late).

2. See e.g. the recent results from Alesia — Mangin, esp. 19f.
3. See below 131.
4. Cf. above 21; and below 124.
5. Cf. above 20f; and below 125.
6. Cf. above 55.
7. So Rivet (3), 499.
8. DeWitt, 16f; cf. above 42.
9. Strabo, 4.2.2.
10. Willeumier (1), 8; cf. below 152.
11. Moreau, 270.
12. Jullian, iv.454; cf. iv.68f, iv.447, and below 102.
13. For this, and generally what follows, see Stein, 23f, and Stevenson, chapter 4, esp. 108f; also Willeumier (1), *passim*.
14. Above 20f.
15. Cf. above 20; cf. Hatt (2), 89.
16. I.e. after the defeat of Lollius, and preparatory to the great German campaign. See Hirschfeld, 465; Stein, 2; and, more recently, Etienne, 82; Brogan (2), 200.
17. So Stein, 23f.
18. Livy, *Epitome* 134; Dio, 53.22.5. Cf. Jullian, iv.68 (who, while admitting the difficulties, seems to lean towards a date of 27 BC).
19. Dio, 54.20.5; cf. above 40, 55.
20. For Reims see Stein, 32; the possible promotion of Trier is argued in Wightman (8).
21. The case for Poitiers has always been recognised as strong — see Jullian, iv.420; Grenier (1), iii.656f; Grenier (3), 483. Recent re-thinking has, on the other hand, weakened that of Saintes — *Gallia* 38, 1980, 198f; cf. Grenier (1), iii.650. The original orientation of Agrippa's road network however seems to indicate the early priority of Saintes; cf. also Etienne, 82, 116f. A new pottery study seems to corroborate the notion of an early capital there, moving soon to Poitiers: my interpretation of Hoffman, 40, 44, 45 — the growing concentration of early imported samian at the latter city.
22. Cf. Stein, 62.
23. E.g. Vindex, Maternus, Albinus — see above 42, 80, 81.
24. Cf. above 81.
25. Thus Acilius Aviola, presumably governor of Lugdunensis, used both the urban cohort from Lugdunum, and legionaries offered to him by his colleagues in Lower Germany, to crush the first signs of the revolt of Florus and Sacrovir: Tacitus, *Annales* 3.41. The possible use made by Vindex of local militias has been discussed above 42; such a force was certainly employed by Didius Julianus as governor of Belgica: Historia Augusta, *Didius Julianus* 1.7f. Cf. above 76, and below 110.
26. Stein, 35f.
27. Again the reader must be warned that this picture of a governor's duties is a composite, drawn from evidence from throughout the Empire. However, for a boundary dispute in Narbonensis see *CIL* xii 113 (settled, oddly, by the army-commander of Upper Germany). Eusebius' source for the martyrdoms at Lugdunum (above 77f) tells us (5.1.8) that the Christians were imprisoned pending the arrival of the governor, and their formal trial; and Tacitus, *Agricola* 9.2f, gives a brief, but clear picture of his father-in-law's term of office as governor of Aquitania.
28. Willeumier (1), 20f.
29. Cf. Hopkins (2), 121; Baatz (2), 14.
30. Cf. below 107.

31. Stein, 38.
32. See above 40f (the acculturation of Vindex).
33. Tacitus, *Historiae* 1.12, 1.58.
34. E.g. Stein, 38; Willeumier (1), 47f; Ternes (1), 94.
35. Jullian, iv. 303; Stein, 41f.
36. Cf. above 50 (the speech of Cerealis): an old excuse, cf. Cicero, *ad Quintum* 1.1.34.
37. Baatz (2), 12f, estimates that the amount of *tributum soli* ran at about 10 per cent of agricultural production, which, though a little on the high side, seems to square well enough with the ideas of Hopkins, discussed above 65 and below 128f.
38. Cf. below 106.
39. Cf. Claudius' remarks in *CIL* xiii 1668 (= *ILS* 212) ii.36-41. In addition to the individual references given below the reader should consult the recent invaluable synthesis provided by Jacques, *passim*.
40. Jullian, iv. 223; Stein, 61f.
41. See Willeumier (1), 13, 39f (*contra* Jullian, iv. 223; Stein, 61f).
42. E.g. see the debate over *CIL* xiii 1680 = *ILS* 1390 in Stein, 65, Willeumier (1), 37f, and Lerat, no. 111 and note. (For previous practice see Stein, 64).
43. See below 101.
44. Stein, 63f; above 76.
45. So Baatz (2), 12; cf. Stein, 60f.
46. Stein, 68f.
47. For the following, see Stein, 42f.
48. Stein, 46f.
49. Willeumier (1), 65f, 71.
50. Willeumier (1), 68f.
51. Stein, 48f.
52. Jullian, iv. 423; Stein, 41 -- from Suetonius, *Claudius* 12.1; Tacitus, *Annales* 12.60.1. Cf. Willeumier (1), 50f for details of the procuratorial staff.
53. Tacitus, *Annales* 14.32.3; *CIL* xiii 3983, cf. Mariën, 115f.
54. See Tacitus, *Agricola* 9, for the likely possibility of quarrels between governor and procurator.
55. *CIL* xiii 3162, Willeumier (1), 19; *CIL* xiii 1807 = *ILS* 1330, Willeumier (1), 46f.
56. Cf. above 25.
57. Cf. above 60.
58. Stein, 15.
59. *CIL* xiii 412 = *ILS* 6961, with *CIL* v 875 = *ILS* 1374. The problem has been much discussed; see e.g. Mommsen (1), v.88; Grenier (1), i.133; Etienne (1), 116f.
60. Cf. above 95f.
61. Eutropius, 9.10;
62. Cf. Etienne (1), 117f. In this case, of course, Eutropius' 'Aquitania' would have to be seen as a literary conceit -- the conscious adoption of Caesar's 'Aquitania'.
63. Moreau, 317.
64. Hirschfeld, 466.
65. Willeumier (1), 69.
66. Willeumier (1), 62f.
67. Jullian, iv. 423.
68. Above 96.
69. Above 100.
70. Above 100.

71. Wauileumier (1), 53.
72. Cf. above 37, 87.
73. Cf. below 124.
74. Cf. below 112.
75. Cf. above 5, 22.
76. Cf. above 10.
77. Cf. above 38f.
78. Cf. above 12.
79. Cf. below 136f, 169f.
80. Cf. van Berchem (1), 31.
81. Cf. above 20; Lerat, 59f.
82. Stevens (4), 22; cf. Hirschfeld, 469: 'Offenbar ist nach der Augusteischen Ordnung, entsprechend der keltischen, die Civitas in ihrer Gesamtheit der einzige politische Faktor, nicht der Hauptort derselben, also das Gebiet des Gaues nicht als das Territorium dieses Hauptortes anzusehen'. See Drinkwater (4), 90f, for the debate over the definition of *civitas*. Cf. below 137.
83. This is discussed in more detail below 141-3.
84. Tacitus, *Historiae* 1.63, of Divodurum Mediomatricorum (Metz); cf. Rivet (3), 499.
85. E.g. Augusta Treverorum (Trier) — above 38, 56, Aventicum (Avenches) — above 73.
86. Grenier (1), ii.86; cf. Hirschfeld, 470 (and Rivet (1), 65).
87. Cf. below 109.
88. E.g. Pliny, *NH* 4.17.106f; *CIL* xiii 3162 (i.28).
89. Cf. above 25, 88, 99.
90. See Sherwin-White (3), 174f; cf. Goudineau, 272f, also Staehlin, 145.
91. Suetonius, *Caesar* 25.1: 'omnem Galliam . . . praeter socias ac bene meritas civitates in provinciae formam redegit'.
92. Above 25, 28.
93. Cf. above 97.
94. E.g. *CIL* xiii 1921 = *ILS* 7024.
95. For what follows see Drinkwater (4), *passim*.
96. For Romanisation see Index.
97. Cf. above 73n6.
98. See Drinkwater (7), 406.
99. DeWitt, 21f.
100. Cf. above 5.
101. On this point in particular see Drinkwater (7), 94.
102. For further discussion of the *vicus* see below 135f.
103. E.g. *CIL* xiii 5233, 5063 = *ILS* 7009; cf. Staehlin, 323, Wightman (1), 128, for a somewhat different view.
104. See below 179f.
105. Cf. above 86.
106. See below 217.
107. E.g. *CIL* xiii 7424; cf. above 96.
108. For local taxes see Jullian, iv.357f; and for local munificence see especially *CIL* xiii 3162 with Pflaum, *passim*; Drinkwater (5), *passim*.
109. Cf. Hopkins (2), 121.
110. Baatz (2), 12. (It is perhaps significant that in the Three Gauls, unlike elsewhere in the Empire, there is as yet no evidence for the state, in the person of the emperor, having to undertake local responsibilities in the absence of suitable local men.)
111. See above n. 108 and references; also below 222.
112. Cf. above 25.

113. Cf. above 21.

114. For what follows see Drinkwater (2), *passim*. (It should be noted that since publishing this article I have changed my mind on the dating of Agrippa's road-building activity, considering it now to have been in the years following 39 BC and not from 27 BC — see below 125f. I would now argue that Munatius Plancus founded a defensive colony on an uncontroversial site; that, given Augustus' policy of restricting the number of full colonies in the Three Gauls, Agrippa was forced to employ this one as the nodal point of his network, in spite of its obvious disadvantages; and that the emperor was then able to take over the place, now increasingly benefiting from its dominance of the road-system, as the capital of the Three Gauls.)

115. Cf. above 96; below 126.

116. Cf. above 122f.

117. Cf. above 24.

118. E.g. Caesar, *BG* 1.30.4; cf. above 36, 47.

119. Cf. above 24; cf. Fishwick (2), 1206.

120. The attractive thesis that the same date was also sacred to the Celtic god 'Lug', with all that this implies, found a number of adherents, but never won full support, and has increasingly come to be doubted: see DeWitt, 14, for bibliography and general discussion, and, more recently in the same vein, Fishwick (2), 1204.

121. For the following see Deininger, 101f; Drinkwater (4), 95f.

122. See above 78.

123. See above 78.

124. For the topographical details see Audin, 92f, 169f; and for the temple see Fishwick (2), 1236f.

125. Fishwick (2), 1204, 1208, 1216.

126. On this generally see Deininger, 104f.

127. For Severus see Fishwick (2), 1242f; cf. above 82.

128. Pflaum, *passim*.

129. Jullian, iv.444 (from *CIL* xiii 1694).

Discussions of the material development of the Three Gauls following the Roman conquest tend to begin with the emergence of the Romano-Gallic town.¹ In my view, however, to proceed directly to urbanisation would be to overlook the significance of a primary element in the Romanisation of the west, namely the Roman army. The army was an ever-present factor in the history of Roman Gaul as a whole, and the Three Gauls in particular. Its role cannot be discounted; indeed, it deserves to be accorded pride of place.

To begin with, it must never be forgotten that Gallia Comata was conquered by brute force. Despite earlier and long-standing political, economic and even cultural contacts, from 58 BC the first direct experience most Gauls would have had of Rome would have been the sight of columns of marching men and the sound of tramping feet, coming either as friendly allies or, as the majority of Gallic *civitates* were to experience before the Conquest was complete, as demanding taskmasters and even merciless enemies. Despite a modern inclination to see this episode almost as incidental to the great unfolding of Gallic (and then French) history, the historian of the Three Gauls must be sensitive to the possibility of serious disruption in the society and culture of these lands.² Seven years of more or less continuous warfare against resisters and rebels certainly took their toll. Caesar's own narrative does not even pretend to gloss over the great destruction of life which resulted, involving both friends and foes, while Plutarch's figures of one million Gauls dead and a further million enslaved, though suspect, at least give an impression of the scale of misery which the land endured.³ Human life and freedom apart, there was also massive destruction and confiscation of property; the latter Caesar either kept himself to promote his own political plans, or else distributed among his cronies, high and low.⁴ By 50 BC the Three Gauls were worn and weary, with every aspect of life – economic, social and political – badly damaged. As one modern scholar has neatly put it, immediately after Caesar's departure from Gaul there was quiet, but it was 'the quiet of the cemetery'.⁵ It is perhaps no accident that, although some Gallic nations continued to produce their own coinages following the Conquest, they did so for the most part in silver and bronze: Gallic gold had disappeared into Roman purses.⁶

This, however, was only the beginning of a protracted military occupation. Even after the Conquest-period proper was at an end, and Caesar was far distant, fighting for the much larger prize of the Empire, troops continued to be garrisoned in the Three Gauls and in The Province. The most obvious reason for this was that Gaul, although defeated and broken, remained troublesome. After Vercingetorix there was to be no further full-scale rising against Rome, but there was still the possibility of local disturbance, and the threat of external attack from across the Rhine remained. D. Junius Brutus Albinus, the first governor of Gaul after Caesar, had to suppress a revolt of the Belgic Bellovaci in 46 BC.⁷ Two years later, his successor, A. Hirtius, was plainly relieved by the promises he received from German and Gallic nations that they would not make trouble following the assassination of the Dictator.⁸ Following Hirtius, L. Munatius Plancus (44-43 BC) campaigned against the Raeti, and established defensive colonies at Lugdunum and Raurica (Augst).⁹ As we shall see, similar disturbances and worse were to plague the land for the next thirty years. There was, however, another motive for maintaining large forces in Gaul which must not be neglected, namely the demands of imperial politics. Caesar's departure from the country heralded the beginning of a series of civil wars which would last, more or less without a break, down to 30 BC. For those involved in the direction of these wars the possession of standing armies was a matter of extreme importance. Gaul (which here denotes the Three Gauls and The Province) could be used as a vast military reservoir in which troops could be both raised and kept. Against this background I suggest that it is possible to detect three different phases of military activity in Gaul following the Conquest. However, I also suggest that, as time progresses, we see political considerations counting less, to be replaced by much more important strategic matters, namely growing Roman concern over the German problem.

To begin with, one may point to the massive military and political unrest which was produced by the opening of the civil wars. At this time Roman governors of Gaul were anxious simply to hold the country and its resources for their particular side. Troubles within Gaul and on its borders were dealt with as they arose, without any overall policy: the governors' thoughts, quite understandably, were elsewhere. In such a light are to be judged the actions of most Caesarian governors, those of Antony who succeeded them, and even Q. Salvidienus Rufus, the first to be appointed by Octavian.¹⁰ The possible exception to this rule, as we have seen, is L. Munatius Plancus who, in the 'phoney-war' period which followed Caesar's assassination at least took thought for the

defence of the Rhône-corridor route into the Three Gauls, The Province and Italy; but he too was quickly overtaken by events and was distracted by the pressing need to ensure his own survival.

As time went on, however, death reduced the number of principals, which allowed a change in the Roman attitude to Gaul. In 40 BC the division of the Empire between himself and Mark Antony gave Octavian the opportunity to deal with the Gallic situation more directly. He first visited the country in 39/38 BC, following the treachery of his governor there, Salvidienus Rufus. A consequent tightening-up of administration may indeed of itself have sparked-off a certain amount of unrest, but obvious troublemakers were quickly identified and later acted against, with the generals involved now being able to concentrate on the purely Gallic, as opposed to the wider imperial, implications of their actions.¹¹ This second phase actually began, I would argue, with Octavian's appointment of his trusted lieutenant, M. Vipsanius Agrippa, to the governorship of Gaul in 39 BC. Agrippa campaigned successfully against both the Aquitanian tribes of the south-west (who, it must be remembered, at this time still had an independent northern Spain to their rear), and against the Gallic nations of the north-east (who clearly had been asking for, and receiving, help from the free Germans). After Agrippa, our knowledge of Gallic affairs is, for a time, much less than comprehensive, but it is interesting that this south-west/north-east theme recurs in those few years of which we do have some record. Thus in the north-east C. Carrinas (governor in 30/29 BC) thrashed the rebellious Morini and their Belgic and Germanic allies; while Nonius Gallus (29 BC) campaigned against and defeated the troublesome Treveri, who had also called on German aid. As far as the south-west is concerned, we find M. Valerius Messalla (28 BC) scoring a further great victory over the Aquitani (significantly, in the year following the opening of Octavian's great Spanish war, which may well have alarmed and disturbed the Celto-Iberian tribes to the north of the Pyrenees). In 27 BC Octavian, now Augustus, visited Gaul to hold the first census there. Two years later M. Vinicius' campaign of retribution against Germans who had slaughtered visiting Roman traders may well have been launched from Gaul. Between 19 and 17 BC Agrippa himself, now the emperor's son-in-law, was back in Gaul dealing, as a matter of urgency, with German-inspired unrest in the north-east, and then moving to northern Spain to sort out the problems which had arisen there following the successful conclusion of the Spanish war.

The final phase of Roman military activity within Gaul resulted, I would argue, from Augustus' long-term policy for the pacification and

reorganisation of the Roman Empire, and his realisation that in the future the defence of Gaul would depend on the holding of just one region – the north-east. The centre was now quiet, and the problem posed by Aquitania was both finite and soluble: an isolated part of the Empire, it, like northern Spain, was eventually bound to be subjugated.¹² Much more threatening (yet, by the same token, for an astute politician living in a highly militaristic society, much more promising) was the long, open Rhine-frontier with Germany. It appears that the stimulus for this realisation was the 'Lollian massacre' (*clades Lolliana*) of 16 BC, when invading Germans cut a Roman army to pieces and took the standard of Legion V.¹³ As Suetonius was later to observe, this setback was nowhere near as serious as that of Varus, but it is instructive to note how quickly and how decisively Augustus acted.¹⁴ I feel that the defeat was not so much important in itself as in the way it made Augustus suddenly aware of the pattern of the German menace as it had been developing over the last few decades. Not only were the Germans directly troublesome, but the success of their daring served constantly to test the loyalty to Rome of important neighbouring Gallic *civitates* on the left bank of the Rhine.¹⁵ With the completion of the Spanish war there was additional military capacity available.¹⁶ The result was Augustus' extended third visit to Gaul from 16 BC, the appointment of Tiberius, then Drusus, as its executive overlord, and the preparation for the launching of the massive assault of 12 BC.

Now, as far as the impact of the post-Caesarian army on Gaul is concerned, the above ideas, if accepted, may help to provide us with some sort of answer to the vexed question concerning the disposition of Roman forces between 50 BC and 12 BC, which has certainly not yet been solved by the archaeological evidence.¹⁷ This in turn may help to give us an inkling of the effect of those forces on the countryside which they were both occupying and protecting. In the first period one may postulate fairly large forces (Calenus controlled eleven legions, and Munatius Plancus five, together with auxiliary troops), at first scattered in the Caesarian fashion through the Gallic nations, but increasingly, as the civil war quickened in pace, tending to concentrate in the south, closer to the main combat-zones. Indeed, we are told that Salvidienus Rufus' army was 'on the Rhône'.¹⁸ The second phase would involve smaller forces, generally moving between the troubled areas of the south-west and the north-east. Such basic police work would have necessitated the development of an efficient transportation and communications system, and I would place Agrippa's famous founding of the Romano-Gallic road-system during the period of his first governor-

ship of Gaul.¹⁹ At the beginning of this phase the troops may well have tended to be quartered in native *oppida*, but I argue below that the establishment of the road-system may well have then stimulated a move to garrison-forts at the key points in the network.²⁰ The final phase would obviously have seen the removal of most of the internal garrisons to the vicinity of the Rhine where, as described earlier, they eventually settled down in permanent bases.

It is clear, therefore, that although much is made of Caesar's leaving the Gauls alone on his departure for Italy, in fact it was to take over a generation before they escaped to any real degree from the iron hand of Roman military power.²¹ As in the case of the Conquest proper, there can be no doubt that the fairly constant warfare, and hence the fairly constant raising, maintaining and moving of armies to and fro across the country, continued to disrupt Gallic society. Friendly *civitates* would stand to be disturbed almost as much as those hostile to Rome, the more so since it would have been from these communities that the Roman army would have drawn the large number of auxiliary troops necessary to fight both foreign and civil wars: for many years the Gallic nations would have been bled of their strongest and most able young males, both leaders and led.²² Recent research has even questioned the very degree of autonomy which was allowed the Gallic peoples at this time, with the tentative but attractive suggestion that these years actually saw a form of martial law in operation, with *civitas*-affairs in the hands of *praefecti*, imperial commissioners, appointed from the army, or from amongst the local aristocrats, according to the estimated degree of loyalty of the leaders of the communities concerned.²³

This is the debit side of the account. On the other hand there is an important credit side. For example, it may be argued that the very disruption and destruction which resulted from the Conquest-period, and the military activity which followed, served to remove those Gauls least susceptible to the acceptance of Romanisation. Their places would be taken by others more sensitive to the opportunities of the new age, and in particular, I feel, by those who had actually fought as auxiliaries in Roman armies. The young Gallic *principes* who raised and led their own regiments in the service of Roman warlords, and who survived the experience, would have returned to their communities wealthy, travelled, and respected men, who had come to know and expect the benefits of Greco-Roman civilisation.²⁴ These men, and their descendants, were to become the main leaders of their *civitates* for at least the next century or so, and it was to be their efforts which were to set their communities firmly in the direction of Romanisation. To a lesser extent the same

could be said of the veteran rank and file. Additionally, even the short-term consequences of military activity within Gaul may not have been entirely negative. The troops were paid for their service, and so would have had money to spend. This may well have stimulated trade and industry, the more so since the Agrippan road-system could also be used by commercial traffic.²⁵ The implications of such a development are dealt with more closely below.²⁶

Thus the period of military occupation, comprising the first four decades following the final subjugation of the Three Gauls by Caesar, was certainly not a pleasant time for these lands but, thanks to it, the foundations were laid (or rather, as we shall see, an existing structure was modified) which later could be very profitably developed. One particular aspect of this early military legacy, already touched upon, demands closer attention, namely the establishment and impact of an ordered communications-system.

I began this chapter by attempting to convey something of the drama — at once the sheer brutality and yet the indispensable education in things Roman — which resulted from the army's activity in Gaul. Something of the same must be done for the communications-system, the social effect of which was enormous, and the psychological impact of which must have been staggering. Few things could have impressed upon the Gallic mind that a new order was now in existence as much as the Roman military highway — a glaring new scar on the landscape — as, sitting on top of its *agger*, and flanked by its drainage ditches, it took hill, valley, forest, marsh, *civitas*-border and field-boundary alike in its contemptuous stride.²⁷

Traditionally, much has been made of pre-Roman means of transport and communication in the Three Gauls. Literary sources, and increasing volume of archaeological evidence, and indeed commonsense, tell us that Celtic Iron-Age society was perfectly capable of keeping open land-routes, exploiting river-transport, and bringing the two together by the use of fords and the building of bridges.²⁸ However, I would argue that Roman Gaul saw far more than a mere acceptance of these early advantages. In establishing a planned, measured, mapped, advertised, maintained and policed all-weather network, and in providing that comprehensive political and administrative framework and that technological expertise without which it could not have worked as a whole, the Empire gave the Three Gauls the integrated system which they previously lacked.²⁹

According to Strabo, Agrippa introduced a systematic road-system more or less from scratch by running four routes from Lugdunum, the

first due west, over the Cevennes, into the territory of the Santones; the second north-north-east to the Rhine; the third north-north-west to the Channel; and the fourth due south into The Province.³⁰ We must not, however, take this too literally: there must surely by this time have been established routes between Lugdunum and the south, and from Lugdunum to her sister-colonies on the central Swiss plateau (Map 7); the military activity of the previous years must also have occasioned the employment, and hence the improvement, of Iron Age routes. Agrippa's contribution was probably rather to give a previously *ad hoc* arrangement shape and direction, while driving new military roads west and north to service troop movements to areas which, as we have already seen, were the trouble-spots of the middle period of post-Conquest occupation.³¹ (It may be observed that Agrippa's new western road could have been used in conjunction with an earlier, Republican, route from The Province, via Tolosa (Toulouse), to attack the Aquitanians from two directions.)

From the above, and from earlier references, it will be seen that I place this activity in the period 39-16 BC. However, the exact dating of Agrippa's work in this respect is far from straightforward, since there is no clear chronology available from any of the sources.³² A further piece of unfinished business which Augustus had to complete on his acquisition of Empire was the crushing of the Alpine tribes and the securing of the Alpine passes. One might well be tempted to think, therefore, that the development of the northern Gallic road-system would be postponed until after the establishment of a safe route into Italy (*via* the Great and Little St Bernard passes, especially the latter), which did not happen until Augustus' defeat of the Salassi and his foundation of the guard-colony of Augusta Praetoria (Aosta) in 25/24 BC.³³ By this argument, therefore, Agrippa should not have begun his roads until his second viceregal term in Gaul, in 19-17 BC.³⁴ On the other hand I would argue that, in view of the necessity of strict cadastration (the surveying and recording of landholdings based on fixed points in the landscape, above all, roads) on which the main calculations of the Roman census depended (but *not*, I believe, centuriation – the wholesale redrawing of property boundaries according to an artificially imposed chequerboard pattern emanating usually from an urban centre – for which there is little hard evidence in the Three Gauls³⁵) the network must already have been in existence by 27 BC.³⁶ The most likely date for the commencement of the enterprise would therefore seem to lie within the period 39-37 BC, when Agrippa was in charge of Gaul for the first time. This earlier placing also better suits the military

activity for which I envisage the road-system as having been originally devised.³⁷ What is more, recent work on the dating of the timbers used to construct part of the earliest river-port at Oppidum Ubiorum (Köln) has suggested that the town, and its harbour, were in existence before 19 BC.³⁸ Since it is extremely likely that the Agrippan settlement and the Agrippan road (the Rhine branch reaches the river at Köln) were closely linked, it is reasonable to suppose that the latter likewise predate 19 BC.³⁹

As far as Lugdunum is concerned, I would argue that Agrippa based his network on a main junction there not because from the beginning he divined the natural advantages of the site, and its inevitable destiny as capital of the Three Gauls (in fact the situation of the city was rather poor), but rather because it was the nearest of the existing Roman colonies to central Gaul and because, closely related to this, as has already been mentioned, two Roman routes (from The Province, and from the upper Rhine) already came together there.⁴⁰

Agrippa's road-system, as described by Strabo, provided of course only the bare framework of the finished scheme. The detailed chronology of the filling in of Agrippa's outline is extremely difficult to establish, and cannot be attempted here.⁴¹ However, we may in brief consider the processes which, fairly quickly it would seem, led to the elaboration of the original design (Map 8). For example, straightforward convenience would have suggested connecting obviously important centres such as Durocortorum Remorum (Reims) and Limonum Pictonum (Poitiers) to the network, probably even before they were formally designated as provincial capitals.⁴² On the other hand, the plugging of the Belfort Gap with a road from Cabillonum (Chalon) *via* Vesontio (Besançon) to the Rhine must have been a matter of absolute military priority.⁴³ At a somewhat later date, but for similar reasons, it seems highly likely from the evidence of inscriptions that the great military highway from Köln to Gesoriacum (Boulogne) by way of the major junction at Bagacum (Bavai) was constructed to service the conquest and then the holding of Britain from the main western military area of the Rhineland.⁴⁴ It has also been suggested that improvements to the Alpine routes into Gaul and Germany were the result of British ambitions, on the part of first Gaius, and then Claudius.⁴⁵ Indeed, although milestones show later emperors and their subordinates hard at work improving land-communications in particular areas of Gaul and the Germanies, the completion of the first stage of the Agrippan system is usually credited to Claudius.⁴⁶ Some scholars have, however, shown caution in accepting this hypothesis.⁴⁷

In addition to the roads were the inland waterways of the Three Gauls and Narbonensis. Strabo's famous eulogy of the opportunities offered by the rivers of Gaul was well justified (Map 9).⁴⁸ Water transport was, after all, the cheaper form of long-distance bulk-carrying transportation in the ancient world.⁴⁹ As already mentioned, there is ample evidence, both literary and archaeological, to show that in the pre-Conquest era the inhabitants of Gaul realised, and were able to exploit, the advantages offered by their rivers.⁵⁰ Under Rome this practice continued and flourished. As in the case of the roads, therefore, Rome brought organisation more than innovation. Waterways, just as much as roadways, would have benefited from the emergence of a central civil power to ensure easy access and free passage.⁵¹

The blossoming of Gallic river transport under Roman rule in the High Empire is, in fact, best reflected in the emergence of apparently rich and well-organised corporations of *nautae* ('boatmen' – to be distinguished from the *navicularii* or sea-going sailors).⁵² As far as the Three Gauls are concerned, the fact that the *nautae* usually called themselves after the particular river or rivers upon which they worked allows us to locate their activity on the Rhodanus (Rhône), the Arar (Saône), the Liger (Loire) and the Mosella (Mosel); the *nautae Parisiaci* were presumably so named because their boats were to be found in all the rivers of the Seine-basin. *Nautae* were also active on Lake Geneva.⁵³ It is clear that *nautae* transhipped goods from one river to another.⁵⁴ The Roman imperial government was notoriously wary of the dangers of allowing private citizens to band together in their own organisations, and it has recently been suggested that one reason why so many of this type were allowed in Gaul was that they fulfilled a specific and necessary role for the state in moving supplies, raised in central Gaul, to the armies settled on the Rhine; trading, of course, could be done on the side by the *nautae* involved.⁵⁵ This, of course, would explain the dominance, in the inscriptional evidence, of those *nautae* who plied the main north-south corridor, along the Rhône and the Saône. It would also put into perspective a number of early schemes devised by the military to improve water-transport in the Three Gauls, in particular a daring, but ultimately unsuccessful, plan to link the Saône and the Mosel by means of a canal, which would have provided direct access from the Mediterranean to the North Sea by removing the necessity of hauling material by wagon over the Langres plateau.⁵⁶ Like so many other ideas to do with Roman Gaul this one is not susceptible to hard proof, and in the end must be seen as being no more than intelligent speculation. However, it is very attractive, and one to which I am inclined, with some qualification, to

lend my support.⁵⁷ In other words, the integrated system of river-transportation within the Three Gauls may be regarded as being just as much the product of military considerations as the road-system.

Against this background we may now proceed to consider in a more daring manner than is customary the likely impact of the final phase of High Roman military activity in the Three Gauls, namely the move to the Rhenish frontier. As we shall observe in this and succeeding chapters, perhaps the most striking and productive economic partnership to develop in Roman Gaul was that between town and *villa*. The latter, the Romanised farm, proved ultimately to be more successful and more resilient than the former, but it may be argued that its prosperity was triggered by the town-market. However, this begs the question as to what forces gave birth to this market. The traditional answer is simply 'Rome', in the sense that Roman encouragement of urban life stimulated the physical growth and development of such centres, reflected most of all in the architectural glory of the '*civitas-capital*'. It seems to me, on the other hand, that the material which we have can be used to provide a less superficial and more satisfying response to the problem, albeit a highly controversial one. Indeed, the reader must be warned that what follows is very much the product of certain lines of argument to be found in recent work on the Roman Empire in general and Roman Gaul in particular which have yet to find unanimous support among scholars, and which have probably not yet themselves been fully explored. Nevertheless they, and the use which may be made of them, give a useful indication of the vitality of the subject and of at least one direction of modern research.

It is generally accepted that the Rhine army, after the German débacle permanently stationed on the the north-eastern margin of the Three Provinces, could not, at least to begin with, have subsisted on the produce of the immediate countryside. Recent calculations have suggested a second-century garrison of over 44,000 men, exclusive of naval personnel.⁵⁸ In terms of basic foodstuff alone this would have required the provision of about 70 tons of wheat per day (a figure which in earlier years would have been much higher in proportion to the larger garrison).⁵⁹ The vast quantities of the other necessities and luxuries of life required by the troops cannot be so exactly calculated, but one may, for example, consider the amount of clothing which would have had to be found.⁶⁰ As has already been observed, in such circumstances we may assume that commonsense and convenience ensured that the bulk of these commodities was provided by the Three Gauls.⁶¹ If the obligation to supply the army had had to be discharged simply in the

form of payment in kind (as indeed was to be more or less the case under the Late Empire) then the Gallic communities might well have found themselves little better off than before, since this form of transaction would not have tended to generate wider economic activity. However, although the question remains disputed it is not unlikely that under the High Empire taxes were for the most part demanded of the Gauls in cash, and this made all the difference.⁶² If money was to be paid then money had to be earned; in other words surpluses would have to be produced to be exchanged for money in the course of trade. Conveniently and neatly, the biggest customer for such produce would have been the army itself. Money raised in taxation in Gaul was therefore spent on the produce of the Gallic hinterland.⁶³ Such a 'complementary flow of taxes and trade' would have had a much more positive effect than taxation in kind.⁶⁴ Above all, it would have provoked a general stimulation of economic activity; and those producers and traders who dealt in goods that were in especial demand along the Rhine would have found themselves in a position to make significant profits. The presence of the Rhine army acted, as it were, like a wind blowing across the top of a chimney-flue: the stronger it was the more draught it created to fan the fire of the Gallic economy. Indeed, to press the simile to its limit, the 'flue' itself can be specifically located on the map, as the great north-south route of the Rhône-Saône corridor.

As has already been noted, in absolute terms these new currents were to have their greatest long-term impact on the predominantly rural agricultural and extractive activities which were by far the dominant constituents of the pre-industrial economy.⁶⁵ However, what is equally interesting is the extent to which such forces also affected the urbanisation of the Three Gauls. The producers and traders had to work within some sort of practical economic structure which was able to respond to and to resolve the problems of supply and demand. To be traded on the open market most goods would have to be moved from the place of their production to a place suitable for their wider distribution. Many would, even then, in some way or other, have required further processing.⁶⁶ The majority of products would, therefore, have had to pass through at least one entrepôt, artisan-centre, or whatever, and often several, before ultimately reaching the hands of the consumer. Such traffic would have encouraged the growth of such centres: in other words, it would have encouraged the development of agglomerations of varying degrees of size and importance (depending on whether they had inter-regional, regional, or only local significance) which for the moment we may loosely call townships.⁶⁷ Once established, such

townships would in their turn have tended to stimulate the economy even further since they themselves would have made their own demands on the surrounding countryside, and wider afield, for the necessities and luxuries of life. These would have been paid for in cash, which would then have been returned to the townships in exchange for the more sophisticated goods and services only they supplied. In a sense, therefore, such agglomerations would have developed economic lives of their own.

The system outlined would obviously have been very difficult to work without effective means of communication and transportation. This is, therefore, where we return to the work of Agrippa, which provided the vital link between producers and consumers, and which in fact dictated the relative size and importance and, in most cases, the very location of those townships which the 'complementary flow' encouraged. In the light of what has already been said, indeed, one might reasonably expect the townships to have best flourished when they lay on, or very close to, one or more routes of the newly organised road/river network, and particularly at the nodal points of that network. For this reason, therefore, it should come as no surprise that the two most successful commercial townships in the Three Gauls seem to have been Lugdunum and Colonia Agrippina (Köln), the former lying at the centre of Agrippa's road network, overlooking the confluence of the Arar (Saône) and Rhodanus (Rhône), while the latter stood at the junction of Agrippa's great military road north from Lugdunum with routes along the Rhine and through Belgica to the Channel, and itself commanded a first-rate river-port.⁶⁸ However, it is important to remember that both are unusual cases. As we have seen, the two townships did not grow spontaneously, but were created by Rome for purposes which were military rather than economic. The former was established to protect a likely invasion-route into The Province and Italy; and the latter began life as the *Oppidum Ubiorum* – the administrative centre of an artificial Gallic *civitas* which Agrippa had created by settling the Germanic Ubii on Treveran territory on the left bank of the Rhine to strengthen a weak sector of the imperial defences there; subsequently, for a short while, it was also the capital of 'Greater Germany'.⁶⁹ In these cases the roads were attracted to the centres and not *vice versa*.

There were certainly, however, more evolutionary developments. In the north, for example, Bagacum (Bavai) and Augusta Treverorum (Trier) grew into very prosperous townships under the High Empire. The former stood at a major junction of roads crossing from the north and east; and the latter commanded an important crossing of the Mosel. In neither case, however, is there good evidence to suggest that these places were the direct successors of pre-conquest settlements.⁷⁰ Rather,

both were born of the road system, which produced not only important crossroads but probably also the military posts, the forts, which were used to guard them, and around which, for the sake of protection and trade, civilians congregated, and so townships crystallised. In such cases we see the army not only providing the general stimulus for urban growth, but also the particular catalysts, in the form of a communications-network and its own bases. (The general role of the Rhine army in promoting this sort of settlement within its main area of operation has already been alluded to above.⁷¹)

This theme may indeed perhaps be taken further to include even sites not normally directly associated with the military. I have already drawn attention to the recent hypothesis that, in the early years at least, some Gallic nations may have suffered a form of martial law under local commissioners, or *praefecti*.⁷² This idea arose out of the observation that there are a number of Gallic township-names the Celtic elements of which (*-dunum*, *-durum*) suggest their possession of defensive walls which, under the High Empire, most could certainly not have boasted.⁷³ To explain the anomaly Rivet has proposed that such names in fact go back to those of Roman forts, built originally to control the surrounding area, and perhaps to accommodate the ruling *praefecti*. The market provided by these bases would have attracted significant local settlements, whose inhabitants might, eventually, have transferred themselves from the civil to the former military sites when the troops were removed to the Rhine. Under the influence of the general economic stimulation which this same move provoked, such centres of population could then have continued to grow as places of manufacture and distribution, as well as of continued administration. A likely example here might well be Augustodunum (Autun) which grew up on a new site by an important crossing of the river Arroux.⁷⁴ Very early permission obtained by the Aedui, as long-standing 'Brothers of the Roman people', to *keep* possession of a magnificent circuit-wall which they had inherited from the army, would go far in explaining their extraordinary possession of a fortified *civitas*-capital.⁷⁵ Once again, of course, such a notion makes much more of accident than design in the siting and foundation of those Gallo-Roman townships with which it is concerned. Thus we may envisage those Aeduans who, for reasons of administration and trade, had originally clung to the old *oppidum* at Bibracte, and had even begun to Romanise its architecture, found the site growing ever more obsolescent, and so gradually drifted downhill to cluster around the new administrative, and subsequently commercial, site on the new military highway, some miles away.⁷⁶ There was no formal resettlement of these people in a designated 'new town'.

Townships could, of course, crystallise around road-based establishments and locations rather less exalted than full colonies and forts. The *Cursus Publicus*, for example, the imperial posting-system as devised by Augustus, required the provision of road-stations (*mansiones*) and staging-posts (*mutationes*) at fairly regular intervals along the main trunk-roads.⁷⁷ The comings and goings of travellers with money to spend would have attracted settlements of traders in their vicinity which, once established, might grow into communities of some importance. Settlements which owed their birth to the post are, unfortunately, notoriously difficult to identify on the ground, since excavators have to be perfectly sure first that they have found the official buildings, and secondly that these provided the original stimulus for urban development.⁷⁸ (The difficulty lies, of course, in distinguishing between such an occurrence and cases where an existing settlement managed to attract an official establishment, as seems to have been the case at Mont Berny, between Senlis and Soissons.⁷⁹) However, we do appear to have at least one good example of a township generated by a posting-station, at the site of Geminiacum (Liberchies, Belgium).⁸⁰ Much the same circumstances produced the small but deservedly well-known township at Belgica vicus (Billig, West Germany) around an internal customs post at a place where a major road entered Lower Germany from Belgica.⁸¹

In a similar fashion, it has been observed that although river transportation was extremely important in Gaul, the road-system sedulously maintained a safe distance from water-routes, presumably to avoid marsh and flood. Except in extremely unusual circumstances, for example in the valley of the lower Rhine, roads tended to keep away from rivers, approaching them only at a ford or bridge.⁸² In such circumstances any site which usefully combined both means of transportation was to be exploited. As we have already seen, this is probably the explanation for the conception and growth of so important a place as Trier. However, the same could happen on a smaller scale, for example at Ernodurum (St Ambroix-sur-Arnon) among the Bituriges, justly famous for the wealth of sculptured material which has come to light there.⁸³ In the latter case the *-durum* element might indicate that the original kernel of the settlement was a small military base (though of a curiously late date, if we are to believe the excavator's dating of the site as a whole).⁸⁴ In the same *civitas*, however, as the researches of Leday have shown in the case of the associated sites of Allichamps and Bruère, prosperous and Romanised centres of commerce and trade could grow up where road met river apparently without military stimulus.⁸⁵


Indeed, many other agglomerations seem simply to have developed

spontaneously at otherwise officially unguarded or unsupervised road junctions. This seems to have occurred, for example, at Orolaunum (Arlon, Belgium), Coriovallum (Heerlen, Netherlands), and regularly at the junction along a major post-Conquest Roman road into Brittany.⁸⁶ A further interesting evolution took place along certain important roads which were nevertheless not perhaps fully served by the imperial post. Here private livery-stables and inns took the place of official *mutationes* and *mansiones*, and likewise generated their own surrounding settlements. The classic example of this is, of course, Tres Tabernae ('The Three Inns', Saverne, France).⁸⁷

Road-based settlement was not, however, necessarily restricted to completely virgin sites; pre-Roman agglomerations could also continue if they happened to find themselves by or on the new roads. Indeed, one might well envisage a situation wherein, while the basic road-network was laid down according to strictly military criteria, with little regard for existing settlement patterns, subsequent additions deliberately plumbed-in older sites if they were considered to be of sufficient importance. Once again, Leday's invaluable regional survey allows us to catch a glimpse of this process at work among the Bituriges. We have already seen new developments at Ernodurum (St Ambroix-sur-Arnon), Allichamps and Bruère; the very useful (and therefore probably quite early) direct road from Lugdunum to Portus Namnetum (Nantes), cutting off the northern loop of the Loire, passed closely enough to the religious site of Aquae Neri (Néris) and the old *oppida* of Mediolanum (Châteaumeillant) and Argentomagus (St Marcel) to allow them to continue to flourish as centres of trade and resort (Figure 6.1).⁸⁸ The great stronghold of Avaricum (Bourges), already badly affected by the Gallic war, seems to have yielded pride of place to Argentomagus in the early period, which seems to suggest that it suffered from being too far to the north of this route.⁸⁹ This, in fact, fits in well with Nash's suggestion that even in the pre-Roman period the place was eccentrically located.⁹⁰ Its subsequent recovery seems to me to be consistent with a conscious decision to make it the centre of a further road-system south of the 'Orleans loop', the stimulus for which may well have included the desire to exploit the mineral resources of the area (particularly the iron). This consideration, again according to Nash, may in fact have dictated the odd positioning of the site in the first place. The date for this could well be Claudian.⁹¹

Very similar results may be obtained from the material collected by Vallat in his study of the Segusiavi: where proto-towns of the pre-Conquest period found themselves completely isolated from the currents

Figure 6.1: Roman roads around Avaricum (Bourges)^a



Source: Leday, (1) 251, (2) pl. 77.

Note: a. Not to scale.

being generated along the transportation-system they declined, or even died (for example, Essalois, Joeuvres); where the routes were close enough for them to exploit the new commercial tides they survived, as 'relais marchés' (e.g. Chézieu); and where they were particularly well placed they did exceptionally well (for example, the lowland site at Roanne, which was able to exploit traffic moving along the overland transshipment-route between the confluence of the Rhône and the Saône, and the Loire; and the religious site of Aquae Segetae – Moingt).⁹² Among the Aedui, the important, but plainly secondary, centre of Alesia (Alise-Ste-Reine) was probably only later joined to the main Roman road-network; indeed, it might well have perished in the intermediate period had it not been for its religious importance and the renown of its craftsmen in the working of bronze.⁹³ In contrast Vermand,

an *oppidum* of the Viromandui, looked securely set to survive when it found itself full on one early Roman road, only to fail when subsequent developments created a major junction to the east, and led to the growth of a new agglomeration which became the formal *civitas*-capital, Augusta Viromanduorum (St Quentin).⁹⁴ Finally, in this respect we must not ignore the possibility that, as was to happen two millenia later in the siting of railways, local influence and considerations could still have produced interesting local alterations to the grand plan. Here I would again draw attention to Mont Berny, where the township lies on a very peculiar kink in the Senlis-Soissons section of the Roman road known as the 'Chaussée Brunehaut', which may well have suffered some small diversion to take in a pre-Roman religious site.⁹⁵

Thus the mark of the conqueror was seen throughout the Three Gauls, not only in the destruction caused by his conquest, and in the strong posts and lines of communication he used to hold the land down, but also in the host of settlements which sprang up to satisfy his material needs. It may indeed be said that the importance of these townships has only recently been realised, as more and more of them come to light, displaying considerable prosperity.⁹⁶ For, like the roads and military installations which preceded them, as time went by these too became increasingly endowed with structures built on the Roman plan and in brick and stone in the Roman fashion; and, again like the roads and forts, they would have impinged upon the Gallic countryside as monuments to the arrival of a new age. The wealth (as reflected in the artefacts) and the specialisation of labour (as demonstrated by the inscriptions and the funerary reliefs) which such places could boast may safely be adduced to justify the use of the word 'urbanisation' as a description of this process.⁹⁷

Here, however, two important issues, both closely related to the argument so far, must be considered. First is the difficult problem of what to call the 'townships'. In the current jargon of the subject they tend to be called *vici* (from the Latin singular, *vicus*) a usage which I have earlier followed as regards the pre-Conquest artisanal and commercial centres, the post-Conquest settlements which developed around German military installations, and the siting of possible capitals of *pagi*.⁹⁸ *Vicus* has in fact been commonly employed by modern writers to describe any set of human habitations in the Three Gauls which was not a formally constituted Roman colony, from *civitas*-capital down to rural hamlet. Not surprisingly there has of late been something of a reaction against so promiscuous a usage. A significant number of scholars now insist on what they see as a very formal contemporary interpretation of

the word, claiming that when used by Gallo-Romans themselves, and especially when used in inscriptions, *vicus* refers to a quite specific sort of urban settlement, subordinate to the *civitas* but nevertheless developed enough to merit its own place in the administrative hierarchy – in other words to possess a degree of local independence which was formally recognised in its possession of its own magistrates.⁹⁹ Such a limitation would mean the designation of only unpromoted (that is, non-colonial) *civitas*-capitals, and certain outstanding subsidiary urban centres within a *civitas* (the possible *pagus*-capitals) as *vici*. The remainder, unless it is possible to find them a name borrowed from their original function, such as *mansio* or *statio*, should be called simply 'villages' or 'hamlets', which would imply their possession of no distinct legal personalities or rights of their own. This is a very difficult issue, and is not made easier by the fact that so exact a definition of *vicus* was anyway, despite its modern protagonists, clearly quite alien to the ancients. It seems to have meant just 'built-up area', large or small, and so could be used to describe a whole range of human habitats. (Caesar himself shows how casually the word could be employed in his own description of Gaul.) In such circumstances one must be prepared to be flexible. It is certainly misguided to abuse so useful a label by attaching it to every mean straggle of houses in the Vosges; on the other hand I believe that it is over-careful to insist on direct proof of a settlement's status as a *vicus* before deploying the word at all. My own inclination is to accept *vicus* as a useful, and unashamedly modern, term to describe any community which, by virtue of any of the evidence available to us, we can accept as depending for a significant part of its livelihood on activity other than that involved in agriculture – that is, one which fulfilled an important artisanal or commercial role, either just locally or further afield. Thus, apart from the colonies, whose particular significance cannot be disputed, all the places I have described in this chapter may be called *vici*.

Such a usage accords, of course with the way in which I employed the word at the very beginning of this work, and this brings us to the second point of discussion.¹⁰⁰ So far in this chapter I have deliberately stressed the Romanity of the changes described. It must now be pointed out that all this had happened before, or rather, that in many ways it may be seen simply as the acceleration of a movement already present in pre-Roman Gallic society. As we have already seen, the relationship between agricultural producer in the *aedificium*, artisan and merchant in the *vicus*, and soldier and administrator in the *oppidum* (by which the last were sustained by, and yet also stimulated, the economic activity

of the first two groups) was already an important characteristic of pre-Conquest society.¹⁰¹ What the new conditions did was simply to organise many separate (because *civitas*-, even *pagus*-based) 'complementary flows' into one great movement, managed by Rome. In fact, what we may perhaps call the natural urbanisation of the Three Gauls through the particular agency of the Roman army was but a continuation of an old tradition whereby the functions of protection, administration and trade were increasingly being fulfilled by the proto-towns, which were the *oppida* and their dependent *vici* scattered through each *civitas*. It is the multiplicity and variety of such places which I wish to emphasise. Wherever one looks, the pre-Roman *civitates* consistently have several major centres of administration, commerce and industry. For example, the Aedui possessed at least five (Bibracte, Chalon, Macon, Décize and 'Noviodunum'), while the Bituriges had at least four (St Marcel, Châteaumeillant, Bourges and Levrux).¹⁰² Amongst each group one place may have from time to time won a position of pre-eminence, but no doubt, given the fluid nature of Gallic politics, this was always likely to change as different factions gained the upper hand. As I have argued before, and despite the somewhat vague remarks of Caesar concerning the status of capital enjoyed by some of these *oppida*, we must envisage the pre-Conquest Gallic *civitas* as being multicellular in form, with people owing a great deal of loyalty to the local *oppidum*, and those who controlled it.¹⁰³ The sort of process which I envisage as having begun in Gaul following the Conquest would not have changed this; indeed, as the many *vici* began to outstrip the fewer *oppida* in numbers and growth, such multiplicity would have become even more apparent. However, on top of this evolutionary growth Rome was to impose another, quite different, sort of order, which takes us away from the military context, and, in the end, towards urbanisation proper.

Notes

1. Cf. Grenier (1), iii.88.
2. See Drinkwater (2), 817f.
3. See Drinkwater (2), 824; Plutarch, *Pompey* 67.6 – cf. Jullian, iii.566.
4. Suetonius, *Caesar* 26.2, 28.1; Caesar, *BC* 3.59.2.
5. Heinen, 33.
6. Wightman (6), 119.
7. Livy, *Epitome* 114.
8. Cicero, *ad Att.* 14.9.3.
9. See above 19.

10. For these governors, and those that immediately follow, see Wightman (2), 474f.

11. Cf. Dyson, 154.

12. Here I go against Dyson, 155f, who proposes that there was continuing unrest in Gaul down to 12 BC, and that indeed the German war which was begun in that year was simply a means of releasing Gallic energies. I feel that the Licinus affair (see above 25, 102), which is one of the incidents which Dyson adduces in proof of his contention, demonstrates on the contrary how tractable the Gauls were; and I think it unlikely that Augustus would have committed himself to so massive a military gamble to obtain so local an advantage. Historically, it is the German menace which can be proved to have the greater significance.

13. Velleius Paterculus, 2.97.1; Dio, 54.20.4-6.

14. Suetonius, *Augustus* 23.1.

15. Heinen, 34.

16. Wells, 10f.

17. For a discussion of this see Wightman (6), *passim*.

18. Appian, 5.66.

19. Cf. below 125f.

20. Wightman (6), 113; cf. below 131.

21. Cf. above 19.

22. Drinkwater (3), 825f.

23. Wightman (5), 81 and references; (6), 122. Cf. Rivet (4), 169 (concerning Britain).

24. Drinkwater (3), 828.

25. Wightman (6), 115, 123.

26. Below 130f.

27. Although cf. Grenier (1), ii.321f, who rightly warns against too easy an assumption of the massiveness of Roman road-construction. See Chevallier (2), 132, fig. 26 (discussed by Rodwell) for a road which clearly overlies an earlier system of field-boundaries.

28. E.g. Caesar *BG* 2.5.6; 7.11.6; 7.34.3; 8.27.2. Generally, see Chevallier (2), 4f, 109. For a convenient discussion of the archaeological evidence from the upper Rhine see Petry, 277, 285, 287f.

29. Cf. Audin P., 196, who notes that the Tours-Angers section of the Loire valley road, although following the general line of the pre-Roman route, was actually built some distance from it (in this case actually nearer to the river).

30. Strabo, 4.6.11.

31. Cf. above 122.

32. See e.g. Grenier (1), ii.33.

33. Staehlin, 163f.

34. Cf. above 121.

35. For similar scepticism see Müller-Wille, 28f; *contra*, Chevallier (2), 88. Cf. above 67.

36. Cf. above 21.

37. Cf. above 122f.

38. Doppelfeld, 44f; Biegel, 6f.

39. For a directly contrary view of the whole dating issue see Grenier (1), ii.33f, who, however, I feel stresses the civil role of the roads too much against their originally military purpose.

40. See Drinkwater (2), *passim*; cf. above 111n114.

41. See generally Chevallier (2), and the exhaustive bibliography which he provides for Gallic roads.

42. See above 95f.

43. Cf. above 43.

44. Chevallier (2), 185.
45. van Berchem (2), 144.
46. Chevallier (2), 185.
47. Grenier (1), ii.46f; cf. below 133n91.
48. Strabo 4.1.2, 4.1.14.
49. Jones, 841f; Finley, 126f; cf. however the remarks of Hopkins (1), 43f.
50. E.g. the Vix burial (above 9) occurs at the place where the Seine first becomes navigable after leaving its source, and which therefore probably attracted travellers moving north from the Rhône: see Lerat, 317.
51. Cf. Drinkwater (3), 843f.
52. Cf. Drinkwater (3), 849f and, for a detailed modern discussion of all the evidence, Rougé (1), *passim*.
53. Staehlin, 481f.
54. Strabo, 4.1.2, 4.1.14; *CIL* xiii 5489 (= Espérandieu 3521/22).
55. Middleton, *passim*.
56. Tacitus, *Annales* 13.53.3 (cf. Grenier (1), ii.578, 583). Generally, Chevallier (2), 186.
57. See Drinkwater (3), 845. (The qualification lies in the fact that unlike Middleton I do not believe that the goods involved should be seen, at least in the early stages, as taxation in kind; I would prefer to see them as having been bought on the open market – see below 129). Cf. Duval (2), 211.
58. Birley (2), 39f.
59. This is based on Davies' calculations in respect of the British garrison – Davies, 122f.
60. See Hopkins (1), 47f, for the commonly unconsidered importance of the textile trade; cf. Drinkwater (8), *passim*.
61. Cf. above 65.
62. Here, by implication, I follow Hopkins, (1) and (2) *passim*; cf. von Petrikovits, 67. The proof lies, I feel, not only in the greater frequency of coins in circulation, as noted by Hopkins, but also, and perhaps more important, in the evident sheer material prosperity of Roman Gaul compared with earlier periods (see below 186f). This must indicate that extra wealth was being generated somewhere, and the model as described seems to provide the simplest solution.
63. Cf. above 65.
64. For the phrase, and the concept, see Hopkins (1), 41f.
65. Cf. above 128.
66. Cf. Drinkwater (8), 116f, for one possible model for the operation of the wool textile industry.
67. Here I avoid use of the word *vicus*, which is discussed below 135f.
68. See Wuilleumier (2), Audin A., Biegel, *passim*.
69. Cf. above 19, 23; Strabo, 4.3.4; Tacitus, *Annales* 12.27.1, *Germania* 28.
70. See Will, 88 (Bavai) and Wightman (1), 36f, 71f (Trier). As far as the latter is concerned, however, see also the slightly different views of Cüppers (2), 224 (envisioning a small native settlement already in existence).
71. Above 66.
72. Cf. above 123. The remarks of Wightman (1), 27, concerning the post of *praefectus ripae Rheni*, also seem to fit this notion.
73. Rivet, (4) and (5) *passim*.
74. Grenier (1), iii.234; Chevallier (2), 80; *CIL* xiii 2681.
75. See Duval and Quoniam, 162, on the likely Roman military origin of the lay-out of this wall.
76. Cf. Wightman (3), 625.
77. Grenier (1), ii.200f.
78. It is to be noted, for example, that Agache's researches have produced

only one likely *mansio* in the whole of the Somme region: (2), 701.

79. Harmand J., 226f.

80. Raepsaet-Charlier, 150.

81. Grenier (1), ii.723f.

82. le Lannou, 29f; Burnand, 289f, 292f.

83. Leday (1), 238.

84. Cf. below 132n91.

85. Leday (2), 306f.

86. Wightman (4), 62; Raepsaet-Charlier, 133f; Eveillard, *passim*.

87. Grenier (1), ii.202.

88. Leday (2), 33f.

89. Leday (2), 31; cf. Allain, 45f.

90. Nash (2), 104.

91. Leday (1), 238f (concerning the dating of Ernodurum and the Bourges-Argenton road — although he himself, (2) 412f, puts the rise of Bourges under Caligula).

92. Vallat, 174f, 205f, 212.

93. Below 152-5.

94. Will, 95f (in fact suggesting that the older road was built by Agrippa during his first governorship of Gaul).

95. Harmand J., 226.

96. See e.g. Picard (2), 103.

97. For these criteria see Hopkins (1), 71f.

98. Above 11, 66, 109.

99. The literature on this debate is extensive; I refer the reader to the very useful 'state of research' provided by volume 11 of *Caesarodunum*, 1976, especially the articles by Ternes and Wightman.

100. Cf. Nash (2), 95, 107.

101. Cf. above 11.

102. Chevallier (2), 279f; Nash (2), 109f.

103. Cf. Picard (2), 104f; Nash (2), 109.

7 URBANISATION

Roman notions of orderly government required that each *civitas* have just one system of administration, controlled from a single urban centre. This preference no doubt resulted from a variety of causes. We have already speculated that to the Mediterranean mind, used to the true city-state, the sprawling multi-centred Gallic communities to be encountered further inland were incomprehensible and therefore disturbing: hence the attempt was made to give them a more Greco-Roman look.¹ There was also undoubtedly administrative convenience to be taken into account, for example the fact that it would surely have made life much harder for a Roman governor and his staff to have to have taken in a multiplicity of major centres of administration in each *civitas* in the course of an assize-circuit.² Related to this, the regular bringing together of the major *civitas*-magistrates, to whom so much power was entrusted, and upon whose competence and co-operation so much depended, would certainly have helped to ensure their efficient fulfilment of the most important of their obligations to Rome, namely the collection of taxes.³ In the first place, by eliminating any rival centres of purely local power, such capitals would confirm the authority of the central magistrates throughout their *civitates* and secondly, they would enable Rome more easily to check that officials were not falling down on the job.⁴ Generally, too, such single centres would permit the Roman government both to assess and promote the level of Romanisation of the leading families within a specific area.

As we have already seen, strictly speaking the *civitas*-capital, like all the other settlements in the territory of the nation concerned, should have had no legal personality independent of that of the *civitas* of which it formed part. The *civitas*-capital did not control the land around; rather those who owned that land journeyed to the capital as a convenient place of resort in which they, under the eye of the imperial power, could co-ordinate the administrative responsibilities placed upon them by their community. The same individuals would look after the affairs of the place where they happened to be meeting *en passant*, perhaps delegating matters of routine to some junior magistrate.⁵ If the capital had any standing of its own this was probably to begin with no more than that of a *vicus* (in the strictest sense of the term⁶). Succeeding years, as insistence upon the constitutional niceties died away,

might see it honoured with the title of *colonia*, but in practice this probably made very little difference to the way in which it was run: the *civitas* continued to exert paramountcy over its capital.⁷

However, despite its somewhat anomalous juridical position, the *civitas*-capital was undoubtedly an important place. Its special local status was reflected in the tacking-on of the name of the community to the straightforward place-name – Lutetia *Parisiorum*; and it was not uncommon for this place-name itself also to contain an imperial element, which may be regarded as some sort of imperial badge of honour – Augustodunum Aeduorum.⁸ Perhaps it was that Rome, aware of the contrived and artificial nature of the pseudo-polis of which the capital formed part, was inclined to insist on the importance of the latter in an effort to give the whole system some stiffening. Such an attitude was bound to have an effect on the nature of the urbanisation of the Three Gauls. It has long been recognised that here, following the Conquest, there developed an ever-growing inclination on the part of those who could afford them to adopt the material amenities of a civilised (that is, Greco-Roman) lifestyle.⁹ Thus there can be no doubt that, in the circumstances outlined in the preceding chapter, given time Roman-style urban architecture would anyway have spread through the Three Provinces. Wealth and willingness were there, and a host of thriving *vici* ripe for development. Inspiration would have come from those, whether Gauls or non-Gauls, who had seen, and formed contacts within, the outside world; and, of course, there were attractive patterns to be found much closer to home, in Lugdunum, Noviodunum, Raurica and the colonies of Narbonensis.

However, I would argue that the process was at the same time accelerated and distorted by the institution of the *civitas*-capital. Here, the pressing need to accommodate those who governed and administered the *civitas* (which required, at minimum, some place of assembly for the decurions, and some form of central *civitas*-archive) was neatly combined with the traditional desire of these same aristocrats to advertise their wealth and their power in the community by acts of conspicuous spending, particularly gestures of public munificence.¹⁰ Hence building-projects in the *civitas*-capitals received the lion's share of private generosity, and resources which might otherwise have been dissipated over many places were instead concentrated on a relative few. We may also imagine that the rivalry involved was not confined to individuals within a *civitas*, but eventually spread to set *civitas* against *civitas* in the adornment of central show-places, intended to rival, if not outstrip, those Mediterranean communities upon which they were

modelled.¹¹ The *civitas*-capital bloomed, but the development resulted in such remarkable uniformity of general concept and individual detail that in the end one would not perhaps be surprised to discover that there was some official blueprint which was made available to the *civitas*-magistrates.¹²

The *oppida* and the *vici* which became *civitas*-capitals, or (to adopt a useful suggestion made by Rivet) those which became 'cities' and not just 'townships', varied greatly in their origins and development.¹³ A number were already, by virtue of their roles as proto-towns, primed to exploit the economic forces created by the Conquest, as long as they were not too inconveniently sited in relationship to the new transportation system.¹⁴ Burdigala (Bordeaux), for example, an international trading-port of long standing at the mouth of the Garonne, was well placed to make the most of the opportunities offered by integration within the Empire and would no doubt have developed as a prosperous Romano-Gallic township without outside intervention.¹⁵ (Indeed, it can only have been the force of this natural vigour which pushed the city to overtake Poitiers in importance, and so become the centre of imperial administration in Aquitania.¹⁶) The same might also be said of Lutetia Parisiorum (Paris), although the crossing over the Seine which the city commanded, and which attracted the ever-important road, never enjoyed the same commercial success as Burdigala's harbour.¹⁷ On the other hand, as we have seen, it appears likely that Avaricum Biturigum (Bourges), a leading *oppidum* of the Independence-era, went into a marked decline in the years immediately following the Conquest, only to be rescued at a somewhat later date by being made an important road-junction — possibly for economic reasons.¹⁸ Further contrast is offered by Augustodunum (Autun) where the former stronghold at Bibracte was eventually completely abandoned in favour of an entirely new site, possibly military in origin.¹⁹ Closer to the German frontier, of course, where the tradition of even proto-urbanisation was much less developed, totally new *civitas*-capitals are even more in evidence.²⁰


However, as already stated, despite their differing histories, the cities of the Three Gauls under the Early Empire displayed a homogeneity which, viewed dispassionately, is a striking reflection of the extent to which the standards of Greco-Roman town-planning and architecture were accepted as the norm.²¹ Thus, where the site permitted, there was always an attempt to lay out a regular street-plan, based on the intersection of the two major axial routes, namely the *kardo* (running from north to south) and the *decumanus* (running from east to west). At regular intervals (measured in Roman feet — either the *pes monetalis*,

or the slightly longer *pes Drusianus*) secondary streets branched off from these at right-angles to produce the famous 'chequerboard' pattern; the 'blocks' so formed were known as *insulae* — 'islands'. Good examples of this are to be found at Trier and Paris (Figure 7.1). It is interesting to note that there are clear indications that in a number of cases the street-plan seems to have been laid out as a whole from the beginning, in anticipation of the city's growing to a certain predetermined size. Where the target was exceeded the existing street-lines could be extended, as seems to have happened at Trier.²² (The long-held view that a similar measure was adopted at Samarobriua Ambianorum (Amiens) is now disputed.²³) More often, however, as will be discussed in more detail below, the cities fell below the expectations of their founders, and we have evidence that in a number of places *insulae* were left undeveloped, at least for building purposes — they could have served as gardens, or even as agricultural land.²⁴

Following good Roman practice, the heart of the Gallo-Roman city was located at the crossing of the *kardo* and the *decumanus*. Here was to be found the *sine qua non* of Romanised urban life, the central space for public congregation, the *forum* (Figure 7.2).²⁵ This was essentially a paved, open area which functioned as the place of first resort for popular social intercourse, the transaction of professional business, and the discussion of matters of the moment; bad weather was provided for by the addition of porticoes which surrounded the forum proper or which even, in some cases (the *cryptoportici*) were built underneath it (although in the latter case warehousing may also have been an important consideration).²⁶ However, the Gallic forum-complex almost invariably included at least two other significant elements.


The first was the most important public building in the city, the *basilica*, the seat of *civitas*-government. This consisted of a rectangular hall, which was used as a law-court (often with an apse at one end, in which sat the judge and his staff). Attached to the hall might be found the *civitas*-magistrates' offices (usually few and small) and the *curia*, or senate-house, where the local decurions would hold their meetings. Secondly, Gallic *fora* (unlike those in Roman Britain) tended to include a classical temple in their precincts. The central location of such buildings would suggest that the deities worshipped were important, either to the Empire or to the *civitas*. There is indeed evidence to suggest that in some places, at least, the gods involved were those of the Capitoline triad — Jupiter, Juno and Minerva — the national gods of Rome;²⁷ however, elsewhere the groundplans of the buildings concerned make this unlikely, and it seems better to think rather of the continuing

Figure 7.1: Lutetia Parisiorum (Paris)



Source: Duval (2), Figure 43.

Figure 7.2: Gallic Fora



Source: Duval (2), Figure 5.2.


veneration of local gods who had particular links with the *civitas* concerned. After the forum, the Greco-Roman visitor curious to assess a Gallic city's claim to call itself by such a name would probably have sought, and found, the public baths – those lavishly equipped leisure-centres of the ancient world where the object was not so much hygiene as enjoyment of a few hours of diversion and relaxation in pleasant and comfortable surroundings. Gallic urban bath-buildings are very well known, possibly the most famous being the Cluny baths in Paris and the 'Barbarathermen' in Trier.²⁸ Both of these establishments were large, allowing the bather to complete the process of raising and then lowering his body temperature by progressing through a range of rooms at various temperatures and humidities without having to double back on his tracks, and both were richly decorated and embellished. Yet, despite their size, neither the Cluny baths nor the Barbarathermen were unique in their cities. In Paris and Trier, as elsewhere, there were other establishments available to the public.²⁹ Such buildings in such numbers required large and regular supplies of water which had to be brought in from outside. The long arcaded aqueducts typical of Italy are rare in Gaul, although stretches do occur, for example around Lugdunum.³⁰ However, the usual practice was to run water through leets, either at or below ground level, resorting to other means (not only arcades, but also lead-lined siphons) only when the lie of the land made it unavoidable, for example in the crossing of a valley, or of a natural water-course. This was no doubt to avoid excessive expenditure. The water supply of Paris has been particularly well studied, and we know that it came from Rungis, some 20 km to the south of the city, and ran along the valley of the Bièvre (for the most part in a conduit, although it crossed the Bièvre by bridge-aqueduct at Cachan).³¹ Metz drew its water over a similar distance, taking it over the Mosel at the splendid bridge-aqueduct at Jouy.³²

All self-respecting Gallo-Roman cities would also have contained, in addition to a forum-temple, several other centres of worship, in keeping with the polytheistic nature of Gallo-Roman religion. It is interesting that, although Roman-style masonry was used in their construction, in this instance the plan employed was commonly Celtic, consisting of a central chamber (*cella*) and concentric lean-to ambulatory, of square, circular or polygonal design. The so-called 'Temple of Janus' (actually more probably of Mars) at Autun is certainly the most impressive surviving example of this type of building; unfortunately for our purposes it actually lies just outside the city. However, we have a good instance of such a structure located within an urban complex in 'La Tour de

Vésone' at Vesunna Petrocoriorum (Périgueux) (Figure 7.3).³³ Yet, probably the most striking remains still visible today belong to none of the types of construction discussed so far, but derive rather from that aspect of Roman life which has achieved some modern notoriety, and which even contemporaries dared to criticise, namely public shows and spectacles.

The true Roman theatre and amphitheatre, as they occur together

Figure 7.3: Groundplan of a Celtic Temple: La Tour de Vésone (Périgueux)




Source: Grenier (1), iii, Figure 143.

for example at Arelate (Arles), are not uncommon in the Three Gauls. They tend to appear in the wealthier and more Romanised regions of the centre, and in the military zones. Thus at Lyon the theatre and *odeon* ('recital-hall') on Fourvières, and the amphitheatre to be found at La Croix Rousse, were clearly the result of the intensive Romanisation of the colony, and of the site of the federal Altar (indeed the last was probably built specifically to accommodate ceremonies in honour of Rome and Augustus).³⁴ The earliest dateable amphitheatre in the Three Gauls, at Mediolanum Santonum (Saintes), once again reflects the very high status of that city in Aquitania in the early imperial period.³⁵ Trier's housing of the imperial procurator of Belgica and the Germanies likewise probably led to her being endowed with a similar building. Autun quite early (during the first century) possessed both theatre and amphitheatre, which must be a mark of the special relationship of the Aedui with Rome.³⁶ However, elsewhere, and particularly in the northern parts of the Three Gauls, cities tended to equip themselves neither with amphitheatres nor with theatres, but with an odd hybrid of the two. Probably the best known example of such a structure is to be found in Paris — the 'Arènes' (Figure 7.4).³⁷ This consists basically of an ellipsoidal arena (55m x 47m at its widest point) surrounded for the most part by standard amphitheatre-seating, but on its west side flanked by a monumental stage (*scaena*). The typology of such structures has caused a great deal of scholarly debate: should they be seen predominantly as amphitheatres (offering spectacles which involved the spilling of blood), or as theatres (presenting more peaceful, and perhaps more uplifting forms of entertainment)?³⁸ In appearance each inclines either one way or the other; and, although the Paris version was built all at once, elsewhere there seem to have been conversions.³⁹ It seems to me that in every case the combination of arena and stage must reflect a common Gallic desire to make all such buildings serve much the same function. Precisely which function, however, must remain obscure.

Clearly the economising of resources played some role in determining the shape of the 'theatre-amphitheatre'. It is a noticeable feature of all such structures in the Three Gauls, whether hybrid or normal, that wherever possible expensive vaulting underneath the *cavea* (the 'stand') was avoided by the judicious use of natural slopes, on which the seating could be directly set; the removal of a sizeable section of the *cavea* proper, and its replacement by a cheaper, but aesthetically acceptable stage, would have further reduced costs. Such argumentation, of course, leads to the conclusion that they were just amphitheatres on the cheap, showing that Rome had passed on to Gaul her love of arena-

Figure 7.4: Groundplan of a Theatre-amphitheatre: Les Arènes (Paris)



Source: Duval (2), Figure 94.

sports. However, the care taken over the building of the stages would suggest that they had something to offer in their own right, but what this was is difficult to say. The obvious answer would be to suggest that they provided the opportunity for the production of classical drama but, as Duval points out, the design of the Parisian *scaena* does not support such a view. Possibly they were used for festivals of ballet, mime and declamation which owed more to Celtic than to Mediterranean influences. That, nevertheless, both amphitheatres and theatre-amphitheatres from time to time housed wild-beast shows is shown by their being positioned away from the main street network (indeed the swallowing of the amphitheatre by the streets of Samarobriua (Amiens) has long been accepted as one of the most important indications of the unexpected growth of that city, although this has recently been questioned).⁴⁰ *Stadia*, or circuses for chariot-racing, would also

tend to be sited on the outskirts because of the amount of space which they occupied. They are notoriously difficult to identify; Paris has, however, produced a possible site.⁴¹

Discussion so far has concerned the public buildings to be found in the cities. To conclude it is essential to consider two other aspects of the urban scene, namely private housing, and defences. The city populations comprised, amongst others, small shopkeepers and craftsmen, merchants, *civitas*-decurions and their families, and Roman administrators. Some of these people would have been permanent residents, and some, to a greater or lesser degree, only temporary, but all would have required some form of housing; we are entitled to imagine the existence of accommodation ranging from simple homes-cum-shops (the somewhat misleadingly named 'strip-houses' of the archaeologists⁴²) through inns and posting-stations to large and comfortable urban mansions. Imagination is required in fact because, thanks to difficulties involved in the preservation of and access to the archaeological evidence, information relating to these structures is not as plentiful in the Three Gauls as it is, for example, in Narbonensis and in Britain. Material is available from lesser centres, as we shall see below, but this is of no help in the solving of certain problems specific to the *civitas*-capitals, for example those involved in determining the main place of residence or the level of wealth of a *civitas*-decurion.


Defences are more straightforward to deal with. It must always be borne in mind that during the period under discussion most *civitas*-capitals of the Three Gauls, and most forms of urban settlement generally, were open and undefended.⁴³ In fact, of all the major urban centres in the Three Gauls and the Germanies under the High Empire only Autun, Köln, Avenches and Xanten are known for sure to have possessed fortifications, the last three certainly by virtue of their colonial status. But even colonial status apparently offered no guarantee in this respect: the defences of Lugdunum remain controversial, as does the date of the walling of Augusta Treverorum (Trier).⁴⁴ This well explains the vulnerability of even large cities to marauders such as Maternus. The Three Provinces were, or were expected to be, a quiet land. In most cases the first signs that a traveller saw to assure him that he was on the outskirts of a Gallic city would have been, not towers and battlements, but memorials to the dead who, according to Roman law and custom, were buried outside the designated residential area, along the sides of the main roads.⁴⁵

There can be no doubt that the imposition of the *civitas*-capitals had a profound effect on the speed and manner in which Gallo-Roman

urbanisation proceeded. As the cities took their standards from Rome and her colonies, so the townships copied the cities;⁴⁶ thus the Roman pattern was stamped (albeit with a growing measure of irregularity) everywhere on the land, from the greatest *civitas*-centre to the humblest roadside *vicus*. Indeed, as we shall see in the following chapter, this even occurred in rural places of assembly which had nothing whatever to do with urban life proper.⁴⁷ In fact, it is interesting to note that our best example of a Gallo-Roman urban settlement in the Three Gauls comes not from the excavation of the site of an important city (since in all cases continuous occupation over the centuries has tended to distort and hide the Roman record) but from a lesser township which nevertheless, thanks to local prosperity, managed to ape the appearance of its more important sisters. This is Alesia (Alise-Ste-Reine, Côte-d'Or), which in terms of the state of preservation and accessibility of its remains deserves to be called the 'French Silchester' (Figure 7.5). The site of Vercingetorix's last stand against Caesar, this Gallic *oppidum* on Mt Auxois continued to be occupied into the Roman period, as the home both of the holy healing waters of Apollo Moritasgus, and of a flourishing metalwork industry. It is likely that the integration of the local community, the Mandubii, into the much larger *civitas* of the Aedui robbed Alesia of her chance of being designated an independent *civitas*-capital,⁴⁸ nevertheless, pilgrimage and trade brought wealth, which was channelled into giving the place all the amenities which were expected of a Romano-Gallic city.

Luckily for us, following the death of the settlement in the third or (more likely) fourth century, the site was not generally re-occupied, leaving the Gallo-Roman levels undisturbed and ready for the trowel. Alesia, therefore, offers a wealth of useful information, and deserves close study. The forum-complex, for example, is particularly interesting, not only because it plainly demonstrates the standard tripartite division into porticoed assembly-area, tri-apsidal basilica and temple, but also because the way these elements are assembled strongly suggests a re-modelling aimed directly or indirectly at the copying of Trajan's Forum in Rome (as completed by Hadrian in the second quarter of the second century). (One presumes that the complex was used in *pagus* and *vicus* administration:⁴⁹ aspirations to the appearance of a *civitas*-capital therefore probably reflected an affectation and a conceit which may have derived from memories of former independence.) A baths-building has been discovered on the eastern end of Mt Auxois, but since it is over 1 km away from the forum and forms the major element in the shrine-complex dedicated to the worship of Apollo, it would be unwise

Figure 7.5: Alesia (Alise-Ste-Reine): A – General site; B – Town centre



Source: R. Chevalier, *ANRW*, II, 3, 950.

to see it as being for general public use. The temple of Apollo was an octagonal structure, built on the Celtic pattern. However, closer to the heart of the town are a number of other places of worship, including a complex and cleverly designed (if in places rather oddly built) monument to the god Ucuētis, who was apparently the local patron of metal-workers. Moreover, just outside the western side of the forum-complex, the temple precinct, there is a typical Gallic theatre, with its horseshoe-shaped *cavea*, and its lack of vaulting (the seats probably consisted of wooden forms resting directly upon an artificial mound of rubble, with-in stone retaining walls). There are no defences belonging to the Roman period. The only way in which Alesia really deviates from the usual city pattern is in the absence of a formal *kardo* or *decumanus*, and hence the absence of a neatly laid-out 'chequerboard' street-plan; the roads, and the buildings which follow them, are strung across the plateau following the natural contours. This might be assigned to the observed propensity of settlements below the rank of *civitas*-capital to be somewhat careless in the arrangement of their streets, with no sign of formal town-planning.⁵⁰ However, in this instance the inhabitants of the site in question should rather perhaps be seen as following no less a precedent than that laid down by the builders of Lugdunum.⁵¹ Such an arrangement was unavoidable when, for a variety of reasons, such as security, or the *ad hoc* expedients which went with unplanned growth, even a Roman-style settlement was placed on, or had to develop on, some sort of geological out-crop instead of the preferred gentle slope. The great advantage of the excavations at Alesia is, however, that they provide information on aspects of its growth and life which elsewhere is very difficult to come by. So, for example, underlying the theatre and the forum there are remains of a much earlier and much more primitive place of assembly which possibly dates back to the Independence-period. Likewise, the somewhat eccentric alignment of the forum-temple (with regard to the forum-enclosure) may suggest that this respected the positioning of a much older sacred site -- perhaps originally the focus of the pre-Conquest assembly-area. In the same area roads made by stripping the ground down to bedrock similarly hint at pre-Roman activity.

All of this (and more) suggests that at Alesia from an early date was to be found the sort of Gallic proto-town mentioned in the first chapter. However, perhaps the most fascinating aspect of this line of enquiry concerns the amount it can tell us about the lives of ordinary people to an extent that is virtually unknown elsewhere.⁵² The earliest detectable structures in Alesia are the rather curious and enigmatic rock dwellings

which, as their name suggests, consist of chambers cut into the living stone. They were followed, just after the Conquest, by simple rectangular wooden huts, partially sunk in the ground and distributed in random fashion. The first century saw more durable materials used in the construction of these buildings, but little more in the way of order. However, by the later part of the second century, following a partial re-planning of the road-system on the site, there appeared in the eastern residential and industrial region known as 'La Fanderolle' much more substantial and developed dwellings, set in courtyards which were used as working areas, and ranged neatly, either singly or in pairs, along the sides of streets. A fronting portico may have served to support a gallery over the street which provided extra living-space; at a later date the covered walkway which this provided seems also to have been invaded by industrial and commercial activity.

Closer to the forum there were larger and more sprawling residences, such as the 'House of Silenus'.⁵³ This, while comfortable, is not luxurious; substantial domestic wealth is found further out at the site called 'Surelot', although the remains here are frustratingly poor.⁵⁴ Similarly, the metalworking which we know from the elder Pliny to have been a famous speciality of Alesia, and traces of which are to be found distributed uniformly over the site (even under the portico of the forum-temple), seems to have been centred on the 'Monument' of Ucuētis, which may therefore have served not only as some sort of religious building but also as a type of corporation-headquarters of the master-craftsmen of the industry.⁵⁵ The very elaborate frontage of this building, which looked out over the otherwise unadorned extension of the forum-area, would certainly have served to emphasise the economic basis of the town's prosperity at its very heart: there is indeed a quite brutal absence of any architectural relationship between it and the central municipal complex. The siting, and the pretentious appearance of the structure, raise important questions concerning the place of the urban craftsmen within the wide community, which will be discussed a little later in this chapter.

An important issue concerning the cities which has so far only been touched upon, is the density of their settlement and hence the size of their resident populations. This is in fact a very difficult question, to which, in the present state of our evidence, no really satisfactory answer can be given.⁵⁶ Scholars have suggested various criteria by which a *civitas*-capital's population might be calculated: for example, by counting the number of seats available in the local theatre or amphitheatre; or by estimating the volume of water delivered by the aqueducts and

dividing this figure by an estimate of individual consumption; or by assuming some sort of density of settlement per hectare; or by trying to establish the total amount of residential accommodation available.⁵⁷ However, all of these expedients are open to serious criticism: places of entertainment were surely designed to cater for visitors from elsewhere in the *civitas*: other supplies of water were commonly available besides that provided by aqueducts; the surface area of a city was certainly not uniformly settled, and indeed, as we have already seen, in certain parts was probably not settled at all; and the difficulties of excavation have ensured that the comprehensive uncovering of a major Gallic city remains as yet unaccomplished – even at Alesia much needs to be done. We can only guess; and the most authoritative estimates would put the population of a flourishing *civitas*-capital at around no more than the low thousands. Duval, for example, suggests a figure of between 6,000 and 9,000 inhabitants for Paris at its height; Etienne, employing what we know of the vital statistics of the age, together with the finds from burial grounds, proposes 20,000 to 25,000 for Bordeaux, which would fit the undoubtedly more important commercial and administrative functions of the latter, but which, I feel, could still be a little on the high side. Whatever the details, it is highly likely that by modern standards the average population of the Gallic cities was very small; however, as we shall see below, this should not be taken as an invitation to assume that the total population of the Three Gauls was no more than a few millions.⁵⁸

The establishment and the fostering of the *civitas*-capital stimulated Romanisation; this, in its turn, surely galvanised the local economy. In the preceding chapter we looked in general terms at the way in which the demands of Roman taxation, and particularly the amounts of money and goods required to support the frontier army, may have encouraged the growth of the economy of the Three Gauls, and would indeed have promoted natural urbanisation. It was also pointed out that such natural townships, once they were firmly established, would themselves have proceeded to add to this initial stimulus by providing goods and services attractive to those who owned the land. They would thus have incited landowners to demand more from their properties (either in kind, or in rents) than was required simply to pay their taxes, in order to be able to purchase the material benefits of Roman civilisation.⁵⁹ Tenants would be obliged, and indeed probably inclined, to follow suit. It may legitimately be argued that the *civitas*-capital greatly promoted this development. In the first place, the greater efficiency which it brought to the administration of local government would, as I

have already suggested, have greatly aided the initial collection of taxes which was the first stage in this process. In addition, however, the working-through of *aemulatio*, as notables sought to out-do each other in acts of public generosity at a national centre, would have taken the spending of each of them well beyond the level of ordinary personal self-indulgence. We know that the amounts expended in the erection and maintenance of public amenities by such people, whether directly or by testamentary instruction, could be enormous.⁶⁰ Such expenditure could only be recouped by, once again, resorting to much higher demands on the productivity of their estates. This would, of course, by demanding the concentration of craftsmen of certain skills and talents, and the wherewithal to support these people and their families, also lead to the further growth and prosperity of the cities themselves, and their greater ability to tempt spending by those who controlled the country's resources. A nice example of this is Avaricum's (Bourges') spawning of a river-port at Les Sables, which increased the urbanisation of the *civitas* of the Bituriges, and opened up the river-system to more intense exploitation, for goods and passenger-traffic alike.⁶¹

It may be argued that the *civitas*-capitals in particular were simply parasitic on the countryside. However, this is probably too harsh a judgement. As Wrigley has recently pointed out, in a general consideration of the parasitical nature of the pre-industrial administrative town, such a centre cannot really be accused of simply devouring the surplus of the countryside because in most cases without the demands of the town this surplus would not have been so large anyway, and what was produced would probably have been consumed almost immediately, since there would have been little possibility of investing it (in the widest sense of the word) for the future.⁶² The agricultural surplus therefore, in a way, belonged to the city because it called it into being, and processed it to produce greater wealth by passing it into wider markets. The country actually shared in this wealth by being able to sell its products to regular and dependable purchasers, and by being able to purchase the goods and the techniques of the town. In this way *aedificium* became *villa*.⁶³ (A further significant role of the town, with its generally poor sanitary conditions, may have been to attract and kill off the excess population of the countryside and so, by reducing the number of mouths to be fed there, maintain the prosperity of rural life. As far as the Three Gauls are concerned, however, where, as we have seen, information on population movements is virtually non-existent, this last aspect would be impossible to prove.)

However, as events were to show, the *civitas*-capitals, and with them

most of the lesser townships of the Three Gauls, were, as industrial and commercial centres, unable to weather a major political and economic storm. Following the great Crisis of the third century most would be transformed into bases of governmental and ecclesiastical administration, much reduced in area and sheltering behind thick defensive walls put together from expensive materials looted from the remains of the public buildings and monuments of their recent heyday. Even after the return of a sort of peace, in the first half of the fourth century, unless there was some particular imperial need (as at Trier) they were not restored. There appears to have been some flaw in the nature of Gallic towns of the early Empire which needs to be investigated. In Hopkins' view there were two general weaknesses. The obvious one was that most of the energy to fuel the existence and development of the urban hierarchy continued to come from the flow of coin to and from the government; in the third century this broke down and was eventually replaced by taxation and payment (to both the military and the civil service) in kind, which did not require towns as intermediaries to the same extent as before.⁶⁴ Underlying this, however, is the fact that towns failed anyway to generate the sort of aggressive independence and flexibility which might have allowed them to weather this storm. They were doomed from the start by, at one extreme, the nature of the *civitas*, and at the other by the overwhelming power of the Roman emperor.

As I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the *civitas*-capital was an artificial creation, designed to promote the greater efficiency of *civitas*-government, and to act as a showpiece of, and hence an encouragement towards, Romanisation. It was inserted into the Gallic community, and played an important part in its development, but it never controlled that community: as we have seen, it was administered simply as part of the *civitas*, by *civitas*-magistrates. The men who ran it, and indeed embellished it, did so as part of their *civitas*-careers, not because of any specific loyalty to the city as such. They were not committed to keeping it running under any circumstances. No counterparts of the great city merchants and bankers of the medieval period, who maintained commerce and trade in the face of poor communications and general disorder comparable to, and at times perhaps worse than, anything the Roman west experienced even in the worst years of the Crisis, were on hand to redress this balance.⁶⁵ Later centuries would show that while commerce brings affluence, only the lending of money to governments brings real wealth and power. This avenue of activity was not open to the businessmen of the Roman world; when the emperor was really short of resources every form of raising extra revenue, from

confiscation to the debasement of the coinage, lay open to him. He did not have to borrow; thus the power and political status of the merchants remained relatively low. There was trading wealth in the Three Gauls, as is reflected in the funeral reliefs to be found at Neumagen, and especially in the great funerary monument of the Secundinii at Igel; but the traders were apparently always dependent upon the landowning aristocrats, who appear in inscriptions as their patrons rather than their equals.⁶⁶ The urban artisans who were, presumably, inferior to both landowners and traders would have been in an even worse position. Alesia's Ucuëtis Monument might at first glance appear, like some medieval guildhall, to be challenging the supremacy of the forum; but in truth it was very probably no more than some superior form of clubhouse.⁶⁷

Notes

1. Cf. above 103-5.
2. Cf. above 96.
3. Cf. above; Hopkins (1), 67.
4. Cf. the remarks of Jullian, iv. 73f.
5. Cf. above 109.
6. Cf. above 135f.
7. Cf. above 105, 107-8.
8. Cf. above 105; Rivet (5), 9 and fig. 7.
9. DeWitt, 12, 18 (rightly wary, I feel, about the too-easy transposition of the later, initially reluctant, British attitude, as described by Tacitus, *Agricola* 21, to Gaul).
10. The most famous pre-Roman figure in this respect is Bituitus, king of the Arverni — Strabo, 4.2.3.
11. Cf. Harmand L. (2), 348. This is, of course, the notorious 'Pausanias complex': see Hopkins (1), 37; cf. below 157. Frere, 103, points out that in most cases such aspirations were not fulfilled: the cities of the northwest, even the colonies, always retained something of a homespun look by Mediterranean standards.
12. Cf. the remarks of Rivet (3), 499 and (4) 161, who in fact believes in direct pressuring by Rome of her Gallic aristocratic subjects.
13. Rivet (3), 499 — attempting to reproduce the ambivalence between *civitas* meaning the whole nation and *civitas* meaning the *civitas*-capital, which is still there in the French 'cité'.
14. Cf. above 133f.
15. Etienne (1), 71f.
16. See above 95f, 102.
17. Cf. le Lannou, 30 (concerning the influence of Paris' political role on her economic development in medieval and modern times).
18. See above 133.
19. See above 131.
20. von Petrikovits, 85; see above 61.
21. Grenier (1), iii is the standard work of reference on all of the following. More recently, see Frere, *passim*.

22. Wightman (1), 72.
23. Walthew, *passim*.
24. See Grenier (1), iii.97 (Autun); Agache (1), 180 (Amiens); le Gall, 164, 173f (Alesia).
25. On this generally see the brief, but classic, article of Goodchild, *passim*.
26. Grenier (1), iii.295.
27. Grenier (1), iii.240, 270; cf. le Gall, 135f.
28. Duval (2), 104; Wightman (1), 82.
29. Duval (2), 140; Grenier (1), iv.276f (on the four sets of baths at Lugdunum Convenarum).
30. Grenier (1), iv.25, 119.
31. Duval (2), 171f.
32. Grenier (1), iv.199f.
33. Grenier (1), iii.441f.
34. Cf. above 113.
35. Grenier (1), iii.561f; cf. above 96.
36. Grenier (1), iii.689f, 698, 802.
37. Duval (2), iii.883.
38. Grenier (1), iii.883.
39. E.g. Vasselle, 1598 (Amiens).
40. Cf. Duval (2), 126; see above 144.
41. Duval (2), 126, 195 (see also Grenier (1), iii.835f, for Saintes).
42. Wightman (1), 73; cf. McKay, 162 – conventionally resorting to the old plan of Belgica vici.
43. Cf. Grenier (1), i.282f.
44. For Lugdunum see Rougé (3), 226f; and for Trier see below 214, 223.
45. For city-cemeteries see Duval (2), 126f; Etienne (1), 177f; Wightman (1), 92. Nb Grenier (1), i.551f – that it was possible to have monumental gates without an associated wall, as at Reims.
46. Cf. Martin, 181.
47. Cf. below 181.
48. Le Gall, 129; cf. above 94.
49. Cf. above 109, 135f.
50. Frere, 87.
51. Drinkwater (2), 135.
52. For the following see especially Martin, *passim*.
53. Le Gall, 159f.
54. Le Gall, 164.
55. For the following see Martin and Varène, *passim*.
56. Cf. Rougé (1), 47f.
57. For recent remarks on these methods and their application see Etienne (1), 144f and Duval (2), 249. I have also been greatly helped by the work of Buchanan.
58. Cf. below 169f.
59. Again here, and in the following, I follow Hopkins, (1) and (2); cf. also van Berchem, in Duval and Frézouls, 23.
60. Drinkwater (5), *passim*.
61. Leday (2), 313.
62. Wrigley, 297f (with Hopkins (1), 75f).
63. Hopkins (1), 75.
64. Hopkins (2), 115f, 122f.
65. Hopkins (1), 76; cf. Drinkwater (6), 231.
66. Cf. below 196, 199f.
67. Cf. Finley, 138; below 203f.

8 THE COUNTRYSIDE

The great cities of the Three Gauls are bound to attract our attention. They are important indicators of the extent to which the inhabitants of the Three Provinces accepted a Mediterranean-form of lifestyle; and, of course, they still provide the modern visitor with the most impressive material reminders of the rule and influence of Rome in the north-west. Also, like the roads and army bases, in their own early days they too would have sprung out of the Gallic landscape as dramatically visible indicators of the change which had come over the country. Unlike the proto-towns of the Independence-period, and the settlements which were arising out of the establishment of new trade routes and a permanent market in Gaul in the shape of the army, these elaborately formal architectural creations were not native growths, but alien shoots grafted on to the native stem. Their strength and resilience has already been questioned. However, it remains clear that all the new features of Gallo-Roman life – towns, roads, army and imperial administrators – depended for their well-being and very existence upon the local prosperity of the ancient world's single major economic activity. This was, of course, agriculture, and it is to life in the Gallic countryside that we must now turn.


Recent thinking, reacting against a traditional emphasis on the urban features of Greco-Roman life, has striven to redirect attention to its dependency upon the countryside. 'Most adults in the Roman world worked in the fields; most wealth was based on landownership.'¹ As far as Gallia Comata is concerned, this has been reflected in a number of recent and important syntheses.² These enable us to appreciate that there, as much as anywhere, most people's horizons were bounded by the land, but a land which, where tamed (because again it must never be forgotten that at this time the cultivated areas were still islands in the northern Gallic sea of forest and marsh) was itself dominated, not by the agricultural village, but by the free-standing farmstead.³ This, as we have seen, had origins going back at least as far as the Iron-Age *aedificium*;⁴ however, in Roman dress – with rectangular rooms built of, or at least on, brick or dressed stone, at its best (but not always) roofed with tiles, decorated with painted plaster or even mosaics, and equipped with baths – it goes under the name of 'villa'.⁵ These structures are ubiquitous. They appear as the main centres for the working of the

produce of the earth, be it on the wheatfields of Picardy, or among the rocky promontories of the western coast (where, presumably, salt, fish, and fish products, were the main concerns of those who had them built).⁶ Thus, for the Three Gauls, 'rural studies' essentially means 'villa-studies'.

The Roman villa in the Three Gauls has, however, to be treated with some care since all who investigate the phenomenon still complain bitterly of difficulties arising from deficiencies in archaeological methodology and technique.⁷ However, despite the problems of the evidence scholars have tended generally to concentrate on three different, but related, areas of study: i) the main dwelling-house (*pars urbana*); ii) the villa-complex as a whole: the *pars urbana* and its working outbuildings (*pars rustica*, or *agraria*); and iii) the social and economic implications of the distribution of villas over a particular area.

The *pars urbana* is that part of the villa which, because it tends to contain visually the most attractive and dramatic finds, has traditionally attracted the most attention. Thus of the three aspects listed, it is this which has been studied most intensively for the longest time. A good deal of energy has been put into establishing some sort of typology.⁸ Opinions differ, but it seems to me that apart from the obvious exceptions, such as the 'palatial' villas (which will be discussed further below), the dwelling-houses of most villas fall into one of the following three categories, listed in ascending order of elaboration and size: i) the plain, rectangular farmhouse (which is the Romanised *aedificium*); ii) the rectangular farmhouse enhanced by the addition of a fronting corridor, additional rooms at the corners, back, and so on; and iii) the extended rectangular farmhouse, with further elaborations detaching themselves from the parent body and projecting themselves outwards in proper wings, usually to form some sort of enclosed court or quadrangle. Such a classification, of course, simplifies a very complex phenomenon, and needs to be modified by a number of important qualifications. For example, it must not be assumed that the three villa-types just described were three stages in a process of a sort of organic growth from smaller to larger establishments. Some villas certainly did expand along these lines (the classic case is Mayen (Figure 8.1), but there are other examples, such as Kaalheide-Krichelberg⁹), but elsewhere we find complexes which were obviously built from scratch at stages ii) or iii), while the unchanged *aedificium*, scattered among more complex establishments, is a long-recognised feature of the Gallo-Roman countryside throughout the High Empire. In addition, and particularly in the quieter and longer-settled areas, as is only to be expected, there appears a range

Figure 8.1: The Emergence of a Winged-corridor Villa (Mayen)




Source: Grenier (1), ii, Figures 265, 268.

of variants of the basic types.¹⁰ However, it may fairly be said that overall these divisions hold true; and, of course, they have long been used by archaeologists of the north-western provinces of the Empire (including Roman Britain as well as Roman Gaul), under the description of the 'simple' or the 'cottage' home, the 'winged-corridor' or 'galerie-façade à tours de l'angle' villa (in German, 'Portikusvilla mit Eckkrisaliten'), and the 'courtyard' villa. There is nothing mysterious about such plans, which can be explained by sheer commonsense. The *Pax Romana* gave people not only greater aspirations to the status and material comforts of increased Romanisation, but also something of the additional wealth with which to achieve this. However, except for the really rich, who could afford to call in skilled architects and craftsmen, most of those who wanted to improve their lifestyles would have had to do so within the limits prescribed by the capabilities of local skills and local materials. Scholars have rightly pointed to foreign, particularly Italian, influences at work in the evolution of the Gallic villa; and certainly what was introduced from outside was a strong yearning for architectural symmetry, but in the last analysis I feel that these must be seen as secondary in their importance.¹¹ The constraints of expense meant for most that the building of a villa was simply the development of the traditional rectangular theme: the courtyard villa is the *aedificium* writ large (Figures 8.1, 8.2).¹²

The investigation of the villa as a working economic unit, with the *pars rustica* being given as much, and possibly even more, attention as the *pars urbana*, is a relatively new development. As much as anything, this is because the subsidiary buildings were constructed of inferior materials, and so in general have survived the centuries far less successfully than the dwellings with which they were originally linked. The earliest archaeologists of Roman Gaul either missed them altogether, or ignored them as disappointing or uninteresting. Even now, however, there are still great problems involved in this type of research. For example, since the areas of excavation required are obviously much larger than those necessary for uncovering just the dwelling-house, there is a corresponding increase in the complications involved in actually getting at the soil to dig it, in the expense of the work, and in the amount of time needed to complete it and to prepare it for publication.¹³ Nevertheless, although for the reasons stated really comprehensively explored sites are rare, they do exist, and in recent years they have been added to and complemented by the results of some outstanding work by aerial photographers, above all by Agache, whose exploration of the Somme basin must count as the most important contribution to Gallo-Roman

Figure 8.2: Groundplan of a Winged-Corridor Villa with Developing Courtyards (Estrées-sur-Noye)



Source: Agache (4), 319.

studies of at least the last decade.¹⁴

The results of this activity are manifold. Above all, perhaps, it has brought home to us the very large areas covered by many villa-complexes, not exceptionally, but simply as a matter of course. Excavation at the Belgian villa of Anthée (Namur) had already produced evidence for the type of work which was accommodated in the *pars rustica* – not only that directly associated with agricultural activity, but also the quasi-industrial in that it involved, for example, the smelting and working of metals. This may best be regarded as the villa's doing its own smithying: the hitherto-accepted idea of a veritable factory producing enamelled ware has recently been shown to be without foundation.¹⁵ However, it is still possible that on some establishments, particularly those close to the appropriate raw materials, local manufacture was taken one stage further, to produce a surplus of finished goods, for example, metalwork or pottery, for distribution away from the home-estate.¹⁶

Such considerations lead inevitably to questions concerning the numbers of people which would be required to work such establishments. Unfortunately, direct archaeological evidence in this respect, such as the assured discovery, in good condition, of all of a villa's cemeteries, is not available, and recourse must be had to a large amount of indirect estimation. This involves, for example, calculations concerning the likely content and capacity of a villa's granaries, the area of land required to produce such an amount of cereal, and the hands needed to tend it.¹⁷ On these lines, most commentators have confidently assessed the numbers of people dependent upon the largest villas as running easily into the low hundreds.¹⁸ Further down the scale we find somewhat smaller estimates, and Wightman has reckoned that the workforce of the average farm was possibly no more than between fifteen to twenty hands, and probably somewhat smaller.¹⁹ Overall, however, we find ourselves dealing with not inconsiderable totals, and it has frequently been remarked that the dependants of many farms must have at least equalled in number the inhabitants of many of the smaller *vici*.²⁰ The further question as to where these people actually lived will receive attention below.

Most effort, however, has been expended in attempting to reconstruct just how the villa-complex worked – what it produced and, above all, how it was organised as a social and economic unit. In the latter respect, for example, scholars have pointed to possible indications of the emergence of a growing social gulf between masters and men. It has been remarked that, where it can be shown to have taken place, the

development of the main dwelling-house from simple cottage to winged-corridor villa and beyond may reflect the growing desire of the owner of the establishment to distance himself and his immediate family physically from his dependants, servants and even animals, with whom he had previously lived on terms of forced intimacy. This is, in fact, regarded as having been particularly the case when the so-called cottage was in fact more like a medieval 'hall'.²¹ In such circumstances the 'winged-corridor' would have brought a degree of privacy, while leaving the social focus of the building, the common hall, unaltered. However, examination of structures beyond the *pars urbana* seems to show the carrying of this divisive process even further. In a number of cases it appears that the inhabitants of the main house removed themselves from the working life of the villa entirely. This was now restricted to the *pars rustica*, and kept at a distance from the *pars urbana* by the building of a wall (sometimes blocking a previous point of access).²² In such a situation a smaller, and usually somewhat meaner, dwelling-house can appear in the *pars urbana* or, more commonly, in the *pars rustica*; this is usually interpreted as the home of a steward or, to give him a title borrowed from Italian practice, a *villicus*, into whose hands the day-to-day administration of the farm was now placed (Figure 8.2).²³

As far as the effort to reconstruct the humdrum details of villa-life is concerned, the best attempt is still probably that made at Müngersdorf, where, for example, a count of the available byres and stables allowed an estimate of the number of horses and cattle present on the farm (around twenty and thirty respectively).²⁴ Crops were clearly varied, but the overwhelming impression is one of a rural economy which strove to produce goods which possessed a ready market. Despite Domitian's edict discouraging the making of provincial wine, and before Probus' repealing of this legislation with respect to Gaul, Pannonia and Moesia, it is clear that under the High Empire the vintages of the Three Gauls were already an easily saleable commodity.²⁵ The cash-crop *par excellence*, however, was probably wheat, especially for sale to the army.²⁶ The need to bring in the ripened grain from the large wheatfields of the north-east as quickly as possible before the onset of winter apparently led to one of the Roman Empire's rare technological inventions and innovations, the Gallic harvesting-machine, the *vallus*.²⁷

Investigation of the relationship between the *pars urbana* and the *pars rustica* of a villa, and particularly a comparison between the main dwelling-house and that of the *villicus*, has occasionally led to the observation that the latter is peculiarly superior to the former or even, very rarely, that the former does not seem to have existed at all. This has

resulted in the formulation of hypotheses concerning the likely existence of semi- or even total absentee-landlords, working their estates through *vilici* and *coloni* (tenant-farmers), and brings us to the third major theme of villa-studies, the examination and interpretation of the distribution of villa-sites and other associated remains over a wider area.

Like the study of the single *pars urbana* and *pars rustica*, this line of research has drawn much of its strength from the realisation that the old-fashioned emphasis on the main dwelling-house neglected, and indeed destroyed, a major portion of the available evidence for the reconstruction of life in the Romano-Gallic countryside. For obvious reasons it also draws much on recent work in aerial photography. However, the difficulties involved are commensurate with the greater amount of ground to be covered, and it may with justification be said that studies of this type are probably still very much in their infancy.

However, some extremely interesting results and ideas are already emerging, that make this perhaps the most active area of thinking in the field of Gallic agricultural studies. Fundamentally, it is now becoming very evident that many more villa-sites exist than had originally been envisaged. It is well enough known that in the area of the Somme-basin Agache has found literally hundreds of new villas in a region where they had previously been considered to be relatively rare;²⁸ more recently, however, Leday's work in Berry has established ninety such sites, and this in an area where the previous standard inventory, that of Grenier, was able to locate only two.²⁹ Indeed, it may be said that the traditional interpretation of villa-distribution region by region has been shown to be insecurely based: therefore I shall not refer to it here.³⁰

In fact, such is the ever-increasing ubiquity of the villa that it is perhaps best to assume that villas are to be expected wherever land could support settled farming.³¹ Most variations in the density of villa-settlement, both from region to region and within individual regions, would therefore be the result of geological and climatological factors that positively inhibited agriculture.³² In such circumstances only good land entirely devoid of villas should require particular explanation, as will be touched upon below.

The increasing frequency with which villas are now coming to light, and the willingness to accept that these supported fairly sizeable numbers of human beings, suggest that the Gallic countryside was much more densely populated than has hitherto been allowed. This has been recognised for the pre-Conquest era; and an indication that there was in fact an appreciable rise in population under the High Empire may be derived from the observation that in this period there was increasing

encroachment upon marginal land, for example in the Eifel, and in Compiègne.³³ All this, of course, is relative; the absolute figures for the population of the Three Gauls are hotly disputed. Jullian's claim that, in the Roman period, the area now occupied by modern France contained hardly fewer inhabitants than it was to under Louis XIV (around 25,000,000) seems wildly over-generous today, when the current orthodoxy is to see the population of the Roman Empire as a whole as amounting to no more than fifty to sixty million.³⁴

Yet it should be remembered that the latter figure itself is now very old, deriving as it does from the researches of Beloch towards the end of the last century.³⁵ He arrived at it by totalling the likely populations of the individual provinces of the Empire, in the process suggesting *c.* 3,390,000 as the possible number of inhabitants of the Three Gauls at the time of Caesar's conquest.³⁶ His Gallic totals were, however, immediately criticised on the grounds that they were based on too old-fashioned and pessimistic a view of the level of development of the Three Provinces, and he was subsequently forced to raise his estimate to *c.* 4,500,000.³⁷ A close reading of the arguments upon which he founded even his revised estimate suggests to me, however, that he was still on very uncertain ground and, particularly, that instead of striving to produce figures for the Three Gauls which would stand up in their own right he was far more concerned to avoid results which would seriously embarrass the totals he had reached for the neighbouring and more developed regions of Narbonensis and especially northern Italy. In brief, he was working with a maximum average population density of some 14-15 persons per square kilometre, and was positively reluctant to see Comatan figures go beyond more than half this amount.³⁸ This is clearly very unsatisfactory, since it means that the Gallic sums were trimmed to force them to fit the wider picture, and hence have no independent validity. On the other hand — a point most seem to ignore — Beloch himself conceded that, as the *Pax Romana* continued, some parts of the Three Gauls probably maintained a significantly higher level of population than that which they experienced in medieval or even early modern times; and he even went so far as to suggest an early-fourth century figure of ten to twelve million.³⁹ All this, of course, puts great strain on the accepted grand total, and any arguments built upon it. One easy solution might be to raise all of Beloch's individual provincial totals in proportion to any accepted rise in the Gallic figures, thus producing a larger overall imperial population. However, this would be to strain the evidence too much in the other direction, and would itself not sit happily with other recent work, such as Brunt's

painstaking calculations which seem to provide broad confirmation of Beloch's north Italian figures.⁴⁰ Clearly the comfortable acceptance of fifty to sixty million is in need of careful revision. In such circumstances I feel justified in ignoring this constraint, which returns us to the task of calculating the likely population of the Three Gauls on purely local considerations. Somewhat later than Jullian, Grenier estimated the population of Caesar's 'Four' Gauls at c. 12,000,000 rising to 20-30,000,000, which would give corresponding figures of 10,700,000 and 17-26,750,000 for the Three Gauls.⁴¹ My own thinking, supposing, in view of the recent rural evidence, an initial average population-density of 15 persons per square kilometre (i.e. in line with Narbonensis and Italy), is to reduce this somewhat, and to envisage an initial figure of c. 8,000,000 growing to around c. 12,000,000. The reader must be warned that all this still involves a very considerable amount of guesswork, but at least it removes the impression of just a bare handful of millions of people which one is likely to get from the standard view.

Recognition of the higher density of villas may seem to undermine the notion, long established, and fundamental to the thesis argued in an earlier chapter, of the existence of a close relationship between villas, roads and market-centres, whereby the villa was fully integrated into an economic system in which it transported its surplus produce to a centre, sold it and with the proceeds paid its taxes and purchased those goods and services which it was unable to provide for itself.⁴² Quite simply, the more villas appear the less clear becomes the accepted pattern of their clustering along the main roads and around the townships. However, regional studies have made clear the invariable location of villas: grouped around cities and important *vici*, and relying much more on secondary and tertiary roads than on the main trunk roads which in the past have tended to claim attention for themselves.⁴³ The former should certainly now be accorded much more of a place in any assessment of the working of the system; and the integration model still stands.

However, the most publicised and possibly the most interesting facet of recent work on the implications of villa-distribution has been the urge to discover the underlying patterns of land-tenure, which at its heart involves the identification and investigation of the *fundus*, or 'estate'. This research is based essentially on a hypothesis derived from certain aspects of the historical record, in part already touched upon.⁴⁴ We have signs of some form of large-scale landowning among Caesar's Gallic nobility of the late Iron Age; and we have firm evidence for this practice in fourth- and fifth-century Roman Gaul. It is generally agreed

that the landlords of both periods exploited the labour of a, at least nominally, free population, not that of slaves.⁴⁵ It has therefore reasonably been claimed that between these chronological extremes we are entitled to expect a degree of continuity, which allows us to interpret certain features discernible in the archaeological record of the high imperial period. Thus, for example, we may distinguish between large, comfortable villas representing the country-homes of the great landlords, and numerous smaller, less luxurious installations which were dependent farms worked by bailiffs or, more commonly, tenant-farmers – *coloni*. It has indeed been surmised that the *coloni* were perhaps originally related to the great landowners, through the local kinship-grouping implied in the *pagus*, or 'clan', and may indeed have formerly enjoyed some sort of independent claim to work the family land.⁴⁶ Such traditions may have persisted for a while into post-Conquest Gaul, but would have ended in 27BC when the operation of the Roman census would have necessitated the registration of land strictly in terms of personal ownership, to the benefit of those who enjoyed Roman favour (and who possessed the necessary understanding of Roman ways) at the moment. The lesser dependants would therefore have effectively been dispossessed. As tenants they would have held their land under a lease formally renewable by both sides every few years but, given the conservative traditions of Gallic society, and the various debts which the rural poor were prone to fall into (e.g. borrowing to survive the effects of a bad harvest) which bound them to the local rich, they developed into a hereditary tied peasantry, thus early giving the word *colonus* the pejorative connotation which it was certainly to bear in legal documents of the early-fourth century. Villas managed by bailiffs could possess substantial residential quarters, implying the presence of the owners from time to time; sometimes, however, as we have seen, these are missing, which suggests more or less permanent absentee-landlordism.⁴⁷ On such bases the sudden elaboration of what was previously a mediocre villa has been seen as a sign of a great landowner deciding to change his permanent country residence, or at least spend much more time at one of his properties,⁴⁸ and the concentration of lesser installations around very large and well-equipped villas such as we find for certain at Chiragan and Montmaurin, and which seem to occur elsewhere, has also been interpreted in terms of 'seigneurial' patterns of landholding.⁴⁹

Efforts to define the boundaries of such hierarchically organised estates have drawn non-archaeological evidence into the picture. Toponymy, and in particular the study of modern place-names which could

originally have been the adjectival forms of Romanised personal names (Aurelius → Aureliacum (that which belongs to Aurelius, his estate) → Orly) has been used not only to suggest the existence of main villa-sites not yet proven, but also to attempt to name and reconstruct the actual shape of the estate. Thus it has been suggested that the local name for the group of parishes in which is sited the villa of Montmaurin — 'Nebouzan' — may be derived from an estate name of *Nepotianum* (derived from Nepos, Nepotius or some such). In this example help has also been sought from the modern parochial boundaries which, like so many other matters of ecclesiastical organisation in France, might well be derived from circumstances obtaining in Roman Gaul; the same features have been employed to determine the extent of the domain at Chiragan, which is not far from Montmaurin.⁵⁰

Among English-speaking scholars there has been even more of an attempt made to get behind the Roman façade of Gallic estate-management to guess at what may have lain behind in terms of Celtic traditions. Emphasis has been put on the reading back of certain elements of early-medieval Welsh (and hence Celtic) law into the Roman period in both Britain and Gaul. It is claimed that this allows us to postulate the existence of, and explain, not only the consolidated and socially-stratified *fundi* of the great landlords and their directly dependent bondmen-*coloni* (which continued unchanged from the pre- into the post-Conquest era by absorbing into Roman legal practice the original Celtic tradition later known to the Welsh as *Tir Cyfrif* or *Tref Gyfrif*) but also areas of generally poorer farms belonging to men who were nominally free but who, thanks to the operation of partible inheritance under an earlier form of *Tir Gwelyawg*, saw their patrimony constantly shrinking as a result of the constant division of land among a growing kinship-group.⁵¹ A recent study has additionally suggested that further evidence for joint ownership and working of land may be available in the ground-plans of a number of apparently orthodox, and sometimes very large, villas in Britain and the northern part of the Three Gauls, which would mean in fact that traditional forms of land-occupancy based on the extended family were stronger and more prevalent in the northern rural landscape than has previously been supposed, at least under the High Empire before personal landowning became predominant.⁵²

Such ideas are undoubtedly interesting and are to be applauded for the way in which they have injected a dose of imagination and dynamism into the treatment of material which, of its nature, can all too often prove inert and lifeless. The debate over the estate has certainly produced

some of the most lively thinking on Roman Gaul of recent years. However, it is clear that much work still remains to be done before any definite and universally-acceptable set of conclusions can emerge. The archaeological evidence by itself has not suggested any particular social pattern. Rather, it has served to test the validity of hypotheses essentially inspired by other sorts of information.⁵³ It may be argued that at the moment much of what is happening in tenure-studies amounts simply to the postulation of certain historical conditions (for example, the continuity of the great landowners, and the likelihood that the right by which anyone held land in the northern provinces was accommodated within rather than changed by Roman law) and the conviction that these can be demonstrated in the archaeological data. This is quite legitimate and, as we have seen, it produces a very lively picture — figures do indeed begin to move in the Romano-Gallic landscape. However, it must always be borne in mind that there is a reverse process, and that if the archaeological information does not entirely support the ideas involved then these ideas need to be changed.

It seems to me indeed that there is at least one serious problem involved in the search for the great estates of the Three Gauls under the Early Empire, and their dependent, depressed and subservient *coloni*. This is, quite simply (and in fact, as Wightman has already noted in respect of the late Iron Age and even the High Roman periods) that apart from a few exceptional sites such dependants are really rather difficult to discover in the archaeological record.⁵⁴ It used to be thought, for example, that the rather weary and woebegone features of certain 'rural' individuals found depicted on a number of north-eastern Gallic funeral reliefs belonged to members of an increasingly depressed class of tenant-farmers; this is no longer quite so certain.⁵⁵ On the contrary, estimates of the areas of land worked from the smaller villas regularly produce farms of some 100 ha/250 acres — hardly subsistence plots even allowing for fallow and unworkable land.⁵⁶ The men who managed enterprises of this kind may not have been fabulously wealthy, but they must surely have been persons of some standing in their communities. Indeed, in this respect it is to be remarked that any picture of an extreme polarisation of wealth in High Roman Gaul must be put in question by the undoubted existence of medium-sized villas, with relatively well appointed dwelling-houses, which it is impossible to fit into a general scheme of great landlords and their downtrodden petty tenants without resorting to a wide range of additional categories such as 'small landowners', 'rich tenants', 'important bailiffs', and so on, to be distinguished from each other only by such questionable criteria as

the presence and extent of painted wall-plaster or mosaics in their homes.⁵⁷ If such thinking is to be allowed, then it might be equally pertinent to observe that most villas belong to the same architectural family of the 'elaborated rectangle'.⁵⁸ Taken together, there is little sense of a yawning divide, little feeling that one part of the villa-dwelling community had drawn ahead socially and economically to leave the rest impossibly behind. Curiously enough, investigation of the great 'palatial' villas, already touched upon above, serves to strengthen rather than to weaken this impression. There is no doubt that some exceptionally appointed and designed country establishments, although they still retained an agricultural function, deserve the label 'palace'.

The most obvious examples are once again Chiragan and Montmaurin in the south, and the very unusual final phase of the residential quarters at St Ulrich in Treveran territory which, like those of the other two, were clearly influenced by Mediterranean rather than Gallic architectural styles.⁵⁹ Elsewhere, however, it seems to me that the terms 'palatial' and 'luxury' have been applied far too liberally and without the application of any clear criteria, so that they have become virtually meaningless.⁶⁰ It is significant that de Boë, while stressing the extent, complexity and richness of the residential area of the villa recently excavated at Haccourt (Liège, Belgium), and in fact classing it among the largest and most lavishly equipped of such establishments ever found in northern Gaul, nevertheless emphasised the point that the 'luxury' was strictly confined to the main public rooms, and that the Haccourt-style house was not unique in Gaul, being in the same league as, say, Anthée or Nennig or, further afield, Zofingen and Seeb.⁶¹ The largest known villa among the Bituriges, at Le Champ-des-Pois, seems to be of much the same design, and indeed rather simpler in its facilities.⁶² Thus the really striking establishments are rare, and may be explained as the result of outside influences: it has long been thought that, at least in its third stage, Chiragan was the residence of an imperial official; and given the high concentration of senior civil and military personnel in the Rhineland and its vicinity, any unusual structure among the Treveri always has to be treated with caution.⁶³

What we are left with is not a thin scattering of 'stately homes' and a wider distribution of simple farms, which would be easy to explain through the existence of massively powerful and demanding Gallo-Roman landowners, but rather a much more general distribution of what, to borrow McKay's term, may perhaps more graphically, if anachronistically, be described as 'luxurious manor-houses', headed by

establishments such as Nennig and Haccourt, but taking in a wide variety of other establishments before stopping at their bottom-end just before the plain, unadorned farmhouse. In fact, as many commentators have observed, what is most striking about all the standard villas is their homogeneity not only in basic plan, but also, as it were, in their social function. From the largest to the smallest – from Haccourt, sitting on its low ridge and deliberately displaying the splendour of its best range to the valley of the Meuse beneath, to the little Rhineland farms with their winged-corridors tacked on to a much simpler design of dwelling-house – the impression given is one of comfortable wealth and Romanisation, and the desire to express that Romanisation through the medium of architecture.⁶⁴ Houses at each end of the scale were different in size, but reflected very similar social and economic attitudes and aspirations. Once more, all this produces the impression of a much more even distribution of wealth, and even, at the lower end of the scale, the tenants appear once again as people of some substance, not to be confused, as all too often is the case, with the real rural poor who actually worked the fields.⁶⁵

There is no easy explanation for this phenomenon. Grenier, who was one of the first to notice it, maintained that it reflected the break-up of the great pre-Conquest estates as the Roman peace got under way, as the result of the investment of town-based commercial wealth in land.⁶⁶ Wightman has briefly countered this by arguing for ways in which the old pattern of land-holding could have been hidden, but was not destroyed, by the apparent fragmentation of the large landholdings (effected for the more convenient working of the soil).⁶⁷ Nevertheless, in certain areas, especially in Agache's Somme-region, where middle- and upper-range standard villas, with their owners apparently generally in permanent residence, are thick on the ground, even she has to admit the existence of a large class of prosperous 'owner-occupiers', and therefore to postulate the presence of significantly larger numbers of minor aristocrats among the Ambiani (in contrast with, say, the area around Chiragan and Montmaurin).⁶⁸ At this stage of the discussion it becomes apparent that we must be prepared to accept a much greater degree of complexity in the arrangement of rural affairs in the Three Gauls than is to be won simply by taking the implications of the Caesarian account as they stand. As we have already seen, thinking derived from the concept of *Tir Gwelyawg* has already served to add variety to our ideas; and it has long been recognised that the persistence of the hall-villa, especially in the north-east and the Rhineland, suggests the existence of another form of independent family-based holding, co-existing with

the great landlords and their tenants.⁶⁹ For ultimately, of course, the existence of a class of great landowners must be conceded, since only by this can we explain the operation of certain important aspects of Gallo-Roman society, touched upon above;⁷⁰ and, as we shall see immediately below, there is some independent evidence to confirm this view.

However, before leaving the subject it might be useful to suggest a rather different approach to the problem of the rarity of the really impressive palaces. At the beginning of this work Caesar was accepted as a fairly reliable observer of the Gallic scene.⁷¹ However, it may be argued that in respect of the great Gallic noble and his dependants scholars have failed to make sufficient allowance for the propagandistic nature of the *Commentaries*. As Caesar describes the situation, the pressure of events in the Three Gauls at the time of the Roman intervention was causing lesser folk to flee for protection to great men, who thereby, thanks to the growing numbers of their supporters, exercised an increasingly strong extra-constitutional power in their own communities and so began to dream of *civitas*, or even pan-Gallic, autocracy.⁷² Rome, represented by Caesar, was instrumental in breaking the ambitions of such dynasts, and in restoring national oligarchies, made up of aristocrats who had a certain number of dependants, but not so many as to terrorise their fellows with the power of the mob; so the continuity of the aristocratic tradition was assured. However, it could perhaps be argued that all this should be seen not as an objective anthropological analysis of an alien society but rather as a deliberate caricature of the contemporary political situation in Rome itself, where Caesar's opponents (quite correctly, as events were to prove) were actually pointing to him as the next warlord who, backed by his clients and his troops, would attempt to overturn the Republic. What better ploy on his part than to act the 'senatorial' role in the Three Provinces in order both to justify and to conceal the aggrandisement of his own personal power? In brief, how much credence should we give to Caesar's analysis; possibly Gallic society was less polarised than he would have us believe? The survival of such fairer ways into the Roman era would also suggest that those Gallic leaders who came out on top after the turmoil of the Conquest and the establishment of the Principate, though undoubtedly rich and powerful, were perhaps less eager to do down their fellows than modern scholars (with events like the 'Highland clearances' of the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries in mind) have imagined.⁷³ The notion of the survival, and subsequent regeneration, of a class of lesser landowners

has important implications for the explanation of the appearance and ubiquity of the medium-size villa, and will be discussed further in the following chapter.⁷⁴

A further weakness of tenure-studies seems to me to be a certain vagueness in the very concept of the 'estate' or the 'domain'. In some instances this has led to the application of the term to describe only the built-up area of a villa, with no reference at all to the land actually being worked.⁷⁵ Less annoying, but in its own way just as misleading, is the limiting of the use of the word to describe the acreage of just one farm, without consideration of how this may have fitted into a larger unit.⁷⁶ However, even when used properly, for example in referring to the complex of establishments and enterprises around and including the great villa at Chiragan, it still has its problems, for it must be remembered that the acceptance and the understanding of the existence of a single estate and its operation is only the first step in coming to understand patterns of land-tenure in the Three Gauls.

It is virtually undeniable that the possessions of the really rich would not have been confined to just one property. However, we have no real idea as to how the bundles of estates which would have made up the entirety of their landed fortunes were composed or even managed, and thus we are deprived of an important means of understanding the political and economic power-bases of the Gallic landowners. For example, without this information we cannot really tell how many rich families there were in each *civitas*, or how their estates were distributed — whether scattered evenly throughout, or concentrated region by region. For the same reasons we also know nothing about the pattern of landholding outside a family's native community. Italian practice, and Gallic practice under the later Empire, would suggest that the possession of a variety of estates over a very wide area was normal;⁷⁷ however, as yet we have no firm evidence for the Three Gauls under the Early Empire on this matter other than inscriptions which show rich Gauls possessing citizenship, and acting as benefactors, in more than one *civitas*.⁷⁸ Quite apart from these considerations, it is likely, as we have already seen, that at least some important estates would have come under the ownership of emigré Gauls, or non-Gauls, or even effectively institutional landlords such as the emperor, or the local authorities, for example by the testamentary endowment of a temple or a bath-building (all of which again does not sit easily next to the concept of straightforward continuity).⁷⁹

Fortunately, however, it remains plausible to equate most High Roman villa-owners with Gallic aristocrats, and so confirm something

of their place as the heirs of Caesar's chieftains and the ancestors of the great Gallic nobles of the fourth and fifth centuries; yet the proof is obstinately non-archaeological in the strictest sense, being overwhelmingly epigraphical in form. The main evidence consists of those rare inscriptions found actually associated with villa-sites which seem to connect the owners of these establishments with the local magistrates who ran the *civitas*.⁸⁰ These may then be related to other inscriptional information which shows that such local magistrates had to be very rich in order to sustain their responsibilities. We may presume that the same were the immensely wealthy Gauls shown by literary sources to have been much talked about at Rome.⁸¹ (Two further stray literary references possibly help to confirm this picture, namely Tacitus' observation that both Sacrovir in 21 and Sabinus in 70 fled to hide in villas after military defeat⁸² — perhaps these were their own.) Since land was the great source of wealth we must presume that the richer these Gauls were the more land they must have owned, and therefore the more villas they must have possessed. In the end, therefore, the great land-owners re-emerge, but with relatively little help from the archaeology, and the search for the domain. Indeed, the uncomfortable lack of alignment between the archaeological and historical evidence already touched upon remains something of an embarrassment.

Yet it would be wrong to leave the subject of villa-distribution on so negative a note. Quite clearly, within certain areas straightforward patterns do emerge, considerably adding to our knowledge and understanding of the feel of the Gallic countryside, and hence the operation of Gallic society and the Gallic economy, in the period under discussion. There was a difference between the agriculture of the Rhineland, with its areas of almost identical small and simple villas, set out at regular and frequent intervals (and hence suggestive of the division of state-land among army veterans) and that of the *civitas* of the Bituriges in central Gaul, where villas were much less uniform, and life as a whole seems to have been far less regimented.⁸³ On the other hand, one cannot but feel excited at the development of the Somme basin, as revealed in Agache's photographs. Here, during the second century, the land seems to have been subjected to an extraordinarily high degree of exploitation by the regular implantation of large and up-to-date farmsteads belonging to people eager to produce and sell cereals and wool in large quantities — presumably to the army.⁸⁴


In addition, the inclination to look further afield in the Gallic countryside has ensured that an important aspect of rural life apart from the villa *per se* has of late been receiving its fair share of attention. Consideration of the *aedificium* and the villa encourages us, rightly, to think

of the bulk of the working population of the Three Gauls as being dispersed throughout the countryside. However, human beings have always required regular centres of resort and congregation in order to exchange goods, to worship and generally to indulge in social intercourse. Also, perhaps equally as important, given the still fundamentally undeveloped (in the modern sense of the word) nature of the Gallo-Roman agricultural economy, there would almost certainly have been a need for places which could act as reservoirs of manpower. For, in a situation where most work was seasonal, one may suppose villa-owners and villa-managers to have been unwilling, and indeed probably unable to maintain throughout a full year the size of workforce that was required at certain critical times, such as during the short, but hectic, harvests of northern Europe.⁸⁵ This surplus had, in a sense, to be stored somewhere until it was needed, and so we may justifiably look away from the villas in an attempt to discover where such people were settled.⁸⁶ One may also surmise that while for some of them such seasonal work was probably no more than an added bonus, for most it was their only livelihood, and that it was such unfortunates, eking out a precarious existence at the beck and call of landowners of any size or status, who were the real oppressed of the Three Gauls, and not the *coloni* who invariably attract modern sympathies. All of the requirements listed, both social and economic, could certainly have been filled by the towns and cities already discussed. In addition, however, it now seems that there were independent centres of what may loosely be called entertainment and habitation set deep in the countryside.

Certainly the most archaeologically impressive of such sites are the sanctuaries or centres of pilgrimage, which are being found in the open countryside in large and ever-increasing numbers.⁸⁷ At their most advanced, in the west and north of the Three Gauls, at such sites as Sanxay, Champieu and, most recently, Ribemont-sur-Ancre, they consist of the ancient Celtic sacred enclosure (the *nemeton*) now housing the typical concentric Celtic temple (consisting of *cella* and ambulatory) richly built and decorated in the Roman fashion; beyond this is a complex of buildings including a residence for the temple-priest, baths-buildings, a theatre, and buildings and open spaces – veritable *fora* – to accommodate visitors (Figure 8.3).⁸⁸ There is a tendency for these to be sited by, but not directly on, main roads as they approach the borders of a *civitas*.⁸⁹ Such a peripheral location would be instrumental in providing the immediate neighbourhood with religious, social and even commercial amenities which might otherwise be lacking.⁹⁰

Indeed, according to a recent theory, while some such 'rural-theatre'

Figure 8.3: Groundplan of a Conciliabulum (Ribemont-sur-Ancre)



Source: Agache (4), 405.

sites might indeed have been primarily religious in origin, others should be seen as having been founded (or re-founded) deliberately as places where urban-style amenities might be enjoyed by the rural populace, thanks to the generosity of local notables, as attested by inscriptions.⁹¹ In other words, less attention should be directed to the temple than to the forum, of which the former formed but part, as in the town-centres. According to Picard, who borrows the term from Italian usage (though arguing reasonably for its appropriateness by reference to known pre-Conquest practices of the Gauls), such complexes may therefore be termed (for the sake of modern convenience) not sanctuaries, but *conciliabula*.⁹² The odd shortage of information to link even the largest of these to any particular divinity (quite different, for example, from the evidence we have for the worship at the known spa-*vici*, such as Grand and Nérès-les-Bains) would seem to support this argument. A less ambitious variant of the *conciliabulum* (perhaps to serve a smaller area), might be seen in complexes which closely resemble the preceding, except that they lack a theatre.⁹³ If true, this deliberate planting of 'towns in country' certainly sheds a new light on life in the Gallic countryside, as well as on the attitudes of the local aristocrats who seem to have made it possible. Once again we see the application of wealth, and local patriotism. The point also springs to mind, in view of the ideas expressed above, that such generosity would make much more sense if it had as its first concern the well-being and the edification of sturdy and prosperous local villa-owners and tenants as opposed to, say, that of a down-trodden peasantry.

Scattered between these great rural agglomerations, whatever their function, appear lesser religious sites in the shape of the isolated shrine or *fanum*, consisting once again of the Celtic temple within its enclosure, but this time being part of no grander complex. As humble centres of worship, very likely at places of age-old religious significance, they would have served a useful purpose in bringing together a scattered congregation on appointed holy days: in his study of Berry Leday has pointed to the possible significance of their occurrence in some very isolated areas, away from the main agricultural zones and possibly connected with the production of wood and iron.⁹⁴ In the more closely settled regions, however, it is possible that what now appear as isolated chapels were, in fact, closely associated with villas, or else with independent hamlets (*loci*) inhabited by poor peasants.⁹⁵ It is this latter aspect, of course, which brings us back to the hypothesis, already postulated, of the existence of an important rural population which was tied to the villa-economy but which did not actually live on villas.

Given the generally poor quality of the archaeological evidence, due to the fact that such people were rarely wealthy enough to leave behind remains of any great size or magnificence, the study of their way of life seems likely to be beset by many frustrating difficulties.⁹⁶ However, certain general observations may be made. First of all, we must be careful to distinguish between the purely rural hamlets on the one hand, and on the other those connected with the great sanctuaries, some of which seem to have attracted a permanent population.⁹⁷ The economic life of the latter would have less resembled that of the former than that of the roadside *vici*, in that the people concerned, although they might well have turned to agricultural work as and when the need arose, had an alternative and completely different means of earning a living — catering to visitors to the shrines.⁹⁸ Secondly, although the existence of these purely rural settlements was at first perhaps more a matter of theory than of proof, the growing realisation of their potential importance has stimulated scholars to reassess old information and to be on the alert for such settlements in the course of new investigations. Thus, gradually, a much fuller picture is emerging. We can now point, for example, with some degree of assurance to the existence of agricultural hamlets in the proximity of the villas at Anthée, Vellereille-le-Brayeux and Le Champs-des-Pois.⁹⁹ The same line of thought has also suggested the presence of fairly primitive independent hamlets on the fringes of good villa-country, for example in the Auvergne, the Vosges and the Eifel — almost as if the villa-managers were maximising the use of their land by banishing the surplus population to the less fertile areas, to keep themselves alive as best they might until called for.¹⁰⁰ As Agache has remarked, we should perhaps be on the look-out for a more obvious mixture of villas, simple farms, and hamlets in mediocre villa-country, where such considerations would not have weighed so heavily.¹⁰¹ Admittedly, in total the number of specific sites is at the moment still small, but it does give hope that more will come to light.

However, as should by now be clear, it is true that it was the villa which remained the overwhelmingly important element in the Gallo-Roman countryside; and, however much scholars argue the details, the villa, and even more, its architectural growth and elaboration, are, just as much as those of the town, sure indications of the increase in wealth and the growing desire for material comfort which were part and parcel of the Romanisation of the Three Gauls under the early Empire. Such a rise in wealth must of itself also betray a corresponding increase in the productivity and profitability of Gallic agriculture, and therefore its

positive reaction to the challenge of new markets, both civil and military. Following the troubles of the third century Crisis, the villa proved itself to be a more securely-based and resilient institution than the Romano-Gallic town.¹⁰²

Notes

1. Hopkins (1), 75.
2. Agache (1) – (4); Wightman (3); Percival (2); Leday (2); Walker (1) (all of whom, however, clearly owe much to the work of Grenier, esp. (2), *passim*.)
3. Cf. above 8.
4. See above 11.
5. Wightman (3), 624; cf. Agache (2), *passim*.
6. Percival (2), 73.
7. Chevallier (1), 452f; Hinz (2), 15; Leday (2), 137 (with a very sad, but fascinating story).
8. E.g. Agache (2), *passim* (used extensively by Leday (2), 166f).
9. Braat, 55f.
10. So Leday (2), 153f.
11. See Swoboda, *passim*.
12. Grenier (1), ii.806; cf. Swoboda, 92, with the remarks of Boëthius and Ward-Perkins, 359: 'the courtyard villa may be regarded simply as a corridor-villa writ large'.
13. Cf. the remarks of de Boë (4), 47: in an area which has been archaeologically relatively well treated for over a century the old excavation at Anthée is still unsurpassed in its comprehensiveness.
14. See especially Agache (1), (3) and (4) for his own syntheses of his work.
15. Spitaels, *passim*.
16. Percival (2), 161; Spitaels, 225.
17. Probably the best available cemetery evidence comes from Müngersdorf – but this is sadly incomplete: Grenier (1), ii.818; Percival (2), 164f.
18. Grenier (1), ii.842, 853.
19. Grenier (1), ii.842f; Leday (2), 199f; Wightman (1), 156f (whose figures, allowing for dependent relatives, seem to tally with those of Hinz (3), 64).
20. E.g. Leday (2), 200.
21. See Hinz (2), 19 and references; and, for general discussion, Percival (2), 134f.
22. Agache (3), 681; Leday (2), 159f.
23. Agache (3), 680f; Leday (2), 181.
24. Grenier (1), ii.818; cf. Percival (2), 164f.
25. Cf. above 73, Aurelius Victor, 37.3; Eutropius, 9.17.2; Etienne (1), 101f; Clippers (1), *passim*. There is evidence, however, that the vine was late in arriving in some areas – see Leday (2), 201.
26. Cf. Wightman (1), 188 (discussing Müngersdorf); likewise Hinz (3), 62; Baatz (3), 103; Müller-Wille, 32f; Agache (2), 47 (also arguing for the importance of wool-production in the north).
27. White, (1) and (2); Legros.
28. Agache (1), 179; cf. Grenier (1), ii.869.
29. Leday (2), 141f; cf. Grenier (1), ii.858f.
30. Cf. Percival (2), 75.
31. See the remarks of Kolling, 88, in this respect with regard to the region around Schwarzenacker.

32. So Leday (2), 145f (esp. 151).
33. Leday (2), 36; Wightman (1), 161; Harmand J., 226. Cf. Strabo, 4.1.2.
34. Jullian, ii.8; cf. Finley, 30f, Hopkins (2), 120.
35. Beloch (1) – especially 502.
36. Beloch (1), 460.
37. Beloch (2), *passim*; cf. Grenier (3), 452f.
38. See Beloch (2), 426f.
39. Beloch (2), 444f.
40. Brunt (2), 12f.
41. Grenier (3), 447f (the Comatan figures are my own, obtained by calculating Grenier's population figures into Beloch's provincial areas).
42. Cf. Percival (2), 13, 36.
43. Agache (2), 46; Leday (2), 35, 194f, 201; note also the suggestion of Etienne (1), 336, that the minor tributaries of the Garonne were important as a means of transport for the local villas.
44. For the following see especially Wightman (3), 592f, and (7), *passim*. See, however, Hawkes for the long pedigree of this line of thinking.
45. Cf. von Petrikovits, 122; Etienne (1), 150; Wightman (7), 98. Even Agache, who earlier strongly championed the notion that his Picardy villas were slave-worked – (2) 38, 48 – now seems to have changed his mind – (4), 361.
46. See Percival (2), 119f.
47. Above 167f.
48. Wightman (3), 638 (with regard to the Fliessem villa).
49. Percival (2), 123f.
50. For all this see Grenier (1), ii.914f; Wightman (3), 642f; Percival (2), 31f, 124; Leday (2), 143f; Walker (3), 317f. Cf., however, Duval (2), 222f, on the problems of this type of exercise.
51. The seminal work is Stevens, (1) and (3). See also Percival (2), 139f; Wightman (3), 596f.
52. Smith, *passim*.
53. See Stevens (3), 108; Percival (2), 19f.
54. Wightman (3), 595, 602, 604; (7), 110; cf. Grenier (3), 402f.
55. Drinkwater (6), *passim*.
56. Grenier (1), ii.931; von Petrikovits, 109; Hinz (3), 64; Chevallier (1), 470; Wightman (1) 154, (3) 699, (7) 105.
57. Wightman (3), 637f, 645.
58. Cf. Percival (2), 40f, and Agache (4), 283f.
59. Lutz, (1) and (2) – esp. (1) 29f.
60. This can be traced back to Swoboda's *Luxusvillen* in Belgica and the Germanies (Swoboda, 85). Even McKay fails to explain the distinction between 'palace', 'luxury villa' and 'manor-house'.
61. de Boë (3), 45f.
62. Leday (2), 174.
63. Grenier (1), ii.833f, 864f.
64. de Boë (3), 39; cf. Swoboda, 97f, 109f etc.
65. So Grenier (3), 538 (seeing the *coloni* as 'paysans qui cultivent ces domaines'); cf. Wightman (7), 103, where the rural poor are described as 'base clients', the victims of hereditary tenure (rather oddly by contrast with Wightman (1), 645, where the *coloni* are referred to as the 'good class' of tenants).
66. Grenier (1), ii.932f; cf. Walker (3), 322f.
67. Wightman (7), 106.
68. Wightman (3), 651; (7), 106; cf. Agache (3), 681.
69. Percival (2), 134; Smith, 170.
70. Above 110.

71. Above 10.
72. E.g. *BG* 1.4, 1.18, 3.22, 8.32, etc.
73. Cf. Smith, 172 (though cf. below, chapter 9, n.63). For the clearances, see Prebble, *passim*.
74. See below 200.
75. E.g. McKay, 165, 174.
76. E.g. (rather oddly in view of the general excellence of the report as a whole) Lutz (1), 18f (envisaging a domain of no more than c. 200 ha. around one of the most luxurious villas of the Three Gauls).
77. Grenier (1), ii.897f; Wightman (7), 107.
78. *CIL* xiii 2669 = *ILS* 7046 = Espérandieu 1962; *CIL* xiii 2873 = *ILS* 4682, 2878; *CIL* xiii 5110. (Cf. Jullian, iv.555.)
79. Cf. below 193; above 84; *CIL* xiii 3162 (Sollemnis).
80. E.g. *CIL* xiii 1632 (Marclopt – cf. Vallat, 183f); *CIL* xiii 4030 (Mersch – cf. Wightman (1), 629; *BRGK* 1925/26, 116f, nos. 306/7 (Ravensbosch – cf. Hinz (1), 48).
81. Drinkwater (5), *passim* (with Duncan-Jones (2), *passim*).
82. Tacitus, *Annales* 3.46, *Historiae* 4.67 (with Wightman (3) 622, (7) 105).
83. Cf. above 67, 164n10.
84. Agache (3), 659f, 674f, 691 (with Agache (4), chapter 6).
85. Hopkins (1), 86.
86. Wightman (1), 156f.
87. Grenier (1), iv.477, knew of 760 in 1920, and many more have come to light since then.
88. Grenier (1), iv.553f, (1) iii.407f, (1) iii.860f, (1) iv.333f, etc; Ribemont, *passim*.
89. Leday (2), 389 (from Niccolini, 265f).
90. Picard (3), 47; Niccolini, 265f.
91. E.g. *CIL* xiii 11151 = *ILS* 9361. See Picard, (1) – (3), *passim*.
92. For an appraisal of this usage, cautious but in the end positive, see Niccolini, 259.
93. Leday (2), 391, 400f.
94. Leday (2), 405f.
95. Leday (2), 387 (cf. Lutz, 61f); 404. Also Agache, (3) 702, (4) 398.
96. See the remarks of Agache, (1) 186f, (3) 694f and 701.
97. See Niccolini, 265, for Sanxay, Barzon, Vandeuves, Chassenon; and Agache (3), 675f, 699f, for settlement at Champlicu, Vendeuil-Caply, Ribemont etc.
98. See Percival (2), 129, for the likely relationship between the *vicus* at St Révérien (Nièvre) and a nearby villa.
99. Percival (2), 129; Leday (2), 196f.
100. Principally Grenier (1), ii.735f, 742f, since followed by Wightman, (3) 646, (7) 105; Agache, (2) 50, (3) 694, 701; Percival (2), 128.
101. Agache (3), 702.
102. Percival (2), 100f; cf. below 212, 216.

In this chapter I offer an interpretation of the condition of Romano-Gallic society as it had developed by the turn of the second and third centuries. Such a presentation is fraught with difficulties, hence caution must be exercised in respect of any conclusions which result from it. However, I believe that the effort should be made, if we are to understand the working of the Three Provinces as a whole.

Attention has been directed to evidence for the growth in the material wealth of the Three Gauls under Roman rule, and this must again be emphasised. The new level of prosperity enjoyed by the Three Provinces is reflected not just in the appearance in the Gallic landscape of Mediterranean-influenced roads, towns, cities, farms and sanctuaries – the sites which we visit and excavate today – but also in the mass of smaller and more personal objects – articles of toilet, jewellery, keys, toys, tools, utensils, furniture, and soon – to be seen in modern French, German and Belgian museums. Since we have the excellent syntheses of Duval and Ternes, it is unnecessary here to enter into a description of ‘everyday life in Roman Gaul’.¹ However, one point, which is difficult to quantify and therefore difficult to present scientifically (in the sense of being able to offer the information in the form of graphs or scales) but which is so obvious that it may easily be missed, should be made. This is that the visitor to all such museums must immediately be struck by the difference, both in quantity and quality, between the articles on display as he moves from the prehistoric to the historic, from the pre-Roman to the Roman galleries. In the latter is always a greater volume of goods, which are generally better made and better finished than their predecessors (if not always as aesthetically pleasing). The most striking impression is perhaps that of the greater availability of metals – especially iron and bronze. The great collection of bronze objects to be found in the Gallo-Roman rooms of the Musée des Antiquités nationales at Saint Germain-en-Laye, just outside Paris, is possibly in the end somewhat oppressive in its size and in the massiveness and uniformity of design of the items on show, especially in comparison with the delicate Celtic-style metalwork of the previous age; but it possesses an undeniable air of solid wealth and well-being. Such affluence was not confined to the rich or to the town-dwellers: there are clear signs of a substantial increase in prosperity even among the

inhabitants of the outlying rural hamlets of the Vosges.²

In similar vein, I do not want at this stage to become involved in any sort of attempt to present a detailed examination of the Gallic economy, which in fact would be bound to turn into the usual list of what the Three Gauls probably produced, and what they bought and sold abroad – cereals, livestock, wood, wine, oil, fish-products, pottery, textiles, metals and metal-products, stone, and so on.³ Much more to the point, I believe, is again the overall impression, to be won from individual studies which have investigated these activities in detail, of the new impetus given at this time to man's manipulation of his environment within the Three Provinces. Raw materials were being worked, shipped and processed into tradeable items on a scale never before witnessed in the region. The cutting and transportation of the stone used in such prodigious quantities in the new buildings of both town and country must have been a major industry in itself, and one which, as Duval has remarked, would be sufficient by itself to explain the prosperity and importance of the *nautae*.⁴ However, stone was of course not the only Gallic commodity traded; the possibility of the river-sailors' carrying government-purchased supplies to the northern armies has already been mentioned, and there can be no doubt that they were also heavily involved in the movement of one of the best-known (to modern students) of Gallic products, the fine-quality red-glazed pottery known as 'samian' ware.⁵ This, at least, deserves closer attention.⁶

The main centre of manufacture of this type of pottery moved from Italy (in fact from an area to the south-west of Florence) to Lugdunum about 10 BC. Some thirty years later it was transferred to the region now known as La Graufesenque, in the *civitas* of the Ruteni. Here it remained for a century or so (until c. 110) until it was taken to the area around Ledosus (Lezoux) in the *civitas* of the Arverni. From about the end of the second century it was to be found in eastern Gaul, where there were various production-sites. There was, however, a marked concentration of this industry between the Mosel and the Rhine, especially at Trier and Tabernae (Rheinzabern). These movements, and the changes in fabric and style which they generated, have been much studied by archaeologists. Indeed, samian has become an extensive field of research in its own right since its susceptibility to fairly exact dating provides an invaluable means of setting associated archaeological discoveries in a precise chronological context. More than this, because this pottery was so plentiful, and is highly resistant to total destruction, if we accept it as a freely and commonly traded commodity it gives us a

very convenient means of tracing the main strength and currents of trade in Gaul and beyond in circumstances where most other objects of commerce have long since perished.

Again, as far as the samian industry is concerned, the impression must be one of pulsing vitality. At their height, each of the main centres of production satisfied the demands of a considerable home-market, and exported its products far beyond Gaul, mainly to the western provinces, and particularly to Britain. It has been reckoned that the annual output at both La Graufesenque and Lezoux must be numbered in millions of vessels. Considerations of weight, volume and fragility would certainly have made an efficient transportation-system a necessity in the success of this trade. The *nautae*, with their expertise in both river- and road-traffic, and, no doubt, with their contacts with marine-shippers, may perhaps be seen as the essential middlemen, standing between the producers (as far as can be seen, small-scale master-potters, employing free workmen and possibly some slaves) and the retailers. And where stone, grain and pottery went, other goods would surely have followed.

Indeed, it seems likely that at some stage in the late-second or early-third century the western taste for samian pottery (which had over the years suffered an undeniable degeneration in form and decoration) was overtaken by a new preference for glassware, and this too began to be produced and traded on a large scale, presumably again with the help of the *nautae*. The centre of the industry was Köln.⁷ Here today the modern Landesmuseum presents an impressive display of the material prosperity of the high imperial period: its cabinets of Roman glassware are renowned. The economy of the Roman Rhineland has received particular attention, and, as elsewhere in Gaul, is a story of the exploitation of local resources, the manufacture of goods (traded extensively in the west and over the imperial frontier into free Germany), and the importation of a wide range of outside products.⁸ The river-port of Köln, situated between the magnificent recently-excavated riverside *Praetorium*, or 'Government House' of the Lower German province, and a busy commercially-dominated island in the Rhine, was the nodal point of all this activity, and was in this respect second in Gaul only to the *Canabae*, the commercial suburb which grew up on the island at the confluence of the Rhöne and the Saône, below the colony and the imperial cult-centre at Lugdunum (Figure 5.1).⁹

Of course, it must be conceded that by present-day standards this wealth was but a thin veneer overlying the basic poverty of a pre-industrial economy. There was to be no agricultural or industrial

revolution; most people in this world would have lived dangerously close to starvation.¹⁰ However, it was still a very significant change relative to what had obtained before: Rome nurtured the seeds of growth already apparent in pre-Conquest Gallia Comata, to the material benefit of most of the Gallic population. In the eyes of contemporaries Gaul (including, of course, Narbonensis) was a rich land.¹¹

I have in earlier chapters touched upon the question as to when the Three Gauls settled down to enjoy the fruits of Romanisation; now is the occasion to review the evidence as a whole. A secure chronology for the development of the Three Provinces is still lacking in Gallo-Roman studies. The one we have has to be treated with care, because it depends heavily on old, and hence unsatisfactory, archaeological techniques, and because it places too much emphasis on rather unsophisticated criteria, such as the presence or absence of brick bonding-courses in the fabric of walls.¹² However, as far as urban growth is concerned there seems to be general agreement that there was a massive leap forward at the turn of the first and second centuries (to be explained by the opportunities offered by Flavian forbearance, Hadrianic encouragement of the well-being of the provinces, and the Antonine peace). About a century later, under the Severan dynasty, there was a similar period of activity (an interesting phenomenon, to which I will return in more detail in the following chapter).¹³ In most cases the buildings of these two periods form the latest of the Roman levels, since they were destroyed, and not subsequently replaced, in the third-century Crisis (again to be examined in the following chapter); hence they are the easiest to detect. Earlier activity is more difficult to establish, for obvious reasons, and recourse must first be had to epigraphical information.¹⁴ As is only to be expected, given his clear interest in Gallic affairs, there certainly seems to have been a major advance under Claudius, demonstrated, for example, by the rebuilding in stone of the theatre at Feurs.¹⁵ Moreover, this very act of replacement suggests that here, and elsewhere in Gaul generally, there were already in existence substantial urban buildings, certainly as early as Tiberius, and perhaps going back even as far as the reign of Augustus. Again in this respect we are fortunate in having corroboratory epigraphical evidence. There is the Tiberian dedication on the arch and bridge built by C. Julius Rufus at Saintes, not to mention the evidence for the same man's generosity in providing money for the amphitheatre at Condate;¹⁶ and a well-cut inscription at Trier mentioning Augustus' two ill-fated heirs-designate, Gaius and Lucius Caesar, which could have been set up only between 3 BC and AD 2, has long been seen as indicating the presence there of

some large monumental structure, possibly a temple or an arch.¹⁷ It is very likely that the private bequest which provided Bordeaux with a piped water-supply also belonged to the pre-Claudian period, although this is not completely certain.¹⁸ Archaeology does, however, have a role to play here. Although the picture is not wholly clear some considerable structures of the early imperial, that is, Julio-Claudian, period have been detected, for example, at Alesia, Avenches, Köln and St Bertrand-de-Comminges, and similar buildings have been strongly suspected at Paris and Trier.¹⁹ In relatively recent years the theatre and amphitheatre at Autun have been re-assigned to the first part of the first century (which ties in somewhat better with the traditional dating for similar buildings at a number of major Gallo-Roman cities, for example Evreux, Cahors and Poitiers, although in this latter group the criteria employed are not always the most reliable).²⁰

What seems to have happened is what in fact commonsense would suggest: once the country began to settle down early Gallic aristocrats put their spare money into expensive urban building-projects, which became even grander as time went on, because through these they were able most quickly and most dramatically to demonstrate both their own wealth and their own high level of Romanisation.²¹ As I have earlier suggested, *aemulatio* had first to be demonstrated in an urban context, especially in the cities.²² One would suspect that the first call of the city upon surplus wealth tended to retard its being spent in the countryside, and this seems to be confirmed by the archaeological picture, as far as it can be pieced together. Generally speaking, in the Three Gauls the Romanisation of the native farm-house, which was to produce the Roman villa, did not really come about until as late as the middle of the first century, and the villa as an institution did not fully bloom until the middle of the second century.²³ By the turn of the second and third centuries, however, it may be said that spending on cities and villas was probably much more even, with a growth in grandeur and comfort on both sides.²⁴ (It is also at about this time that the really palatial villas seem to come into their own, although, as I suggested in the previous chapter, it is difficult to fit these within the overall pattern of villa-development.²⁵) It has been claimed that the great age of the rural sanctuary and the *conciliabulum* was also probably the late-Antonine or Severan period, although the origins of many of these went back to pre-Conquest times, and their sites were continually occupied and developed on Roman lines from the earliest imperial period.²⁶ It has even been argued, in the case of one major Belgic site, that its already impressive first-century monumental aspect and layout deeply

influenced the still-nascent local villa-architecture.²⁷ The notion that Roman-style building methods spread from the city to the country through the agency of an intermediary is an interesting one, and would fit in with my earlier remarks concerning the importance of *aemulatio*, since we may envisage the building of sanctuaries and *conciliabula* as being supported by local aristocrats just as much as they supported the development of their cities. However, much more work will be needed to settle the question one way or the other.

In the case of the *vici* we should probably allow for a slightly less straightforward situation. On the one hand, since the townships were ideally placed to exploit the new commercial currents which were circulating through the Three Gauls, and indeed, as I have argued, were in many cases actually created by them, we should expect to find signs of very early development and growth, certainly contemporary with, and perhaps even at times ahead of, that of the cities. This in fact seems to be borne out by the archaeological evidence, which reveals precocity as being a general feature of most Gallic *vici*. Thus Les Bolards (Côte-d'Or) goes back to the first century BC, and St Marcel to the reign of Augustus, as do Heerlen and Liberchies;²⁸ Schwarzenacker, which survived directly from the pre-Conquest era, seems to have begun to take on a Roman appearance in the early imperial period.²⁹ Some did very well indeed: St Marcel blossomed early in no uncertain manner, spreading out quickly from the original *oppidum*-site to equip itself with great urban structures such as a theatre and amphitheatre, baths, temples and the like;³⁰ its Biturigan neighbours, Nérès and Châteaumeillant, also prospered early.³¹ This was, however, an unusual case since, as we have already seen, the Bituriges may at this stage have lacked a clearly-defined *civitas*-capital.³² The early prominence of these three centres is a nice indication of the way in which resources would have been spread in the Three Gauls without the concentrating effect of a single national city; and, of course, when Bourges eventually revived to play this part the others fell behind. This indeed brings us to the other side of the question, for probably elsewhere most *vici* suffered from the competition of the *civitas*-capitals. Like the villas, they emerged healthy and strong during the first century, but remained fairly simple in appearance, coming into their own only in the following century, as they began to copy their larger sisters.³³ A number, as *pagus*-capitals, in the same way and for the same reasons as the *conciliabula*, may well have then benefited from the spilling over of aristocratic *aemulatio* from the cities to the rest of the *civitates* as the wealthy strove to advertise and confirm their local ties.³⁴ As with everything

else, however, all clearly benefited from the general peace and prosperity of the second century.³⁵

What were the specific effects of the increase in material wealth upon the inhabitants of the Three Gauls? The bulk of our evidence, of course, has to do with those at the top of the social ladder and here, as I have already argued, I feel that the modern historian should be rather more sensitive to the possibility of change, as opposed to continuity, than has recently been fashionable. I earlier suggested that Caesar's invasion and the Roman civil wars which followed brought into existence what amounted to a new ruling-class in the Three Gauls, namely the 'Julii', the young, adventurous and ambitious leaders of irregular auxiliary units, and their descendants, who occur in the historical record immediately after the Conquest and persist as powerful local leaders in Gallic affairs at least down to the disturbances of 68-70.³⁶ Their success is obvious: they provided the first Altar-priests, and built the first great urban buildings, both in their home-*civitates* and at Condate; and they proceeded to become Roman senators and governors. In the course of their flirtation with Civilis it was the Julii who took the Three Provinces to the brink of total insurrection against Rome, and it was they who pulled back from the edge. From this time the Julii virtually vanish from the historical scene. I believe, while admitting that the evidence is open to a number of interpretations, that this is not just an historiographical accident, the result of our losing the remaining books of Tacitus' *Histories*. We find the same phenomenon reflected in the epigraphic record, in the host of non-Julianic names of Altar-priests and Altar-officials, which occur from the late-first into the third century. Again, as I have already argued, this disappearance should certainly not be laid at the door of Flavian persecution. Its causes must be sought more generally in the workings of the Gallic mind and of Gallic society.

I would propose that, despite the apparent splendour and permanence of their position as reflected in the early literary and epigraphical records, the Julii as a class were far less secure than has previously been thought. They were a very new aristocracy, born of the pressures of both German and Roman interference in the affairs of the Gallic *civitates*, and certainly until 27 BC, and maybe even as late as 12 BC, their continuing obligation to serve in the armies of Rome, and thus face death or mutilation as well as the more agreeable prospects of rewards and honour, would have reduced their capability to consolidate their gains. When they came upon more settled times, the fact that they could almost immediately command great wealth and influence is a clear measure of the extent to which the Julii had been able to enrich

themselves while fighting for Roman generals. However, the same wealth and power were themselves highly corrosive. For example they allowed, even demanded, a high level of education to be given to the children of the Gallic aristocracy, which was provided at such centres as Autun. Yet this might lead to new ambitions which could take whole families away from Gaul to the opportunities, and the dangers, of Rome itself (witness the oratorical careers of the Julii Africani, probably of Santonian stock). Even for those who stayed at home, however, life could not have been simple. The same prominence and prosperity made them prey to the suspicion and greed of emperors and their officials, and, even without this, the nagging demands of *aemulatio* would have tempted them to undertake lavish expenditure, not only on buildings and the like but possibly also on helping Rome fight her German wars. If they then found themselves living beyond their means, unrest, revolt and imperial retribution might follow, and more Julii would leave the Gallic scene. In fact the emergence of the Gallic 'Claudii' in the middle years of the first century must surely be seen as a significant indication of the gaps which had already opened up in the ranks of the older aristocracy and the way in which they were being filled.³⁷ Whatever the origins of the newcomers (which will be discussed below) they were presumably from a sector of the population which had not benefited from having given important military support to Republican warlords and which had struggled along so far without the benefit of Roman citizenship, but which was now beginning to assert itself. Hence they also posed something of a challenge to the surviving Julii.

I believe that the suppression of the *Imperium Galliarum* in 70 caused the already weakened position of the Julii to crumble. Although we can dismiss the notion of comprehensive and indiscriminate vengeance there can be no doubt that there was particular retribution against the leaders of the revolt and their closest followers, which would have served to undermine the position of individual families (in a situation where, it must be remembered, the earlier fall of Vindex, and Vitellian persecution of his followers, would have already served to unsettle the condition of Gallic aristocratic society). There can be no doubt too that certain *civitates* suffered particularly badly, especially the Treveri, where the Julii had always been strong.³⁸ Therefore there would have been even more opportunity for local non-Julianic leaders to break through. Additionally, I suggest, the prestige and self-esteem of the surviving Julii were hard hit by changes in Roman military thinking, already touched upon above.³⁹

In the Caesarian tradition (which also had strong links with pre-Roman practice) Gallic aristocrats had been able to raise and command their own forces, not by virtue of any Roman post or rank, but simply through the exploitation of their local standing and prestige: they were still warrior-chiefs in a warrior-society, and indeed this sort of undertaking was probably necessary not just to increase but also to sustain their local status. At some stage this stopped; I have suggested either 27 BC or 12 BC as the most likely dates for this development. Throughout most of the Three Gauls, and in particular in Aquitania and Lugdunensis, the old national regiments disappeared, to be replaced by composite units comprising men from a number of *civitates*, which were under much more direct Roman control. The older tradition continued in parts of Belgica and the German military zone, but it was restricted to peoples with whom Rome had a special relationship and whose warlike qualities it was thought wasteful to adulterate, such as the Batavi and the Treveri (and even in the case of the latter the privilege was very limited).

However, the warrior-tradition was not killed overnight. The Gallic composite units still consisted of Gallic troops and Gallic officers, the latter appointed perhaps after some sort of military apprenticeship on the staff of the regular Roman army. Therefore, although the system was not quite as straightforward as before, there was still a chance for a leading Gaul to be put in command of fighting men. It was also important that this could be done relatively close to home, since there seems to have been a marked reluctance on the part of men of all ranks from Lugdunensis and Aquitania to go far from their native *civitates*. In the early imperial period there was a concentration of Gallic auxiliary units on the Rhine. We may perhaps see this whole situation as a means of accommodating national leaders whose traditions required them to take an active interest in war, but who as yet were unwilling fully to accept the existence of the Roman Empire and Gaul's subjection to it, and therefore to undertake an ordinary career in the impersonal imperial institution which was the Roman army. Thanks to the continuation of some form of local recruitment and local service the Gallic leaders might convince themselves that they were the allies more than the subjects of Rome, with personal ties to the Julian house. This, however, was but an intermediary stage, in which influential Gauls could be weaned away from their former attitudes and directed towards new ways of thinking, and we must assume that the latter were already having an effect. As we have seen, we may assume that Vindex saw some sort of service away from Gaul in his pursuit of a senatorial career;

and on a lesser scale, around the middle of the first century we find a Helvetian, a Cadurcan and possibly a Petrocorian being persuaded to accept more orthodox equestrian and legionary posts on the Rhine and even on the Danube. On the other hand, the continuing warrior-tradition, however attenuated its form, explains how easily aristocratic Gauls could raise the local militias if they put their minds to it, to produce forces which by now had lost their cutting edge and which could have borne little resemblance to the great national hordes of the Caesarian era, but which could still give Romans, with their instinctive tendency to recall the *terror Gallicus*, a very nasty shock.

This brings us back to the year 70. Events since the original revolt against Nero had plainly by then demonstrated an unhealthy willingness and ability to interfere in imperial affairs on the part of Gallic auxiliary commanders and by those Gallic aristocrats able to levy the militia. I would suggest that to Roman eyes it seemed too easy for hotheads in the Three Gauls to cause trouble simply by playing on their positions as Gauls, with little real consideration for the well-being of the Empire. Therefore the military system was changed again, with the disbanding of many of the former Gallic auxiliary regiments, the introduction of Italians and other outsiders as commanders of all such units in Gaul and the Germanies, and the insistence that such postings formed part of a regular equestrian career. Basically, the Gallic aristocrats were faced with a choice – to continue to participate in military matters, but to do so on purely Roman terms, which might take them far from Gaul, or to forego the privilege. Most seem to have taken the second option, for henceforward Gallic auxiliary prefects, and indeed Gallic equestrians as a whole, are difficult to find in the historical record.

There is the possibility that the early-second century saw some attempt to relax the rules, to allow Gallic *civitas*-leaders to indulge in some form of more local military service, but this does not seem to have been taken up. I would argue that most of this would in fact have had little effect on the new non-military aristocracy which was already coming forward to replace the Julii: they had no earlier tradition of service to look back to, and they shared what seems to have been a general Gallic reluctance to pursue imperial careers beyond Gaul. In fact the new situation probably suited them. However, it is possible that for the surviving Julii the collapse of the last vestiges of the warrior-tradition, together with the utter ruination of the dynasty with which they had been so intimately associated, dealt a hard blow to their pride and self-esteem, since their power and status had been founded on personal military service to the Julian line. An embarrassment to themselves

and the Empire, they disappeared – but how? It is not impossible, given the general difficulties experienced by aristocratic families in securing a direct line of descent, that they died out physically. In addition, in view of the known fluidity of Gallic name-forms, there is the possibility that the 'Julius' element was discarded like an out-of-date title (which is many ways it probably was). In fact we do have a case of an official of the federal Altar, the grandson of C. Julius (Pacatianus?), and the son of Tiberius Julius Pacatianus, who called himself Tiberius Sulpicius . . .⁴⁰ The family lived on, but the old label was dropped.

Therefore some Julii may have survived; many, however, had certainly perished, and thus we return to the question of who replaced them. The lack of literary sources, and the obviously increasing material wealth of the Three Gauls under the High Empire, make it necessary to give first place to the epigraphic and archaeological evidence in any attempt to find an answer to this problem; and any study of the epigraphy and archaeology of this period is bound to produce one single overriding impression of life in the Three Gauls, namely, as touched on earlier, the very significant presence of commercial and industrial activity, and hence of a prosperous, confident, and self-aware artisanal and trading class.⁴¹ This is demonstrated in the great number of tombstones of wholesalers, retailers, artisans, workers in various service-industries, and minor professional people to be found in cities and townships throughout the Three Provinces. Especially important concentrations are present at Arlon, Autun, Bordeaux, Bourges, Dijon, Paris, Reims, St Ambroix, Sens, Soulosse and Trier.⁴² These memorials often show, or else are closely associated in style with others that show, the deceased and their spouses staring out into the world well dressed, well fed and unafraid. The wife usually holds a 'kerchief' (*mappa*) or phial of perfume; the husband carries a purse bulging with coins, or a stout, lockable, strong-box. The most remarkable aspect of all this is not that the sorts of jobs that these people did were being done; as we have already seen, there must have been native artisans and traders in pre-Conquest Gaul. The point is rather that those who did them were now in a position to be able and to want to advertise themselves, and their contentment with the solid rewards of hard work and effort, in a way which previously had not been possible. The most striking monuments of this type are to be found in Treveran territory, at Igel, Neumagen, and, most recently, in the vicinity of Arlon, and seem to commemorate great wholesalers in woollen cloth and wine.⁴³ One interesting detail to be found on many such memorials which deserves particular mention is the marked insistence on methods of transportation, not only of goods, but also, in

the shape of light passenger-traps, for people: those who could afford to erect such structures had become 'carriage-folk' and wanted the world to know it. (Such representations also, of course, hint at a busy traffic along the roads of the Three Gauls.)

Yet, to judge from the epigraphical record, without doubt the greatest trading city of High Roman Gaul was not Trier, but Lugdunum.⁴⁴ It possessed its own local craftsmen and merchants who banded together either in two specialised trade-associations, the *utricularii* (lightermen) and the *vinarii* (vintners), or else in three catch-all groupings – for builders, rag-men and timber-dealers. These, unlike medieval guilds, were designed more to promote personal comfort and well-being than the quantity or quality of production and trade, and could therefore afford to be broad-minded about whom they took in. They therefore accommodated a host of non-resident *negotiatores* in oil, pottery, food-stuffs and the like. Dominating the whole commercial scene were, however, the great river-shippers, the *nautae*, of the Rhône and the Saône. Not just sailors, but important traders in their own right, the *nautae* should be seen as the cream of the *negotiatores*. As *nautae* they were probably responsible not to the local magistrates at Lyon, but to the imperial governor; they entered local trade-associations, but probably to give themselves a place in local life.

The business activity of Lyon is even more emphasised by the strong presence there of freedmen *seviri Augustales*.⁴⁵ It is well enough known that traditionally commercial and industrial activity did not rank highly in the estimation of the highest level of the Roman landowning aristocracy – the senatorial class. When members of this class did deign to participate in such ventures they tended to do so in an indirect manner, through the agency of their own slaves or, more particularly, their own freedmen. This gave the latter valuable experience which, together with financial backing from their former owners, enabled many of them eventually to set up in business on their own account. They won the reputation of being shrewd entrepreneurs; however, due to the prejudices of the time the taint of servility prevented them from taking on the privileges and responsibilities of local office, and so from entering into the game of *aemulatio*, which contributed so much to the dynamism of Greco-Roman society. Augustus hit on a way of tapping this private wealth for the public good by allowing such people (at the discretion of the decurions of the communities in which they lived) to become members of six-man committees responsible for the local running of the imperial cult – the *seviri Augustales*. The most notorious *sevir* is, of course, the fictional Trimalchio, a character in Petronius'

Satyricon, written in the middle years of the first century. Trimalchio made an immense fortune from trade, which he then invested in vast estates in Italy and Sicily. He became a *sevir*, and was so proud of the post that he made sure before his death, that this, together with other boastful biographical information, was inscribed on his tomb.⁴⁶

As far as the Three Gauls are concerned, the evidence we have points to the relative rarity of *seviri Augustales*; and it is important to note that where these officials do occur they are not always ex-slaves. In fact the post carried such status that it could respectably be held by the rich free-born, which occurred, perhaps, in cases where insufficient *liberti* were available to take on the post or, equally likely, where individuals were, for reasons of their own, unwilling or unable to take on a full local magisterial career.⁴⁷ However, orthodox *seviri* are to be found among the Ausci, Aedui, Bituriges, Helvetii and Mediomatrici, and at Köln and Mainz, and especially at Lugdunum.⁴⁸ Here, in a very Trimalchionic way we find them as traders, wholesalers, *nautae*, and the patrons of *nautae*.⁴⁹ Once more there is an undeniable sense of economic vitality and material success leading to public munificence and coupled, naturally, with quite remarkable social mobility. Indeed we discover a virtual freedmen-dynasty in the shape of the ex-slave and *sevir*, M. Antonius Sacer, his two male slaves, Polytimus and Candidus, whom he freed and who in their turn became *seviri*, and his slave-girl, Tyche, whom he freed and married.⁵⁰

It is clear that the peak of this Gallic commercial activity occurred in the second and early-third centuries. However, from this vantage-point it is possible to look back to the first century and to the galvanisation of the Gallic economy by the 'complementary flow of taxes and trade' and by a rising population, to locate the beginnings of this movement at least as early as the reign of Tiberius, whom we find honoured by *negotiatores* based in a township of the Mediomatrici, by the butchers association of the Petrocorii, and by the *nautae Parisiaci*.⁵¹ In such circumstances one very tempting solution to the question of who replaced the Julii is bound to suggest itself: what we have just seen formed part of a great evolving rhythm in the society of the Three Gauls which slowly but surely drove the traders to the top of the Gallic tree. Indeed, if one is inclined to argue in this direction it is not difficult to squeeze more corroborative evidence from the epigraphical record, to find powerful Gallic aristocrats (specifically, officials of the federal Altar) who were willing to be patrons of the *nautae*, and so apparently were not ill at ease at being seen in company with freedmen-*seviri* acting in an identical capacity.⁵² More than this, we have the very interesting

case of a Treveran decurion, C. Apronius Raptor, who was not only patron of the Lugdunum vintners-association, and of the Saône-shippers, but also a practising *negotiator vinarius* and *nauta Araricus* in his own right. (He probably died at Lugdunum, far from his native *civitas*.) His period of activity, in the late-Flavian/Trajanic period also fits in neatly with the turn of the century disappearance of the Julii, and the great expansion of Gallic urbanism already discussed.⁵³ Again, the traders seem to be taking over. Indeed, the French historiographical tradition is adamant in its assertion of this hypothesis, even to the point of seeing in it an explanation for the second-century dominance in Gaul of the medium- to small-size villa, which, it is argued, resulted from the break-up of earlier large estates as commercial wealth was poured into land.⁵⁴

The temptation to accept such a solution is very great, yet I feel that it must be rejected, at least in the way in which it is normally presented. We must be very careful not to generalise from the case of the Treveri. As a nation these people suffered unusually for their involvement with the *Imperium Galliarum*, particularly the established decuri- ons. This dislocation of local power and administration would have necessitated the emergence of new *civitas*-leaders to take charge of the situation. These probably included lesser landowners, but also perhaps important traders, making the most of the opportunities for commerce and industry which the position and the prosperity of the land offered, but which had been relatively neglected by those who had formerly controlled it. Indeed, it has been noted that from the late-first century there was a virtual explosion of business-activity among the Treveri. Citizens of this *civitas* are found scattered through the western Empire at all levels of commercial enterprise.⁵⁵ However, conditions are likely to have been quite different elsewhere. Care must be exercised in equating the commercial classes and the governing aristocracies of all the *civitates*. The direct linking of a decurion and a *negotiator*, which we find in the case of Apronius Raptor, is a rarity. As far as I am aware there is no other evidence of a *civitas*-magistrate identifying himself as a businessman, or *vice versa*. Indeed, even among the Treveri the most impressive of the commercial funeral monuments announce simply that the deceased were *negotiatores*, making no mention of local careers (except for the predictable *sevirate*).⁵⁶

This in fact brings us to what I have already proposed as the likely explanation for the general division between traders and magistrates, namely a sizeable difference in resources between the two, with the advantage lying on the side of the latter.⁵⁷ This is reflected in micro-cosm in the community of concept and design between the largest and

the smallest commercial memorials and the great difference between these and those expensive tombs which may be assigned to the non-trading aristocracy.⁵⁸ It is also, and perhaps best of all, seen in the enormous expenditure expected of municipal and federal officials in the carrying out of their duties, which could only be sustained by the sort of wealth which, as I have already suggested, in this society was to be won from land-ownership, not trade alone.⁵⁹

Against the background of such qualifications it is pertinent once again to draw attention to the fact that movement among the aristocracy of the Three Gauls begins very early, before the great upsets of 68-70, and before the rise of the traders had managed to get fully under way. The Claudii, for example, emerged to take municipal and military positions, and to become *civitas*-benefactors at the middle of the century; and even before these we find firm evidence for non-citizens prominent in their *civitates*.⁶⁰ Also, alongside the Claudii we must also consider other Gauls enfranchised at the same time, or shortly afterwards, who did not bear the Julian name but who are not easy to pin down because they chose not to take the Claudian name either.⁶¹ I would argue that what we have here are the descendants of indigenous land-owning aristocratic families which had survived the Conquest but who, unlike the Julii, had missed the first wave of opportunities to enrich themselves under Roman rule, now beginning to push forward as the Julii began to buckle under the strains already described.⁶² Indeed, perhaps we see here yet another aspect of the basic instability of the social position of the Julii. One may speculate that the need to recruit cavalry-forces, and a Roman willingness to give full credence to the Caesarian version of Gallic society, had caused Rome to give too much wealth and power to too few people at the start of her rule in the Three Gauls: Gallic society was far from equal economically, but was not usually as polarised as this. Inevitably there had to be a readjustment, and as the Julii weakened the social pyramid settled down more firmly on a much broader base.⁶³ The medium to small-size villas, emerging, it should be noted, in the middle of the first century, would therefore indeed have developed out of the break-up of the larger estates, but this would not have been the result of a flood of new, commercial wealth into the countryside but rather the reassertion of an older landholding pattern.⁶⁴

As I have earlier suggested, we have to think of individual farms as being still in some way constituent elements of larger holdings, since it is only on this basis that we can account for the high levels of personal expenditure expected of *civitas*-magistrates. However,

the overall size of these holdings could have been smaller than under the Julii (it is perhaps significant that the really extravagant spending in the Three Gauls comes early in their history⁶⁵) and the farm units which comprised them may have been held on a much slacker rein than has been usually accepted, being worked by well-to-do farmers — prosperous, respected gentry in their own right — responsible to, but most miserably dependent upon, the great landlords. (The exact nature of the relationship between the former and the latter, whether based on Celtic or Roman traditions and laws, must at this stage remain a mystery.⁶⁶)

Of course the leading landowners and the traders must have been aware of each other's existence. Above all, the two groups would have been forced into close proximity with each other at Lyon, where the traders seem virtually to have taken over the colony, and whither the great Gallic landlords resorted for their annual gathering at the Condate Altar.⁶⁷ At such times the *nautae* in particular would have had the opportunity to acquire the services of powerful *civitas*-patrons and protectors, necessary to ensure the smooth running of their far-flung business-enterprises;⁶⁸ it is hardly surprising that they seem to have preferred the most worldly of the Gallic aristocrats, the officials of the Altar, who, as I have observed above, were in this respect not afraid to consort with ex-slaves, and who were no doubt aware that some of the free *seviri*, *nautae* and *negotiatores* were of high, even equestrian, rank.⁶⁹ At this stage we can again only speculate, but I would be prepared to guess, given the common human desire for wealth on the one hand and status on the other, that such relationships would have opened the way to serious intercourse between the landowning and the trading classes. Thus the former would have involved themselves, albeit indirectly, in the activities of the latter, while the latter, through the obtaining of land by purchase or marriage, drifted across to join the lower ranks of the former, eventually putting their business-life behind them in the best Trimalchionic tradition, and so leaving room for new *negotiatores* to come forward in their turn. The possibility of obtaining sound, medium-sized properties may have helped in this movement.⁷⁰

To return to the subject of funeral monuments, there is, as Hatt has observed, an odd stylistic relationship between the commercial 'pillar' monuments of the north-east and the rural 'piles' of Aquitania; perhaps in these we do have an indication of some sort of fusion, which would fit in well with Etienne's constant emphasis on the '*aristocratie marchande*' and the '*aristocratie de propriétaires négociants en vin*' of the Bordeaux region.⁷¹ But to the last I would emphasise that this develop-

ment followed the displacement of the Julii by smaller indigenous land-owners; the traders alone could not have managed this.

Thus in my view the sort of aristocracy which prevailed in the Three Gauls from the late-first to the early-third centuries, the attested period of Gallic prosperity, was not a relatively small group of great 'barons' running massive consolidated estates from magnificent palaces but rather one in which wealth and power were more broadly spread, and indeed one in which (although here the present rather patchy state of archaeological evidence may well deceive us) apart from generous expenditure at *civitas*- and *Altar*-level, such concentrations of resources as did exist tended to be somewhat oddly veiled: the rarity of great city-houses and of truly palatial villas in the Three Gauls still prevents us from saying exactly where and how a man like T. Sennius Sollemnis would have lived.⁷² This peculiar reluctance to show themselves, along with a native inclination not to wander too far from Gaul and continuing Roman prejudices spawned by the *terror Gallicus*, may explain the well-known scarcity of men from the Three Gauls in equestrian and senatorial posts under the High Empire. However, we must not allow this absence to persuade us that the Gallic aristocrats were dully inward-looking. There were still leading Gauls who possessed the necessary initiative to spend some time away, as long as they did not get too involved in imperial affairs and they could return home fairly quickly to *civitas* affairs.⁷³ There was also an inclination among such men to involve themselves with powerful imperial patrons (which was indeed necessary for the good of their local communities in a world where a word in a highly-placed ear could speed the working of the somewhat ponderous machine of government). Such connections could and did at times, and especially it would seem in the early third century, cause the involvement of Gallic leaders in quite heady political matters.⁷⁴ It is a great pity that the details of these relationships are lost to us. Most of all, however, we should not be tempted to write off the possibility of Gallo-Roman careers entirely. We have at least one piece of evidence which shows an *Altar*-priest fathering a son who entered at least the first stage of a senatorial career:⁷⁵ whatever the difficulties, in best Roman fashion the traditional route to orthodox promotion within the imperial hierarchy still lay open. At the end the impression remains that although the foreground is dominated by the activity of the artisans and the traders, and even those who worked the small- and medium-size villas, in the background are tantalising glimpses of some really powerful figures, whose day was yet to dawn.

Given the nature of our evidence, the lives of people lower down the

social ladder are much less accessible to historical scrutiny. They are at their most elusive in the case of the mass of the population, the rural poor, who do not usually figure in inscriptions or reliefs, and who made previous little impact on the archaeological record. Here, as indicated in earlier chapters, I have followed prevailing views in assuming a large, nominally free, labour-force, living either on the villas themselves, or in the roadside *vici*, or in rural hamlets. Given the conditions of the age one must suppose that these people eked out existences which by modern standards must have been materially deprived, and that they were dependent for their very livelihoods on those who managed the land. On the other hand, as we have seen in respect of the Vosges hamlets, even such people could not have remained unaffected by the general rise in Gallic prosperity, and they must also have benefited to some degree from the new opportunities for work, trade and relaxation offered by the amenities available in the *vici* and the *conciliabula*. One particular point which may be worth considering in this context is that, in view of the apparent ubiquity of the villas, and the attention lavished by national leaders on *civitas*- and *pagus*-activities, it is probable that at their prime the Three Gauls presented a picture of a well tended and a well ordered land, in which case any instance of social disruption would come as even more of a shock. (This will be further examined in the following chapter.)

In the case of the ordinary people in the cities and the townships our information is much better. As we have already seen, the artisans and merchants seem to have done very well out of the Roman peace, and for many the opportunity to make a decent living away from the land would certainly have offered a route to a better life and to social advancement. The urban communities, and the trading-network which connected them, would indeed have offered quite humble people the chance to travel and to join with others of different backgrounds for purposes of mutual material and spiritual comfort, and so help to weaken *civitas*-ties. The inscriptional record in fact provides quite dramatic evidence for the pace and volume of migration within Gaul. Bordeaux, for example, accommodated men and women from the Ambiani, Auleri, Bellovaci, Bituriges Vivisci, Coriosolites, Lemovices, Mediomatrici, Nervii, Parisii, Remi, Ruteni, and Sequani, not to mention the ubiquitous Treveri and traders from the rest of the Empire, both easterners and westerners. The same phenomenon is observable at other major centres.⁷⁶ In smaller places there is even a hint that the local community and the main industry practised there came close to being a single independent socio-economic unit, separate from the

surrounding area — as for example at Nantes, where an inscription hints at very close relations between the *vicani* and the *nautae Ligerici*.⁷⁷ The impression is again one of great activity, with the cities and the townships as lively, cosmopolitan places, with personalities and interests of their own, and less susceptible to aristocratic control than their ancestors, the *oppida* and *vici* of the Independence-period.

On the other hand we should not exaggerate the liberating power of urban life; it is impossible that the Gallo-Romans could have said, in the medieval manner, that 'town-air makes free'. As was earlier argued, the cities and the townships remained relatively small in population, and, what is more, they continued under the control of *civitas*-magistrates whose main interests lay elsewhere. It is unlikely that there developed a sturdy class of burghers ready to defend their municipal freedoms.⁷⁸ Indeed, we may guess that within all such settlements effective control was wielded first by the inter-*civitas negotiatores* who bought and sold in bulk the goods from which the lesser artisans and traders made their living, and above all by the great *civitas*-landowners whose control of national affairs probably prevented even the *negotiatores* from laying claim to political power. In this respect, perhaps the best evidence comes from a pair of Sequanian inscriptions which reveal the exaggerated flattery with which the associations of iron-workers and stonemasons of Dijon and the (presumably) surrounding *pagus* named Andomus treated the prospect of the departure and the return of their patron, Tiberius Flavius Vetus, at a date somewhere at the end of the second or the beginning of the third century.⁷⁹ This man may have been a powerful *negotiator*, but my feeling is that he is better seen as an important landowner, involved in the exploitation of the mineral resources of his properties.⁸⁰ Overall, it is unlikely that the leading Gallic aristocrats would have had to face in their home-*civitates* the same level of commercial power which they found in Lugdunum. For these reasons I cannot follow Jullian in envisaging the deliberate encouragement of trade-associations by the Roman emperors as a means of balancing the power of the landowning nobility.⁸¹ Yet again, such qualification must not be carried too far. The associations did introduce a new vitality into Gallic life, and one which could not be ignored. The bronze-workers must have played an important role in the life of Alesia;⁸² and it is noteworthy that a certain P. Suillius P. . . went to a great deal of trouble on behalf of the fullers of Evreux, which reflects something of their high standing in the local community.⁸³ There was in the Three Gauls by the end of the second century a prosperous, self-aware and presumably fairly literate urban population which depended for its

continued well-being on a fair degree of peace and effective government. Just as much as the rural poor, but for rather different reasons, these people would have been vulnerable to sudden change and disruption in their everyday lives.⁸⁴

Mention has been made of army-service, but so far only with regard to the relatively well-to-do. Of course this option was also open to ordinary males of the right age and physical condition, and the opportunity to acquire Roman citizenship, some degree of wealth and education, and a great deal of status, by spending some time with the auxiliaries or (less commonly) the legions, would certainly have allowed some to better themselves. However, it does seem that recruitment into the ranks was subject to the same forces as recruitment to the officer-corps. Until 68-70 there was general entry into Gallic auxiliary regiments from *civitates* throughout the Three Gauls (although again Aquitanian and Lugdunensian Gauls are poorly represented in units serving away from the Rhine). From 70, and in fact even before the Empire-wide localised recruitment of ordinary troops got under way in the early second century, there was a marked decline in the enlistment of Gallic soldiers not born in Belgica or the Germanies.⁸⁵ As far as the second century is concerned, therefore, it seems that the military alternative to agricultural life was less open to men from the non-border areas.

So far in this section emphasis has been mostly on the free-born, but it is of course important to bear in mind that the Roman Empire accepted slavery as a matter of course and that slaves, and freed slaves, must have played a very significant part in life in High Imperial Gaul. In fact the contribution of the freedmen *seviri Augustales* has already been noted, and others of servile backgrounds occur in interesting contexts. Thus, for example, we seem to have evidence for the use of slaves as shepherds,⁸⁶ and in typical Roman fashion we find household slaves becoming the confidants and friends of their masters, and thus winning their own freedom. A Gallic aristocrat's great personal dependence on his slaves is indeed vividly demonstrated in the famous testament of a wealthy Lingonian landowner — the more so if we accept Hatt's restoration of the text and presume that he expected a significant proportion of the upkeep of his tomb to be met by an annual levy of only one sesterlius from each of the men and women he had freed in his will, which must surely hint at a very large number involved.⁸⁷ (We should also bear in mind that such generosity may well have caused the earlier Julii to undermine the value of their name by diluting it through extensive freeing of house-slaves, all of whom would have become 'Julii' in their turn.⁸⁸) Most of all, however, Krier has recently shown the

great importance of slaves and freedmen, operating at great distances from their masters, in the running of commercial concerns in the cities and towns of the Three Provinces.⁸⁹ The place of the *servi* and *liberti* in Gallic society as a whole would repay even further study.

The extent to which the conquest and Romanisation of the Three Gauls altered the basic Gallic lifestyle and character is difficult to judge. For most, despite the increase in material wealth, there was probably very little effective difference. The land had to be worked, and this meant a lifetime of drudgery, with more concern for the vagaries of Nature than for changes in forms of government. For most people the world would have remained the land, the farm, the *pagus* and the *civitas*, with their markets and towns, and their religious festivals.

Gallic religion is indeed another of those issues which I do not plan to examine closely here. This is because, rather as in the case of the Gallic economy, such investigations too easily turn into exercises in definition by description, consisting usually of a catalogue of the known deities, running from the Homeric to the Celtic and from the fairly explicable to the downright enigmatic, together with valiant efforts to reconstruct what their worship involved.⁹⁰ Fundamentally, of course, this is because there was no such thing as a native *Gallic* religion, in the sense of a well-defined, comprehensive, organised and popularly accepted effort to explain the Universe, the place of mankind within it, and the nature of the relationship between gods and men. This, of course, was also a weakness in Greco-Roman paganism but here at least poets and philosophers had managed to make some headway. The Gauls however, were in a much weaker position in this respect than their Greek and Roman cousins, since, with the early elimination of the druids, and the destruction of all the traditional learning which they had deliberately committed only to memory, there was not the material or the inter-*civitas* authority to maintain and develop a unified religion.⁹¹ Indeed, the totally confused nature of Gallic cultural identity within just a relatively short time after the Conquest is both instructive and depressing. When Julius Sabinus wished to enhance his position in the eyes of his countrymen he claimed descent not from Vercingetorix, or some Celtic hero or god, but from one of Julius Caesar's bastards.⁹²

In such circumstances it is not surprising that Greco-Roman religious ways flooded into the Three Provinces, and that ultimately where it can be understood, a large proportion of Gallic religion appears as really no more than a native version of Mediterranean beliefs. However, having said this it must be stressed that some individual local deities preserved their personalities, and even grew in strength, such as the Celtic Epona,

goddess of horses, and the *Matres*, goddesses of Plenty.⁹³ There is also no sign that the Three Gauls were invaded by inimical, unsympathetic and hopelessly alien religious forces. The two sides were fundamentally quite near to each other in their conception of their gods, and the result was fusion rather than the destruction of native ways. What was missing was simply pattern, and hence the stimulus to attempt further to define the significance of individual godlings. Such changes would, of course, have mainly affected the more sophisticated cult-centres in the cities, towns and great sanctuaries. Outside, there was probably much more resistance to innovation and, apart from the banning of human sacrifice, Gallic rural religion must have remained much the same (though probably, in the absence of druidical authority, becoming more primitive) from the time of the Conquest until the direct onslaught of the Christian missionaries in the later Empire.

The better-off were probably in their own way equally prisoners of the *civitas*. As we have seen, there seems to have been a strong tradition which bound them to *civitas*-service and following the episode of the *Imperium Galliarum* this may well have been reinforced by renewed Roman coldness towards Gauls, so that when relations improved the Gauls still stayed away from imperial office. Of course, the ownership of scattered estates, and the holding of *civitas*-curatorships, might take an aristocrat somewhat further round Gaul; and if he wanted to play a part on a larger stage there was always the Gallic Council and its contacts beyond the Three Provinces.⁹⁴ However, even in the case of the last, as the career of Sollemnis shows, the home-base was very important. Although some did manage to wander a little more widely afield, the evidence would seem to show that most Gallic aristocrats liked to keep their feet firmly in the Three Provinces.

Again, however, continuity must be balanced by change. There was a material transformation of the Three Gauls, and material alterations must have in some way at least altered Gallic thinking. We know that the intense imperial Romanisation of Narbonensis transformed it from a Greco-Celtic into a thoroughly Italianised land, and we must surely envisage the same processes at work in similar areas of the Three Provinces, especially around Lugdunum and in the Rhenish military zone and its hinterland. Indeed, as has already been said, the latter must be imagined as a highly developed region, the intense Romanisation of which was only later destroyed by its dangerously close proximity to Germanic invaders (but which still surfaces in modern times, for example in the odd occurrence of Mediterranean-style roof-tiles in an isolated area of Lorraine and eastern Champagne⁹⁵). Elsewhere, objects

such as the great highway direction-indicators, to be found at the hearts of the cities, and the massive Greco-Roman style statue of Mercury dominating the Auvergne from its position on the Puy-de-Dôme, must have directed men's thoughts to wider horizons.⁹⁶ And of course, as mentioned above, education itself could be purchased directly. As a result of these forces, and others, and despite the indulgence to Celtic shown by Septimius Severus, we must, for example, grant the spread of the Latin language through the Three Gauls, displacing Gallic and preparing for the ultimate emergence of French. This is a very difficult and much-disputed subject, but commonsense surely demands that by the High Empire Latin was the first language of at least the well-to-do, and of the large traders.⁹⁷

This, of course, returns us to the cities and towns where, despite the qualifications expressed above, it must be admitted that the pressures for change were at their most intense. To return to the subject of religion, Hatt's researches have clearly shown that the new and more developed religions from the east came into Gaul along the trade-routes, and the staging-posts in this movement were the towns, where there was a prosperous, alert and educated section of the community able to grasp the significance of these faiths, be they of Mithras, Cybele or Jesus Christ.⁹⁸

I must repeat the warning which I gave at the opening of this chapter: our evidence may be interpreted in many ways other than my own. However, in my opinion the feel of the Three Provinces under the High Empire remains one of general prosperity and order, with external security being guaranteed by the operation of the *limes*-system of defence, and internal peace being assured by the existence of a stable central government at Rome and of smoothly running local administrations in the *civitates*. It was a land of open cities, and undefended farmsteads.⁹⁹ By comparison with modern expectations the general standard of living must have been extremely low and, for example, the very personal disasters of disease and pain continued to be unalleviated by efficient medical techniques, as the pathetic hordes of offerings, representing parts of the human body, found at the major healing-shrines so touchingly reveal.¹⁰⁰ On the other hand, the very fact that people were able to travel to such shrines, there to be accommodated in reasonable comfort in civilised surroundings, and there to bathe in the holy waters, represented a marked improvement in social habits and hygiene over previous ages.

Notes

1. See Duval (1); Ternes (1).
2. See most recently the reports in *Gallia* 30, 1972, 411f (coins, reliefs, altars); *Gallia* 32, 1974, 399 (ex-votos, coins, jewellery); *Gallia* 34, 1976, 401 (coins): all from a small local temple of Mercury.
3. Thus Grenier (3), 581f; Brogan (1), 130f; and, perhaps the most typical in this respect, West, *passim*.
4. Duval (2), 235; cf. above 127. (It has recently been suggested that the stone used in the restoration of the sanctuary at Ribemont-sur-Ancre was brought a distance of some 100km – Ribemont, 492f.)
5. Cf. Middleton, 94f.
6. Most of what follows is derived from the very convenient summary of the state of research provided by Bulmer, *passim*.
7. Biegel, 15f.
8. von Petrikovits, 112f; Biegel, 10f.
9. von Petrikovits, 88; Biegel, 21f; cf. below 197f.
10. Cf. Wrigley, 302.
11. Drinkwater (5), 237 (with Duncan-Jones (2), *passim*).
12. Cf. the rightly cautionary remarks of Wightman (1), 81.
13. See generally Grenier (1), i.99. This pattern of dating recurs so frequently in Grenier's catalogue of sites that it would be pointless to list all his references. However, for more recent examples see Duval (2), 124f, 137, 160, 171, 178, 188, 195; and Etienne (1), 189f.
14. Cf. the remarks of Audin, 104f.
15. *CIL* xiii 1642 = *ILS* 5639.
16. *CIL* xiii 1036; *ILTG* 217.
17. *CIL* xiii 3671; cf. Wightman (1), 74.
18. *CIL* xiii 596.
19. Varène, 83; Bögli, 207; von Petrikovits, 85; Grenier (1), iii.334, 338f; Duval (2), 139; Wightman (1), 75, 78.
20. Duval and Quoniam, 176; Grenier (1), iii.950f, 839, 679.
21. I feel that Wightman (3), 625, is unduly cautious in this respect; cf. Walker (3), 320f.
22. See above 142.
23. Wightman (1) 139, 160f, (3) 626, 634; Agache (3), 683; Percival (2), 36f, 71f; cf. Walker (3), 321. For a good recent specific example of this pattern of dating see de Boë (4), 45f.
24. E.g. at Mayen and Chiragan – Grenier (1), ii.784f, 832f; cf. Vallat, 181, Walker (3), 321. See below 216, however, concerning the possibility of the beginning of the decline of the high imperial villa-system at this time.
25. Chiragan and St Ulrich apparently were at their most advanced states in this period, which also saw the building of Nennig – Grenier (1), ii.834f; Lutz, 30f; Wightman (1), 147.
26. E.g. Champlieu (Oise), Yzeures (Indre-et-Loire), Ribemont-sur-Ancre (Somme), Aillonnes (Sarthe) – Grenier (1), iii.411f, 414; Ribemont, 492f; Terouanne, 186; cf. Niccolini, 266f.
27. Agache, (3) 698, (4) 410.
28. Planson, 149; Allain, 45; Raepsaet-Charlier, 134, 150.
29. Kolling, 87.
30. Allain, 48.
31. Leday (2), 31.
32. Above 143.
33. Above 152.

34. Above 109.
35. E.g., concerning the development of Heerlen, Raepsaet-Charlier, 134.
36. Cf. above 19f and generally, for what follows, Drinkwater (3), *passim*.
37. Above 38, and Drinkwater (3), 833.
38. Above 48n85.
39. Above 48, and Drinkwater (3), 828f, 848f, (4) 97f.
40. *CIL* xiii 1708.
41. For what follows see Drinkwater (3), 833f.
42. This observation results from my own, as yet unpublished, analyses of Espérandieu, *passim*.
43. See Drinkwater (8), *passim*.
44. See Drinkwater (3), 841f, and references.
45. Duthoy, *passim*.
46. *Satyricon*, 71, 76.
47. E.g. C. Agileius Primus, *sevir* and *curator civium Romanorum* among the Bituriges Cubi in 38-41 – *CIL* xiii 1194 = *ILS* 197, cf. Drinkwater (4), 97.
48. E.g. *ILTG* 135, *CIL* xiii 2584, 4325, 4335.
49. E.g. *CIL* xiii 1961, 1967, 1974.
50. *CIL* xiii 1936.
51. *CIL* xiii 4481, 941, 3026a (= *ILS* 4613d). Cf. above 27.
52. *CIL* xiii 1688 = *ILS* 7021, 1695, 1709 = *ILS* 7020, 11480; cf. Drinkwater (4), 96.
53. *CIL* xiii 1911 = *ILS* 7033, 11179; Krier, 31f.
54. Drinkwater (3), 833f; cf. above 175.
55. Krier, 186.
56. Drinkwater (6), 230f.
57. Above 158.
58. Drinkwater (3), 839f.
59. Above 79, 110, 113, 158f; Drinkwater (6), 231.
60. E.g. the Claudian benefactor of *CIL* xiii 1642 = *ILS* 5639 replaced a structure which had, one must assume quite some time earlier, been erected by the peregrine Lupus, son of Aruca. For a very early non-citizen magistrate see *CIL* xiii 5 = *ILS* 6963.
61. Cf. Dio, 60.17.7. (The C. Agileius Primus of note 47 above is very odd in that he must have been enfranchised before the reign of Claudius.) During the troubles which followed the death of Nero there were also, of course, the Galban enfranchisements – *CIL* xiii 1096, 1517; and the rich Lingonian landowner of *CIL* xiii 5708 = *ILS* 8379 (below 205), Sextus Julius Aquila, is despite his Julian name probably also a late citizen (the client of Sextus Julius Frontinus?).
62. This in fact comes close to the views of Wightman (3), 633.
63. See above 173f. The idea expressed here also ties in with a thought of Professor Wightman, offered to me in the course of correspondence over this question; what I have made of it is, of course, completely my own responsibility. Smith, 172, seems likewise to be thinking on these lines: I believe that it is possible that in the Three Gauls, unlike Scotland, an unhealthy situation may have righted itself, by degrees.
64. See above 174.
65. See Drinkwater (5), 238 (concerning *CIL* xiii 596-600).
66. It has occurred to me that the Continental tendency to view the *colonus* in so poor a light may perhaps be due to the lack of familiarity of an agricultural tradition which has only recently begun to dispose of its peasants with the type of well-to-do and respected tenant-farmer who has for so long been part of the English country-scene.
67. A notable feature of the Musée Gallo-romain at Lyon is the way in which

the tombstones of the traders are generally much grander than those of the magistrates of the colony; and, as already discussed, the *seviri* played a very important role in the life of the city.

68. Drinkwater (3), 845f.

69. E.g. *CIL* xiii 1954.

70. The transformation was probably not immediate: see Drinkwater (6), 225f for the existence of properties owned by still-practising merchants, great and small.

71. Drinkwater (3), 839; Etienne, (1) 90, 108, 148; (2) 336. Cf. Baatz (3), 103, for the possibility of speedier movement from trade to the local aristocracy in the artificial *civitates* of the Agri Decumates.

72. For Sollemnis see above 114, and Drinkwater (5), 241f.

73. See e.g. *CIL* xiii 1684 = *ILS* 1441 (procurator of Hadrumetum); *CIL* xiii 3162; xiii 4030 (with Krier and Schwinden, *passim*).

74. E.g. *CIL* xiii 1807 = *ILS* 1330, and again *CIL* xiii 3162 (with Pflaum, *passim*).

75. *CIL* xiii 1682. (It is interesting to note, taking into account xiii 1710, that the father may in his time have been an unusual high-flier, in that he attained the post of *sacerdos* unusually early – perhaps another sign of family wealth and influence?)

76. The observations will be confirmed by any glance at the appropriate sections of *CIL* xiii, and its supplements. (The problem as to how great a proportion of the total population such people represented remains, of course, unresolved.)

77. *CIL* xiii 3105 = *ILS* 7052; cf. *CIL* xiii 3106 = *ILS* 7051.

78. See above 155f, 158. (From this it also follows that I do not concur with Hatt (1), 31f, in seeing a considerable and significant movement of the rural population into the towns in the second and third centuries.)

79. *CIL* xiii 5474, 5475 (= *ILS* 7048, 7048a).

80. *CIL* xiii 5476 reveals his employment of a steward (*actor* – cf. xiii 2533 = *ILS* 7452) although of course, given the ability of *negotiatores* to acquire small properties, this is far from conclusive.

81. Julian, iv.385f.

82. Cf. above 155.

83. *CIL* xiii 3202 = *ILS* 5594.

84. In the case of particular specialised industries one is perhaps even justified in thinking in terms of a 'proto-urban proletariat': see Drinkwater (8), 125.

85. These observations result from my own, as yet unpublished, analyses of the Gallic inscriptional evidence; they seem to fit well enough with the results of Alföldy (1), 99f and Kraft, 44f.

86. *CIL* xiii 7070 = Espérandieu 5824; with Rostovtzeff, pl. xxiv.1.

87. *CIL* xiii 5708 = *ILS* 8379; Hatt (1), 66f.

88. E.g. see *CIL* xiii 275, 1041 = *ILS* 2531, 1075.

89. Krier, especially 46f (concerning the sad tale of the death by fire of Lucius Secundus Octavus: *CIL* xiii 2027 = *ILS* 8520).

90. E.g. Brogan (1), 182f; Etienne (1), 164f; Leday (2), 410f. For the subject in general see Duval (3), *passim*.

91. Caesar, *BG* 6.14.3.

92. Tacitus, *Historiae* 4.55.

93. Duval (3), 49f, 55f.

94. Cf. above 111, 114, 177, 202.

95. See above 68; Pinchemel, 153f.

96. Chevallier (2), 53; Pliny, *NH* 34.18.45-7.

97. Duval (1), 46f.

98. Hatt (1), 57f; cf. above 78.

99. See above 151; and Agache (3), 689; Leday (2), 164.

100. Harmand L. (1), 776f; Le Gall, 145f.

10 THE THREE GAULS AND THE THIRD-CENTURY CRISIS

Before the end of the third century the way of life described in the preceding chapter had vanished. Fragments of great urban monuments, dedicatory-inscriptions, tombstones, and even mile- and league-stones built into carefully constructed but pathetically restricted circuit-walls, which turned carelessly sprawling cities and towns into grimly-held redoubts, bear eloquent witness to the new and harsher age which arrived to take its place.

The third-century Crisis, which afflicted not only the Three Gauls but also the whole of the Greco-Roman world, is a phenomenon which has consistently attracted an extraordinary amount of attention on the part of historians of imperial Rome. However it may be explained, there is no doubt that it marks the end of the high Roman period and the beginning of the later Roman Empire. It was effectively terminated by the military success and administrative genius of the emperor Diocletian (284-305) who, while obviously believing himself to be the heir and re-creator of old Rome, in fact laid the foundations of the Byzantine state. In addition, since survival from the Crisis was in no sense inevitable, and indeed since on at least one occasion during it the Roman Empire came perilously close to outright disintegration, the events of this period have also been regarded as harbingers of the great 'Fall' to come. As far as explanation is concerned, at one end of the spectrum is the view that the Empire of this time was in some way or other the innocent victim of external aggressors, and at the other that it was solely responsible for its own misfortunes. A particular well-publicised version of the latter is provided by Marxist historians, who see in the troubles of the age a reflection of the underlying distress among the great landowners of the Empire. Some of these, faced by the collapse of an agricultural system based on the exploitation of slave-labour (becoming ever more expensive and difficult to manage profitably), increasingly exploited the free poor through the transformation of the *colonus* into a proto-serf. In doing this they ran into conflict with reaction in the shape of other landowners, the urban population, and even the emperors, who saw their own interests best served by attempting to preserve the existing order. This precipitated political and

social disorder, out of which came the Crisis.¹

If the different strands of evidence available from throughout the Greco-Roman world which relate to this period are woven together they indeed present an apparently clear picture of a society which was everywhere harassed and unhappy. Events at the height of the Crisis have been touched upon earlier;² to explain them recourse may conveniently be had to a recent short study which lists the evils of the age as seen by contemporaries, namely the development of an autocratic and tyrannical monarchy, political instability, the over-involvement of the military in state affairs, and hence the rise in importance of those border-provinces where troops were stationed and recruited, social upheaval, weaknesses in economic life, depopulation, religious and moral revolution and, of course, the inroads of foreign enemies.³ These last, however, appear more as the symptoms of a chronic disease rather than the causes of it; and indeed the prevailing orthodoxy is to see the High Empire as having produced the seeds of its own destruction. However, interesting as such general surveys are, in the end a solid understanding of the Crisis as it affected the Three Gauls can only be won from close scrutiny of the local information, which must be allowed to speak for itself. This is in fact all the more important because the Gallic experience at this time, and particularly the phenomenon of the emergence of the 'Gallic Empire' in the worst years of Rome's suffering, has long been exploited by historians in search of an explanation for the Crisis as a whole.⁴

There can be no doubt, as I conceded in an earlier chapter, that it is easy to make a case for economic difficulty and social tension within the Three Provinces from as early as the late-second century.⁵ Under Marcus Aurelius there was renewed pressure on the frontiers, which affected the Gauls not only directly, through war, but indirectly by increasing imperial demands on the resources of the country; out of this may have sprung trouble with the Sequani, and possibly the complaints concerning the expense involved in providing gladiatorial contests. Under Commodus there occurred the strange popular revolt of Maternus, to be followed by all the turmoil involved in the usurpation of Clodius Albinus, and his suppression by Septimius Severus. The latter's subsequent policies, in buttressing the imperial power by the building-up of large landholdings in the west, and by compelling the well-to-do to perform their civic duties, could also not have been easy to live with. There was continuing unrest, and the *beneficiarii*, the military policemen, make an appearance along the major roads in the interior of Gaul. Thus, even before Severus Alexander came hurrying westwards to

campaign against the second major incursion of the Alamanni, the Three Gauls were already under some stress.

In support of these observations, based on material already presented in earlier chapters, we may now introduce further evidence. A fascinating inscription, dateable to the late-second century, indicates trouble among the peoples of the Breton peninsula, which required an expeditionary force from Britain to put it down.⁶ From archaeological finds it has been claimed that before the outbreak of the Crisis proper, in the second quarter of the third century, the Three Provinces began to lose their peaceful aspect as cities and towns were fortified – Tongres during the second century, and Trier and the *civitas*-capitals of the Agri Decumates at the turn of this and the following century.⁷ It has also been claimed that the same period saw a faltering in the pace of urban life, and of the villa-system which both stimulated and depended on a high degree of urbanisation. This phenomenon has been particularly remarked at Lugdunum and in the surrounding region, although Agache has seen a decline in his Picardy villas from about the end of the second century, and Percival has seen a similar process at work in the case of individual villas elsewhere in the Three Gauls.⁸ A loss of vitality on the part of the towns would also, of course, have had a bad effect on trade in general; and the migration of the main centres of production, and the contraction in the areas of distribution, of samian ware, together with a resurgence in local pottery-styles (and indeed in the local production of other forms of artefacts – the ‘Celtic renaissance’⁹) have been represented as reflecting a decline in long-distance commerce. Against such a background the actual barbarian invasions of the third century came as the secondary, not the primary, evil. According to King, with regard to the Gallic samian industry: ‘this apparent death-blow was inflicted on a virtually lifeless body’.¹⁰ Again, the experience of the Three Gauls thus appears to match that of the rest of the Empire: the invaders aggravated rather than created the third-century misfortunes of the Roman Empire.

The two principal Germanic tribes (or better, in their early days at least, tribal confederations) which may thus be seen as having brought the weak and rotten edifice of the Gallic economy and Gallic society crashing down were the Franks, who threatened attack across the lower Rhine, and the Alamanni, who menaced the Agri Decumates and the upper Rhine.¹¹ The latter showed themselves first, as we have seen, during the reign of Caracalla, although it was to be another decade or so before they began to pose a serious problem for the defenders of Upper Germany. As in the case of all such German peoples, their early history is extremely difficult to reconstruct. They seem to have

developed along the upper Main out of a fusion of smaller population-groupings, probably in the course of the second century. At the core of this confederation of 'All men' may have been the Semnones, displaced from their homeland on the middle Elbe by the dislocation of people which resulted from the mysterious changes which were eventually to transfer the heartland of Gothic culture from the southern Baltic coast to the north of the Black Sea. The Franks made their first recorded appearance in the darkest days of the Crisis; like the Alamanni they were probably in the first place the result of the coalescing, under pressure, of a number of smaller tribes, some of which, it has been suggested, may in fact have been known earlier to the Romans as the Chatti, Batavi, Sugambri, Bructeri and the like.

Further afield, pressing on the Danube rather than the Rhine, although having an important indirect effect on the well-being of the Three Gauls to the extent that they diverted imperial attention and resources away from the defence of the west, were the Goths themselves, who reached the northern shores of the Black Sea around the beginning of the third century, and within a generation had moved westwards into conflict with Rome on the lower Danube.¹² Between Goths and Alamanni were also other Germanic peoples, either newcomers or long-known to Rome, caught up in the turmoil of the age and ready to raid across the imperial frontier. In the east, of course, and hardly to be termed barbaric, was freshly revived Sassanian Persia. However, it should again be emphasised that many, probably most, historians today would see all these peoples as having simply accelerated the death of the already mortally diseased organism, which was the High Empire, exploiting rather than causing the major ills of the Crisis.

But if the outsiders were not primarily to blame for these ills, then where are the causes to be found? A completely satisfying synthesis of modern views on this subject is at the moment an impossibility, since it is still a field of heated controversy and debate. However, it seems that current opinion on the state of the west in the third century would have it that fundamentally Rome ground to a halt as her Empire ceased to grow.¹³ It has been argued that the social and economic dynamism of the Roman Empire derived from its military success: in fact it fed off the bullion, the manpower and the new markets won by constantly advancing the imperial frontier. This worked well, until the Empire reached the point where it had absorbed all those societies which were susceptible to its domination — that is, which were socially and economically sufficiently advanced to be able to support occupying troops and Roman administrators. (As we have seen, this was certainly

the situation which Rome found in Gaul under Caesar, and which she failed to find in Greater Germany under Augustus.) Henceforth the Empire had to live within its means; and at this point atrophy set in, although it took some time to show itself.

Manufacturing and commercial activity, already moving out from the Mediterranean heartland in pursuit of the advancing armies, eventually came to settle in the border areas, where the concentration of troops and officials assured a ready market: this is graphically demonstrated in the movement of the main centres of samian production from Italy, to southern and central Gaul, and then to the Rhine. Away from the border-zones, therefore, trade, especially long-distance trade, declined. This was an extended, but an accelerating, process since a falling off in the movement of particular bulk-products might in its turn lead to a decline in the general transportation network, and so cause difficulties for the movement of other products still in demand.¹⁴ The growing trend in this direction eventually resulted in a growth in local manufactures, as reflected in the products of the 'Celtic renaissance'. This contraction was, however, not confined simply to manufactured goods: the ill-fortune of the Somme villas towards the end of the second century has been explained as the consequence of the attainment of self-sufficiency in agricultural products by Britain and the Germanies, which made the importation of wheat and sheep-products from Belgica unnecessary.¹⁵ The central towns and cities, the prosperity of which closely depended upon the movement of raw materials and finished items in the course of trade were bound to suffer from such developments; they lost the ability to pay for themselves and their upkeep became more of a drain upon the resources of the landed aristocrats, already suffering from the effects of the general economic recession in which they found themselves. Some may have even attempted to escape the burden of their responsibilities by retiring to their country-estates;¹⁶ this retreat was made easier by the fact that the Greco-Roman insistence on active participation in city life was something of an alien attitude, which it had once been fun to espouse, but which had now lost its novelty.¹⁷ In fact, some would see the decline in the number of urban temples built in the Three Gauls from the late-second and into the third century, and the corresponding increase in rural religious building, especially at the great sanctuaries, as reflecting some sort of rejection of the urban norm.¹⁸ Such an option was, of course, more available to people who commanded large, self-sufficient properties, distant from the cities. Smaller villas, which depended for their existence on a lively urban market, would have suffered with the

towns.

These developments also damaged the interests of the imperial government since, as the economy weakened, and the attractions of local office grew less, the system became less taxable. A potentially dangerous gap therefore opened up between governmental income and expenditure, which showed itself when the Empire, after a long period of comparative peace, once again found itself under the strain of war. This, in fact, was the experience of the period of Marcus Aurelius' German campaigns, when disturbances which at an earlier date might have been shrugged off, or at least speedily dealt with, threw a totally unexpected burden on imperial resources, and alarmed the Empire by making it realise that it was not all-powerful. Increased demands on a slack economy for money and men to support the fight on the Rhine and the Danube, and the deleterious effect on that economy of the very uncertainty of a prolonged state of war, may, as I have earlier hinted, help to explain Gallic unease around the 170s and 180s. Such a growing lack of flexibility within the system would also make civil strife more difficult to recover from, which might well explain the pains which Septimius Severus took to buttress the imperial finances and to press local magistrates to undertake the full range of their duties, and generally, in abandoning the Augustan Principate, to give himself much greater direct control of imperial affairs.

However, as far as the Three Gauls are concerned, as we have already seen, the very means by which the strong monarch had come to power rocked the country still further; and anyway, he very quickly sold out to the oncoming economic recession. The continuance of the underlying economic problems, and the greater expenses of the new form of government, with the increased employment of administrators and soldiers, at higher levels of pay, resulted in a continual shortfall in taxation, which could be met only by extraordinary measures, including spectacular debasement of the silver coinage. The 'complementary flow' of taxes and trade suffered as the monetary economy on which it was based was poisoned by poor coin. It was then killed as, in desperation (since, without a corresponding increase in the rates of taxation, the issuing of poor money progressively decreased its real income) the government increasingly demanded the payment of its taxes, and paid its dependants, in kind — the *'annona-system'*. Non-local trade and commerce ground to a halt, and the towns and cities, and their surrounding villas, further decayed.¹⁹ External aggression became more difficult to deal with; indeed the outsiders may have been encouraged to attack by the apparently moribund nature of the state they were

bent upon despoiling.

Such problems exacerbated the inherent political, social, and religious weaknesses mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the effects of which continued to deepen the economic and military problems, to give further impetus to the whirligig of disaster. Percival has written of the 'underlying problem, essentially economic and sufficient to have caused a major recession without the pressures from outside the Empire';²⁰ this is echoed by Walker who, observing the effects of a general decline in the prosperity of Lugdunum and its neighbourhood, remarks: 'The major problem is that of social and economic decline, and even without the problems of the frontier a major crisis was inevitable.'²¹ The economic debilitation of the interior of the Empire had led to the undermining of the centrally-organised system of taxation in money. This in its turn caused a weakening of the administrative, military and ultimately political control of the imperial government over the distant provinces.²² The civil wars and foreign invasions provoked by such a situation served only to accelerate its further development. The tide of imperial power was on the ebb, leaving behind rock-pools of localised Roman rule and lifestyles. When, in 260, the ultimate disaster of the capture of a Roman emperor in battle ended the reign of Valerian, the peoples of the periphery were ready to go their own ways, in the sub-empires of Palmyra, and of Gaul.²³

This analysis contains a number of worthwhile ideas, and certainly commands attention. However, to my mind it also has its weaknesses, in particular a tendency to wander too far from specific pieces of evidence and to rely too heavily on generalities, which, in the case of the Three Gauls, possibly gives it too negative a tone. Such is the known distress of the Greco-Roman world overall during the Crisis-years, so eloquent are the complaints of contemporaries such as Tertullian and Cyprian, and indeed so manifest are the disasters the troubles of the age were to have wrought in the Three Gauls by the end of the century — not just the violated towns but, for example, in the north hundreds of villas ruined and forgotten²⁴ — that scholars seem to have been carried away by the drama of the situation, and to have persuaded themselves that the best way of understanding events is by searching out in a variety of sources the earliest possible evidence for the move towards the disruption and disaster which was the unavoidable fate of the Roman world. In fact a rather different and much more positive view of the Three Gauls during the first half of the third century may be obtained simply by focusing attention on the direct archaeological and epigraphical evidence. This was indeed touched

upon in the earlier narrative chapter relating to this period; now is the time to review in slightly more detail the main pieces of evidence for such a hypothesis.

Even if the idea of social and economic decline is accepted for some parts of Gaul (and the evidence in this respect is not wholly convincing²⁵), it cannot be denied that elsewhere the opposite seems to have been true. It has long been accepted that Belgica and the Germanies flourished deep into the third century. The famous funeral reliefs found at Neumagen and Igel form a series which has been dated, on stylistic grounds, from the early-second to the mid-third centuries;²⁶ and, as has already been suggested, the great rise in the Belgic wool textile industry, which gave the Secundinij the wealth to build at Igel, may well have resulted from a relatively late boost given to it by the emperor Caracalla.²⁷ Generally, indeed, Trier and the Treveri seem to have done exceptionally well, enjoying a prosperity which did not decline, but was ended by outside forces, namely the invasions and the political turmoil of the height of the Crisis.²⁸ Recent studies have shown that the greatest period of Menapian affluence belongs to this period, and that the artisan-quarter at Xanten succumbed only to the Frankish onslaught.²⁹ Attention has previously been drawn to the continuing vitality of life in the Agri Decumates until the very middle of the century. Of course it is quite possible to argue that in all these cases we are dealing with the prosperous outer-core of the Three Gauls, the well-being of which was supported in an unusual manner by the presence of the military, quite different from the stagnating centre. However, in this respect other scholars have shown that third-century growth and well-being was certainly not confined to the area of the Rhine. In the west, the flowering of Bordeaux under the Severan emperors, seen in the building of the magnificently 'baroque' 'Piliers de Tutelle' (possibly a supplementary forum), and the 'Palais de Galien' (probably an amphitheatre), has long been recognised.³⁰ More important, however, is the case currently strongly argued by Galliou, that among the Gallic *civitates* which bordered the Atlantic generally, and particularly in the case of those of the Breton peninsula, the archaeological record indicates that the first fifty years of the third century saw significant economic growth and affluence (reflected especially in the erection and the embellishment of villas, although towns too benefited from building activity).³¹ It may, perhaps, be objected that even the west was untypical, in that it had access to maritime trade-routes to Britain, the Rhine, and beyond, and so could have been, to some degree, protected from the decline which was affecting the centre of the Three Provinces.³² Yet even here new

thinking is calling into question the concept of a comprehensive collapse. According to Buckley, there is no real sign that the Severan troubles caused any lasting harm among any of the Aeduan townships, and indeed there seems to have been an increase in activity and prosperity under Severus Alexander and Maximinus: 'in general, the impression is that the first half of the third century was a time of prosperity'.³³

On reflection, it is now perhaps more understandable how such observations can be made. The Rhineland, for example, and the Belgic hinterland, could not have prospered in isolation. There is no doubt that from the second century the area became a net-exporter of finished goods and raw materials, to the Germanies, to Britain, into the Three Gauls, and beyond.³⁴ Its economic well-being depended on other people's needing its products, and having the wherewithal to pay for them. In other words, the very fact that the Rhineland did well in the second, and continued to do well in the third, century must surely indicate that its trading partners were not doing too badly themselves. Roles were now, of course, reversed: buyers had become sellers and *vice versa*, and there may well have been problems in adjusting to the new balance of trade; but in talking in such terms we are still discussing levels of prosperity on both sides, not poverty. This means, of course, that we must guard against too easy an acceptance of the notion of drastic decline in the means of internal transportation in Gaul during this period. As I have already mentioned, the accepted chronology of the Neumagen and Igel monuments indicates continuing strong activity among the great Treveran *negotiatores* into the middle years of the third century, and if these were flourishing then we must assume that the *nautae* with whom they are so closely associated as a class remained a force to be reckoned with. Indeed, as I have myself argued, the Igel monument, dated by style to the 250s, makes great play with the theme of the conveyance of cloth on the Gallic river-network;³⁵ and the similarity in conception between the north-eastern pillars and the south-western 'piles', already discussed, may indicate the existence of a road-river trade route between Trier and Bordeaux in the same period.³⁶

Underlying all these arguments is, of course, the idea that the notion of a wholesale collapse in Gallic trade, as apparently shown by the history of samian production, has to be treated with great caution. In fact the disintegration and the demise of this industry, particularly in its final and debased form, may have been due simply to a change in taste — in the same way that the decline in intaglio jewellery in the Roman Empire in the third century, which used to be thought to have been due to increasingly unfavourable economic circumstances, is now

simply assigned to a change in fashion.³⁷ Indeed, King's revised dating for the effective demise of Lezoux and Rheinzabern samian — both around the 230s — puts this occurrence, as we shall see below, in a period of great Gallic economic vitality, which suggests once more that its failure was due more to a change in consumer-preference in an active market than to comprehensive economic slump.³⁸

This is not to say that the Three Gauls were uniformly prosperous, nor that certain areas did not have their own particular troubles. For example, the area around Lyon may indeed have suffered its own form of recession, not so much because of troubles arising out of the Septimius Severus' war against Albinus (although these could not have helped the situation) but more because of the undoubted advantages, as the external threat to the borders grew more obvious, of having the Gallic capital closer to the events unfolding on the German frontier. The third century was to be the century of Köln and Trier, not Lyon, and the change of emphasis may have begun earlier, thus reducing the amount of imperial resources expended in central Gaul, with obvious effects on the local economy.³⁹ The federal Altar, and the worship associated with it, seem however to have stayed at Condate, so there could not have been total abandonment.⁴⁰

From what I have said it must be obvious that I do not myself believe in the theory that internal decay was the cause of the third-century Crisis, at least where the Three Gauls are concerned.⁴¹ Our evidence is of course far from satisfactory, and even when dealing with what we do possess there remains the serious problem, already touched upon, of recognising, and making allowance for, the pessimism of the literary sources and the rather different interpretation of events available from the study of the archaeological information.⁴² However, in terms of volume and variety of material, as well as its directly local application, the advantage lies with the latter, which suggests the continuing existence of the relative prosperity of the Three Provinces as a whole until fairly late into the third century. Decline in one area has to be balanced against growth in another; and indeed a complete absence of change would not have been the sign of a healthy economy. Such a point of view, of course, also precludes the acceptance of all other hypotheses which involve the assumption that from a very early date Gaul was stumbling to disaster. Thus the 'Crisis of the slaveowning class' does not seem to fit a situation where there were probably relatively few agricultural slaves; and the continuing high level of economic activity in the Three Provinces would belie the notion, whatever was being said in the rest of the Empire at the time, or in Gaul itself at a

later date, that the first half of the third century witnessed significant depopulation in these lands.⁴³

The picture of the Three Gauls which I propose for this period leading up to the establishment of the Gallic Empire is therefore one which is basically a continuation of that which I proposed for the period of the High Empire, namely of a generally settled, wealthy and peaceful land. Certainly under Marcus Aurelius, Commodus, and the latter's immediate successors there had been something of a change for the worse; border-troubles and civil wars were bound to cause difficulties, as much as anything because they came after such a long period of tranquillity. There can be no doubt that at this time the Three Gauls, in common with much of the rest of the Roman Empire, found themselves under the strains of new burdens, military, financial and social. However, the impression remains that once Septimius Severus had established his rule, and despite the expense and inconvenience of tighter imperial administration, the Three Provinces quickly adjusted to the new order, and indeed settled down to enjoy a period of unparalleled prosperity. (We perhaps forget too easily that it was the long Antonine 'Golden Age' that was abnormal, not the turbulent periods which preceded and succeeded it: perhaps the lively Gallic mentality responded rather better to a somewhat more challenging environment?) Again our evidence is far from perfect, but from what has already been said it should be seen that it is perfectly possible to argue that this prosperous state of affairs persisted well into the middle years of the third century. The inscriptions erected in honour of or by men such as T. Sennius Sollemnis and the M. Aurelius Lunaris, *sevir* of York and Lincoln, who seems to have plied his trade between Britain and Bordeaux, demonstrate that traditional local and federal administration and politics, and significant long-distance commercial activity, were still very much in evidence at the end of the fourth decade of the third century.⁴⁴ An active career in local administration could still be pursued among the Senones in the following decade.⁴⁵ Similar are the inscriptions which record the continuance of municipal life in the Agri Decumates in the same period, and which are all the more remarkable given the fact that the area to which they belong was becoming increasingly exposed to Alamannic attack.⁴⁶ Clearly there still remained aristocrats willing to shoulder the burdens of *civitas*-office. A cooler appraisal of the decline in urban building concludes that following the great Severan building-boom the cities and towns were well stocked with great monuments and edifices, and that satiety not neglect was the cause of surplus wealth being spent on country shrines (many of which,

of course, themselves looked like town-centres).⁴⁷ Most of all, however, as already remarked, attention must be directed towards the sculptures and inscriptions from Neumagen, Igel, Arlon, Buzénol, Sens, St Ambroix, Bordeaux and the like which show still burgeoning artisanal and commercial activity, and all that this implies in the way of the continued vitality of the cities, townships and communications-network of the Three Provinces in the third century.

Of course there were difficulties at this time, such as the second Alamannic thrust which, as I have already conceded, must have caused concern. However, Maximinus did his job, and the defences held. Possibly more worrying may have been the prospect of internal unrest. I have argued earlier for a relatively densely populated and strictly controlled countryside, and for a significant degree of influence being exercised over semi-industrial workers in the cities and towns by the great *negotiatores*.⁴⁸ I see this as being a tightly-wound social system, vulnerable to outside disturbance (occasioned, say, by war or political disorder) and perhaps too easily liable to release its energies elsewhere to produce a Maternus, or troublemakers in Aremorica or along the Rhine.⁴⁹ In this situation landowners, traders, and the military commanders would tend to favour strong government. However, once again it would be unwise to exaggerate the extent of these early problems. Despite the point made earlier, it seems clear that, unlike the British towns of the period, those of the Three Gauls continued to possess defences only exceptionally and not as a matter of course. The case of Tongres is very odd, since its High Empire walls were built remarkably early, and were subsequently outgrown by the buildings of the city, reflecting a still peaceful age.⁵⁰ As far as Trier is concerned, the city wall is also in fact likely to have been constructed at a relatively early date (probably late-second or early-third century) and its long circuit takes in the local amphitheatre to act as a grand ceremonial gateway, not as a grim citadel (as was to be the case elsewhere in Gaul at the end of the third century).⁵¹ To my mind these defences smack more of a compliment to the place, the future sub-capital of the western Empire, than of any real fears for its safety. The fortification of the townships of the Agri Decumates is likely, given their location, but remains to be proved conclusively.

Any assumption of the continuation of trade must also, of course, include the acceptance that this was in some manner or other maintained in the face of an increase in the amount of debased coin in circulation, and an increase in taxation in kind which was gradually strangling the 'complementary flow' of taxes and trade on which

everything depended. This must sound odd, but is explicable. It is not impossible that, helped by the initial presence of the military markets, the Gallic economy achieved such an impetus that eventually it was able to run under its own momentum, not directly tied to army-purchases. As far as the debased coinage is concerned, we must always bear in mind that the ancient economy was far less financially complex than the modern and thus could probably better ride and adjust to new conditions. Prices might rise, and (illegal) formulae would have to be found for tariffing *denarius* against *denarius*, taking into account the amount of base metal each coin contained, but this could be borne. In any case, figures from site-finds show a peculiarly steady (possibly even declining) level of coinage in circulation in the west from as early as the reign of Marcus Aurelius, despite the increased production one would assume from the rising proportion of copper to be found in the silver pieces.⁵² This is very difficult to explain, and I will not attempt it here, but it does suggest that price inflation was possibly not so savage an economic scourge in this area as is usually thought.

Other regions within the Empire were probably less lucky than the Three Gauls in escaping the first horrors of the Crisis, and this may well have affected international trade. However, the west was a large area in itself, and the loss of such dealings may well have been balanced by an increase in commerce closer to home. The possibility of a trade-triangle comprising traffic between the Mosel and Aquitania, between Aquitania and Britain, and between Britain and the Rhine/Mosel river-system has already been mentioned, and has attracted scholarly attention. Spain was to hand (not to mention Africa), like Gaul in the early stages relatively unscathed by events on the Danube and the Euphrates. Such a line of thinking makes some concession to the notion of an increase in regional trade in the Roman Empire in the third century, but the region involved is not inconsiderable, and indeed its development as a distinct and flourishing trading-area would help to explain the known political borders of the Gallic Empire which was to follow.

My argument is therefore that there was no general economic or social decline within the Three Gauls during the first half of the third century. Elsewhere the Empire was in difficulties, some of its own making (particularly, I feel, its ill-defined structure of government, the legacy of the 'restored Republic'), others forced upon it from outside. The product of the complex reaction between these various problems was the political and military anarchy which the ancients themselves saw as the main feature of the Crisis. However, for a while Gaul was relatively free from the worst effects of these developments, a state of

affairs which lasted probably until after 250. She felt its full weight for the first time around the period which saw the accession of Valerian and Gallienus as joint rulers of the Roman world. The new situation arose not out of any sharp increase in Gallic internal weakness, but from a rise in external pressures. In fact, however reactionary it might seem, I am prepared to accept something of the argument that it was quite simply the barbarians who were to blame.

Elsewhere the Gothic and Persian threats were now reaching their height, and closer to home the Alamanni were stirring once more, with the Franks about to make themselves felt for the first time. The need for assured military protection, and for firm regional government, was therefore doubly felt by landowners great and small, and by the traders — especially, as seems likely, when the Alamanni managed to breach the *limes*. Appeal was made to Gallienus, who arrived with all the haste he could manage and restored the situation, but then equally quickly departed from the Rhine. The subsequent shock of the capture of Valerian, which caused consternation throughout the Empire, resulted in the Three Gauls now having to face the Crisis full in the face, with the incursions of the Franks and the Alamanni, and the usurpation of Postumus. The scene was set for disaster. However, when Postumus, unable to eliminate garrisons still loyal to Gallienus in time to make a realistic dash for Rome, decided to stay in Gaul, the unexpected happened, and peace and order were restored. The Gauls, heirs to a tradition of essentially Gallic activity and of Roman aloofness resulting from the *terror Gallicus*, who even under a very strong and capable Roman emperor had managed to replace Roman miles with Celtic leagues, responded well to the new Rhine-based Empire, and helped to make of it something more than just a disconnected limb of the Roman Empire. I would argue that the Gallic Empire was in fact founded on and supported by the essentially prosperous society and economy of High Roman Gaul described in previous chapters — the Gaul not just of the great aristocrats but also of the smaller farmers, the *navatae* and the *negotiatores*, and the urban traders and craftsmen. It was solidly based, and it worked.

The change seems to have come about approximately eight years later, after the assassination of Postumus, when civil war, ineffectual government, and more invasions corroded the position of the humbler members of society, and allowed the great landowners to develop and consolidate their positions. Thus was Victoria, mother of the recently-murdered Gallic emperor Victorinus, able to buy the imperial purple for P. Esuvius Tetricus (whose resoundingly Celtic middle name should

be noted). However, I would equally argue that the final collapse was postponed until the reckless imperialism of the emperor Aurelian led to Tetricus' defeat in battle and the reabsorption of the Gallic Empire by Rome. This, and the retribution that followed, broke the Gallic spirit, ruined the land, and prepared the way for the barbarian inroads of the 270s. It was then that the cities and towns were destroyed, most never to recover, their great buildings to be used as quarries for the building of defences around the much reduced administrative-centres of the later Empire. The Crisis affected the Three Gauls particularly badly, because it had come so savagely, and so late; what followed was a quite different society, but that is another story.⁵³

Notes

1. See the useful summary of views, with bibliography, in Held, 7-14.
2. See above 87-9.
3. Alföldy (2), 98-103.
4. E.g. (from the Marxist viewpoint) Schtjajerman, 405-24.
5. See above 76-85.
6. *CIL* iii 1919 = *ILS* 2770; cf. Galliou (1), 116.
7. Baatz (3), 103; Ternes (2), 22f; Wankenne, 33; Clüppers (2), 225.
8. Walker (3), 312, (4) 317f; Agache (3), 674; Percival (2), 41f, esp. 44.
9. MacMullen (1), *passim*. See also Chenet, 4, 90f.
10. King, 71.
11. For the Franks and the Alamanni see Todd, 32; Held, 19; *KP* i.227f, ii.608.
12. For the Goths see Burns, *passim*.
13. The following is based mainly on the papers collected in King and Henig, especially that of Reece, together with Hopkins (2), esp. 120f.
14. King, 67f.
15. Reece, 29f.
16. Vallat, 239.
17. Reece, 35f.
18. See Horne, 25.
19. Cf. Hopkins (2), 122f; and above 109 (the *praefectus annonae*), 156.
20. Percival (2), 41.
21. Walker (4), 318.
22. Thus Hopkins (2), 123; cf. Reece, 36f.
23. Cf. above 89.
24. See Agache (3), 707 – concerning the great change in the appearance of the landscape of the Somme basin from the high to the later Empire: almost certainly the result of the wholesale abandonment and destruction of villas which took place during the later third century.
25. E.g. Agache's theories on the decline of the Somme villas seem to me to be weakly argued: see Agache (4), 374. In the absence of extensive excavation much remains supposition. It is interesting to note that de Boë's work at Haccourt has revealed a villa, very similar to those found on the Somme, which seems to have been occupied down to the very middle of the third century – de Boë (4), 45.

Some of Percival's examples of villas in precocious decline are also unconvincing: the gap in the occupation of the subsidiary building at Guiry-Guadancourt is probably related to the *violent* destruction of the main dwelling at the end of the second century (though the latter seems to have recovered fairly quickly): *Gallia* 16, 1958, 226-80; *Gallia* 18, 1960, 163-85, esp. 168f. As for Lyons-la-Forêt, the site is extremely enigmatic, with no real proof that we are here dealing with a villa at all: *Gallia* 26, 1968, 366.

26. von Massow, 280f; Dragendorff and Krüger, 100.

27. See above 86.

28. Wightman (1), 52, 138.

29. Thoen, 246; Hinz (1), 49f.

30. Etienne (1), 187f.

31. Galliou (2), *passim*, esp. 270: 'This brief survey of western Gaul in the first half of the third century has shown us very few signs, if any, of a deep crisis'; also Galliou (1), *passim*.

32. Cf. Galliou (2), 267.

33. Buckley, 290f.

34. von Petrikovits, 112f, esp. 117f, 123f.

35. Drinkwater (8), 122f.

36. See above 201; cf. Hatt (1), 174f; Etienne (1), 143.

37. Henig, 128.

38. King, 66.

39. So Walker (3), 323; cf. Etienne (1), 143, who makes the interesting suggestion that Bordeaux may also have benefited from Lyon's loss of prominence.

40. See above 114 (the activity of Sennius Solleminis).

41. And even perhaps beyond. It seems to me that the proponents of the 'infrastructure-theory' overlook the fact that, once the early imperial frontier had been settled, external peoples nestled up to it and benefited from the diffusion of Greco-Roman material wealth across it. Thus, even if unsuitable to begin with, they would gradually have become ready for inclusion within the Empire – which Marcus Aurelius seems to have had in mind for the tribes across the Danube – a plan thwarted by political troubles, and then by his death: *Historia Augusta, Marcus Aurelius* 24.5f; *Dio*, 72.33.4. As I explain below, I lay rather more blame on the Germanic migrations than does the current orthodoxy.

42. See above 72.

43. For depopulation as the essential factor in the Gallic crisis see Grenier (3), 574f, 591. For the general problems involved in examining this, see Duncan-Jones (1), esp. 79f.

44. See above 87, 114 (inscription dated to 238); *ILTG* 141 (dated to 237; as Galliou (1), 121, observes, it is surely significant that this inscription, found at Bordeaux, was inscribed on British millstone-grit).

45. *CIL* xiii 2949 = *ILS* 7049 (dated to April, 250); cf. above 109.

46. *CIL* xiii 7424, 9123, 9103, 9111; cf. Schönberger, 176; Baatz (3), 109.

47. Blass, 174.

48. See above 203, 204f.

49. Cf. above 80, 84, 214.

50. Wachter, 75; Raepsaet-Charlier, 146f.

51. Wightman (1), 92f.

52. This conclusion results from my own researches: Drinkwater (1), 216f cf. Hopkins (2), 113. Much more work certainly remains to be done in this field.

53. This very brief summary of the rise, fall and aftermath of the Gallic Empire comes from Drinkwater (1), *passim*. I hope to be able to publish this in the near future.

KEY TO MAPS

List 1 – indicates, from left to right: the number used to show the location of each site on the Maps; its Roman name (where known); its modern name; the country and district of local government in which it is now to be found; the numbers of the Maps in which it appears; and, in the case of *civitas*-capitals, the *civitates* they served.

List 2 – gives an alphabetical list of modern names, and their location in List 1.

List 1

- 1 Aardenburg (NL – Zeeland), 5
- 2 Aduatuca (Tongres) (B – Limbourg), 6, 8 (Tungri)
- 3 Agedincum (Sens) (F – Yonne), 6, 8 (Senones)
- 4 Aginnum (Agen) (F – Lot-et-Garonne), 6
- 5 Alesia (Alise-Ste-Reine) (F – Côte-d'Or), 1, 5, 8
- 6 Andemantunnum (Langres) (F – Haute-Marne), 3, 6, 7, 8 (Lingones)
- 7 Anderitum (Javols) (F – Lozère), 6 (Gabali)
- 8 Aquae Granni (Aachen) (D – Nordrhein-Westfalen), 3
- 9 Aquae Mattiacae (Wiesbaden) (D – Hessen) 4 (Mattiaci)
- 10 Aquae Sextiae (Aix-en-Provence) (F – Bouches-du-Rhône), 1, 7, 8
- 11 Aquae Tarbellicae (Dax) (F – Landes), 6, 8 (Tarbelli)
- Ara Ubiorum – see Colonia Agrippina
- 12 Arae Flaviae (Rottweil) (D – Baden-Württemberg), 4
- 13 Arausio (Orange) (F – Vaucluse), 7, 8
- 14 Aregenua (Vieux) (F – Calvados), 6 (Viducasses)
- 15 Arelate (Arles) (F – Bouches-du-Rhône), 7, 8
- 16 Argentorate (Strasbourg) (F – Bas-Rhin), 3, 4, 5, 8
- 17 Augusta Praetoria (Aosta) (I – Val d'Aosta), 7, 8
- 18 Augusta Rauracorum/Raurica (Augst) (CH – Baselland), 1, 6, 7, 8 (Rauraci)
- 19 Augusta Suessionum (Soissons) (F – Aisne), 6, 7, 8 (Suessiones)
- 20 Augusta Taurinorum (Turin) (I – Piedmont), 8
- 21 Augusta Treverorum (Trier) (D – Rheinland-Pfalz), 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 (Treveri)
- 22 Augusta Viromandunorum (St-Quentin) (F – Aisne), 6 (Viromandui)
- 23 Augustobona (Troyes) (F – Aube), 6, 8 (Tricasses)
- 24 Augustodunum (Autun) (F – Saône-et-Loire), 2, 6, 8 (Aedui)
- 25 Augustodurum (Bayeux) (F – Calvados), 6 (Baïocasses)
- 26 Augustomagus (Senlis) (F – Oise), 6 (Silvanectes)
- 27 Augustonemetum (Clermont-Ferrand) (F – Puy-de-Dôme), 6, 7, 8 (Arverni)
- 28 Augustoritum (Limoges) (F – Haute-Vienne), 6, 7, 8 (Lemovices)
- 29 Autricum (Chartres) (F – Eure-et-Loire), 6 (Carnutes)
- 30 Avaricum (Bourges) (F – Cher), 6, 8 (Bituriges)

- 31 Aventicum (Avenches) (CH – Vaud), 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 (Helvetii)
- 32 Baeterrae (Béziers) (F – Hérault), 1, 7, 8
- 33 Bagacum (Bavai) (F – Nord), 6, 8 (Nervii)
- 34 Belgica vicus (Billig) (D – Nordrhein-Westfalen), 3
- 35 Bonna (Bonn) (D), 3, 5, 8
- 36 Borbetomagus (Worms) (D – Rheinland-Pfalz), 6 (Vangiones)
- 37 Brocomagus (Brumath) (F – Bas-Rhin), 6 (Triboci)
- 38 Burdigala (Bordeaux) (F – Gironde), 6, 8, 9 (Bituriges Vivisci)
- 39 Cabillonum (Chalon-sur-Saône) (F – Saône-et-Loire), 7, 8
- 40 Caesarodunum (Tours) (F – Indre-et-Loire), 5, 6, 8 (Turonos)
- 41 Caesaromagus (Beauvais) (F – Oise), 6 (Bellovaci)
- 42 Castellum Mattiacorum (Kastel) (D – Rheinland-Pfalz), 4
- 43 Castellum Menapiorum (Cassel) (F – Nord), 6, 8 (Menapii)
- 44 Cenabum (Orléans) (F – Loiret), 8
- 45 Colonia Agrippina (Köln) (D – Nordrhein-Westfalen), 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9 (Ubii)
- 46 Condate (Lyon) (F – Rhône), 2, 5
- 47 Condate Redonum (Rennes) (F – Ille-et-Vilaine), 6 (Redones)
- 48 Cosedia (Coutances) (F – Manches), 6 (Unelli)
- 49 Cossium (Bazas) (F – Gironde), 6 (Vasates)
- 50 Darioriturum (Vannes) (F – Morbihan), 6 (Venetes)
- 51 Dibio (Dijon) (F – Côte-d'Or), 3, 5, 7, 8
- 52 Divodurum (Metz) (F – Moselle), 6, 7, 8 (Mediomatrici)
- 53 Divona (Cahors) (F – Lot) 6 (Cadurci)
- 54 Durocortorum (Reims) (F – Marne), 2, 6, 8 (Remi)
- 55 Elimberrum (Auch) (F – Gers), 6 (Ausci)
- 56 Elusa (Eauze) (F – Gers), 6 (Elusates)
- 57 Fanum Martis (Corseul) (F – Côtes-du-Nord), 6 (Coriosolites)
- 58 Forum Iulii (Fréjus) (F – Var), 1, 7, 8
- 59 Forum Segusiavorum (Feurs) (F – Loire), 6 (Segusiavi)
- 60 Genava (Geneva) (CH – Genève), 8
- 61 Gesoriacum (Boulogne) (F – Pas-de-Calais), 2, 7, 8, 9
- 62 Glanon (St-Rémy-de-Provence) (F – Bouches-du-Rhône), 7
- 63 Höchst (D – Hessen), 4
- 64 Hofheim (D – Hessen), 4
- 65 Iatinum (Meaux) (F – Seine-et-Marne), 6 (Meldi)
- 66 Juliobona (Lillebonne) (F – Seine-Maritime), 8, 9 (Caleti)
- 67 Juliomagus (Angers) (F – Maine-et-Loire), 2, 6, 8 (Andecavi)
- 68 Köngen (D – Baden-Württemberg), 4
- 69 Lactora (Lectoure) (F – Gers) 6 (Lactorates)
- 70 Ledosus (Lezoux) (F – Puy-de-Dôme), 8
- 71 Legedia (Avranches) (F – Manche), 6 (Abrincates)
- 72 Limonum (Poitiers) (F – Vienne), 6, 8 (Pictones)
- 73 Lopodunum (Ladenburg) (D – Baden-Württemberg), 4
- 74 Lugdunum (Lyon) (F – Rhône), 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
- 75 Lugdunum Convenarum (St-Bertrand-de-Comminges) (F – Haute-Garonne),
6 (Convenae)
- 76 Lutetia (Paris) (F), 6, 8 (Parisii)
- 77 Massalia/Massilia (Marseille) (F – Bouches-du-Rhône), 1, 8
- 78 Mediolanum Ebuovicum (Évreux) (F – Eure), 6 (Ebuovices)
- 79 Mediolanum Santonum (Saintes) (F – Charente-Maritime), 5, 6, 7, 8
(Santones)
- 80 Miltenburg-Ost (D – Bayern), 4
- 81 Moguntiacum (Mainz) (D – Rheinland-Pfalz), 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8
- 82 Narbo Martius (Narbonne) (F – Aude), 1, 7, 8


- 83 Nemausus (Nîmes) (F – Gard), 7, 8
 84 Nemetacum (Arras) (F – Pas-de-Calais), 6 (Atrebatas)
 85 Nida (Heddernheim) (D – Hessen), 4
 86 Novaesium (Neuss) (D – Nordrhein-Westfalen), 3, 8
 87 Noviodunum Diablintum (Jublains) (F – Mayenne), 6 (Diablintes)
 88 Noviodunum Equestrium (Nyon) (CH – Vaud), 1, 7, 8
 89 Noviomagus Batavorum (Nijmegen) (NL – Gelderland), 3, 8
 90 Noviomagus Lexoviorum (Lisieux) (F – Calvados), 6 (Lexovii)
 91 Noviomagus Nemetum (Speyer) (D – Rheinland-Pfalz), 6 (Nemetes)
 92 Obernburg (D – Bayern), 4
 93 Offenburg (D – Baden-Württemberg), 4
 Oppidum Ubiorum – see Colonia Agrippina
 94 Orolaunum (Arlon) (B – Luxembourg), 8
 95 Oudenburg (B – West-Vlaanderen), 5
 96 Portus Namnetum (Nantes) (F – Loire-Atlantique), 6, 8, 9 (Namnetes)
 97 Rotomagus (Rouen) (F – Seine-Maritime), 6, 8 (Vellocasses)
 98 Ruessio (St-Paulien) (F – Haute-Loire), 6 (Vellavi)
 99 Sagii (Sées) (F – Orne), 6 (Esuvii)
 100 Samarobriva (Amiens) (F – Somme), 6, 7, 8 (Ambiani)
 101 Seeb (CH – Zurich), 3
 102 Segodunum (Rodez) (F – Aveyron), 6, 8 (Ruteni)
 103 Tabernae (Rheinzabern) (D – Rheinland-Pfalz), 8
 104 Tarvanna (Théroutanne) (F – Pas-de-Calais), 6 (Morini)
 105 Tolosa (Toulouse) (F – Hte-Garonne), 1, 7, 8
 106 Tres Tabernae (Saverne) (F – Bas-Rhin), 8
 107 Tullum (Toul) (F – Meurthe-et-Moselle), 6 (Leuci)
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 108 Valkenburg (NL – Limburg), 3
 109 Vesontio (Besançon) (F – Doubs), 5, 6, 8 (Sequani)
 110 Vesunna (Périgueux) (F – Dordogne), 6, 8 (Petrocorii)
 111 Vetera (Xanten-Birten) (D – Nordrhein-Westfalen), 2, 3, 5, 8
 112 Vienna (Vienne) (F – Isère), 2, 5, 7, 8
 113 Vindinum (Le Mans) (F – Sarthe), 6, 8 (Cenomanni)
 114 Vindonissa (Windisch) (CH – Aargau), 3, 5, 8
 115 Vorigium (Carhaix) (F – Finistère), 6 (Osisimi)
 116 Waldmössingen (D – Baden-Württemberg), 4
 117 Welzheim (D – Baden-Württemberg), 4
 118 Zugmantel (D – Hessen), 4

List 2


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Agen	4	Augst	18
Aix-en-Provence	10	Autun	24
Alise-Ste-Reine	5	Avenches	31
Amiens	100	Avranches	71
Angers	67	Bavai	33
Aosta	17	Bayeux	25
Aries	15	Bazas	49
Arion	94	Beauvais	41
Arras	84	Besançon	109

Béziers	32	Neuss	86
Billig	34	Nijmegen	89
Bonn	35	Nîmes	83
Bordeaux	38	Nyon	88
Boulogne	61	Orange	13
Bourges	30	Orléans	44
Brumath	37	Paris	76
Cahors	53	Périgueux	110
Carhaix	115	Poitiers	72
Cassel	43	Reims	54
Chalon-sur-Saône	39	Rennes	47
Chartres	29	Rheinzabern	103
Clermont-Ferrand	27	Rodez	102
Corseul	57	Rottweil	12
Coutances	48	Rouen	97
Dax	11	St Bertrand-de-Comminges	75
Dijon	51	St Paulien	98
Eauze	56	St Quentin	22
Évreux	78	St Rémy-de-Provence	62
Feurs	59	Saintes	79
Fréjus	58	Saverne	106
Geneva	60	Sées	99
Heddernheim	85	Senlis	26
Javols	7	Sens	3
Jublains	87	Soissons	19
Kastel	42	Speyer	91
Köln	45	Strasbourg	16
Ladenburg	73	Thérouanne	104
Langres	6	Tongres	2
Lectoure	69	Toul	107
Le Mans	113	Toulouse	105
Lezoux	70	Tours	40
Lillebonne	66	Trier	21
Limoges	28	Troyes	23
Lisieux	90	Turin	20
Lyon	74	Vannes	50
Mainz	81	Vienne	112
Marseilles	77	Vieux	14
Meaux	65	Wiesbaden	9
Metz	52	Windisch	114
Nantes	96	Worms	36
Narbonne	82	Xanten-Birten	111

Map 1. The Four Gauls, According to Julius Caesar




Map 2. The Three Gauls Under the Early Empire




Map 3. The Two Germanies




Map 4. The Agri Decumates and the Upper German Limes



Map 5. The Roman West in the Second and Third Centuries




Map 6. The Civitates of the Three Gauls, and their Capitals




Source: Moreau.


Map 7. Roman Main Roads in Gaul: I – The Basic Augustan System



Map 8. Roman Main Roads in Gaul: II – The Completed Network



Map 9. Gallic Waterways (Showing the Navigable Stretches of the Main Rivers)



Source: *Caesarodunum*, II, 1976, pl. 3.

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